

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN SOCIETY

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

BY

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PREFACE

This book is intended to supersede my *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* and my *Introduction to Social Psychology*. It is not a revision of those books but is an entirely new work. The progress of both sociology and psychology has necessitated a restatement of the theories of the earlier books from a more objective and scientific point of view. This book is designed as an elementary text in sociological theory,¹ though the more purely biological portions of sociology, such as the theory of population, etc., are in it taken for granted. The sub-title, "An Introduction to Sociological Theory," is intended to emphasize that the problems with which the book deals are those of sociology, rather than psychology in the strict sense.

In the main, the method of the book is the method that has been called that of the "participant observer." The book should be used by the student, therefore, as a sort of laboratory manual, its generalizations to be tested so far as possible by the observation of social groups with which the student has had experience. Illustrative material will also be found, however, in written history, in anthropological books, and in works in sociology, especially in my elementary text, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*. Such qualitative analysis of the determinants in group behavior is necessary before quantitative analysis can be fruitfully undertaken.

For the sake of clearness, and to prevent misunderstanding, it may be well to present a brief outline of the concepts

¹ This fact must explain certain omissions and peculiarities such as the division into sixteen chapters, corresponding to the usual number of weeks in a semester.

and problems which the author considers fundamental in sociological theory. The first of these concepts is that of the "group." It is the concrete group, rather than the abstract society, that is the primary datum of present-day sociology. But groups are of many sorts. However, Professor Cooley has made it plain that the work of the sociologist and the social psychologist must start with the face-to-face or "primary groups," and that "secondary groups" must be understood through the study of face-to-face groups. Such groups can be observed, and theorizing can thus be brought up against observable facts. The situation or stimuli and the behavior of such a group, the processes of interaction or interadjustment among its members, of "interstimulation and response," in brief, "the social process," can be studied concretely. The method of "coördination" or "coadaptation" which maintains the unity of the group and which enables it to function as a unity, as well as "cooperation" and "conflict" as different aspects of adjustment among its members, can be observed and studied in the concrete. The common values and common attitudes prevailing in a group, in other words, the "social values" and "social attitudes," are accessible to investigation. The most ordinary observation shows that the individuals of a group get these common values and common attitudes through "intercommunication." The web of intercommunication in a group carries its values, which we call the "group tradition," and also its practical attitudes, which we call "customs." The tradition and customs of a group taken together make up what we know as its "culture." Here is another fundamental category for human groups, scarcely less important than "intercommunication." But the "social patterns" passed along in culture are nothing more, if looked at psychologically, than a series of "mental patterns" passed from individual to individual in a group by "imitation" and "intercommunication." Embodied in tradition these give

"continuity" to the group life. They have to be acquired or learned by each individual of the group, as all culture, so far as we know, is acquired by the individual through learning. Hence, "the learning process" becomes another fundamental concept or category for sociology. Changes in group behavior are brought about through this learning process. Group "discussion" is one phase of this process in social change; "group opinion" is another phase, indicative of the construction of a new coördination in group life.

Using these fundamental categories, the problems of group behavior become subject to scientific analysis and explanation. Thus the unity of the group can be explained in terms of the process of interstimulation and response and coadaptation among its members. The continuity of the group, again, can be explained in terms of the process of intercommunication, and the resulting growth of tradition and custom, which go to make up the culture of the group. The changes within the group can be explained by this same process of intercommunication, functioning with reference to new situations, so that by a learning process new values and new attitudes become diffused throughout the group. So far as the group achieves harmonious adjustments within itself, we have the condition that is known as "social order." So far as the group by the process of change achieves superior adjustments, increasing group efficiency and group harmony, we have what is known as "social progress."

It will be observed that these concepts and problems, which the author regards as fundamental in sociological theory, are substantially the same as those proposed by a number of recent books in the sociological field. However, those who are familiar with the author's previously published works, especially his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, will perceive that he has for some time made use of these concepts and problems in developing sociological theory, and that this

book is the result of the development of his sociological thought.

This book practically takes up the problem of group behavior where Allport's *Social Psychology*, if we leave out of account the last chapter of that book, leaves it off.² Unlike Allport, however, the author has made no attempt to make use of Freudianism and other recent debatable psychological hypotheses. He believes that these are not yet established as a part of scientific psychology, and therefore should not be introduced to the elementary student. Even if they become established, they will not materially affect the more general psychological theory upon which this book is based. An elementary text in sociological theory, the author believes, should make use only of the more generally accepted facts and principles of psychology. This is all the more true because the dependence of sociology upon individual psychology is general, and not a matter of detail. Even if some of the psychology of this book is inadequate, it will not affect the general argument of the book. It may be well to repeat that the book does not attempt to solve *psychological* problems, but *sociological* problems.

For the convenience of students a select list of references has been appended to each chapter. The first named reference is especially commended in connection with the chapter. Chapters I to III are introductory; Chapters IV to VIII contain the central theories of the book; while Chapters IX to XVI develop these theories with reference to certain special problems.

The author finds it impossible to acknowledge his indebtedness to all his colleagues in sociology and social psychology, but he wishes publicly to acknowledge the assistance which he has received from his colleagues in sociology at

² Of course, this does not mean that this book is a development of the psychological principles employed by Allport. James, Dewey, Thorndike, and Woodworth furnish the leading principles used.

the University of Missouri, Professor A. F. Kuhlman, and Mr. Herbert Blumer, who have read the entire manuscript and made many suggestions and also assisted in the correction of the proofs.

C. A. E.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN SOCIETY

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF THE GROUP

The Nature of Social Science

Science is merely a name for accurate, tested and systematized knowledge. In its broadest sense it is "but the most accurate information available about the world in which we live and the nature of ourselves and our fellow men."¹ In other words, science is the term we use for the accurate knowledge which we secure when we carefully observe, and investigate, and then classify and interpret the results. It is man's effort to interpret and understand his world through tested knowledge. Science springs, therefore, from the desire to understand what happens in our experience. It is the result of applying human reason to the "phenomena of experience," by which we mean anything that happens.

The starting point of science is common sense.² Man finds himself in a world which must be understood in order to be controlled. His world of experience is constantly changing from moment to moment. In order to adjust himself to these changes he must understand the conditions giving rise to them and the manner in which they occur. This he endeavors to do by observing or discovering the conditions

¹ Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, p. 208

² Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 3d edition, Chaps. I, II.

which seem to be connected with the appearance of phenomena; for this knowledge enables him to explain them. Any phenomenon is explained scientifically when all the conditions essential to its appearance are fully described. Therefore, the effort of science is to understand the mechanism through which phenomena take place; that is, all occurrences. Hence, science is the method of solving the more complex problems of experience which man has worked out through his intelligence.³

Now it has been supposed by some that science is limited to the description and explanation of the phenomena of the physical universe. Some have even gone so far as to deny the possibility of sciences of mental and social phenomena. But if science be the product of reason and common sense applied to the phenomena of experience, then it would seem that science has as much right to observe, investigate, and correlate mental and social phenomena as any other sort. Indeed, in our world there is even more need to understand these phenomena than those of physical nature if we wish to gain control over life. Science starts with the common-sense view of the world, and common sense does not find mental and social phenomena less real than physical phenomena. Science does not, indeed, question the reality of the phenomena which it investigates. Its effort, as we have just said, is to understand them, and if possible to furnish man with means of controlling them.

Now the effort of the social sciences, no less than of other sciences, is to understand the mechanism or technique of the phenomena with which they deal, which is, in their case, the processes of the social life. They endeavor, like all sciences, to explain phenomena by describing fully all conditions essential to their occurrence. In this broad sense there is no difference in the spirit and method of the

³ Compare Lindeman, *Social Discovery*, Chap. I; also Thomson, *An Introduction to Science*, pp. 1-56.

so-called natural sciences and of the social sciences. The social sciences are as much true sciences as the physical sciences; but on account of the complexity of the phenomena with which they deal, they have more difficulty than have the physical sciences in becoming bodies of accurate, tested knowledge, such as every science aspires to be.

The physical sciences have become bodies of accurate, tested knowledge largely through the method of experimentation, which is the method of observing phenomena under such controlled conditions that they can usually be accurately compared and measured. While this method is not absolutely closed to the social sciences, it seems to have such limited possibilities in the field of social phenomena that the scientific student of social life is forced to depend largely upon other methods, such as the observation, comparison, and correlation of social phenomena.⁴ Measurement is, however, not essential to science, and it is a mistake to think of science as merely or chiefly a "quantitative statement of objective facts."⁵ The most important statements of modern science, for example, those connected with the theory of evolution, are not quantitative statements, but statements of developmental relations; and to limit science to quantitative formulations is unwarranted by either the history or the nature of science. Quantitative measurements are desirable in every science for the sake of exactness; but the social sciences for a long time will probably have to content themselves with the critical qualitative analysis, comparison, and correlation of social phenomena. While they may not become exact quantitative statements, the social sciences may become bodies of critically established, and, therefore, of

⁴ Compare Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, p. 55f. Social experimentation is, of course, limited by many factors, such as sentiment and the shortness of individual lives.

⁵ Even the most scientific "case studies" of small groups, such as families, for example, may show but little quantitative analysis.

trustworthy, knowledge. In the broad field of the social sciences sociology is usually recognized as the most general of the sciences of social phenomena. Starting with a common-sense view of the world, sociology and the other social sciences seek to show how certain conditions or forces make that part of our experience which we call "social" what it is from moment to moment. They aim to make human society and its changes intelligible.

Social⁶ or Group Life

Living in groups is not peculiar to man, but characterizes many plants and animals as well. Nor is living in groups in itself "social life." A clump of grasses, a forest of trees, a colony of bacteria, or a group of protozoa may show interdependence⁷ in the life activities of their separate units; but we do not usually call such groups "societies," because, so far as we know, no conscious relations or "comradeship" are involved in such forms of collective life.⁸ The relations between their units seem to be purely physical or physiological. Such groups, it is true, show the first mark of social life in that they share a common life; but since they are lacking in conscious relations they cannot be regarded as having social life.

As soon as mentality appears in the world of animal life

⁶ There seems to be little reason for coining a new technical word, such as "societal," meaning *of, or pertaining to, society, or a social group*. We shall use "social" in the same sense that the word "societal" is generally employed by those who prefer that technical term. This is in accord with the best scientific usage.

⁷ To emphasize the idea of reciprocity the words "interdependence," "interstimulation," "intercommunication," etc., have been preferred to "dependence," "stimulation," "communication," in most places in the text. "Stimulation," for example, might not imply a reciprocal process.

⁸ Because some botanists have found it convenient to call certain plant colonies "societies" does not, of course, prove that they use the word rightly. Such use is metaphorical from the critical scientific standpoint.

another sort of interdependence is possible. This new interdependence takes the form of mental interaction or, as we might more accurately say, of mental interstimulation and response.⁹ In other words, more or less conscious relations arise among the members of animal groups, and the group activities begin to be carried on by means of more or less conscious interactions or mutual adjustments between the members of such a group. In this case, the association of the members of a group is guided and controlled by conscious or mental processes, giving rise to what we may properly call collective or group behavior, and so to "social life." Not simply collective life, but *conscious* collective life is necessary for true society.

When we analyze this "collective behavior" we find that it is made up of various forms of interstimulation and response, which range all the way from the level of almost unconscious, instinctive reactions, controlled wholly by heredity, to the level of rational adjustments, controlled (in human beings) by the highest conscious intelligence. Now this collective behavior which is intermediated and controlled by more or less conscious processes is also known as "social behavior."¹⁰ We might call "social behavior," therefore, that which results from the more or less conscious adjustments of individuals to one another and "social life" the life which results from the mental interstimulation and response

⁹ That is, interstimulation and response accompanied by or giving rise to conscious processes. In this book, when subjective terms, like "mind," "feelings," "ideas," "values," etc., are used, it must be understood that the correlated neural processes are included in those terms.

¹⁰ Some preliminary analysis and definition of concepts or terms is the first step in scientific method. While it is true that definition in the final sense is the last stage of science, as is often said, it is also true that in science we must know from the beginning what we are talking about. Tentative definition of concepts, therefore, is a necessary preliminary in all scientific work, and particularly in the reasoned sciences.

of the members of the group.¹¹ In the lower forms of animal life it begins with very simple forms of mental interstimulation and response, such as imitation and sympathy, but in man it rises to the level of intelligent communication. It is the process of communication between individuals which especially makes possible the organized and definite forms of collective behavior which we see in human groups. In human groups this intercommunication is the chief form of mental interstimulation and response, and so it is the main form of mental interaction to concern us in our study.

We are now prepared to see that the two marks of "social life" are (1) coöperation, in the sense of the carrying on of certain common activities by a group, and (2) mental interaction, in the sense of conscious interstimulation and response.¹² The latter, however, is only the means or method of carrying on common or group activities. Social life is evidently that form of collective life which is carried on by mental interaction, that is to say, on a conscious plane. This is because a social group is made up of relatively independent individuals, and hence their only possible means of reciprocal adjustment is through more or less conscious interstimulation and response. It follows, therefore, that the psychology of "social life" cannot be in terms of "subjective" mental processes within the individual, but must be in terms of the whole process of interstimulation and response between individuals.¹³ The psychology of collective human behavior must

¹¹ Compare Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, p. 103f.

¹² Some sociologists and psychologists, who would make sociology begin with human culture and human institutions, would add a third mark of the social, namely, *acquired* uniformity of reaction in a group, such as common habits, usages, customs, aims, etc. This would make the social synonymous with the cultural. Comment will be found later in the text.

¹³ The "subjective" or mental processes, as Dr. L. L. Thurstone (in his book *The Nature of Intelligence*) and others have pointed out, *represent incomplete or unfinished behavior*; but as they are determinative of individual or personal attitudes, they are important

accordingly form a very considerable part of sociology, which treats of social phenomena in general; for only in this way can we secure scientific analysis of the method by which the common life or activities of human groups is carried on.

From what has been said we may define society as *collective or group life carried on by means of conscious relations between its members* or, concretely, as *any group of individuals who carry on common activities or a common life by means of mental interstimulation and response*. Conscious relations there may be without social life, but there is no social life without conscious relations or mental interaction. It is, therefore, the psychic¹⁴ element which constitutes the "social"; or to put it in other words, it is intermental life in a group of individuals which makes possible "social life." It would be a mistake, however, to think that the whole of the social life is to be found in its psychic or mental elements; for, on the contrary, the interdependence which we find in a social group is an interdependence of the whole life-process. It includes objective physical activities as well as the psychic processes which guide and control these activities. While there is no excuse for the one-sided conclusion that intermental life is the whole of social life or that the psychology of collective behavior is the whole of sociology, yet we must recognize that intermental stimulation and response is what makes possible social group life. It is its method—its essential and constitutive element.

This is true of all sorts of social groups, whether they are national groups, cultural groups, community groups, family groups, or any social groups of animals or men. It is the mental element in the life of the group which makes it a society and which makes us call it a "society"; but this

not only for individual but also for group behavior, for the sociologist as well as for the psychologist.

¹⁴ The word "psychic," or "psychical," is used in the scientific sense as synonymous with mental.

mental element is functional to the collective life. It is the instrument through which the social life of the group is carried on. It is not social life itself (for that is the whole collective life of the group), but it marks a new kind, a new level, of collective life—the “social.” The external mark of the “social” is the interdependence in activity or behavior of a group of relatively independent individuals.¹⁵ But some degree of reciprocal consciousness on the part of the individuals of a group is the only possible method of establishing and maintaining coördinated activities. The most ordinary observation establishes the fact that the members of such a group are stimulated by the presence of other individuals of the group.

Some consciousness of other individuals, in other words, is necessary to make any social adjustment. Indeed, we cannot think of society in any intelligible sense in which we use the term without reference to conscious elements. When we study all the elements which go to make up human social life, moreover, we find them to be either conscious processes or closely associated with conscious processes. Any situation in the social life of humanity will be found upon scientific analysis to consist of conscious activities, mental attitudes, feelings, beliefs, interests, desires, values, and standards on the part of individuals. Nor is there any social situation left when these psychic elements are entirely taken away. Usages, customs, traditions, institutions, even civilization itself, all alike resolve themselves into elements which are essentially psychic. They are social psychic phenomena. We cannot, indeed, think of human institutions or of human history as existing apart from conscious agents. The social

¹⁵ Compare Park and Burgess's statement (in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (second edition), p. 42): “The thing that distinguishes a mere collection of individuals from a society is not like-mindedness, but corporate action.” See Chap. V of this book for elaboration.

is evidently a special development of the mental or psychic. It is mental interdependence, the contact and overlapping of our inner selves, which makes the "social." All this merely emphasizes again the point that it is the psychic element which constitutes the social, and that the criterion of the social is mental interdependence. The social process is a psychological phenomenon, consequently a psychological explanation is necessary to understand social processes or group behavior.¹⁶

Evolutionary Phases of Social Life

Social life begins with animal association. Culture is not necessary for social group life. Many animals besides man, as we have already said, live in groups and adjust themselves to one another through some sort of consciousness of the presence of other individuals in their group. Even instinctive activities frequently require some degree of reciprocal consciousness on the part of individuals for their functioning. Thus collective behavior, or social life, begins far down in the reaches of animal life. The life of the social insects, such as the ants and the bees, sufficiently illustrates this phase of social life.¹⁷ But not until social life, or collective behavior, depends upon *acquired* uniformities of action, rather than upon inborn or hereditary uniformities of instinct, is there opportunity for the *domination* of such behavior by conscious processes and intelligent purposes.

Even before the human stage is reached we find uniformities of action apparently brought about in social groups of animals by such psychic processes as suggestion, imitation, and sympathy. Animal groups, however, are undoubtedly

¹⁶ Compare Lindeman, *Social Discovery*, pp. 112-119; also Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. III.

¹⁷ See Espinas, *Des Sociétés animales*; also, Wheeler, *Ants, Their Structure, Development, Behavior*; and Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-172; and finally Alverdes, *Tiersoziologie*, Band I.

dominated by the hereditary or instinctive element. Human society, on the other hand, is characterized from its earliest beginnings by *acquired* uniformities due to habit.¹⁸ A habit which is acquired by one individual of the group may be communicated to and learned by other members of the group and thus become the common property of all. Mental interstimulation and response, especially in the form of intercommunication, thus assumes new importance. Hence a new type of social life is possible—one built upon the basis of learning and of acquired habit;¹⁹ and the acquirements of one individual may become acquirements of all through mental interstimulation and response. Accordingly, the web of intercommunication through furnishing the social stimulation necessary for the transmission of habit takes the place in human groups of instinct in bringing about relative uniformity of action on the part of all members of the group. This explains why the social life of man shows many complex phases of behavior not shown by animal groups, such as industry, art, government, education, science, morality, and religion. All of these taken collectively form what the anthropologist and the sociologist term “culture” (which is the scientific term for civilization in the broadest sense), and rest upon acquired group habits and go back to man’s superior means of social communication through articulate speech, as well as to his superior power of adaptation through abstract thought. They distinguish human groups from animal groups.

Culture or civilization is, then, not inborn but acquired by every individual in human groups; but this culture of the group dominates the behavior of the human individual and so the behavior of human groups. Human social life is

¹⁸ “Habit” is used in this book in the broad sense, including not only all acquired modes of action, but also all acquired modes of thought and feeling which persist. See Chap. III.

¹⁹ The expression “acquired habit” is, of course, strictly speaking, tautologous since all habits are acquired; it is, however, retained at various places in the book for the sake of clearness.

thus dominated by "culture";²⁰ and culture is a matter of habits of thought and action acquired by interaction with other members of one's group. This interaction is, however, almost wholly on the psychic plane, and is mediated by suggestion, imitation, and the more definite forms of communication, such as language. Human sociology becomes very distinct, therefore, from the psychology of the collective behavior of animal groups. *It is culture and habit, not instinct, which must be the main concern of the sociologist, or of any one who offers a psychological interpretation of collective human behavior; for it is the development of culture which distinguishes the social life of man from the social life of the brutes.* In the human sense, as Professors Park and Burgess say,²¹ society almost "may be defined as the social heritage of habit and sentiment, folkways and mores, technique and culture, all of which are incident or necessary to collective human behavior." And all of which, we may add, are included in what the anthropologist calls "culture," which is but a synonym for our social heritage. By this we do not mean to say that the element of instinct and other hereditary and biological elements should not be taken into account in a psychological interpretation of human society. As we shall see, these elements do obtrude themselves upon human social behavior; but they are not the dominant elements in the social process, and should not occupy the center of the sociological stage.

Thus approaching social life from the standpoint of evolu-

²⁰ Professor C. M. Case, however, in his *Outline of Introductory Sociology* (pp. xvii, xviii, xxix-xxxiv) goes too far in following Professor A. L. Kroeber in the identification of the cultural and the social. If this is done, not only is the ground cut from beneath the lower human and subhuman sociology, as Professor Ross says (*Foundations of Sociology*, p. 89), but also from the study of the non-cultural and non-institutional aspects of human group life—a most important part of human sociology. See p. 5 of my *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*; also Chap. II of this book.

²¹ *Introduction to Science of Sociology*, p. 161.

tion we discover again that it is essentially psychic in its nature and method;²² indeed, increasingly so as we ascend in the scale of human social development. A purely objective sociology, that is a sociology wholly in terms of physical processes, if it were possible, would be meaningless to us, because human culture is a matter of acquired habits, ideas, and values—it is a psychic phenomenon. Scientific description of human social life, accordingly, must be largely in terms of conscious processes if it is to be intelligible to us. The psychological part of sociology, therefore, becomes its main part. It is not only the larger part, but it is the more fruitful part, if our aim in studying social life is to learn how to control it; for it is conscious processes which are especially subject to control. This is not saying, however, that there is not a physical and mechanical element in human society as well as a psychic element. Sociology is a broader subject than the psychology of collective behavior, even though the latter may be the most immediately practicable part of sociology.

Forms of Group Life

The forms and varieties of human groups are multitudinous. All social groups, however, are derived from the type of group which we may call a "community." We may define a community as *any group which carries on all phases of a common life*. It is "a definite area of common life."²³ Hence individuals are born into communities. They are natural, genetic groups, capable of reproducing themselves,

²² "An analysis of culture, if fully carried out," says Professor Goldenweiser, "leads back to the individual psyche."

²³ Compare MacIver, *Community, A Sociological Study*, Chap. II. This book follows MacIver, but usage is not yet uniform among sociologists. See Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 163. Hobhouse (*Social Development*, Chap. II) makes the mark of a community "common rule habitually observed," but finds the origin of community in "a circle of intermarrying families," thus recognizing the genetic factor in its origin.

in contradistinction to the artificial groups which we find formed among men for special purposes. In this broad sense families, neighborhoods, cities, states, and nations may be considered communities; for all of these are areas of common life and are formed for the general purpose of living together, rather than for any special purpose. Now while all social groups are of interest to the sociologist and the social psychologist, yet those natural, genetic groups which we term communities serve best to illustrate the problems of group life, and so of sociology. This is so because they show all phases of social life. They are, moreover, more stable, less artificial, and less specialized than the groups formed for special purposes. Besides, the simplest communities, such as the family and the neighborhood, are characterized by face-to-face association, and so illustrate most clearly the psychology of individual interaction and of group behavior. Finally, these simplest communities are primitive and "primary" chronologically as well as psychologically.²⁴ The problems of sociology can be much better attacked through the study of such groups than through the study of society at large or association in general.

Social groups, then, their form, organization, interrelations, changes, and behavior are what we shall attempt to study.²⁵ Society at large is made up of these. As the authors just quoted say in effect;²⁶ "Society, in the most inclusive sense of that term, the Great Society, as Graham Wallas described it, turns out upon analysis to be a constellation of other smaller societies. The world community is merely the Great Society viewed from the standpoint of the territorial distribution of its members. From the point

²⁴ Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chap. III.

²⁵ Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology and Contemporary American Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVI.

²⁶ Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 164.

of view of territorial distribution the world community is composed of nations, colonies, spheres of influence, cities, towns, local communities, neighborhoods, and families. These represent in a rough way the subject matter of sociological science. Their organization, interrelation, constituent elements, and the characteristic changes (social processes) which take place in them are the phenomena of sociological science."

It will be noted that society in this broad sense is practically synonymous with human association, that is, with the whole network of interactions and interrelations between individuals and groups of individuals. Some sociologists think that "association" is the more scientific term.²⁷ At any rate, it is the processes of association, of group life, whether he studies their biological or their psychological aspects, which are the primary objects of the sociologist's attention.

Sociology and Social Psychology

Both sociology and social psychology (as ordinarily understood) are concerned with the study of social groups, especially human groups, their organization, development, and behavior. What is the relation between these two studies, if both aim to make the collective life of man and its changes intelligible?

In the broad sense sociology may be defined as the study of human relations, or of the interactions of individuals and of groups. But inasmuch as these relations are the outcome of group life, we may accept as a working definition for sociology that it is *the science of the origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups*. Its point of view, its interest, is always in the group or in collective behavior.²⁸ On the other hand, the point of view, the interest, of psychol-

²⁷ Compare Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 183, 184.

²⁸ "Sociology is the science of collective behavior."—Lindeman, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

ogy as ordinarily understood is in the individual and his behavior.²⁹ The problem of psychology is to explain the experience and the behavior of the individual, while the problem of sociology is to explain the nature and the behavior of the group.³⁰ *As soon as interest shifts from the individual to the group, it shifts from the purely psychological to the sociological.*

But what shall we call the consideration of the psychical aspects of social groups and of social life generally? This has usually been called "social psychology," but it is evidently a part of sociology if the distinction between psychology and sociology, which has just been pointed out, is a valid one. Even if it is acknowledged, however, that the study of group life is sociology it would seem appropriate to call that part of the study which concerns itself with group behavior and with the mental interactions of individuals "social psychology" or "the psychology of society." If the study of collective behavior may not be appropriately called the psychology of society, it may at least be called "psychological sociology," and this is what we shall concern ourselves with.³¹ If, of course, it is an error to explain society in psychological terms at all, as some social thinkers have con-

²⁹ Allport (*Social Psychology*, p. 4) goes so far as to say: "Psychology in all its branches is a science of the individual."

³⁰ Allport (*Social Psychology*, p. 10) rightly says: "The study of groups is the province of the special science of *sociology*. While the social psychologist studies the individual in the group, the sociologist deals with the group as a whole."

³¹ Professor Giddings (*The Scientific Study of Human Society*, p. 11) has suggested "societal psychology," limiting "social psychology" to the study of the individual's social behavior (see footnote on p. 4). He says: "Social psychology occupies itself chiefly with the behavioristic interactions of intimates, and the development thereby of the social attitudes and habits of *socii*. . . Societal psychology, or sociology, in distinction, while depending on social psychology at every step, occupies itself in the main with the genesis and the carrying on and the characteristic achievements of that comprehensive group which the Latins called *societas*."

tended, then there can remain only a physics or a biology of society, and the attempt at a psychological interpretation of group life is a mistake, due probably to a false metaphysics, and not within the limits of science. Such a view, however, is absurd, both from the standpoint of science and of common sense. The main development, both of scientific sociology and of scientific psychology, has held to the view that a psychological interpretation of social life is a part, and a very necessary and important part, of any general science of society, or of sociology. We shall regard our subject, accordingly, as a part of sociology³² and as *the study of the psychic processes involved in the origin, development, structure, and functioning of group life*.³³

It must be admitted, however, if the study of collective behavior is superficial and unorganized it may fall short of sociological science. After all, sociology, like all other sciences, is defined by its problems, and if a psychological study of group behavior is not made with reference to the explanation of the objective or external forms and changes of social life, it can hardly be said to be truly sociological; for the aim of the sociologist, as we have pointed out, is to reach a general and consistent theory of the objective social

³² Compare Giddings' statement (*Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 252): "Pluralistic behavior is the subject matter of the psychology of society, otherwise called sociology."

³³ Professor W. I. Thomas (*The Polish Peasant*, Vol. I) has championed the view that social psychology is the general science of the subjective side of society, while sociology, economics, political science, etc., are sciences of the objective side of society. This view can scarcely be regarded as tenable, since economics, political science, as well as sociology, etc., have their subjective or psychological sides. *All the social sciences have both subjective and objective aspects*. Moreover, an objective, behavioristic social psychology would, even according to this view, blend with objective social science. Professor Thomas was much more logical when, in an earlier paper (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 445-455) he claimed that social psychology was a vague term covering both parts of individual psychology and parts of sociology.

life. It must also be admitted that social psychology as a study may cover the social motives and social behavior of the individual; that is, how the behavior of the individual is affected by his social contacts. In this case, its center of interest is the individual and his behavior, and such social psychology remains purely psychological.³⁴ It will be of value to the sociologist because it will aid him in understanding the forms and the changes of group life; but it is not sociology. Apparently then, social psychology, as commonly used, is a vague term which covers parts both of the psychology of the individual and of sociology. It is only with the latter, or with the psychology of society, or the social psychic, that we shall concern ourselves, though, of course, we shall not be able wholly to avoid reference to the motives and behavior of individuals as members of groups. Our purpose, however, is to understand group life and group behavior, rather than individual life and individual behavior, though these are closely correlated facts.

That there is group life and group behavior as certainly as there is individual life and individual behavior is attested in our experience by such facts as customs, institutions, group organization, and group changes. To think, however, that these can be understood apart from the behavior and experience of individuals is also absurd.³⁵ The group and the individual, social life and the individual life, are correlatives,

³⁴ This is the view of social psychology taken by Professor F. H. Allport in his *Social Psychology*. He says (p. 12): "Social psychology is the study of the social behavior and the social consciousness of the individual." He rightly holds that social psychology in this sense is one of the foundation sciences of sociology. We may add that in accordance with this view the study of the *person*, as such, belongs to psychology rather than to sociology.

³⁵ As Lindeman says (*Social Discovery*, p. 128): "An accurate understanding of the behavior-pattern of each individual in the group would undoubtedly assist in arriving at conclusions regarding the group, but the sum total of these individual behavior-patterns would not constitute the behavior-pattern of the group."

and neither can be understood apart from the other. Hence the need of a study of group life and of collective behavior, as well as of human nature and individual behavior, of the psychology of society as well as a psychology of the individual. Like the individual and the social life, like the individual human mind and civilization, so psychology and sociology are inextricably linked and overlap. It is hardly profitable to inquire too narrowly where one leaves off and the other begins; but it is profitable to study both the individual and the collective aspects of life and behavior, both human nature and human society.

The Problems of Sociology

The sociologist has, as we have seen, certain definite problems which define for him his science. These problems may be stated in different ways, but they always reduce themselves to problems of the origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups. They are the more general and fundamental problems of the social life. To unravel these problems, however, the sociologist has to study primarily the associational processes, or interactions of individuals; for these lie back of all forms and changes of the social life. Now when these associational processes are studied as we find them in actual experience, we find that they are greatly modified, if not controlled, by "psychic processes," by which we mean mental processes or processes more or less associated with conscious states. The human social process is dominated by these "psychic factors."⁸⁶ The place of psychic processes in the problems of collective behavior, or of social life, therefore, needs to be investigated by the sociologist. He must learn to understand the psychology of human society. For instance, he must study the rôle of instinct and acquired

⁸⁶ For this reason Hobhouse says (*Social Development*, p. 11): "Essentially the subject matter of sociology is the interaction of individual minds."

habit, of emotion and desire, of love and hatred, of suggestion and imitation, of feeling and intelligence in the social life. In such a study the problems of social organization and evolution, or the practical problems of social order and social progress, should always be in the background of his mind. Instinct, for example, may be studied in its bearings both upon the origin of social groups and upon their organization and behavior. Again, habit may be studied in its relation to the organization, the persistent behavior, and the changes of social groups. Again, feeling and intelligence may be studied to see their bearing upon social order or upon both gradual and abrupt social changes. These are but a few examples of the working of psychic processes in the social life. All the interactions of individuals, all the forms of mental interstimulation and response among men should be studied by the psychological sociologist if he wishes to understand the real happenings of the social world. All this study, however, will be far from complete and profitable unless it brings its results together as a part of a general theory of social life.

Evidently some general classification of the fundamental problems of the social life is needed if we are to see the relation of these special studies to the whole. The traditional division of the problems of sociology is a division into *static* and *dynamic* problems. The static problems are those of hypothetically stationary society; that is, one in which the types of social interaction, and so the forms of social life, do not change. They are the problems which we get when we take a cross-section, photographic view of social life. In brief, they are problems of social organization and of social functioning considered as unchanging.

The dynamic problems, on the other hand, are those of changes in the type of social organization and activity. They cover the whole field of social evolution from the origin of the earliest social groups to the latest changes in human social

life. These dynamic problems are evidently the central problems of sociology; for the real social world is a growing, changing world. Just as in biology the central problem is organic evolution, so in sociology the central problem is social evolution. By this we understand a scientific theory of social origins and of social change or development of all sorts—from the changes in the family life or industry to the rise and decline of cultures or civilizations. Sociology to-day is mainly dynamic.

We shall see that the factors involved in these changes are the same in the great human groups as in the small groups, the same in the minute phenomena of group life and in great historical movements. If this were not so, we would stand little chance of understanding the larger changes and movements of human society on account of their complexity. But we shall see that if we understand the psychology of the behavior and changes of small human groups, the movements and changes in the larger groups will become understandable also.

Now this classification of the problems of our social life is perfectly valid from the standpoint of pure or theoretical science. It corresponds, it will be noted, to the chief problems indicated in our definition of sociology; for the problems of origin and development of social groups are manifestly the problems of social evolution; and the problems of the structure and functioning of social groups are problems of social organization viewed as unchanging. But the practical problems of the human social world at the present time suggest another classification of the fundamental problems of social or group life, which may perhaps be more convenient and even clearer. Almost any observer would say that, at the present time, the problems of our human world are problems of unity and change; and he would probably add that the changes which we are forced to deal with in practical human affairs are of two types, gradual changes, which may be

called "growth," and abrupt, violent changes, which might be called "revolutions." There is also much consideration given at the present time to continuity of historic social forms. From this point of view the fundamental problems of the social life may be classified as those (1) of social unity or group integration; (2) of social continuity, or unity of group life in time; (3) of gradual social change, or normal group development; and (4) of abrupt or revolutionary changes in groups.³⁷

We shall, accordingly, in this book adopt this classification as convenient for our purposes, and discuss our problems under heads of the unity of the group and the continuity of the group, normal changes in group behavior and abrupt or abnormal changes in group behavior. It does not matter what human groups we are seeking to understand, whether it is the family, the neighborhood or local community, the city or the nation, the principles of collective behavior which we are about to discuss will apply to any or to all of them. For the uniformity of human social or group life in its fundamental laws and principles is not less a fact than the uniformity of physical nature. This new classification of the problems of group life is, of course, not in contradiction with the traditional classification. For the problems of group unity and of group continuity are evidently problems of social organization and functioning; while the problems of gradual social change and of abrupt or revolutionary changes in groups are problems of social evolution. Thus the two classifications of sociological problems may be readily reconciled.

Bearing of the Psychology of Society upon Other Sciences

The only satisfactory basis for distinguishing the sciences from one another is the distinction between their problems.

³⁷ Many other classifications of the problems of sociology are of course possible. They are readily reconcilable with the classifications just noted.

The basis of division between the sciences is the problem. The different sciences merely represent divisions of labor among the workers in the scientific field, and so, frequently overlap. There is probably nothing in the social life of man which cannot be explained by principles of physics, chemistry, geography, biology, and psychology. Nevertheless, these antecedent sciences do not explain the social life of man, for the simple reason that that is not their problem.

The distinction between sociology and psychology, as we have seen, is peculiarly difficult to define if we recognize the validity of the psychological method of sociology, unless we frankly recognize that the distinction between the sciences is one of the problems. *Psychology*, as we have said, *studies the individual and his behavior, while sociology studies the group and its behavior*. But we cannot understand the individual apart from his group, any more than we can understand the group apart from the nature of the individuals who compose it. Thus the dependence between sociology and psychology is reciprocal. Individual psychology must accordingly look to the study of group life for the explanation of much in individual behavior. It depends as much upon the psychology of society as the psychology of society depends upon it.

This fact enables us to see clearly, however, that the social sciences are interested primarily in the problems of collective life and not primarily in understanding the nature and behavior of the individual. Nevertheless, the behavior, interaction, and organization of individuals in groups cannot be understood apart from the instincts, habits, feelings and intelligence of individuals. Consequently, the work of the sociologist consists largely in tracing the working of these various individual psychic processes in the group life. The sociologist is, necessarily, a psychologist if he is an adequate scientific student of group behavior.³⁸

³⁸ Compare Lindeman's statement (*Social Discovery*, p. 32): "It

To make individual human nature the basis for the scientific understanding of collective behavior is, of course, not to exclude in any way the fullest recognition of the working of biological factors in human social life. The behavior of the individual, even if modified and controlled by consciousness, is nevertheless rooted in the biological conditions of life. Moreover, there is no biological fact of importance, at least so far as man is concerned, which has not some effect upon human behavior. Hence most biological facts have their correlates in man's mental life. Individuality and originality, for example, seem to be largely correlates of the biological fact of variation; while instinct is the psychological correlate of inherited nervous structure and functioning. These are only a few examples of the bearing of biological facts and principles upon individual and group behavior. Modern psychology bases itself upon biology, and hence the sociologist must be alive to all that modern biology can teach him.

The bearing of the psychology of society upon the theoretical portions of the special social sciences deserves consideration in detail. The history of these sciences clearly shows that throughout their development they have either made or borrowed a psychology for their purposes. This is not surprising, since all of these sciences study human behavior. The central problems in most of these sciences are of a socio-psychological nature. Let us briefly consider some of these sciences to see how true this is.

1. *History*³⁹

History is a concrete, descriptive science of society which, as a whole, attempts to record the development of human culture or civilization. It shows the connection in a concrete

becomes increasingly evident that sociology approximates scientific proportions in ratio to its use of psychological data and methods."

³⁹ Compare Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-23; Lindeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-47; also Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies*.

way between events, institutions, and eras. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to interpret these records and to derive from them principles of behavior which will have a universal application. The continuity of development in human social life is especially the concern of history; but its problems are evidently problems in collective human behavior and in the development of culture. History, however, limits its descriptions to a particular group and time, and it studies the life of that group in a concrete manner. Sociology describes in universal terms, which necessarily are of an abstract nature. Thus the history of the United States and Canada are necessarily distinct; while the psychology and sociology of these two groups might coincide. As we have indicated, history is concrete while sociology is abstract; yet history is a socio-psychological science, for it cannot explain its events or the connections between institutions and epochs without resort to social and psychological principles. If it attempts to interpret the facts with which it deals, it must do so in socio-psychological terms. On the other hand, the psychology of human society could not develop without the use of historical facts and of the historical method in ways which we shall notice later.

2. *Economics*

The central problem of economics is usually considered to be the origin and nature of economic values. The new economics quite generally recognizes that economic values are social values, and that they cannot be understood apart from the psychology of human society.⁴⁰ Prices, markets, and economic organization are as much a part of human behavior as is anything else in human society; and these cannot be explained on the basis of individual psychology but rather only through the interaction of masses of men. Tradition

⁴⁰ Compare Edie, *Principles of the New Economics*, Chap. I; also Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, Chaps. XIX, XX.

and custom are as powerful in the economic sphere as in any other phase of human social life. Consequently, business organization and industrial management are as clearly socio-psychological problems as any that we know. Throughout its history economics has made large use of individual psychology to explain economic phenomena, but often using, we are now beginning to see, a scientifically inadequate psychology. The new economics, however, quite generally recognizes the institutional character of our present economic life and that this means that economics as a science must base itself upon a scientific social psychology.

3. *Political Science*

The central problem discussed in political science at the present time is the problem of sovereignty, or the origin and nature of governmental authority. This, again, is evidently a problem in the psychology of human society.⁴¹ Governmental authority, or the sovereignty of the state, is but one aspect of the larger problem of social control, which is one of the central problems of collective behavior or of sociology. The whole process of government is quite evidently a socio-psychological problem. Indeed, the problems connected with government and law are typical problems in the control of group behavior as well as in institutional development. We cannot understand, therefore, such concrete problems as the functions of government, the nature and functions of law, the origin and nature of sovereignty, the origin and meaning of the forms of government, and many other similar political problems, without an adequate psychology of human society.

4. *Ethics*

The central problem of ethics is the origin and nature of moral values and moral obligations. Morality always in-

⁴¹ Compare Williams, *op. cit.*, Chaps. I-VIII; also Barnes' *Sociology and Political Theory*, Chaps. I-V.

volves interpersonal relations, and it is, therefore, a social matter. Moral ideals are also social ideals, and their validity cannot be judged apart from social conditions. Moral conduct is simply a form of social behavior, and our judgment of its value is itself a socio-psychological product, quite as much as is economic valuation. If the moral is a phase of the social, then an understanding of the social will help us better to understand the moral. A moral judgment involves a consideration not only of human nature, but also of the interactions of individuals and of their consequences. Consequently the judgment is social as well as moral. To provide a basis for rational moral judgment, one must consider the social bearing of individual conduct, which necessitates an understanding of socio-psychological facts and principles.⁴² Accordingly, ethics as the science of moral values must find in the psychology of human society its chief scientific basis.

5. *The Science of Education*

The central problem in the science of education is the nature and method of the educative process. This process is not only psychological, but is also social; it is socio-psychological, for it requires a process of interaction between individuals and between individuals and institutions.⁴³ It is the process of transmitting culture in the anthropological sense in which we have defined that term. Hence the educative process is peculiarly characteristic of human society and is a peculiarly important phase of the social process. The attempt to understand, control, and develop the educative process without a clear understanding of the social process is bound to fail. A science of education must be built upon sociology quite as much, therefore, as upon individual

⁴² See Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, Chap. III; also Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, Chap. V.

⁴³ See Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Chap I; also Snedden, *Educational Sociology*, Part III.

psychology. It is not, however, the biological side of sociology, but rather the side which concerns itself with habit, intelligence, and culture which is of a special concern to the educationist. That is, the psychology of our social life is the key to the understanding and development of the educative process.

6. *The Applied Social Sciences*

Strictly speaking, the science of education is one of the applied social sciences. But there are many other sciences concerned with social practice. Applied sciences, or those connected with practical arts, are always complex in their relation to the pure or theoretical sciences. That is, they are based not upon one theoretical science, but upon many. This may be illustrated by the science of social politics. Manifestly, such a science must be based, not only upon political science, but upon economics, biology, psychology, and sociology. The psychology of the social life would, however, have an immediate bearing upon all the problems of social legislation and administration. If political and social practices are based upon wrong ideas of human nature or upon wrong conceptions of human relations, we must expect them to work poorly. This is manifestly one of the fundamental things wrong with our present world. Those who are in charge of its policies as a rule understand neither human nature nor the laws of human living together.

All social work and social practice, if it is to be successful, however, must rest upon a scientific understanding of these things. Scientific social work must accordingly look for guidance as much to social psychology and sociology as to economics and biology.⁴⁴ Social psychology can show the social worker the way in which we expect the individual to

⁴⁴ Compare Burgess, "The Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work" in *The Journal of Social Forces*, May, 1923, pp. 366-370; also Ford, *Social Problems and Social Policy*, pp. 1-7.

behave in a given social situation, and it can also show the way in which the attitudes and policies of communities, as well as of individuals, may be changed. Most important of all, it can be of great assistance to the welfare worker in the small community, not less than to the statesman and the social reformer, in formulating rational and progressive social policies. It can show how far progress can be brought about by changes in the opinions, ideas, and values of individuals, and how far through changes in the external physical environment; and whether progress had best be sought through the gradual modification of existing institutions or through sudden and revolutionary changes. The building of institutions, the changing of laws and customs, the general reconstruction of our civilization, all evidently demand as high a degree of scientific knowledge as the building of bridges or steamships; and the psychology of group behavior constitutes the larger part of the scientific knowledge which we need when we attempt the modification of human institutions. Had the past had such knowledge some of its worst social and political blunders might have been avoided.

The Classification of the Social Sciences

From this brief discussion it will be evident that there are several different orders of science, in the sense in which we have defined that word. It is evident, for example, that history and sociology are sciences of a different order. History belongs to an order of studies which may best be called "descriptive," since it is concrete and does not aim at the generalization of laws and principles. Sociology and social psychology, on the other hand, are theoretical; that is, they aim at universal generalizations which may be called laws or principles. Both history and sociology may deal conceivably with everything that has occurred in human society from the earliest beginnings to now, but history

will deal with it concretely while sociology will deal with it abstractly. There are other abstract or theoretical sciences, however, which deal, not with everything social, but with particular phases or aspects of the social. They study but one line of facts or but one side of the social life, in order to get at its laws and principles. Such are economics and political science. When these special studies aim immediately at the control of social practice, they are the applied social sciences, such as education, social politics, social economics, and criminology. Another order of science emerges when we consider problems of social validity. Then we strive to discover norms and standards by which we may judge validity. Such science we may call "normative"; and when it concerns social behavior we call it "ethics." The following table ⁴⁵ will help us to see the relations between the different social sciences at a glance:

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Descriptive Social Science	Pure or Theoretical Social Science		Normative Social Science	Applied Social Science
	General	Special		
History: general and special. Ethnography: demography (including statistics).	Sociology: static and dynamic; biological and psychological (social psychology).	Economics, political science, jurisprudence, science of religion, social anthropology, etc.	Ethics: general and special, such as political ethics, etc.	Education, philanthropy, social economics, social politics, home economics, etc.

Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society ⁴⁶

It is becoming increasingly evident that what has been called the psychological method of studying social problems,

⁴⁵ Taken from the author's *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. III, where a more elaborate discussion of the relations of sociology to other sciences will be found.

⁴⁶ Probably the best available recent discussions of this topic are Giddings' *The Scientific Study of Human Society* and Lindeman's *Social Discovery*, Chaps. I-IX.

namely, by deductions from individual psychology, or original human nature, is inadequate. A too exclusive use of this sort of psychological analysis in the social sciences leads to many serious errors; for the human mind, as we know it, and hence social behavior, are very largely products of historical social conditions. The mind and the conduct of an individual, in other words, are largely products of the social tradition or culture into which the individual is born. The psychology of the individual's social behavior becomes dependent, therefore, upon an understanding of the historical social environment in which the individual lives.⁴⁷ To study human institutions exclusively from the standpoint of the mechanism of the individual mind is, accordingly, a grievous blunder. Group behavior especially is far more a historical and cultural product than a product of original human nature. Much more than deduction from individual psychology is, therefore, involved in the psychology of human society. It would be unreasonable to suppose that such complex phenomena could be understood through the work in psychological and biological laboratories, though this work may be of great value toward such an understanding. The exact place of deductions from individual psychology and biology in the scientific study of human society will be seen later.

All modern science is essentially inductive in spirit; that is, it proceeds from facts to theory rather than from theory to facts—from particulars to universals rather than from universals to particulars. This does not preclude all use of deductions from biological and psychological laws and principles in the scientific study of society; for such laws and principles have been built up from the inductive study of facts. It does indicate, however, that the scientific student of human society must study social facts, if he is to proceed according to a sound method. Where, then, shall he get his

⁴⁷ Compare Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, Chap. I.

facts concerning human society? Manifestly there are three sources: first, from anthropology and ethnology, both physical and cultural; second, from written history; third, from the observation and collection of facts regarding present social life. Let us consider briefly what each of these methods might contribute to the study of human social behavior.

1. *The Anthropological or Comparative Method*

The facts which anthropology has gathered regarding the social life and institutions of uncivilized peoples are of unique value in the scientific study of human society because they help us to understand the beginnings of customs and institutions, and so afford a background for the understanding, not only of present social life, but also of the whole course of social evolution.⁴⁸ This mass of data enables us not only to compare the institutions of various peoples in different stages of social evolution, but also to compare the reactions of human nature to various social conditions. There are, however, grave dangers in this method when it is applied too uncritically to the interpretation of the existing social life of civilized peoples; for uncivilized peoples are not "our contemporaneous ancestors," as they have often been called, but in every case represent more or less divergent social evolution. Reasoning from them, therefore, is apt to be reasoning from analogy. There can be no question, however, as to the value of this method when used with reasonable precautions by students who understand human history and human nature.

2. *The Historical Method*

The study of human history enables us to compare social processes and social behavior at different points of time, and also to see the modifying effect exerted upon it by various

⁴⁸ Case's *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, especially Part Three, illustrates this method of approach to sociological problems. See also Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*.

conditions. Moreover, it spreads before us the process of social development during a certain period of time and enables us to trace the continuity of factors and forces in social development.⁴⁹ This is especially true when the history of a people is full and all-sided, rather than unilateral. Thus, reliable written history furnishes the scientific student of society a mine of social facts which are perhaps more valuable than any other set of facts in the inductive study of human society. The great social problems and social movements in the civilized world of the present especially cannot be understood apart from their historic setting. It would be vain, for example, to try to get a scientific understanding of such a social movement as Christianity without an understanding of its historic setting; yet this movement affects all the problems of our present civilization, and hence practically all the problems of social behavior in which we are vitally interested. It may be said that such a reliable, all-sided history remains yet to be written. This may be granted; but it would remain not less true that scientifically written history, despite the short time which it covers, is the great desideratum of the scientific study of existing social behavior. It is, of course, inadequate by itself and must be supplemented by all the other methods which we are discussing.

3. *The Social Survey Method*

A third source of facts for the scientific study of human society is to be found in the observation and collection of facts regarding existing civilized communities. In a broad sense this method covers all statistical and exact methods of studying present social life.⁵⁰ Usually we mean by "social

⁴⁹ See Parsons, *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems*, for a textbook in sociology illustrating this method, and Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies*, for further discussion.

⁵⁰ It, of course, covers in particular the "case study" of small groups, especially families, which has been found so valuable in social work and which we have reason to believe can be made to

surveys," however, special studies, more or less exact, of local communities. It is only when this method is generalized and extended over large areas and through considerable lengths of time, as in the United States Census and in other collections of demographical and statistical material, that it becomes of high scientific value. Such observations and collections of facts regarding present social behavior and present social conditions throw light upon human behavior in domestic, political, and industrial relations which we could not get from anthropology, psychology, or even written history. When our survey of social facts is wide enough it reveals great trends in human behavior which laboratory methods could scarcely discover.⁵¹ Moreover, it is a general scientific principle that the scientific value of a fact is usually in proportion to its nearness to the scientific observer. The survey method of studying social facts is, therefore, of great value to the scientific student of society.

The statistical method is simply that phase of this method which undertakes to reach exact measurements of social movements and tendencies through the tabulation, enumeration, and comparison of the facts collected by observation. The statistical method presents the one method open to us of measuring mass movements or social facts upon a wide scale. As yet we possess statistics of only very small sections of our social life, and the method has still to be enormously developed before it is susceptible of application to the more general problems of social behavior. Qualitative analysis of these problems must be pushed much further before quantitative analysis can be applied. For this reason but little use can be made of the statistical method at the present time in deal-

yield valuable results even for general sociology. This method cannot be sharply separated from that of the "participant observer" mentioned at the end of this section.

⁵¹ See the author's paper, "The Present Condition of the Social Sciences," in *Science*, Nov. 16, 1917; also Taylor, *The Social Survey, Its History and Methods*.

ing with the more general problems of sociology and social psychology.

We should not overlook the fact that the observation and study of the smaller human groups, which involve face-to-face association, may furnish a wealth of facts, which in a certain sense are of greater sociological value than any which the study of larger groups can afford, to the trained scientific observer who participates in their life. It is the study of these face-to-face groups by participant observers which especially gives a valuable insight into the processes of social life. This is all the more true when we combine the observation of such groups with what we may call "sympathetic introspection" of the minds of the individuals making up different groups; for we then study them from the inside, as it were. If sympathetic introspection by participant observers is not to introduce fallacies, however, it must be checked up by careful observation of objective behavior. When coupled with such observation it enables us to study the working of many psychic processes in group life, such as interest, desire, emotion, belief, and tradition. Sympathetic introspection, while itself deductive, when used in combination with observation is an invaluable instrument for the psychological understanding of group life.

Obviously, all of these inductive methods of studying collective human behavior will be employed by the intelligent scientific student. A complex science such as sociology demands a composite method which synthesizes all inductive methods of research, the anthropological, the historical, the statistical, and the survey methods. Even such a composite inductive method will, however, prove inadequate for the higher generalizations in sociology and social psychology. In science in general, while induction may furnish us facts, it is deduction which furnishes the hypothesis to interpret the facts; so in the social sciences deduction is of use in furnishing us with working hypotheses.

4. *The Method of Deduction from Biology and Psychology*

Biology and psychology may furnish us with general principles for the interpretation of the facts of social behavior. It is a general rule in the more complex sciences that principles of explanation come from the simpler antecedent sciences. The social is not a realm by itself, but is built up out of the biological and psychological. Hence, ultimate principles of explanation in sociology must be either biological or psychological. It is scarcely ever possible, however, to explain human social phenomena simply and wholly through some biological fact; and the same is true of psychological facts. Biological and psychological facts and principles are at work in human society, but we shall untangle their workings best if we combine a knowledge of biological and psychological principles with an inductive study of collective human behavior. In other words, *a complex science such as sociology demands, for a complete and adequate scientific method, a synthesis of the results of deduction from the principles of antecedent sciences with the facts secured through the inductive study of the social life by means of anthropology, history, observation, and statistics.* All the facts from all these sources must be put together in a constructive synthesis before our psychology of human society is complete.

5. *Philosophical Assumptions and A Priori Methods*

It should not be necessary to say that metaphysical assumptions and personal biases should be eliminated as far as possible, if the problems of the social life are to be studied from the scientific point of view.⁵² To make use of metaphysical assumptions in our social study is to reverse the methods of science and will probably obscure to our minds some of the

⁵² See the author's *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. IV, for elaboration.

facts which should be taken into account. Scientific reasoning should never be based upon mere assumptions. The method of science is not to build itself upon some universal assumption, but rather to start with common sense, and to build up our generalizations out of all the facts of experience. These facts appear to us as both physical and psychical. We are unwarranted, therefore, in assuming the doctrine of materialism, that only physical facts have reality. The attempt to reduce scientific method in the social sciences to the tracing of mechanical causation in social phenomena, thus excluding all explanation of our social life in terms of conscious purposes, is unwarranted by the nature and method of science; for the universal validity of such a principle of explanation has not been demonstrated.

In the physical sciences the mechanistic principle of explanation seems to have demonstrated its sufficiency; but the case is very different in the mental and social sciences. As scientific students of society we can have no objection to carrying the mechanistic or materialistic explanation of social phenomena as far as it has been demonstrated to go. But if we keep the scientific attitude of mind we will not extend its use beyond the limits of demonstration. Nothing but confusion and disagreement can result if we do so. The economists, for example, would not be justified at the present time in disregarding all conscious social processes and in trying to construe the phenomena of prices and markets in terms of mechanical causation. Moreover, if they did so, such an explanation by itself would be meaningless; for we cannot understand such a fact as economic value, or any other value, apart from all consciousness.

On the other hand, the scientific student of society who ignores the physical facts of life and attempts to explain everything in terms of psychic processes is equally guilty of the use of a wrong method. It may even be said that in the past, at least, a too exclusive use of subjective methods in

the social sciences has prevented those studies from developing into true sciences or reliable bodies of tested knowledge, even more than the use of materialistic methods. It may be well to repeat that *the method of science is the method of the open-minded, unbiased investigation of facts*. Hence, we must put down as inadequate methods both "subjectivism," or exclusive attention to internal psychic factors, and "objectivism," or exclusive attention to external physical factors.⁵³ For example, if we study the cultural stages in the history of an institution we shall need to study, not only the physical and economic environment, but also habit, suggestion, imitation, and inventive ideas. We shall need to pay as much attention to custom, tradition, communication, group opinion, and the rise of new ideas as we do to the physical environment. We shall see that we have no way as yet of tracing or reducing such psychic factors to the physical. Hence, in civilized human society the great mass of social phenomena can be understood only in psychological terms. This is true not only of economic values, social standards, traditions, and religion, but also of customs, institutions, and nearly all group behavior.

All this discussion of scientific method, remote as it may seem to the student from the practical problems of life, has a vital bearing upon these latter. For if social science is to guide us in the solution of these practical problems, as an eminent British sociologist has said,⁵⁴ "it must purge itself of that mechanistic taint which pollutes its sources of vital thought, inhibits spiritual insight, and lowers its efficiency for

⁵³ A fuller discussion of "objectivism" in the social sciences will be found in the Preface of the author's *Introduction to Social Psychology*; also in his article on "Objectivism in Sociology" in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1916, pp. 289-305. As Miss Follett says: "Objectivity alone is not reality." . . . "Internal conditioning is of equal importance with external conditioning" (*Creative Experience*, pp. 54, 65).

⁵⁴ Branford, *Science and Sanctity*, pp. 246 and 252.

social service. . . . Current industry and business, even politics and education, have come to be fatally dominated by the mode of thought which characterizes the lower sciences. The consequent bias of a hard and forbidding materialism is all the more perilous because so largely unconscious." And we may add that a bias in the opposite direction might readily lead to a lack of reality in our conceptions and to futility in our practical control over social situations. If it is true that only a competent and sound scientific method is capable of producing competent and sound social knowledge, it is also true that only the open-minded love of truth, the unprejudged consideration of all facts, is able to give us a sound and competent scientific method for our study of human society.

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CHAPTER II

GROUP LIFE AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION

THE social life of man is a part of the world of life in general, and even in a psychological interpretation of society we must have as our background organic evolution. Social or group life could not have started unless the factors and forces of organic evolution were favorable to its production. Indeed, the relations between organic evolution and group life are so close that there is danger of their confusion. We shall see that at points the two processes overlap. Some sociologists have even regarded social evolution as merely a phase of organic evolution. Such a view would seem to be supported by the fact that living together in groups begins very low in the scale of organic evolution, and, as we have already seen, characterizes some of the lowest types of life. But only that form of group life will concern us which is characterized by "comradeship" or social relations between relatively independent, conscious individuals. Only the group life which is made possible through mental interstimulation and response we have agreed to regard as social. What bearing has organic evolution upon such group life, that is, upon social evolution?

Organic Evolution and Social Evolution

Science has come to distinguish different phases or stages of universal evolution. The first phase is stellar and planetary evolution, which is dealt with by such sciences as astronomy, geology, and geography. The second stage is organic evolution, or the evolution of living organisms. The third stage is mental evolution, or the evolution of conscious life.




FIG. 1. PHASES OF UNIVERSAL EVOLUTION.

The fourth stage is social evolution, or the evolution of social groups. A fifth stage may be distinguished as cultural evolution, or the evolution of the peculiar and distinctive traits of human social groups, which, as we have already said, may be summed up in the word "culture." Cultural evolution by some is not regarded as a separate stage, but rather as a manifestation of mental and social evolution under human conditions.

If we take the stellar universe to represent the largest process which we know, then we might designate stellar or cosmic evolution by a large circle, having within itself the other phases of evolution represented by smaller circles, as in Figure 1.

We see that in a large sense organic evolution includes social evolution. We see also that the factors or forces of

organic evolution must affect social evolution, but that these forces are modified by mental evolution, or mental life. The lower phases of social evolution, in which there is less developed mentality, would accordingly be held more in subjection to the forces of organic evolution. The higher phases of social evolution, especially those which we have designated as "cultural evolution," having to do with the development of civilization in human society, would be more remotely affected by organic evolution. Indeed, we shall see that organic evolution affects the cultural traits of human society only indirectly. This is because organic evolution has to do mainly with the physical and hereditary traits of man, while cultural evolution relates rather to his mental and acquired traits. The biologist pays but little attention to acquired habit, and so far as we know acquired habit has little or no influence upon organic evolution, unless indeed, it shall be proved that acquired traits are transmissible. The sociologist, on the other hand, gives attention chiefly to acquired habits, and to the mental processes involved in the readjustment of habits, since these are the most significant things in social life and social evolution. Hence, biological facts and laws, such as variation, heredity, and selection, form only the beginnings and foundation of social evolution. Nevertheless, the biological factors which lie back of social life condition and limit social evolution and must be kept in a proper perspective; for these biological factors affect both the individuals who compose social groups and the organization of the groups themselves.

It is a general principle that the lower phases of evolution not only furnish bases for the development of the higher phases, but also that the factors and forces at work in these lower phases are at work in the higher phases. Thus geographical factors and forces are at work in human society and affect the development of culture. Even more do these geographical factors play a part in organic evolution. We

might illustrate this by a diagram in the form of an inverted pyramid as in Figure 2.¹




FIG. 2. RELATIONS OF HIGHER TO LOWER PHASES OF EVOLUTION.

G represents geographic factors; O, organic factors; M, mental factors; S, social factors; and C, cultural factors.

Relations of Higher to Lower Phases of Evolution

From Figure 2 the student will see the complexity of the factors or forces which affect human social life, and especially human cultural evolution, since all the factors in the lower phases of evolution play also through the higher phases. It would be possible to trace elaborately the factors in organic evolution for example, and show that they are at work in human social evolution. This indeed has been done by many writers with more or less success. Our interest is rather in tracing the factors of mental evolution in social and cultural evolution; but before this can be done profitably we must note very briefly how organic evolution has furnished a basis for social and cultural evolution.

Organic Evolution and the Nature of the Individual

The inborn traits of individuals are the result of organic evolution; that is, they are produced by organic variation, heredity, and selection. The individual as he is born into

¹ The diagram is left open at the top to indicate that cultural (or human social) evolution is just beginning, other phases forming its basis.

society is thus a product of organic evolution. He may be greatly modified later by the particular environment in which he lives, and so far as his behavior as a member of a group is concerned, this may be perhaps indefinitely modified; but it remains true nevertheless that the individual as he comes into society by the gate of birth must be regarded mainly as a product of biological forces, and so as a product of organic evolution.² Organic variation, heredity, and selection give each individual distinct individual and racial traits which will affect his reactions to his group and the reactions of his group to him throughout his life.³ This is easy enough to see as regards the gross bodily traits with which the individual is born, especially those connected with the facts of sex and race. Moreover, if the mental and moral traits of the individual are more or less closely bound up with the inherited structure of his nervous system, as modern biology declares, then mental and moral traits are to that extent also subject to the forces of organic evolution. No biologist questions that there is an hereditary structure of the nervous system which is a result of organic evolution. It would seem probable, therefore, that such hereditary structure expresses itself in the behavior of the individual in certain characteristic reactions. These reactions are known in psychology under such names as appetites, instincts, emotions,

² This is, of course, not to deny that culture and social environment may often affect the health, etc., of the individual before birth.

³ For a brief presentation of the modern theory of heredity, that it is to be understood as developmental tendencies rather than as hard and fast traits, see Professor H. S. Jennings' article on "Heredity and Environment" in *The Scientific Monthly* for September, 1924, pp. 225-238. Says Professor Jennings: "More properly, characteristics are not inherited at all; what one inherits is certain material that under certain conditions will produce a particular characteristic; if these conditions are not supplied, some other characteristic is produced." As the author accepts this theory, the statements in the body of the text are to be understood in the light of this theory.

and native impulses. How far such hereditary reactions may reasonably be invoked to explain the behavior of civilized human beings in their social life is a question which we shall discuss later. We need to note here that organic evolution has furnished man not only with distinct bodily traits, but also with certain original tendencies which run through his whole life and behavior in society.

The original intellectual capacity of man is also a product of organic evolution. Modern anthropology teaches us that the physical trait which especially distinguishes man from other animals is the much greater size of his brain. This greater size of the human brain is due to the increase in the size of the cortex and of other areas concerned with intellectual processes. This larger brain and consequent greater intellectual capacity of man must be regarded as an organic mutation which has been perpetuated by heredity and selection. No other organic trait, not even the erect attitude and the development of the hands, has had such significance for man's evolution, because upon this trait rests man's capacity for thinking and learning, which is much greater than that of any other animal and through which man has produced his culture. Thus we see that man's social and cultural evolution is based upon his distinctive organic evolution. The full significance of these peculiar traits of man will be discussed later.

Individual Differences *

Organic evolution has created original differences between individuals and these are very significant for the social life. Man is probably the most variable of all animal species, and human individuality owes its distinctness in part to this fact. The complex of inborn traits and of acquired character, which we call personality, also owes not a little to these original

* See Thorndike, *Individuality*; also Edman, *Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, Chap. IX.

individual differences. No two individuals are born alike. The differences in their hereditary endowments may range all the way from the lowest grade of feeble-mindedness to the highest genius. Some individuals are born with favorable endowments, others with unfavorable. In part the original strength or weakness, physical or mental, of an individual is a matter of his heredity; but it is also in part a matter of individual variation. Owing, therefore, both to variation and to heredity, some individuals are born strong and others are born weak in some of the traits which are necessary for success. Hence it follows that there is no such thing as biological equality among individuals at birth. The old belief that "all men are born equal" is without foundation if taken in a biological sense. It is only in a moral and ideal social sense that we can hold this to be true.

If some individuals are born with superior traits and others with inferior traits, this is a very important matter from the standpoint of group life. Some individuals will be better fitted by natural endowments than others for certain tasks. This is especially true in regard to matters of leadership. In part, the successful leader of men is born with the qualities and endowments which make it possible for him to be a successful leader. This shows the importance of being able to discover in advance, if possible, individuals with such natural endowments or gifts. Among these original endowments of the individual the most significant socially is intellectual capacity. Modern psychology is busy with the problem of devising means to measure original intellectual capacity and other original behavioristic traits of individuals. It has not yet perfected such means of measurement, and some doubt seems to attach to all mental measurements thus far as to whether they measure original endowments or acquirements through experience; but such measurements have at least gone far enough to demonstrate that there do exist great differences in the original mental endowments of

individuals, and that in any scientific plan of social organization these original differences between individuals will have to be taken into account.

Differences of Sex ⁵

Among the original differences of individuals none are more striking in human society than those of sex and race. The differences between the sexes, like the differences between races, are a matter of such controversy at the present time that it is difficult to get a balanced scientific view of the subject. We have some scientific men asserting that "men and women are physiologically different species," while others have asserted that "few if any psychological differences of sex are of biological origin." The truth would seem to be midway between these extreme views. That there are original differences between the sexes of a biological nature resulting from organic evolution cannot be doubted; for such differences are found practically throughout the organic world. Neither can it be denied that there are other differences between the sexes in human society which are the product of culture or civilization. The problem is to disentangle these two sorts of sex differences. Practically all laboratory experiments have shown insignificant differences between the sexes in the elementary intellectual functions of perception, attention, and memory. The original differences between the sexes seem to lie not so much in intellectual capacity as in temperament or emotional reaction. Throughout the animal world the male with his usually greater physical strength shows more of the fighting impulse accompanied by more aggressiveness and desire for mastery; the female, on the other hand, shows more of the nursing or mothering disposition and exhibits more capacity for sympathy and self-sacrifice. In general, however, the original differences between the sexes seem to be, not

⁵ See Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XVI.

qualitative as popular opinion supposes, but quantitative. They consist of slight differences in strength, particularly of certain emotional reactions. They seem to favor the harmonious adaptation of the sexes to each other in normal social life, and hence we may call them *complementary* differences. They are differences which have been developed in an organic division of labor between the sexes. To ignore the differences in original endowment, whether physical or mental, of the two sexes is bound to result in social maladjustments; on the other hand, to discover and use these differences properly is necessary for a scientific organization of human relationships. This, however, does not apply to the differences between the sexes which have been produced artificially by civilization; and the vast mass of observed differences in behavior of the two sexes are undoubtedly of this character. Some of the cultural differences in the behavior of the sexes may be advantageous; others may be disadvantageous. We are discussing here only the original differences which have a biological basis.

Differences of Race *

The original differences between the various human races are equally significant with those of sex for the social life of man. They are even more in controversy at the present time, and it is even more difficult to secure an unbiased judgment regarding them. There can be no question but that the different races of man have been physically specialized to different geographic environments. To some extent, therefore, the races are the result of divergent organic evolution. Their different physical appearance in itself makes difficult the harmonious adjustment of their relations. On the general

* See Reuter, *Population Problems*, Chaps. XVIII-XXI; Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. V; Park and Burgess, *Introduction to Science of Sociology*, pp. 89-92; also Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. XII.

psychological and sociological principle that "likes attract and unlikes repel," or "the consciousness of kind," as Professor Giddings called it, these physical differences seem to impede sympathy and understanding between races. There remains, however, the deeper question whether the divergent physical evolution of the human races has produced differences in their nervous systems, so that their hereditary reactions are different. This is still an unsettled question. The student should note, however, that physical anthropology has demonstrated that the physical differences between races, which often seem so large to us, are, when carefully studied, found after all to be very slight, and to consist merely in certain *quantitative* variations. The same conclusion would seem to hold for their original mental differences. That some differences in hereditary reactions to stimuli do exist among the human races would seem to be confirmed by history and experience, and also by some experimental evidence. In general, the differences in the elementary intellectual functions are again insignificant, although the army mental tests in the United States are held by some to show that the negro is inherently intellectually inferior to the white race by about 20 per cent.⁷ Again, however, the differences between the races, like the differences between the sexes, would seem to be more temperamental and emotional than intellectual; that is, they consist in the greater or lesser strength of certain natural impulses in one race than in the other. They are quantitative differences, as we have just said, not qualitative. It may seem Utopian to suggest that the differences between the races are *complementary*, and when rightly understood

⁷ See Gault, *Social Psychology*, Chap. V; also Pyle, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 205; and especially Ferguson's article on "The Mental Status of the American Negro" in *The Scientific Monthly* for June, 1921, pp. 533-543. Professor Pyle's conclusion is based upon an independent investigation. For the opposite view see Gregg's paper, "The Comparison of Races" in *The Scientific Monthly* for March, 1925, pp. 248-254.

will not impede, but rather favor, the harmonious adjustment of races in a common social life. Yet there are reasons for thinking that this will be the ultimate judgment of science. All races seem to have their defects and all certain good points. The maladjustments between the races at the present time, therefore, are more probably the result of culture than of irreconcilable hereditary differences between races.

Before leaving this discussion of original individual differences, the student should note that organic differences, as well as organic similarity, may favor the development of group life. When differences are such that they favor and make easy a division of labor, they promote interdependence, and so social solidarity, rather than the reverse. It is such differences which we have called complementary. Probably most of the normal differences between individuals brought about by organic evolution are of this sort. They help rather than hinder the development of social life, if rightly understood and utilized.

The Origin of Group Life among Animals

Social evolution is rooted in the necessities of organic existence. By biological necessity most species of animals live in groups. The processes of nutrition and reproduction in all the higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species. This necessary interdependence of living forms in the food and reproductive processes has undoubtedly been the basis of social evolution. Animals found it necessary to live in groups in order to procure an adequate food supply, to reproduce and care for offspring, and, lastly, to protect themselves against enemies. These three necessary life-processes from the start gave rise to living in groups. Life, therefore, never developed in an isolated way, each individual by himself. From the very beginning there has been more or less

group life among organisms of the same species. The isolated and solitary individual has been an exception in the world of animal life, particularly in all higher forms. Social groups, or groups of organisms carrying on a common life by means of mental interstimulation and response, have their origin in the necessary interdependence of life-processes of organisms of the same species.

Now if this be true, the origin of social or group life is manifestly biological. In its lowliest beginnings such living in groups was merely a phase of organic evolution. At first, too, the interdependence was undoubtedly purely physical, and there can be little doubt that such physical interdependence was the basis upon which later developed the mental interaction which we have seen to be the essence of social life. This mental interdependence must be regarded as a result of the breaking up of the original physical interdependence through the development of relatively independent individuals, who had to retain their unity of activity through interstimulation and response. Social life must be regarded, accordingly, as a higher, more complex unity of a psychic character which has developed out of a primitive biological unity.

Aside from emphasizing the primitive biological basis of group life, this conclusion is very important for sociological theory because of the serious errors in social theories in the past which come from the assumption that social groups have their origin through the coming together of individuals who were developed in isolation or separateness. In order to obtain society, the theorist had to find a cause which would bring together such individuals developed in isolation. The result was that the organic character of group life was lost sight of, and that the unity of social groups seemed a mystery which could be explained only through some intellectualistic or else some mechanical theory. As soon as we see, however, that group life springs spontaneously from the necessi-

ties of the process of living; that it has grown up out of the fundamental phases of that process, namely, the food process, the reproductive process, and defense, then there is no mystery regarding social life. It becomes clear that social life is an expression of the original and continuing interdependence of individuals in a common life-process. But, it may be asked, which factor plays the leading part in the origin and development of social groups—food, reproduction, or defense?

Social Life in Part a Function of the Food Process

It may be admitted at once that social or group life grows out of both of the two most fundamental phases of the process of living—the food process, or the activities connected with nutrition, and the reproductive process, or the activities connected with the birth and rearing of offspring. The food process, however, seems to have acted chiefly in a negative way upon the earliest beginnings of association. As a rule, organisms of the same species remain together as long as food is abundant and scatter only when the conditions of nutrition become unfavorable. Now when living forms remain in close proximity, they tend to become dependent upon one another in the process of living. These relations create mutual interdependence. In the higher forms of life, moreover, association and coöperation often give control over food, because a food supply can be more easily secured by a group of coöperating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection operating upon groups would, therefore, favor those groups which associated in order to control food supply. It would especially favor groups in which the interactions between individuals were quick and sure—that is, groups which developed the power of mental interstimulation and response, and so, of intelligent coöperation and orderly relations among their individual units. From this point of view it is possible to say that social life was developed

as a control over the food process. From the standpoint of biology social life is a variation or mutation in the form of living which has been found advantageous in the procuring of adequate subsistence. This does not mean, however, that social or group life, even in the animal world below man, was developed wholly or even chiefly to control food. Social or group life from the very beginning has existed for other purposes than control over the food process, though food is, of course, prerequisite for any sort of survival and also for reproduction. The food process, however, is only one factor in social organization and development. Social life even among the brutes is equally a function of the processes of reproduction and defense.

Social Life in Part a Function of the Process of Defense

Among the things in the environment to which organisms have always to adjust themselves, besides food, are inanimate enemies and animate enemies, either of the same species or of others. Now defense against enemies, whether animate or inanimate, can be much better undertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated individuals. The process of defense in the animal world, therefore, tends toward the formation and maintenance of groups. Many writers have been inclined to make the necessities of defense the main factor in accounting for group life and organization. This may be so in the case of some species; for it is certain that in the world of life there are no dangers which animals have to fear so much as attacks by other animals; and, therefore, that there is no force working for group cohesion stronger than the necessities of defense against other animals, either of the same or related species. In many cases the most cohesive groups among the higher animals are those which function largely for defense. In the struggle of group with group the chances are that the larger and better organized group will survive. Here, again, we find natural selection

placing a premium upon group life. Ultimately, the outcome of intergroup struggle is to favor those groups that develop the greatest unity, the most intelligent coöperation, and the best leadership in facing a common foe. Living in groups must, therefore, be regarded in part as a method developed by evolution for defense against enemies.

But it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the rôle of conflict in the world of life, and especially in the origin of social groups. It must be conceded that conflict is one of the important factors, though it would seem that defense would come in not in the very origin of the group but rather to safeguard it after it had been formed. Moreover, defense against enemies is largely simply the negative side of the food process which we have just discussed and of the reproductive process which we will now consider.

Social Life in Part a Function of the Reproductive Process

In spite of the importance of food and defense against enemies, it seems probable that reproduction has played the chief part in the origin and development of social or group life. The birth and care of offspring among all the higher animals have been, almost from the earliest stages of organic evolution, very important phases of life. From the standpoint of the continuity of life, that is, from the standpoint of the species, the reproductive process is of equal importance with the food process. Obviously, sexual reproduction has always necessitated the interaction of two individuals; but the association to which it gives rise in the earlier stages of organic evolution is often momentary and indefinite. It is not until we find the production of "child" forms which need prolonged and tender care on the part of one or both parents that the reproductive process gives rise to definite, intimate and prolonged association. It is probably the association of mother and child which started intimate, primary group life. At any rate, out of this relationship sprang

the family in the full sense of the term, that is, an indefinite association of parents and offspring. Out of the family grew the consanguineous group, and out of the kindred group grew many of the most important features of human society.

The relationship of the child form to the parent form becomes more prolonged, and hence of more social importance, as organic evolution advances. In those species where the dependence of the child form upon the parent form is very slight the social results of the reproductive process seem also to be comparatively unimportant; but with the prolongation of the period of immaturity of the child and of its dependence upon the parent form, there is increasing necessity for the coöperation of both parents in the care of offspring; and hence the reproductive process brings about increasingly important social results. It develops, if it does not originate, a whole series of reactions of a sympathetic or altruistic character. It makes possible the continuity of face-to-face or primary group life, and so a group which can transmit culture. From an evolutionary point of view, the higher forms of group life must be regarded, therefore, as built up by the reproductive process; that is, by the necessities connected with the birth and rearing of offspring needing prolonged and tender care.

It is quite as right, therefore, to say that the origin of living in groups is in the reproductive process as to say that it is in the food process or in conflict; and that the social process is a function of the reproductive process as to say that it is a function of the food process or of defense. When we examine the whole series of animal groups, from the ants and bees to man, we find them to be as obviously devised to guard the birth and rearing of each new generation as to secure an adequate food supply or defense against enemies. Indeed, most of the peculiar arrangements in animal groups, as well as in the social life of man, seem designed to safeguard the reproductive process. There is, therefore, much truth

in the contention of those writers who have claimed that social life has developed about the child. Child care, at any rate, has been one of the principal interests of human groups from the earliest times. The child has been the center not only of family life, but of the whole social system as well. Safeguarding the child's heredity, birth, and education has been the chief end of much institutional development in human society. While the food process has been the basis for the development of man's economic life, and the defense process the main basis for the development of his political life, the reproductive process has served as the basis for the development of much of man's higher social and moral life.⁸ It is the keystone of the arch of social life.

Thus we see that the origin of social life, even below the human level, was complex, and that all three of the great phases of the life-process, nutrition, reproduction, and defense, were factors therein. Consequently social evolution cannot be regarded as a product of any one of these factors alone. Living in groups has functioned with reference to all of these phases of life and no single one has determined it. May we, then, safely proceed to interpret the social life of man in terms of these three fundamental factors, food, reproduction, and defense? The materialistic theories of human society have generally proceeded upon the assumption that this may safely be done. They have ignored in large measure the peculiar traits of man and the importance of human psychology. To such social thinkers it has seemed adequate to interpret the human social process in terms of these fundamental organic needs in reaction with the situation in the physical environment.

Such a sociology may be adequate for animal groups, but it is not adequate for the social life of man for the simple

⁸ See Chapter IV of this book for the expansion of these statements, especially as to the rôle of the family in the transmission of culture.

reason that man has passed through many independent stages of evolution which have endowed him with qualities which no brute possesses. Social psychology would be of little importance for sociology if we could understand human social life adequately through the factors which explain the group life of animals. To be sure, in our study of human social life we shall not be able to get away from these fundamental biological factors. Man has not dispensed with any of the factors which control animal behavior because he has become human; but several distinctive, new factors affect his behavior. Whether we explain these factors as wholly new and distinct, or as the result of the combination of old factors in new ways, it is true, at any rate, that with the coming of man, social life rose to a new level and the type of association was changed. The fundamental factors—nutrition, reproduction, struggle for existence, variation, heredity, instinct, habit, and intelligent adaptation—all remained, but they became combined in a new and distinct complex which we call “culture.” Social evolution in the human species, in other words, reached a stage of development in which a new and seemingly independent phase has developed which we have already called “cultural evolution.” But it was organic evolution which made cultural evolution possible. Let us see how this took place.

The Origin of Human Society

If, from the scientific standpoint, it is impossible to regard man as anything else than a highly developed animal, so human society cannot be regarded strictly as having had an independent origin, but must be considered scientifically as a developed form of animal association. Many of the forms of human association were doubtless fixed in the subhuman stage, such, for example, as the essential relations between the sexes. In this sense human society must be regarded as an inheritance from man's prehuman progenitors. The

forms of association among the earliest men doubtless rested upon instinctive adaptations which came about as the result of biological necessities. Probably the simpler forms of group life or association among men can, therefore, be explained in the same way in which we have already explained group life among animals. Let us note again what sort of social or group life this was.

In the animals below man we find the fundamental adjustments of behavior largely provided for through inherited instincts, though even the brutes are capable of modifying their inherited reactions to some extent through the formation of intelligent habits. But if any individual in the brute world thus acquires any special skill or superior control over his environment, he does not possess the ability to communicate these attainments to any appreciable extent to his fellows; and the behavior of the group is accordingly not appreciably affected or modified. It is only the behavior of the individual which is affected. It is evident that social life among the brutes, so far as it exists, is simply the result of organic evolution through natural selection.

But when we ascend to man, we find new factors in his collective behavior. While man possesses, probably, fundamental instinctive adjustments, and while he shares with the higher animals the capacity to modify his conduct through the formation of habits, he possesses in addition certain superior intellectual powers and superior means of intercommunication with his fellows in the form of articulate speech. These peculiar endowments of man become the basis for a new type of social evolution. It becomes possible to develop a type of social life which is dominated by a learning process—by acquired habits, acquired intelligence, and acquired values; in other words, a type of social life which is dominated by "culture."⁹

⁹ See the writer's paper, "The Educational Theory of Social Progress" in *The Scientific Monthly* for November, 1917 (pp. 439-450).

Now culture is the distinctive feature of human social life, and, as we have just said, dominates most of the social behavior of man. By culture we mean man's power of control over nature and himself. More concretely, we mean tool-making and institution-making. Culture, therefore, includes the whole of man's material civilization and such phases of his social life as language, literature, art, religion, morality, law, and government. None of these things are possessed by any of the brutes, and yet it is obvious that they dominate much of human behavior. They create the distinctively human elements in the social life. Man as a social creature is largely a cultural being. We must understand culture, therefore, if we are to understand human society. It is culture which has made man *human*.

Distinctive Factors in Human Social Evolution

To what peculiar traits of the human individual, as created by organic evolution, is culture due? Upon what inherent individual traits does it rest? The whole of physical anthropology and of human psychology would be needed to answer this question completely. In a general way these sciences tell us that human culture rests upon four chief traits which distinguish man as an individual in the animal kingdom. These traits are: (1) man's superior brain with its power of abstract thought, of forming "general notions" or "independent ideas"; (2) man's power of articulate speech, or of vocalizing sound, thus symbolizing his ideas and feelings and making possible their intercommunication among the individuals of a group; (3) man's prolonged immaturity, making his individual life plastic and enabling the formation of many possible habits; (4) man's erect attitude and free hands which facilitate the making and the use of physical tools. To some extent, foreshadowings of all these special traits of man may be seen in the animal world below him, especially in the anthropoid ape; but in no species are these peculiar traits

of man developed, and hence the brutes remain cultureless. Let us see how each of these traits has affected man's cultural and social life.

1. There can be scarcely any doubt that man's culture is due chiefly to that fundamental mutation which we have already spoken of as distinguishing man especially from the other animals, namely, his superior brain with its higher intellectual centers.¹⁰ This superior brain of man, which anthropologists regard as the most distinctive and peculiar trait of man's biological make-up, is probably the basis of the development of most of his other peculiar human traits, such as the power of articulate speech, the power of learning or of indefinite habit formation, and prolonged immaturity. Some anthropologists even think that it accounts for man's upright attitude. At any rate, it accounts for man's power of abstraction, of forming independent ideas, concepts, or "mental patterns." It accounts for the fact that man's type of adaptation is mental and usually self-conscious and intelligent. It is what has given man his power of learning, his capacity to profit by experience, and so to re-make his habits. This is not to deny that man as an animal may have certain peculiar instincts, but to say that it is not these peculiar instincts which account for his culture, though they may affect to some extent some of the peculiarities of his social life. Peculiar instincts do not give rise to culture among the brutes, therefore. we must turn to the distinctive traits of man to explain culture, and undoubtedly chief among these traits are his powers of intellectual abstraction, especially of imagination and reasoning, which were made possible through his larger and more complex brain. Imagination and reasoning have made man a *creative* being.

2. The power of articulate speech has always been noted

¹⁰ See the writer's paper, "Theories of Cultural Evolution" in *American Journal of Sociology* for May, 1918 (Vol. XXIII, pp. 779-800), for elaboration.

as one of the distinct peculiarities of man and one of the most significant of all facts for the development of man's social life.¹¹ This power, as we have already said, implies the power to form abstract ideas, though it, of course, reacts to develop such ideas. From the moment that articulate speech became possible a new type of social life was also possible—a type in which the interactions and interrelations between individuals became far more definite and far more complex than they are among the brutes. It became possible to communicate from individual to individual definite ideas and images which would aid in the mutual adaptation of the whole group. By means of articulate speech, for example, superior skill or knowledge acquired by one individual, whether as a result of accident or of reflective thought, might be communicated to other members of his group. Thus the whole group might be enabled to profit by the experience and intelligence of one individual, and in this way the conduct of an entire group may be changed through the attainments of one fortunate or exceptionally intelligent individual. Nor would such attainments of a group be lost by the death of the generation in which they were learned. By articulate speech the knowledge and the patterns of the activity, or the adjustment, could be passed along from generation to generation, so that each succeeding generation could acquire the knowledge and skill found advantageous in the experience of past generations.

The patterns of action among the animals below man are shut up, so to speak, within the nervous organization of the individuals, or communicated, if at all, only by means of imitation of one individual by another; but, owing to articulate speech among human beings, the patterns of behavior have escaped, so to speak, from the individual brain and are

¹¹ See Case, *op. cit.*, Chap. XII; also the writer's paper, "Mental Patterns in Social Evolution" in publications of *American Sociological Society*, pp. 88-100 (1922).

transmitted from individual to individual, not simply by imitation, but by the spoken word or language. Thus language is evidently the main vehicle by which culture is transmitted from individual to individual and from generation to generation. The patterns for culture which are handed down from the past we call social tradition. This social tradition plus the group opinion regarding the present situation controls the coadaptive habits of the group. Thus the web of intercommunication in human groups forms a psychosocial environment which becomes the main control over social behavior. It is not too much to say, therefore, that the web of intercommunication in human groups has supplanted animal instinct as the dominant factor in social adjustment. Thus man's superior power of intercommunication, together with his superior powers of ideation and the formation of habits, has enabled him to build up a world of behavior unlike that of any of the brutes. In human social life it becomes less necessary to rely upon the original inherited tendencies of the individual. Social tradition, as Professor Hobhouse says, or "social heredity," as some have unhappily called it, takes the place in human group life of organic heredity among the brutes as the effective means of standardizing behavior.¹² It is through tradition that the social past exercises control over the social present.

3. The whole biological constitution of man as created by organic evolution has coöperated, of course, with man's superior brain and superior powers of intercommunication, to make human culture and the peculiar traits of human society. Man's prolonged immaturity is a biological trait of scarcely less significance than the human brain itself for the understanding of human social life. A prolonged period of immaturity means the possibility of greater social control over the habits of the individual. Since it implies plasticity in

¹² Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 212; also *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, pp. 34-39.

the individual and in society, it lays the basis for education and for social control through education. It means furthermore a social life which is modifiable, such as we find man to possess as a matter of fact, since it gives opportunity for custom and tradition to mold each individual in conformity with the habits of the group. But it has even more significance than this. It gives the intellectual elements of human society—ideas, ideals, and social values—their opportunity to do their work not only through social tradition, but through the fact that the prolonged immaturity of the individual is a period of trial and error, of experimenting and testing, in which old habits and ideas may be rejected and new ones may be discovered. This makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the sway of mere habit and tradition. Comte was not wrong in claiming that social progress depended largely upon the predominance of youth in human society; for ultimately the capacity of human society to progress does rest upon man's prolonged immaturity not less than upon his superior intellectual power. The two facts are indeed correlatives. Man's brain is superior only because it is itself a slowly developing organ, very imperfectly developed at birth, and destined to get its full development only through reaction with its physical and social environment. Its superiority is a development which comes through use.

The prolonged immaturity of the individual has, of course, affected the whole organization of human society. As Fiske pointed out,¹³ it is largely responsible for the permanency of the union between the sexes in human society and hence for the development of the more intimate and sympathetic forms of social life. There can be scarcely any doubt that the prolonged immaturity of man has had much to do, not only with the origin and permanence of his family and kindred groups, but also with the high development of sympathetic

¹³ *The Meaning of Infancy.*

feeling and of altruism in human society generally. Without the care and the education of the young, which has been one of the main preoccupations of man from the earliest time, human sympathy and altruism would have been but little developed, and we could scarcely imagine human society to be as it is. Human culture and the spiritual possessions of humanity, such as language, art, religion, moral ideals, and government, have found their opportunity for development and transmission through the long physical and social infancy of the human individual.

4. The importance of the erect attitude of man and of his free hands as a part of his biological nature for the understanding of the origin and development of his culture, and so of the peculiarities of his social life, is manifest. Indeed, these physical attributes of man have been overstressed by some writers. As we have seen, culture is to be explained far more by man's superior brain, his powers of intercommunication, and his plasticity of habit formation during the period of immaturity. We can scarcely imagine, however, what human society would be like without man's erect attitude and free hands; for these have been indispensable for the making and use of physical tools as we know them. The reaction of the hand upon the development of the brain, and especially of the intelligence, has often been emphasized, and it is probable that it is scarcely less important than the reaction of the spoken word. But language and social tradition, rather than the hand and physical tools, have probably played the larger part in the development of the total complex of human culture. To debate this point, however, is idle; for as we shall see, these factors are all so closely interwoven in culture that it is impossible to disentangle them.

Human society, we now see, is based more upon habit and intelligence than upon hereditary reactions or changes in

organic structure. Organic evolution furnished the changes in organic structure, such as a larger and more complex brain and prolonged immaturity, which made it possible to develop a social life based largely upon habit and intelligence. Organic evolution, therefore, furnished the necessary organic conditions; but the actual culture of every human group is a matter of habits, ideas, standards, and values—a matter of acquired rather than of inherited behavior. We must conclude, therefore, that it is the more or less intelligent modification, direction, and control of instinctive and habitual activities which has produced the distinctive traits of human social life. This is not to propose an intellectualistic theory of human social origins. Because man has become a cultural being does not mean that he has escaped from the control of heredity and selection which so dominates the world of life below him; but in the human world man's higher intellectual development and superior means of social intercommunication have modified the workings of heredity and selection and made possible an evolution, within the framework which they have provided, of acquired habits, ideas, and values; namely, an evolution of culture. But cultural evolution, as the human phase of social evolution, is not free to take any development which man's fancy may dictate. It must develop within the bounds set by natural selection and by man's heredity. A culture, or a civilization, which oversteps these bounds is just as liable to be eliminated by the forces of organic evolution as a species of plant or animal which is unadapted to its environment. If civilization is to survive and continue to develop it must be not by a study of Utopias, but by a study of necessary progressive adjustments. Sociology must study how man may progressively adjust himself to the requirements of an increasingly complex social existence. Human society is modifiable, and it is the business of the social sciences to find out in what ways and in what directions it can be advantageously modified.

The Nature of Primitive Human Social Life¹⁴

One problem yet remains which must be touched upon, though it belongs primarily to the domain of cultural anthropology. That is, what was the character of the primitive social life of man? If human society developed out of the association of man's prehuman precursors, what was the earliest human group like? What was the character of primitive social behavior? We cannot answer these questions in full, but three or four points may be noted.

1. The earliest human groups must have been small, face-to-face groups, or what we now call "primary groups." No other groups could have existed in primitive times. The food supply was limited and widespread intercommunication impossible. It is such groups, namely, family groups or small hordes or neighborhoods, of a few related families, which still make up the peoples lowest in cultural development.

2. The earliest human groups must have been controlled more by the human instincts, or the natural animal impulses of men, than the groups of modern society, since experience had not accumulated and social tradition had not been formulated. Man's original social life started upon the instinctive level and has only gradually risen to the cultural level. Control through habit and education could scarcely have been organized at the beginning. Man's sociability was, therefore, originally instinctive but limited to small groups. Wider sociability and coöperation have only come through culture and education. Hence they have come slowly and with difficulty. Even yet, man's natural tendency seems to be to limit his kindliness, sympathy, and altruism to small groups of personal associates.

3. The earliest human groups were probably peaceful.

¹⁴ See Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*; also Case, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XIII, XIX.

Their struggle was with physical nature and the world of animal life below them, not with one another. Human groups were too widely separated for many wars between such groups. The lowest peoples in point of culture, even at the present time, we find to be essentially peaceful. Prehistoric archæology shows no clear evidence of warlike instruments or weapons until we come to upper paleolithic times. We have called the lowest peoples in point of culture "savages,"¹⁵ but anthropological research has established the fact that war with its attendant ferocities and cruelties is more characteristic of later stages of human culture, and that it became well organized only in the stage of "barbarism." It was only in this latter stage that slavery and cannibalism were definitely developed. There is no scientific evidence, therefore, which warrants us in believing that the most opprobrious of the so-called antisocial traits of man were primitive. The predatory and antisocial traits of man must be interpreted, therefore, as developments due to the transition from a social life of small, relatively isolated groups, whose struggle was chiefly with physical nature, to a social life of groups in close contact and in competition with each other for the means of existence. In other words, predatory traits have been developed as habits through the development of an intense struggle for existence between human groups, resulting from the filling up of the world with human beings.

The predatory features of human society were probably less characteristic of primitive social life than they are even of our present civilization. It may be psychologically right to infer, as McDougall and others have done, that warlike traits have been inbred in modern man, since the civilized

¹⁵ We may conveniently divide preliterate peoples into those who lived entirely by hunting and fishing and the collecting of wild fruits (savages) and those who in addition practiced primitive agriculture (barbarians). Literate peoples (those having written language and records) are called "civilized."

nations of the earth are descended largely from the fighting and victorious tribes of barbarism. The more probable explanation of the warlike and predatory traits of modern peoples, however, is the survival among them of the traditions of barbarism.

There is nothing, so far as we can see, in man's organic evolution which will necessarily prevent his adjustment to a world-wide, peaceful society consisting of all humanity. While man's natural tendencies adjust him only to relatively narrow groups, yet man's social evolution has not proceeded upon the basis of man's natural tendencies, but rather upon the basis of acquired habits, ideas, and values. Intelligently formed habits have enabled man to adjust himself to wider and wider groups. Hence human history shows an expanding social consciousness. Continued social adjustment to wider and wider groups, however, is possible only through education of the individual and through conscious social ideals. It is through such conscious education and the deliberate adoption of humanitarian ideals that we can expect humanity to become one society. Organic evolution failed to produce the fully socialized individual, hence it failed to produce a type of individual adapted to the needs of present social life. Alone it could bring man only as far as the earliest stage of primitive society, that is, of savagery, and leave him there with the potentialities and capacities for high civilization. What organic evolution did for the race was to produce a type endowed with the potentiality and capacity for the highest social and cultural development.

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CHAPTER III

GROUP LIFE AND MENTAL EVOLUTION

THE group life which we know presupposes mental life. The group life of plants and other lowly organisms we have agreed to regard as not true social life. At any rate, the interactions which we find in human groups between individuals are largely mental, and the type of adaptation¹ which we find in human society is also mental. Therefore, as we have already seen, social evolution presupposes some degree of mental evolution, and the higher phases of social evolution, resting upon the acquired habits, feelings, and intelligence of individuals, presuppose a high degree of mental evolution.² Mental evolution, as well as organic evolution, must furnish the background for the understanding of human society.

Organic Evolution and Mental Evolution

Mental evolution is not something apart from organic evolution. If we take a strictly biological point of view,

¹ The word "adaptation" is to be preferred in most cases to the word "adjustment" in social psychology, since "adjustment" is usually used in a static sense, whereas "adaptation" implies activity, "the process of adjustment," or "progressive adjustment."

² As this chapter is intended to be a statement of the principles of individual psychology made use of in later discussions, the phrase "mental evolution" is used in the narrow sense of the development of the individual mind brought about by nature, not that brought about by nurture or culture. Mental evolution in this sense is the mental side of organic evolution. The chapter is therefore continuous with the preceding chapter. Each topic touched upon in the chapter is developed sociologically in the succeeding chapters.

mentality may be regarded as a variation in the life-process. It is the most significant mutation which life has brought forth; for when mind or consciousness appeared in organic evolution, the whole balance of the world of life was changed. Thereafter, the determining factors in the life-process became more and more the inner and psychic, not the outer and physical. Among animals those that had this inner control over behavior would stand the best chance of survival; for by means of it they could adapt themselves quickly to their environment. The animal that could sense approaching danger and develop conscious control over its behavior could escape; again, if it could sense food, it could survive better than a form of life without consciousness. Mentality, it is evident, has had a survival value from the start far in excess of almost any other organic trait.

Since all organisms do not show signs of mental life, we must seek to locate mind, if possible, in the scheme of organic development. The lowest organisms do not possess nervous systems; hence, in their case, it would seem idle to raise the question whether they have neural processes which are accompanied by consciousness. In such forms of life, which include the lower animal types and the whole plant world, adaptation to environment is probably secured by purely physical or mechanical means. The plant is sessile and its movements are of the simplest kind; therefore, its life-processes do not need conscious guidance. But as we ascend in the animal scale, the katabolic tendencies of the organism—that is, the tendencies to expend energy rather than to store it up—increase, and hence bodily movements become greater, more varied, and more complex. Now the mind, with its consciousness, seems to have been developed as a control over the complex and varied movements which we find in the higher types of animal behavior.³ Even in the highest

³ Some of the chief texts in psychology which have set forth the functional view of mind are: James, *Principles of Psychology*;

animals, however, there are many bodily activities which are not accompanied by consciousness. The need of conscious control apparently exists only at those points where new adjustments are required, where changes in relatively complex activities occur. We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness is associated in living creatures with the process of adaptation, especially when the process is rapid and complex. The mind is evidently an organ of adaptation, whose function is to furnish a superior method of control over the adaptive processes of life. The neural processes involved in consciousness, therefore, constitute the master device produced by organic evolution to perfect the control of the organism over its environment.

According to this view, which is that of modern psychology, mind is not something apart from life, but is a functioning element in the life-process. Like all other elements in life, it is subject to the laws of organic evolution. The fundamental attributes of our mental life must, therefore, be regarded as produced by variation, transmitted by heredity, and fixed by selection. They are as much determined by variation, heredity, and selection as the general characteristics of our bodies. Our capacities for sensation, for perception, for thought, our natural impulses, our emotions, and even our power of abstraction and reasoning, as we have seen, have been produced by organic evolution. All of these things can only be understood as functioning elements within the life process to which they bear an intimate connection. This does not mean, of course, that they may not function at times in imperfect and very disadvantageous ways, for the mind, as an organ of adaptation, is, even in man, still incompletely developed. It does indicate, however, that the mind and all of its processes must be regarded as a "control" over the adaptive operations of life.

Angell, *Psychology*; Thorndike, *Elements of Psychology*; McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*; Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*.

Now if the function of the mind is to bring about rapid, short-cut adaptations of the organism to its environment, then, manifestly, it must select among the countless stimuli which surround the organism those which need attention for the maintenance and development of life. Hence, intelligence is *selective*. From the first, therefore, mental activity is more or less purposeful,⁴ which means that the mind is concerned not merely with the passive adaptation of the organism to its environment, but with bending and shaping the environment to meet the needs of the organism. In the higher reaches of mental life the mind seems especially concerned with the active adaptation of the environment to the organism, that is, with the transformation of the environment. Most of the activities of man, which we call cultural, are of this sort; that is, they are purposeful. Whether purposeful activity is a form of mechanical reaction or not, as the materialists claim, *it is a fact, and one which is of peculiar importance for understanding human society.*

Purposeful activity, then, is a result of the selective method of mind as an organ of adaptation. As we have indicated, the mind selects the stimulus to which it responds. Moreover, in the higher creatures the stimuli to which responses are made are more and more actively sought. This shows that the purposeful becomes increasingly important as we ascend in the scale of life and of mind, and so, also, in the scale of social evolution. Human society, for instance, has become increasingly an expression of purposeful activity until, at the level of our present civilization, we may properly say that it is dominantly so. This purposive activity is particu-

⁴ Compare McDougall's statement: "Purposiveness seems to be the essence of mental activity" (*Outline of Psychology*, p. 49). See also McDougall's paper, "Purposive Striving as a Fundamental Category of Psychology" in *The Scientific Monthly* for September, 1924. Compare also the statements of Woodworth (*Psychology*, pp. 70-72) in which he defines purpose in effect "an internal state that lasts for a time and directs action."

larly revealed in the social sciences, which aim to replace the action of blind forces and circumstances in human social life by the action of intelligently formed purposes.

Original Human Nature ⁵

Before we can exercise this control over society we must understand the nature with which the individual is endowed by birth, and the possible limitations which it imposes upon scientific control. Some social thinkers ignore the original nature of man, or say that it has nothing to do with present social life;⁶ others, as we have seen, have made the mistake of making everything depend upon "original nature" and have confounded social evolution with organic evolution. Some social thinkers, again, have found the original nature of man inherently opposed to a high development of civilization; others have claimed that the original nature of man is so socially good and perfect that all that is needed is to remove from it all artificial constraints. Evidently the lack of a scientific psychology of the individual is responsible for the numerous, one-sided views of human nature which afflict our social thinking. Let us note some of these false psychologies of individual behavior.

The Passive View of Human Nature

According to this view the individual is by nature inert and does not act until some external cause or stimulus compels

⁵ "Human nature" is an ambiguous phrase depending for its meaning upon which term of the phrase is emphasized; hence the need of some modifying adjective. In this chapter we will use it in the sense of "the original nature of man." Professor Cooley, however, uses the term to mean, not the original animal nature of man, but "the nature which is developed and expressed" in primary groups (*Social Organization*, p. 30), and most sociologists follow his example. In later chapters the phrase is sometimes used in Cooley's sense without a modifying adjective. The student will experience no confusion if he observes the context.

⁶ This seems to be the position of Professor C. C. Josey in *The Social Philosophy of Instinct*.

him to do so. Sense impressions received from the external world, according to this theory, are what cause individual activity. The nervous system is regarded merely as a system of conductors. Action, accordingly, must be explained always through external stimuli, or the way that these stimuli associate with other stimuli already received and stored up by the nervous system. This would make the original nature of the individual, his character, and behavior simply the result of the circumstances of environment.

Now it is true that the environment acts upon the organism; but it is also true that the organism acts upon the environment, and that the organism is relatively much more active than the environment. The organism is dynamic; the environment is relatively static. Modern biology inclines to the view that spontaneity, that is, self-activity, is a characteristic of living bodies. A great biologist has said,⁷ "the organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive, living creature—to some extent master of its fate." Biological and psychological experiments have shown that living organisms remain active in media from which all changes in stimulation have been excluded.⁸ The conclusion has been reached, therefore, that the living organism is by nature self-active, and does not require stimulation from its environment in order to act.⁹ The organism under all normal conditions is constantly discharging energy which it has accumulated through its nutritive and other organic processes. This conclusion is in accord with the trend in modern physical science. If the kinetic theory of matter is not yet definitely established, it

⁷ See Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 284.

⁸ See Jennings, *The Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, pp. 191, 283-286.

⁹ Compare Hobhouse's statement (*Mind in Evolution*, Revised Edition, p. x): "The fundamental fact everywhere is that the living being is not passive, but active, not mechanical in its reaction to things, but assertive, plastic, and, in a measure proportioned to its development, self-determining."

seems about to become so. According to this theory, the passive view of physical nature is an illusion, for every particle of matter in the universe is in spontaneous motion, owing to its own internal nature, without waiting for the push of any external force.¹⁰

Now if the passive view of organic life below man, and even of physical nature, has been given up by modern science, then even more must we abandon the passive view of human nature; for the higher we ascend in the scale of animal organisms, the more katabolic their nature becomes; that is, the more they are constantly discharging energy. The human individual must be regarded as self-active, taking up from his environment whatever he needs in order to aid him in adapting himself to his surroundings. He does not react to all the stimuli in his environment, but selects rather those which have to do with his self-preservation and self-development. In other words, the individual selects the stimuli to which he attends according to his organic needs or acquired interests. Action really starts from within. The external stimulus is not so much that which compels action as that which gives opportunity for action and conditions it. It is a common error of those who are ignorant of human psychology to speak of the external stimulus as though it were the cause of action or behavior; but the cause of a given act lies, rather, in the whole set of the nervous system of an individual and in all the environing conditions.¹¹ The

¹⁰ A good brief summary of the new physics will be found in *The Scientific Monthly* for February, 1925, especially in Sir Ernest Rutherford's article "Electricity and Matter." See also J. A. Crowther, *Ions, Electrons, and Ionizing Radiations*, Chap. XVI. Professor E. W. Washburn (*Introduction to the Principles of Physical Chemistry*, p. 11) sums up the new theory thus: "The molecules of every substance, the atoms within the molecules, and the electrons within the atoms are in constant motion."

¹¹ Compare the careful discussion of this point in Miss Follett's *Creative Experience*, pp. 54-66. Miss Follett says: "Stimulus is not cause and response the effect . . . the sociologist must note as

subjection of the individual to his environment is, therefore, not immediate, as the passive view of human nature supposed, but only indirectly through habit and the selective power of the environment.

But the environment continually reacts upon and modifies the individual during his lifetime. For while the beginning of activity lies in the needs and nature of the organism, yet the stimulus maintains, develops, and conditions the activity. Thus the activity of the organism becomes modified through reaction with the environment. The total behavior of the individual can, of course, only be understood through understanding his inner constitution, on the one hand, and the stimuli in the environment to which he may react, upon the other hand. What this inner constitution of the individual is we shall see more in detail directly. Here we wish only to emphasize that the individual must be conceived of as a self-active and relatively independent unit, more or less capable of determining his own behavior among the conditions and forces surrounding him.

The Hedonistic View of Human Nature

Closely connected with the passive view of human nature is the hedonistic theory of individual behavior, according to which, the individual is moved to action wholly by pleasure or pain, using those terms in the broad sense of agreeable and disagreeable feeling. Perhaps this theory was never better stated than when Bentham said, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*." This theory has played a great part in the social thinking of the past, especially in economics and ethics.

carefully, must see as integral part of the causal process, internal as well as external condition." As regards organic metabolism initiating behavior, she quotes Professor E. B. Holt (p. 66) as follows: "If driven by metabolism, we have a disturbed nervous system, that system will so act toward environment as to put environment in that state which will make it send to the nervous system what it needs."

It was supposed by the advocates of this theory that some feeling of pleasure was necessary to move an organism toward an object and some feeling of pain or disagreeableness to repel from an object. The organism was considered to be passive, until the sense of some stimulus gave rise to either a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. If the feeling was pleasurable, then the organism was attracted toward the stimulus and action developed; but if the feeling was unpleasant, the organism was repelled from the stimulus and action inhibited.¹²

But the view that the organism is essentially active with reference to its environment has destroyed the foundations of this theory. We no longer need to suppose that it is always some pleasant or unpleasant feeling which leads to action. Psychologists are now unanimous in their opinion that activity may be antecedent to feeling and that feeling accompanies, rather than precedes, activity. Nevertheless, feeling may modify activity. Pleasant feeling seems to reinforce activity, while unpleasant feeling may inhibit activity. The mistake of the hedonistic view of human nature was rather that it made pleasant and unpleasant feeling the sole motive to action, and so the sole explanation of behavior. Human nature is not so simple.

The Egoistic View of Human Nature

This view is also more or less closely connected with the two preceding theories. It is the view which regards every act of the individual as selfish or self-regarding. It was a view easy to hold as long as the theory that every act was the outcome of pleasant or unpleasant feeling was held. But with the more biological theory of original human nature,

¹² For criticism of psychological hedonism, see Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 458-463; also Meyer's articles on "The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness" in *The Psychological Review*, Vol. XV.

which modern science has established, we now see that activities may be as easily other-regarding as self-regarding. Variation and natural selection can as easily establish innate impulses in the individual toward action favorable to others or to the race as to self.¹³ We find in original human nature both altruistic, or other-regarding, impulses and egoistic, or self-regarding. Both egoism and altruism are equally natural, though the necessities for the struggle for existence have made the egoistic impulses stronger in most animals, including man. Which impulses will be stronger in the adult individual is, however, a matter of education and environment. Here it is important only to note that both egoism and altruism are equally natural and that it is a psychological error to derive altruistic behavior in general from egoistic impulses.

The Individualistic View of Human Nature

Somewhat related to all three of the preceding views is the view that the individual is a quite independent and self-contained unit, who comes onto the stage of life completely equipped for action and with a definite nature. According to this view, each individual is a separate creation. His connections with his fellow men are adventitious and non-essential. As we have seen, modern science says that the individual has been produced through the operation of the organic forces which have evolved his species; that he has nowhere developed in isolation, but everywhere in association with his fellow beings; and finally, that natural selection has established in him impulses and capacities which concern the race and the members of his group even more than they concern himself as an individual. While science shows the individual to be a self-active, more or less self-determining unit, it shows him at the same time to have been fashioned

¹³ Compare Hobhouse's statement (*Mind in Evolution*, p. 339): "The conception of a primitive egoism on which sociability is somehow overlaid is without foundation either in biology or psychology."

by an organic evolution which has been conditioned by social evolution; that is, that the individual has been developed as a member of a group. It shows, in particular, that the mental capacities and character of the human individual have been developed in connection with group life, and that their main function has been to adapt the individual to his group; that is, to make possible a process of interaction among individuals which may enable them mutually to adjust themselves to one another in the carrying on of the life of the group. Mind is, therefore, not an individualistic matter. Even a man's instincts and appetites link him to his fellow men. The most egoistic of his natural impulses are found upon analysis to presuppose social life. Even the feelings, which seem so peculiarly an individual matter, give value to the life and actions of others not less than to the life and actions of oneself. The main individual mental processes act as a link between individuals and further their better mutual adaptation to one another in the process of living together. Mind is an organ of social interconnection as well as of adaptation.

All this can be said of the original tendencies and capacities of man. If we include any consideration of his acquired traits, his social nature becomes even more obvious; for it is obvious that language, habits, thoughts, standards, and values are all acquired by the individual from his social environment. He could scarcely acquire these if originally he did not inherit social tendencies and capacities; or rather, if he had not been evolved as a member of a group and for living in groups. Human personality is mainly acquired and a creation of the human social process. Philosophical or psychological individualism must, therefore, be given up; but the main truth which it sought to emphasize, that a human group is not a simple mass, but is made up of relatively independent, autonomous individuals, will stand. The individual is not merely a relatively independent center of energy, but is the variable, and so the creative, element in the group life. The

influence of the creative personalities of individuals upon group life must be taken into account. The key to the activities of a human group is, therefore, not merely the principles which apply to the mass as a whole, but also in the laws and principles of individual behavior. It should not be forgotten, however, that human groups are functional units, and that individuals in social relations always form for one another a mutual environment, which is by far the most important part of their total environment; and that, therefore, the group and its organization is not less real than the individual and his behavior.

Social Adaptation

The whole life of the group, as well as of the individual, centers around habitual and adaptive activities. The mental life of the individual, as we have seen, begins in life activity and ends in life activity. Conscious processes come in to intermediate and control larger activities. They function, as we have already said, to control action or behavior in those complex situations in which the unconscious, physiological reactions of the body are inadequate to secure adaptation. They function, therefore, especially to control the individual's social behavior.

Now, just as the mental life of the individual centers around habit and adaptation, so, also, does the life of the group. Just as conscious processes in the individual appear in the transition from one habit to another at those points where purely mechanical means of adjustment are inadequate, and there is need of conscious control of action, so processes of mental interstimulation and response, or the various forms of intercommunication, appear in a group in the transition from one form of social activity to another, when unconscious means of reciprocal adjustment on the part of individuals are inadequate. The whole process of interstimulation and response between individuals evidently comes in to

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intermediate and control processes of social adaptation. *The social process is a process of reciprocal progressive adaptation of individuals to one another in the carrying on of some phase of group life.* Hence the greater part of the consciousness of individuals is taken up with the relations of individuals to one another. If this were not so, the mutual adjustments of their activities would be impossible under the conditions of a complex group life. The mental life of the individual and his social life in his group are, therefore, inseparable. To understand one we must understand the other. But our problem is to understand the behavior of the group, rather than the behavior of the individual. But if social and mental life are inseparable, in order to understand the behavior of groups, we must understand everything which enters into the behavior of the individual. The individual mind is the basis of group behavior.

The Different Levels of Human Behavior¹⁴

We have already seen that original human nature, even as given us by organic evolution, is complex, and that we cannot explain it in such simple terms as popular psychology is accustomed to do. But it is much more complex than what we have thus far indicated. In the evolution of behavior from the protozoans to man, different levels of behavior have appeared and different "controls" over behavior have been developed. By the very nature of the process of evolution the later and higher levels of behavior do not supplant the earlier and lower levels. At best, they simply act as controls over the lower. In the actual, concrete behavior of individuals they are inextricably mingled; but for the sake of psychological analysis, in order to understand human behavior, we must try to separate them. Five different levels of human behavior are evident upon analysis:

¹⁴ One of the best recent psychological presentations of this topic is Woodworth's *Psychology, A Study of Mental Life*.

1. *Hereditary or Instinctive Reactions*¹⁵

Difficult as it may be to distinguish the hereditary, or the inborn, from the acquired element in human behavior, it must be attempted. So fundamental a problem cannot be dodged, even though instruments of precision have not been perfected to make this distinction. The distinction is important scientifically because we must know the biological or organic equipment of the individuals we start with.¹⁶ It is important practically because we must discriminate between the "native," or "inborn," in the behavior of the individual and of the group and what is "acquired," or "learned." For this knowledge of the relative influence of the inborn and the acquired will largely determine the type of scientific control which must be developed over life. If the innate proves to be most important, emphasis must be placed on the biological approach in controlling social life; if the acquired, instead, stands out as the most influential, the stress must be put on environmental means. The question of the relative position of the innate and the acquired is still a matter of controversy among both psychologists and sociologists, and we can only indicate what seems to us in the light of our present knowledge the most reasonable conclusion.¹⁷ Scientific balance must be preserved in this as in all controversies.

We have noted that all organisms are by nature active, and that their original activities are directed to maintaining and developing the life of the organism. These original activities of living forms, which nearly coincide with what biologists call "tropisms," include the simple activities which we find in the lower organisms connected with the processes of nutrition,

¹⁵ For the sociological elaboration and applications of this topic, see Chap. IX of this book.

¹⁶ Compare Woodworth, *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

¹⁷ The most recent summing up of this controversy is to be found in Professor Bernard's *Instinct, A Study in Social Psychology*.

reproduction, and defense.¹⁸ In higher organisms with nervous systems we find these same organic reactions, only more complex, and, as we should expect, apparently definitely correlated with the structure of the nervous system. As the hereditary structure of the nervous system becomes still more complex as we ascend in the scale of life, these organic reactions persist, only becoming more complex, more numerous, more indefinite, and more modifiable. In the human individual, therefore, we find few or no hereditary reactions which are of the fixed and definite type which we find in the lower types of life, such as among the insects. On the other hand, we seem to find a great variety of "native impulses," "natural" or "instinctive tendencies," all more or less modifiable. A few of these, like the impulses connected with food and sex, are definite appetites; most of them, however, appear in conscious experience as spontaneous or "natural desires." Hence, we are forced to conclude that among our nervous reactions to stimuli are certain reactions which we may call original; that is, they are unlearned and furnished us by heredity. The only way in which heredity can express itself in behavior is through inherited tendencies to react in certain ways. These inherited reaction tendencies probably represent inborn, hereditary, or preorganized, connections in the nervous system, and so to that extent may be regarded as inherited "action patterns."¹⁹ Biologists tell us that roughly one-third of the connections in the nervous system of man are organized at birth or shortly after. While it would be unsafe to infer that this represents the part which hereditary reactions play in the behavior of the individual, it at least indicates that there are certain preformed or heredi-

¹⁸ See Kellogg's statement (*Mind and Heredity*): "A tropism is the inborn, diffuse tendency to move to or from some stimulus, as light, heat, food, or the mate."

¹⁹ Inherited reaction patterns are of several types, some being dominantly emotional rather than impulsive, but for the reason given on p. 83 we lump all together.

tary pathways in the nervous system, which give rise to what we may call natural or organic reactions in contrast to the reactions which are acquired or learned by the individual. The hereditary bent is thus one factor in behavior.

Now these organic reactions with which the individual is equipped by his hereditary nature, psychologists usually call "instinctive reactions." Because the word "instinct" suggests the hard and fast types of hereditary reaction which we find in the insects and other lower forms of life, there has been great objection to the use of the word in describing any part of the social behavior of man.²⁰ Certainly there are in man no "inherited automatic action patterns" such as we find in the insects, unless it be a few simple reflexes. It would perhaps be better, usually, to employ such terms as "native impulses," "natural tendency," "inherited proclivity," or the like.²¹ We shall employ the terms "instinct" and "instinctive tendency" as synonymous with these other terms, and as covering the whole hereditary element in human behavior except inherited capacity.²² In this broad sense of native impulse, or inherited reaction tendency, there is probably an indefinite number of instinctive reactions in the human individual. In this sense it is probably true that man has more instincts than any other animal, as Comte said, long before

²⁰ Many biologists hold to this hard and fast view of instinct. Thus Kellogg (*Mind and Heredity*) implies that in instinct, there is but one way to a necessary result, and instinct runs in pre-determined grooves, offering no alternatives. If we take instinct in this sense, there is no instinctive element in human behavior, apart from the simple reflexes.

²¹ Professor Dewey (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 105) thus justifies a similar position: "The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted—which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings."

²² Allport (*Social Psychology*, p. 79f.) would use the phrase "prepotent reflexes" to cover the same element.

William James said the same thing.²³ It would seem probable, at any rate, that the number of instinctive or hereditary reactions in man are greater than in any other animal, simply because his nervous system is so much further evolved and his heredity is so much richer and more complex. What are ordinarily called "instincts" in individual behavior, however, are complexes or combinations of these instinctive impulses with acquired reactions. Hence, the instinctive reactions of man are little more than a complex series of natural impulses or reflexes which may be modified by experience and built up into permanent habits. The hereditary reactions of man are, therefore, more plastic and modifiable than in any other species of animal of which we have knowledge. Nevertheless, for the reason which we have pointed out above, any psychology of human society which is based upon modern biology cannot escape the concept of instinct or its equivalent, for we have to start the social adjustments of man with hereditary or organic reactions if we begin at the beginning.

What we have said thus far is purely psychological; and we have agreed that individual psychology does not concern us except as we can show that it has some definite relation to group life and social organization. The question remains, then, how far instinctive tendencies affect the behavior of human groups, their organization, and the development of human institutions. As soon as we grasp the fact that *instinctive tendencies are the original animal impulses*, then it becomes evident that they might affect social evolution in at least three ways:

1. These original animal impulses would furnish the most primitive basis for adjustment in social relations. Their influence in human society would probably not be conspicuous except in the most primitive origins of institutions and of culture; but they would furnish at the beginning certain very

²³ Compare Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 522.

simple coördinations or adaptations between individuals, such as those of sex, parents and children, leader and follower. If we take the simpler human social groups, we shall have little difficulty in seeing this. The family, for example, is a typical group in which the instinctive element is very pronounced. Here we have at work, not only such natural tendencies as sexual and parental love, but also the impulses associated with attitudes of superiority and subordination.

2. The original animal impulses furnish human beings with certain persistent motives which enter into human wishes and turn up in social behavior constantly. Natural or instinctive impulses are probably the strongest motives to action in most human beings until relatively late in life, and in all human beings they persist throughout life. We must understand them in order to understand the real springs of activity in social life. No matter how complex social life becomes, it is based upon the modification of the hereditary reactions which persist throughout its structure. In every relation of life, therefore, the original impulses of human nature may be found at work beneath the acquired habits which make up our institutional and cultural life.

3. In periods of emotional excitement the original animal impulses of human beings may come to expression almost in their primitive form. Under such circumstances they usually produce reversion to something approaching animal behavior under similar conditions. Such crude manifestations of instinctive tendencies are seen in human populations especially in times of war, of mobs, or of other public excitement. Natural impulses on these occasions usually work in a brutal and destructive way.²⁴ This is one of the explanations of

²⁴ Says Professor E. L. Thorndike (in *Educational Review*, Dec., 1914): "I find many of these tendencies born in man to be archaic, useless, immoral adaptations to such a life as man lived in the woods a hundred thousand years ago—when affection had not spread beyond the family or justice beyond the tribe or science beyond the need of to-morrow, when truth was only the undisputed and goodness

the reversionary tendencies which are sometimes manifested in human groups. As we shall see in a later chapter, we touch at this point, also, upon the whole problem of evil or maladjustment in human relations, though the problem is obviously so complex that the animal impulses of human nature cannot be more than one of the factors involved.

4. Professor Dewey has suggested that the native impulses of human nature are not always static or reversionary in their influence upon the social life of man. The strictly biological view would seemingly force us to the conclusion that hereditary reactions can adjust individuals and groups only to past environments or even, perhaps, only to the conditions of life as they existed almost before human culture began. At any rate, all scientific psychology recognizes that original impulses are quite inadequate to secure proper adjustment in a rapidly changing world, such as human society now is. Professor Dewey, however, suggests that the very richness of man's natural impulses gives him an opportunity of choice such as no animal possesses, and that, therefore, such opportunity has made for progress.²⁵ In this way impulses come to aid, not only in breaking up habits that are no longer adjusted, but in securing new and better adjustments. Thus the plasticity and richness of man's natural impulses is one of the conditions of social progress. This view is at least worthy of consideration.

2. *Acquired Habits* ²⁶

Besides the activities which come to us by heredity, there are the many modifications of these activities which arise through the influence of environment. These latter we call

only the unrebutted." Quoted by Kilpatrick, *Source Book in the Philosophy of Education*, p. 47.

²⁵ "Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be *learned*." Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

²⁶ See footnote page 10. The main sociological effects of habit are discussed in Chapters V-VIII.

acquired habits. They probably express the acquired connections in the nervous system in distinction from the original connections which are inherited. They may, therefore, be called "acquired action patterns." While habits are due to the modifying influence of the environment, we must not think that they are formed by the mechanical pressure of the environment upon the individual. We have already seen that the individual selects upon the basis of his needs the stimuli in the environment to which he responds. When he has responded successfully to new stimuli in the environment and has adapted himself to them, a habit of action becomes established. This habit becomes persistent after several similar responses to similar stimuli, and so takes on the character of a new impulse. It becomes, as we may say, "second nature." Early habits, of course, are modified by later habits, and thus are built up the countless habits of the mature human individual.

Individual attitudes and character in the adult are largely the result of the habits which he acquires. What we mean by character in the individual is the whole complex of his habits and mental attitudes. If we include under the term habit not only the bodily activities of the individual, but also his internal "mental attitudes," as we may properly do, then we see that mature human life is very largely a matter of habit.

Man's capacity to acquire an indefinite number of habits is, as we have already seen, the main basis upon which cultural evolution, or civilization, has been built. Through the acquiring and diffusion and handing down habits of tool making and using and of ways of living together, man has been able to build up the wonderful structure of his culture. Thus the very substance of human culture, and so of human social life, is habit. Let us see what are the particular social expressions of habit in human society:

1. Social usages, or "folkways," are simply group habits.

that is, habits shared in common by practically all members of a group. On the side of individual behavior these habits give rise to the prevalent "social attitudes" of individuals. Such "social habits"²⁷ are the raw material out of which human institutions are made. Practically, however, we have restricted the term "usage" to those social habits that are not particularly sanctioned by the group, but more or less unconsciously practiced. We have other names for socially prevalent habits which have various degrees of social sanction attached to them.

2. Social customs, or the "mores," are the social habits which have been more or less sanctioned by the groups in which they obtain. There is, therefore, more or less social compulsion connected with a custom, and its violation is apt to bring some more or less unpleasant reaction from the group. When social customs have been long established and have been reflected upon in connection with the welfare of the group, they are especially apt to get very strong sanctions attached to them. It is these, especially, which Professor Sumner called the mores; and he showed that when the folkways become mores they become practically all-powerful on account of the strong social sanctions attached to them.²⁸

3. Social institutions are simply social habits which are systematized, instituted or established by groups, and have still stronger sanctions attached to them than do simple customs. They carry a step further the establishment of the social habit through the exercise of authority or compulsion

²⁷ Allport (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, p. 696) objects to the use of the term "social habits" in the sense of group habits. This is in accordance with his general position that there is only individual behavior, and hence no group behavior or group habits. See again Chap. I for the argument for the reality of group behavior. "Socially prevalent habits" may be read by those who object to the term "social habits" or "group habits." There seems to be little reason for coining a new term such as "societal habitudes." See the definition of the word "social" in Chap. I.

²⁸ See Sumner, *Folkways*, especially pp. 30, 173, 174.

on the part of a group. Institutions may be defined as *habitual ways of living together which have been sanctioned, systematized, and established by the authority of communities.*²⁹ As they represent the culmination of group control over social habits and social behavior, they are the especial concern of sociology, though folkways and customs, which represent less formalized and sanctioned expressions of habit in human society, are of scarcely less interest. So far as we know, institutions, in any proper use of the term, do not exist below the human level. They are, therefore, one of the distinctive traits of human society, and along with tool making one of the most conspicuous products of cultural evolution.

4. Now social organization in human groups is a result of their usages, customs, and institutions, and so is very largely a matter of habit. So far as it is on the distinctively human level it is a result of the habitual adjustments which the members of a group maintain among themselves. The prevalent "social attitudes" of individuals largely result from these group habits. The psychological fact of habit is thus the main carrier of all forms of social organization which rise above the merely instinctive level. The social order of high civilization, especially, is almost entirely made up of habitual types of reaction, acquired, sometimes painfully learned, by each individual, which serve to hold each person in orderly relations to all the other individuals of his group.

Thus we see that *human society is more largely dominated by habit than by instinctive reaction or heredity.* Man seems

²⁹ Compare Hobhouse's definition of institution (*Social Development*, p. 49): "Part of the established and recognized apparatus of social life regulating a whole mass of human relations." Some writers use the word wrongly to include customs and even usages. MacIver (*Community*, third edition, p. 154) rightly says: "Institutions are forms of order established within social life by some common will. The qualifying phrase, 'established by some common will,' enables us to distinguish these from customs. . . . Customs are but the habits of community."

to have an indefinite capacity to acquire habits. Whether this capacity has natural limits or not we cannot say. Some writers in psychology hold that habit is not second nature, but something very much weaker than original nature; that, therefore, man can never remain permanently adjusted to a very complex civilization, but through inability to learn complex habits and through fatigue, he will tend always to revert to those lower levels of behavior which will be closer to his original nature. It may be safely held at present that there is no adequate scientific evidence for these views. There is no evidence that our present civilization is so high that man cannot adapt himself to it. We know of no form of society or of culture which is so complex that man, through the sheer weakness of his original nature, is incapable of maintaining it. All such instances upon analysis resolve themselves into either faulty means of education and habituation of individuals or faults in social organization and environment which are capable of correction. Man seems at the beginning of his cultural evolution, so far as sociology can discover, rather than to have reached too high a culture for his original nature. Even the original tendencies of human nature, barring a few which are connected with the functions of nutrition and reproduction, are not stronger than the habits of adult life which have become successfully established. This is not saying, however, that if the original tendencies of human nature are wrongly dealt with, or foolishly repressed, they may not result in a "balked disposition," or other morbid or pathological manifestations.³⁰

If our human world were static, instinctive impulses and acquired habits would be sufficient to carry on all life-

³⁰ The elaborate literature on this topic, especially that of the Freudian psychologists, needs to be used critically. Critical discussion of the matter will be found in Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method*, especially Chap. VI, and in Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, especially Chap. VII.

processes and to control behavior. We have seen that something very much higher than our original animal impulses is needed to produce distinctly human social life and its culture. This something is in part supplied by man's great capacity to acquire habits. But even habit adjusts us to the environment of yesterday rather than to the environment of to-day. Habit is an inadequate control over behavior in a moving, dynamic world. Habits must change with changing conditions. New habits must be built up continually if progress is to go on. Under such circumstances there is evidently needed inner controls over behavior, which will facilitate the process of adaptation or the readjustment of habits. These inner controls are feeling and thought.

3. *Feeling*³¹

By feeling we mean the pleasant or unpleasant tone of consciousness which accompanies an activity. Using the words in a very broad way, feeling is practically synonymous with pleasure and pain. It is a subjective valuation which the organism gives to an activity. On the neural side it seems to mark the reinforcement or weakening of the nervous current concerned with any particular activity by the lower and more vegetative nervous centers. When the nervous current is augmented or reinforced by these lower nervous centers the feeling experienced is one of pleasure or pleasantness. When it is weakened or diminished the feeling is that of unpleasantness or discomfort. Now the lower nervous centers usually reinforce the activities which express original animal impulses or the original tendencies of human nature. The feelings which accompany the satisfaction of these impulses are, therefore, generally pleasurable.³² But on account

³¹ For the sociological elaboration and application, see Chap. XII of this book.

³² Compare with the theories of feeling in Woodworth, *Psychology*, Chap. IX; also M'ever's theory referred to on p. 78.

of man's power to form habits these lower centers come also in time to reinforce habitual modes of activity; and hence the feelings which accompany habitual activities are usually pleasant. On the other hand, the impeding of instinctive or habitual activities is usually experienced as unpleasant. Feeling, therefore, powerfully reinforces both habits and original impulses. It is evident that it may vary greatly from individual to individual, so far as it is a matter of habit. Peculiarities of individual constitution, of health, and of habit often powerfully influence our feelings and make what is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. In short, feeling is quite a subjective and individualistic matter.³³ It is the individual's value of an activity; or as one writer has happily termed it,³⁴ "it is the *me*-side of the whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjustment."

Now, there are several phases of feeling which demand especial attention on account of their influence upon behavior. The feelings which are connected with organic reactions, and which are rooted, therefore, in the hereditary constitution of our organism, are particularly strong, and we call them the *emotions*. Primary emotions, like the instinctive impulses, are original hereditary endowments of human nature, and, though varying in strength with individuals, are common to all men.³⁵ They may be regarded as complexes of organic reactions, feelings, and sensations, and are among the powerful motives which influence human action.³⁶ Less strong than the emotions, but more prevalent and manifest in everyday human behavior, are the *interests*, *desires*, and *wishes*. While our strongest desires and wishes seem attached to our original animal impulses, the mass of our desires, wishes, and interests are unquestionably associated with our habits, and so

³³ Compare Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

³⁴ Miller, *The Psychology of Thinking*, p. 64.

³⁵ See Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII. See also Bernard, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVIII.

may be regarded as the subjective side of our habits, involving not only elements of feeling but also of perception. Somewhat more complex than the emotions or desires are the *sentiments*. These are enduring attitudes of impulse and feeling toward some object or idea. They are sometimes simply called "complexes," though the best usage limits the latter term to morbid or pathological combinations of feeling and impulse. It has been said that the sentiments are the units out of which adult individual character is made.³⁷ There can be little objection to this statement if we mean by the sentiments the complexes of feeling and impulse which are associated with the habits of mature life. Finally, from all of these—the emotions, interests, desires, and sentiments—arise the social values of individuals.

While it is a mistake to find in pleasure and pain, or in agreeable and disagreeable feelings, the sole motives to action, as the psychology of the early nineteenth century did, it is equally a mistake in our study of human behavior not to take feeling sufficiently into account. Feeling, as we have seen, is a conscious accompaniment of activity. Hence it modifies activity or behavior. If feeling is pleasurable, the activity is reinforced, but if feeling is disagreeable or painful the activity tends to be inhibited. The emotions are particularly effective modifiers of behavior. "Our emotions," says Professor Pyle, "are back of nearly all that we voluntarily do. At the bottom of nearly every act is love or hate or envy or jealousy or anger or fear. Nothing of great consequence is ever undertaken that does not have back of it some emotion." Again, Professor Cooley rightly says, "sentiment is the chief motive power of life and, as a rule, lies deeper in our minds than thought, from which, however, it is not to be sharply separated." This last quotation indicates that these writers are using the terms emotion and sentiment in a broad way,

³⁷ See McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, Chap. XVII.

not excluding associated habits and ideas. The student should not fail to note that these psychological principles have a direct bearing, not only on the motivation of actual social behavior as we find it, but also on the motivation of higher types of behavior. If we can discover how to cultivate in individuals the right emotional attitudes and sentiments, we shall be a long way on the road to discovering how human society may be bettered.

Thus far our analysis has been psychological, but our interest is not in the individual, but in the social, effects of feeling. What are the social effects of feeling, whether feeling be in the form of emotion, desire, interest, or sentiment? At least three very evident social effects of feeling may be pointed out.

1. Feeling furnishes the most persistent, conscious motives to action in the mass of individuals. Even the motivating power of inborn impulses is unconscious until it expresses itself in some form of feeling, such as emotion or desire. The mass of social values in a given group is embedded in the more or less conscious desires, wishes, and sentiments of the individuals of the group. To change social values we must educate the desires and sentiments of individuals. If we wish to secure changes in human society we must enlist the feelings on the side of those changes. Usually it is the sympathetic or altruistic feelings which are most favorable to progressive changes, as they are the most socialized of our feelings. Even egoistic or selfish feelings must be respected, however, if we are going to be successful in bringing about changes in society; for feeling, as we have seen, in a peculiar sense stands for the individual, and the individual may not safely be ignored in social arrangements. It is the feelings, or sentiments and desires, of the mass of individuals that immediately motivate mass action. The control of collective emotion and feeling is, therefore, one secret of effective social control.

2. Feeling has often a powerful conservative effect in our social life because it tends to reinforce habitual activities. Folkways, customs, and institutions are embedded in feeling and it is often very hard to get feeling to sanction a change. Thus an institution like monarchy or slavery, which has been long established, has powerful supporting feelings among the mass of the people, and this dead weight of feeling has to be overcome before a more rational institution can be established. This is particularly true in a population, not trained to use its intelligence, which guides itself largely through feeling. It is fortunate that feeling is not wholly a matter of habit or else its influence would tend to be overconservative.

3. Feeling also often proves a dissolving force in human society as regards the higher types of behavior and of social order; for the most powerful feelings are attached to our instinctive or animal impulses. When an institution is needlessly repressive of our original human nature, it stimulates reactions against itself. Strong emotions are aroused, and unless the repression ceases, the institution in question may be swept away. Hence the appeal to feeling has always been a method used for the overthrow of despotic and oppressive institutions. Unfortunately, the same appeal can be made for the overthrow of wise and salutary institutions; for all institutions involve some degree of restraint upon the individual. Thus the anarchist makes his appeal to feeling not less than the true liberator. The emotions of man may, therefore, be enlisted on the side either of social retrogression or of social progress, as well as on the side of social conservatism. Uncontrolled emotion in human society, however, nearly always works either for a static condition or for retrogression.

It is evident that feeling is a powerful force in human society, and, as such, that it must always be taken into account. But it is also evident that feeling alone is a very unsafe guide in our complex social life. Progress, change for the better in human society, involves complex and diffi-

cult adjustments, and difficult adjustments are always unpleasant. Hence if we adopt feeling as a guide for our social behavior, we make it much more difficult to bring about rational changes or new adaptations in the social order. To be sure, the emotions can easily be enlisted against a repressive social order. But pure emotionalism reduces social behavior to the animal level. The sympathetic emotions, however, when rationally controlled, do furnish a basis for higher social adjustments; and so far as we can find safe social guidance in feeling it is largely in the emotions and sentiments of sympathy and love of mankind as a whole. Our own comfort or discomfort, pleasure or pain, can furnish little of such guidance.

4. *Intelligence*³⁸

By intelligence we mean the capacity to improve upon natural tendencies through profiting by prior experience.³⁹ On the intelligent level of action previous experience is, through memory, brought to bear upon the guidance of present action. Intelligence differs from both instinct and habit in that it does not consist in already formed reactions. It functions to evaluate and control activities with reference to present and future environments, while instinct and habit have reference to past environments, and hence represent already formed reactions, one by heredity, the other by learning. Intelligence also differs from feeling. Feeling is subjective, nonanalytic, and individualistic in its reference. Intelligence is objective, analytic, and tends to be universal in its reference. The method of intelligence is not only the utilization of the stored-up experience of the organism, but

³⁸ The sociological effects of intelligence and rationality are discussed more fully in Chaps. VII and X. Intelligence, of course, is much broader than rationality, the ability to form and use concepts.

³⁹ Compare McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 71; also Woodworth, *Psychology*, Chap. XII.

an attempt, through attention, discrimination, and perception, to evaluate the present environment. These cognitive mental processes, therefore, come in as elements or factors in the process of adaptation.

It is evident that intelligence has to do with the making of the more difficult and more complex adjustments of the organism to its environment. The most general mark of intelligent behavior is the adaptation of means to ends, or the overcoming of difficulties by the utilization of past experience and the perception of relationships. In other words, the most general mark of intelligence is *problem-solving ability*. But intelligence solves the problems of life not through mere "trial and error" responses, but through perception of relationships, knowledge, and values. Thus intelligence plays a decisive rôle in adapting the organism to its environment. Man's innate capacity for intelligence beyond that of any other animal is especially what has given him a distinctive social life; while the increase of intelligence in society through training of the individual mind and through the accumulation of knowledge is the main foundation for our belief that man's social life will continue to evolve in the future to much higher stages of development.

The development of intelligence in the world of animal life took place slowly and gradually from the lowliest beginnings. In the lower animals, in general, intelligence was developed as an aid in carrying out instinctive impulses and in satisfying the demands for feeling. Even in man intelligence is still too often in subjection to animal impulses and to individualistic feelings. But it is not necessarily in subjection to these, because one way that intelligence has developed is as a control over action when natural impulse, feeling, and even habit were insufficient. In other words, intelligence gets its chance to control action largely when instincts, feelings, and habits break down. Then it has a chance to select among competing impulses as well as to

evaluate the situation in the environment. Through this selection it may play a large part in the formation of new habits.

We are now ready to see some general effects of intelligence upon the social life, even before it reaches the level of rationality.

1. First of all, it gives conscious purposes to group life, that is, conscious foreknowledge of the goal toward which the action of the group is directed. Some degree of purpose may, perhaps, be found in the lower levels of behavior, but conscious purposes could hardly exist until one knows both what he wants and the means to get it. It is only the later and more complex adjustments in social life, however, which are thus intelligently purposeful. In the lower levels of behavior the appearance of what seems intelligent purpose is often the result of more or less automatic adjustment upon the basis of blind impulse, habit, or feeling. Only when we have conscious, intelligent selection of means to reach certain ends may we regard adaptations as consciously purposeful; but these we find in human society.

2. Problem-solving ability, or intelligence, implies *learning ability*. This makes possible a form of social life which is more or less based upon the experience and learning of the individual. This is the type of social life which we find in humanity. Learning is not simply a matter of habit formation; in any proper sense of the word, it is also a matter of intelligence. It is the *intelligent* control over the formation of habit (or over the selection of impulses) which is the basis of the learning process. It is the same way in groups of individuals as with a single individual. Groups of individuals learn to do new things and to build up complex adjustments through intelligent control of the formation of habits. It is in this way that man has built up a social life unlike that of any other animal. At bottom this is a result of the fact that man has passed through stages of organic evolution which

have developed in him a higher capacity for intelligence than any other animal possesses. This distinctively higher type of intelligence which characterizes man we call "reasoning" or "rationality."

5. *Rationality*

By rationality or reasoning we mean the power of abstract thought, of conceptual thinking, of mental exploration, which enables man to see relationships which exist between facts and to put facts into new relationships.⁴⁰ It is, of course, merely a higher development of intelligence and depends upon the power of the mind to think in symbols, or to form abstract ideas, "general notions," or concepts, which are relatively independent of particular objects. It is this power of abstraction, as we have repeatedly said, which distinguishes the mind of man from that of other animals and which has given man a power of control over his own behavior and over his world such as no other animal possesses. Probably the older and more spontaneous form of this power of abstraction is what we call *imagination*. In the process of imagination we put facts into new relationships; our thoughts and images wander, seemingly without definite direction or control, though some aim may be given to their wandering. In such a case, imagination may become constructive and so work out a plan, design a tool or an object of art, and so also create inner patterns for action. In *reasoning* we control our thoughts and have a very precise aim, to see the actual meaning of the combined premises. Thus reasoning is nothing more than controlled, abstract thinking in order to see new meanings in given relationships, and is very closely related to imagination. It is performing experiments, as it were, in imagination. Imagination is merely freer and more variable. Both are processes of *mental* exploration, while

⁴⁰ See Woodworth, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XVIII and XIX.

the animals below man, so far as we know, can learn only by *muscular* exploration.

Man's power of abstraction, his power of imagination and reasoning, therefore, gives him a device for controlling behavior and dealing with the environment such as no other animal possesses. Man through imagination and reasoning may evaluate activity, not simply with reference to his present environment, but also with reference to any possible future environment. By means of this superior development of his intelligence his mind is able to take account of facts neither present nor tangible to the senses, remote perhaps in both space and time. In this way he reaches judgments regarding these facts and forms social and moral ideals to guide him. Thus this highest level of intelligence and of behavior enables man to do many things which the simpler cognitive processes, such as sensation, perception, and recognition, could not possibly do. Reason and imagination are the two universally-relating activities of the mind and their goal seems to be nothing less than to adapt man to the universe itself.

Nothing has been the subject of greater dispute in modern thought than the place of these higher intellectual powers of man in his social life. The tendency of nineteenth century thought was to discount the part which reasoning and imagination played in social evolution. It would seem tolerably clear that reflective thought, as the latest phase of mind to develop fully and as something in its full development quite peculiar to man, could not have much to do with the most primitive social origins. Such origins must be sought mainly in human instincts, in the "trial and error" method of adaptation, and in resulting habits. Neither has reason nor imagination much to do with sustaining social institutions and organizations after they have become established; for that is largely a matter of habit. Nevertheless, man's higher intellectual powers have entered into social life increasingly as humanity has outgrown or found insufficient the trial and error method

of adaptation; and it is these higher intellectual powers which from the first have given human society its distinct and peculiar traits. Let us see what are these peculiar traits of human society which owe their origin to man's higher intellectual development.

1. The first outcome of the distinctively human brain with its power of abstraction was *language* or articulate speech. By means of language, patterns of action in the mind could be symbolized and communicated. "Mental patterns" thus became "social patterns." Thus a group tradition could be formed by means of which each generation could hand down to its successors its knowledge, ideas, standards, and values. Thus language, in becoming the vehicle of social tradition, reacted to further the intellectual development of man. It became a social means for storing up knowledge, thought, beliefs, mental patterns, and social stimuli of every sort. In fact the spoken word, or articulate speech, became the primary device which made cultural evolution possible; and let us not forget that every spoken word presupposes mental abstraction.

2. Inventions and discoveries of all sorts are products of man's imagination and reasoning. The simplest stone tool anthropologists tell us, was made with a mental pattern in mind. There is no evidence that invention and discovery, in the strict sense, that is, in the sense of putting things together mentally into new relationships, exist below man. Invention and discovery in this sense involve the making of hypotheses and testing of hypotheses; that is, they depend upon constructive imagination and reasoning. The simplest inventions and discoveries were doubtless often accidental; but man's rational perception of relationships led to his utilization of the patterns suggested by nature or accident. In other words, every new invention is a new idea, a new mental pattern, which is a result of imagination and reasoning. Now invention and discovery have been the means by which

man has slowly conquered the forces of nature and harnessed them to his use. Through invention man has learned to make and use tools, from the simplest stone tool to the modern airplane. The making of tools, along with the scientific discovery of the property and nature of things, has given man his material culture. But invention and discovery should not be confined to new combinations or utilizations of physical forces; for new social arrangements, new forms of group life, may be equally products of imagination and reasoning. Hence, social and moral development in human society has depended very largely upon these higher intellectual processes. Moral ideas and ideals are as much mental patterns as are the patterns for physical tools, and depend quite as much upon the rational element in man's mind.

3. We may sum up by saying that culture itself is essentially the creation of man's imagination and reasoning. Culture is not simply acquired habits, but habits acquired through higher intelligence. Not only language, tool making, invention, and discovery depended upon man's higher intelligence, but also such regulative institutions of human society as those associated with government, religion, morality, and education. That is the reason why we do not find these below the human level. In art and science human imagination and reasoning especially manifest themselves; but we now see that some degree of art and science enters into all human achievements, from the making of the simplest stone tools to the highest forms of religion and morality. All of the achievements of man, all man's mastery over nature and self, are products of his reasoning and imagination. On the spiritual as well as on the material side civilization is the creation of man's higher intelligence.

4. Progress, or new and higher adjustments in social life, is, accordingly, largely the work of imagination and reasoning. Individuals of exceptional intelligence are the producers of the new inventions and discoveries which have enabled man

increasingly to master nature and to control his own behavior. Even among savages higher intellectual ability is one of the things which count most in social leadership. In part, the genius or man of great intellectual ability is doubtless a product of biological variation. Yet his work is distinctly the intellectual one of producing new "pattern ideas" which his group finds useful in mastering nature on the one hand or human nature on the other. Thus we may justly regard the higher intelligence as the active agent in social progress. Progress may not be maintained without the coöperation of other elements in human nature, such as the feeling and the will, but it is intelligence which leads the way.

Hence we have a right to believe that through the rationalization of knowledge, that is, through science, man will be enabled more and more to master nature and to control his own behavior. We are justified from the past history of mankind in relying upon intelligence and reason for the mastery of forces both without and within us. Increasingly human adjustments have been made and perfected upon the basis of rationalized knowledge, that is, upon the basis of science. In proportion as we build our social life intelligently upon ascertained facts and laws, we shall be successful in our human living together; while in proportion as we build upon blind tradition, mere emotions, or prejudices, we shall fail. Only in the development and maintenance of the rational level of behavior lies the safety and security of civilization. Whether for individuals or for groups, the reason must be the ultimate guide of life, and it offers the only secure basis for continued human progress.

The Complexity and Modifiability of Human Behavior⁴¹

Thus we see that human behavior is very complex, and shows upon analysis within itself a number of stages of

⁴¹ See Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior*, Chaps. XIX, XX, for the biological basis of modifiable behavior.

development. There are, however, in human nature no such divisions as the psychological analysis which we have just made might lead the student to suppose. Such divisions must be thought of as different aspects of the living, functioning organism, rather than as entirely different processes. Impulse, habit, and adaptation are but the more objective sides of the same processes which express themselves on the subjective or conscious side as feeling and intelligence.

Moreover, these different aspects or levels of behavior are not clearly separable in the behavior of the adult individual. They not only overlap, but blend. Thus every act of an adult individual is compounded out of several of these aspects of behavior, and usually out of all of them. It is impossible to isolate a purely 'instinctive' or purely intelligent act. *Ordinary human behavior, as we find it in human society, is an indefinite compound of instinct, habit, feeling, and intelligence.* We say "indefinite," because, of course, the amount of instinct, habit, feeling, or intelligence may vary. Our ideal is that our actions shall be dominated by our higher intelligence, by rationality; but the most intelligent act may have in it some element of animal impulse or hereditary reaction. Nevertheless, this analysis helps us to understand behavior because it separates it into its constituent elements, and this makes it easier to control behavior as a whole. In given circumstances we will know better what elements need attention.

It is also a mistake to think that these elements of behavior have no independence whatsoever of each other. Each of the levels of mental evolution seems to have been developed for some purpose or to meet some need in the adaptive process. Hence it is possible to order and arrange the elements of behavior and frequently to play one element off against another. It is in this way that we gain control over human nature. We use habit, for example, to modify original impulses, and we use intelligence to modify both.

In civilized man there can be no doubt that we find intelligence not infrequently in opposition to impulse, habit, and feeling. Intelligence seems to have a function of its own over and above impulse, habit, or feeling. Especially is it true that civilized man depends less and less upon instinct, habit, and feeling and more and more upon intelligence. This does not mean that we can or should get rid of the lower levels of behavior. It only means that they need to be fused with and dominated by the highest intelligence.

This is not an impracticable ideal. Both modern psychology and modern sociology have united in showing the modifiability of human behavior. Experience, psychology shows, continually results in the modification of human behavior. The studies of anthropologists and sociologists among all the peoples of the world, moreover, show human behavior to be one of the most modifiable things we know. Thus we find a great variety of forms of the family, of industry, of government, and of other social institutions among the different peoples. Apparently in every case these different forms of social behavior are due to the different social traditions and customs, the different social patterns, of the groups in which they are found. Man is far more of a cultural being in his behavior than a product of organic evolution or original nature. He learns through experience, and as he learns he changes or modifies his action patterns.

It follows that the social behavior of men and the institutions of human society are plastic and modifiable. They are the result not so much of innate or biological traits, plus the pressure of the physical environment, as of the mental patterns in the tradition and in the minds of the members of the group. To be sure, biological conditions, or innate tendencies, and conditions in the physical environment very greatly affect these mental patterns; but many other conditions also affect them, such as the ignorance or knowledge of the group, its experience of good or bad

fortune in the past, and the like. The source of these mental patterns, which become social patterns by being embodied in the social tradition, is hence to be sought in the total experience of group life. Thus the element of intelligence in them, and so in human behavior, may vary with the knowledge and intelligence possessed by the individuals of the group. When the opinions and beliefs of individuals are scientifically correct we may reasonably expect socially better human behavior. It is, therefore, not too much to say that the scientific study of human life shows the possibility of remaking both human nature and human society.

The Social Character of Human Behavior, Feeling, and Thinking

We have seen that the mind of the individual has been evolved very largely as a social instrument, an instrument of adjustment in group life. So far as we can judge, this has been the history of mind from its very beginning. As we have seen, life has been group life because of biological necessities from the beginning. Individual behavior has been conditioned by a social situation through the whole history of its development. All the different elements or aspects of mind have been used to adjust individuals to their group and to their species from the start. The psychic elements of life, as far back as we can go in mental evolution, are a chief means of binding individuals of the same group or species together. The conclusion of social psychology is that the mind of man—that is, the complex of thoughts, feelings, desires, and impulses which we actually find in human beings—is very largely a product of social conditions. This is true even of the instincts and emotions with which we are equipped by heredity. Any study of these shows that they presuppose a social medium for their evolution. The instincts, emotions, and sensations of one individual often seem made to fit into corresponding processes in other individuals, and

so to bind all together in a larger unity. Hence even these hereditary aspects of mind and behavior are socially conditioned.

It is even clearer that our acquired habits of behavior, feeling, and thinking come largely from our group life. Through imitation and social pressure we get the vast majority of our habits. From the culture of our group we get not only our knowledge, our beliefs, our ideals, standards, and values, but even our precepts and our concepts, in the strict sense of those terms. We could scarcely know the meaning of the simplest object, at least not its cultural meaning, unless we shared in the culture of our group. Concepts, or abstract ideas, are also social in character; they denote or represent objects common to all members of the group. These very concepts, we have seen, have been transmitted and developed through language. The most abstract thought is carried on by means of concepts or words, and it is largely in the nature of imaginary conversation. It, therefore, presupposes social life.

In a word, mind has been developed through the interaction of mind with mind in the carrying on and controlling of group life-processes. The mind has been used as a link between different members of the same group since mental life appeared. Mental life, therefore, belongs quite as much to the group as to the individual.⁴² Intercommunication is as necessary for the development of the mind of the individual as for the control of group life. If mental processes in the individual function to control individual behavior, it is not less true that intermental processes among the individuals of a group, such as suggestion, sympathy, imitation, and communication, function to control group behavior. If the mind

⁴² Very rightly Professor Cooley made the fact that mind has two manifestations, one in individual life and the other in social life, both being aspects of the same process, one of the cornerstones of sociology. See *Social Organization*, Chap. I.

is the chief organ of adaptation for the individual, then these forms of mental interstimulation and response are the means of adjustment between individuals and so the means of adjustment of group behavior. We may regard these forms of mental interstimulation and response as instruments for the mutual adaptation of individuals who carry on common activities. But they are also the means for the development of the individual mind. Hence the individual and society develop together. The individual mind gets its development largely by participating in a group life, while the life of the group is carried on by mental interstimulation and response, chiefly in the form of intercommunication among its members. Therefore, man's mental and social life grow together and are largely one.

There is only one scientific conclusion which can be reached from these facts, and that is that *the individual as we know him has been developed as a part of a larger life-process*; in other words, is largely a social product. Hence, as we have already said, a scientific basis for philosophical individualism does not exist. This does not mean, however, that the individual's mental life is wholly submerged in that of his group. Biological variation alone would prevent this. The active character of the individual mind also militates against this view. Consequently, we must avoid the error of the complete social determinism of individual consciousness and of individual behavior. So far as science can discover, there is no such determinism. The individual develops variations of his own both physically and mentally. If this were not so, progress would be impossible in human society, except through the action of natural selection upon groups. But the facts seem to show that most changes in human society start with the variations, originalities, and inventions of the individual.⁴³ While these are socially conditioned, they are also

⁴³ We would, however, agree with Bartlett (*Psychology and Primitive Culture*, p. 11) that "the attempt to find the beginning of social

conditioned by the nature of the individual. As we have seen, if they are found socially useful, they may be taken up by the group, diffused by means of suggestion, imitation, and communication, and hence learned by all the members of the group. Thus the individual is a factor in the group life and may change the culture and the behavior of his group.

Individual determinism is, however, as impossible as social determinism in any scientific explanation of human behavior. Since individuals form a mutual environment for each other, the form of their association, their group organization, and their culture are quite as influential in determining behavior as internal factors within the individual. Indeed, under ordinary conditions they are the most important element in the determination of individual as well as of group behavior. It is, however, the creative individual who usually initiates *changes* in the form and organization, culture and behavior, of groups. Thus we see again that the individual and society are correlatives and that neither can be understood apart from the other.

The Active Factors in Association

In the past there has been much discussion among sociologists as to the "social forces." Thus it has been said by some that the "desires" or "wishes" are the social forces; others have spoken of the "interests" as the social forces. We have tried to show that the active factors, or "forces," at work in human social relationships consist not simply of compounds of feeling, such as desires, wishes, and interests, but also of all the impulses and intellectual elements which enter into the mental life of the individual. In other words,

customs and institutions in *purely individual experience* is essentially a mistaken one." The reality, as Bartlett points out, is never the individual pure and simple, but always "the individual-in-a-given-social-group."

we have tried to show that the whole mind, in all of its aspects, is active in our social life. Among social psychologists there has been a tendency to recognize only the "psychic factors" as true social forces, and even among these only the acquired psychic traits which are the result of cultural evolution, since these latter alone can be considered as having originated *within* human society.⁴⁴

Now the more advanced sciences no longer raise the question of "forces"; they content themselves simply with analyzing elements in the situation.⁴⁵ The question is not how these elements originate, but how they work in a given situation, and how our understanding of their working helps us to explain that situation. In the psychology of human society our question would be, then, what factors do we have to take into account in explaining psychologically the social life of mankind? As soon as we put this question and take the evolutionary point of view, we see that physical and biological factors cannot be left out of account. They also are factors or elements which are necessary to explain every social situation. Indeed, over long stretches of time, the biological factors of heredity, variation, and selection and the geographical factors of climate, food, and soil seem to be the significant factors. At any given moment, however, the influence of these physical factors on social behavior is through the impulses, feelings, and ideas of individuals; for it is only through these psychic elements, as we have seen, that any kind of social life is maintained. Hence, in interpreting definite group behavior the psychological sociologist may rightly emphasize the psychic processes which we have studied in this chapter, provided he keeps in the background the

⁴⁴ See Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. VII, for an elaborate discussion of the notion of "social forces."

⁴⁵ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 149: "Science and invention did not get on as long as men indulged in the notion of special forces to account for phenomena."

geographical and biological factors which continually condition and modify the action of socio-psychic processes.

We may conveniently divide the factors of human association into *original* and *derived*. The original factors are those furnished by physical nature and original human nature. The derived factors are compounded out of the simple, original factors and many of them are products of human culture. As *original* social forces or active factors in human association we must recognize the following:

1. The Physical Factors
 - (a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, natural resources, topography, etc.
 - (b) Biological factors, as heredity, variation, selection, etc.
2. The Psychical Factors
 - (a) Impulses, both hereditary (instinctive) and acquired (habitual).⁴⁶
 - (b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired (habitual).
 - (c) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception, and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.).

Derivative social forces or factors in association are those compounded out of these original elements. They are very numerous and have never been satisfactorily listed or classified. They include, for example, the *desires* and *wishes* of individuals, compounded mainly out of feelings and impulses; the *sentiments*, which are enduring *attitudes* built up mainly out of feelings and impulses; the *interests* and *values*, which are compounds built up out of feelings, impulses, and intellectual elements. All of these supply normally the motives for the reflective activities of civilized men. Hence they all modify and condition the expression of the original psychic

⁴⁶ Professor Dewey, as we have seen, would use the word "impulses" as synonymous with "instincts" or "native impulses," but it is certain that many impulses are acquired, or, in other words, that all habits express themselves in appropriate impulses. This, Dewey virtually acknowledges.

factors of impulse, feeling, and intellect, just as the physical factors also modify and condition them.

The social values and interests have often been classified. Perhaps as convenient a classification as any is the six-fold classification proposed by Professor Small as follows:

(1) Health interests; (2) wealth or economic interests; (3) political and social interests; (4) intellectual or scientific interests; (5) esthetic interests; (6) moral and religious interests. These have been summed up in the six words: health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. They indicate roughly the main activities and pursuits of human groups, and something like this classification is a practical necessity when we discuss the activities and institutions of human society. The classification is sociological rather than psychological.

The *technic* or *technological* factors affecting human association are among the most important influences at work on the behavior of civilized men. They are the tools, machines, houses, roads, and all other modifications of the physical environment produced by human culture. They create a new, artificial, physical environment for man which largely replaces the natural, geographic environment. They may be regarded as modifications of the geographic environment created by human intelligence. This technological environment modifies and conditions all human behavior, especially at present, because it furnishes many of the most potent stimuli and most difficult problems for the social behavior of modern men.

But there are also other cultural and institutional complexes in human society which furnish potent stimuli and problems for social behavior, and which must accordingly be reckoned with as "forces" or "factors" in social situations. Such are the institutions associated with government, religion, morality, art, and education. Some would say that these complexes of institutional stimuli are the chief factors to which we must

pay attention in explaining human social behavior. At any rate, they will frequently concern us in our discussion of group life. In succeeding chapters we shall take up and discuss at length some of the more important psychological factors, whether original or derived, which enter into and affect our present social life. The place of these psychological categories in the sociological categories which we shall examine in the next five chapters will become evident.

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CHAPTER IV

PRIMARY GROUP LIFE—THE FORMS OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION

SOME sort of enumeration, description, and comparison of the different kinds of social groups is manifestly one of the first things to be considered in sociology and social psychology. Not only is the form, or the type of organization, of social groups interesting, but it is highly important for understanding the life and behavior of the group. The different kinds of social groups, however, seem so manifold that it would appear to be next to impossible to enumerate and classify them. Even this preliminary work of sociological science is not yet complete, but sociologists have succeeded in bringing about a few simple classifications which have enabled us to see more deeply into the nature of group life. The principal types of human association have already been described, classified, and compared. In as much as it is the *form* of the associational process in groups which we wish to emphasize, we shall call the different kinds of social groups "forms of association."

Forms of Association

We have already mentioned among the forms of human association or types of human groups, natural genetic groups, which we have called "communities,"¹ and also "primary groups." We have not distinguished between these two, as some communities are primary groups. If a community is any group which carries on all phases of a common life, it must be a natural genetic group. Individuals are born

¹ See definition in Chap. I; also MacIver, *Community* (third edition), pp. 22, 23.

into it and hence membership in it is more or less involuntary. Hence such groups are sometimes called *involuntary groups*.² They include all sorts of natural groups, such as the family, the neighborhood group, kinship groups, cities, states, and nations. Because communities are natural, nonspecialized groups, embracing all phases of life, they are of more interest to students of group behavior than the more or less artificial and specialized groups. They are more stable, as a rule, as well as more all-embracing. The student should note that such groups are found in animal as well as in human association. Indeed, they are the only permanent groups which are found below the human level.

In contrast with these natural, genetic groups we must place the *voluntary*, purposive groups which we find in human society.³ These are associations of persons formed for special purposes. They are sometimes called "interest groups." Such are political parties, religious sects, trade unions, industrial corporations, cultural associations, and the like. Sometimes these specialized, purposive groups include in their membership only one sex, one age class, or one economic class. Modern civilization is characterized by the great growth of these specialized forms of human association. As such groups are not found below the human level, they must be considered as products of human culture. While, therefore, they are very important for understanding the later phases of social and cultural evolution, they are not so important for understanding fundamental factors in human social life.

More important still for sociological purposes is the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* groups. Primary groups are those which involve more or less face-to-face,

² Professor Giddings has called these "component societies." See *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Part III, Chap. II.

³ Giddings calls these "constituent societies," *op. cit.*, Part III, Chap. III.

intimate, direct personal relations. In a word, they involve personal presence and personal acquaintance. Such groups are the family, the neighborhood, play or recreation groups, groups of friends, some crowds, and the like. We have every reason to believe that these groups are primitive. For thousands of generations men knew no other form of association than these face-to-face groups. But the main reason for calling these groups "primary" is that psychologically the stimulus of the presence of other individuals is necessary for the development of any social life whatsoever. Out of primary groups have sprung all the other forms of association. Groups which did not involve the association of personal presence, obviously, could not be formed until there had been a relatively high development of face-to-face groups. It will be noted that only primary groups, so far as we know, exist among the animals below man. Primary groups were the original form of social life.

Secondary groups are those which do not necessarily involve face-to-face association or intimate, direct, personal relations. These groups have become so important in human society that some, like the state and the nation, have actually been confused with human society itself. Yet secondary groups are all the result of human culture and could not even exist without considerable cultural equipment on the part of man. They probably did not begin to exist until the stage of barbarism was reached, or not more than twenty thousand years ago. Yet such groups as cities, provinces, states, and nations, on the one hand, and political parties, religious sects, and great industrial corporations, on the other, are not only obviously important for understanding the social life of our present human world, but their control has become one of the main problems of our civilization. We can best understand these secondary groups, however, by approaching them through the study of the primary group. The student should not fail to note that the classification of

groups into primary and secondary cuts across the classification of groups as involuntary and voluntary.

Another very important distinction for sociological purposes among the forms of human association is that between the *institutional* and *noninstitutional*. As we have seen, those groupings and relations of individuals which have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and established, or "instituted," by the authority of communities, we call "institutions."⁴ Such are the family, property, the state, the church, and the school. As institutions are dependent upon reflective thought, intercommunication, and the organization of authority, they are not found, in the strict sense, below the human level. Their importance in human social life is indicated by the fact that they have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and established by human communities. They embody the chief, consciously recognized values in the social life.

In spite of the tendency of civilization to "institutionalize" all the more important groups and relations in human society, there are still many noninstitutional groups and relations. Such, for example, are the temporary groups that are constantly forming and dissolving, as crowds, mobs, play groups, or groups of friends. Indeed, many of the everyday relations of life of individuals with one another are still noninstitutional.⁵ The neighborhood group, for example, although a permanent group, can scarcely be said to be institutionalized. These unreflective, noninstitutionalized forms of association of human beings retain great interest for the social psychologist, because in them we may frequently discern the original,

⁴ Compare again MacIver, *Community*, Bk. II, Chap. IV. Sumner says (*Folkways*, p. 53): "An institution consists of a concept and a structure. . . . The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society."

⁵ This is, of course, the chief reason why the concepts of "institution" and "the institutional" cannot be taken as defining the limits of sociology.

unreflective tendencies of human nature more clearly than in the institutional groups, which necessarily take on an artificial character, as a result not only of reflection but of social coercion. However, institutional stimuli have become so important for the understanding of human behavior that our chief attention will have to be paid to institutional groups and relations.

The distinction between *temporary* and *permanent* groups is not so important, as the temporary groups are usually found within larger permanent groups. However, even here certain distinctions in the type of behavior may be noted. Evidently the permanent group is more important for understanding human collective life as a whole than the temporary group; so also, the involuntary than the voluntary, the institutional than the noninstitutional, the primary than the secondary.⁶ Primary groups are especially important for the understanding of social behavior, since the original form of association was an association of personal presence. We shall, accordingly, begin with the study of primary groups.

The Social Function of Primary Groups⁷

In general, primary groups are the makers of the *primary social attitudes* of individuals. There are three main ways in which they influence social behavior:

1. *They socialize the individual.* Psychologically, the stimulus of the presence of other individuals is necessary for the development of the instincts, habits, feelings, ideas, and values, in brief, the attitudes which enter into and make the

⁶ Professor H. A. Miller (*Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. II) suggests as very important for understanding modern social structure "vertical groups" and "horizontal groups." Vertical groups include all classes, horizontal groups are only in one class or caste. Many other classifications of groups might be suggested. Many other classes and types of social groups can, of course, be made out. See p. 138 of this chapter.

⁷ See Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chaps. III-V.

social character of the individual. In face-to-face association social life is most vividly realized. The social impulses and attitudes connected with sex, with parenthood, with kinship, are incapable of normal development, so far as we know, without the stimulus of personal presence. Habits of toleration and coöperation get their start in such intimate relations. Here come the first lessons in mutual aid, sympathy, and understanding. Sympathy and understanding could scarcely develop between individuals without personal acquaintance, yet these are the very core of the social nature of the individual. In brief, the *we*-feeling in a group has its origin in the experiences of individuals in small, face-to-face groups. It is in such groups that individuals develop their capacity and will to act together. In them, as we have said, they learn their "primary social attitudes" and their "primary social values." Professor Cooley has argued that the sense of social solidarity comes from the unity experienced in these small primary groups, and that primary group life is the creator of our valuation of social or moral unity. He has contended, also, with some justice, that what we ordinarily call "human nature" is really acquired through experience in such groups. It is certain, at any rate, that in such groups the primary social traits of human nature receive their first development.

2. *Primary groups are the chief carriers of custom and tradition.* They are the chief carriers of custom and tradition because they furnish the main environment of the child from his earliest years. In the family and in the neighborhood the child learns his language and, in learning it, he gets with it the fundamental knowledge, beliefs, and values contained in the tradition of his civilization. The family group from its very nature is, above all other human groups, fitted to transmit from generation to generation definite habits, or customs, and definite ideas and values, or traditions. The prolonged immaturity of the child is spent largely within the family.

During this plastic period he has not only a natural tendency to imitate his elders, but pressure is brought to bear upon him if he does not. The organization and discipline of the family group is usually of the nature of a close, personal control over conduct and such as practically compels the child to acquire many of the habits, attitudes, and values of his parents.

The neighborhood group is another group in which all the arrangements for human living are such as to favor the transmission of custom and tradition. Until very recently, tradition and custom reigned supreme in the neighborhood group; and very strong, compelling influences were brought to bear upon the individual to make him follow, in practically all things, the custom of the group.

The family, the neighborhood, and the play group are practically the first school for the child. So much does the child get his central social traditions, social attitudes, and social values from these groups that there are not wanting educators who claim that social and moral education can never be given adequately in our public schools. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that all the essential social traditions of our life are preserved and passed along in the face-to-face association in primary groups. The meaning of essential traditions is clearer to the young when received in these groups, moreover, because they are usually accompanied by actual appropriate behavior. The child, therefore, can get the meaning of a certain tradition regarding religion, morality, or government, for example, from the family life better than he can from the printed page or even from the spoken word in a public assembly. Probably he can get the meaning better, too, in the close and intimate relations in the family group than he can in the more partial and uncertain associations of the neighborhood or the play group.

3. *Primary groups are the source of primary social ideals.*
By this we mean that primary social ideals have originated

in the experiences in these groups. The ideals of love, service, self-sacrifice, and human brotherhood, for example, originated in the experiences of family life. The ideals of freedom, justice, and good citizenship originated largely in the experiences of neighborhood life; while the ideal of fair play manifestly came from the play group. These idealistic social attitudes have their source in the experiences of primary group life. As Professor Cooley says, "In these relations mankind realizes itself, gratifies its primary needs, in a fairly satisfactory manner, and from the experience forms standards of what it is to expect from elaborate association." Professor Cooley points out that the ideals of both Christianity and democracy have sprung naturally from the experiences of primary group life.

In other words, the origin of many of the social patterns which men set before themselves as the goals of social development is to be sought in the form and organization of primary groups. These primary groups give us our primary social attitudes and primary social values, not simply because they transmit the tradition of these, but also because by their very form and organization they naturally create, originate, these values and attitudes. This shows the great significance of primary groups for understanding the whole development of human society and of human culture. It may be said at this point that men have always had two divergent and broadly contrasting sets of patterns for social behavior: one which they have followed in the intimate social life within their primary groups, and another which they have followed in relationships with men outside these groups. Evidently one of the prime problems in the psychology of social behavior is whether the primary group attitudes and values can be carried out successfully in the wider relations of men. But before we can answer this question we must understand even more clearly the workings of these primary groups in socializing the individual, in transmitting custom

and tradition, and in originating social attitudes, social values, and social patterns. Let us consider then the processes of socialization, of the transmission of culture, and of the origination of social patterns.

The Process of Socialization

We mean by socialization the growth in individuals of the capacity and will to act together. Subjectively it is a growth of *we*-feeling in members of a group, or the development in them of social-mindedness. Professor Giddings finds that the process of socialization is a process wherein there is a growing consciousness of kind, an increasing like-mindedness, increasing sympathy and understanding, and increasing friendliness or affection among the members of a group.⁸ It is obviously personal acquaintance and intimate association which brings about most effectively the development of these traits.⁹ Sympathy and understanding, for example, are best promoted through personal acquaintance; yet upon sympathy and understanding depend largely the harmony of human association wherever it exists.¹⁰ The socialization of the individual must evidently take place within one or more face-to-face groups before we can expect that it will be manifest in wider social relations. Yet upon socialization depends the whole harmony of human relationships. According to Professor Giddings, it is the development of socialization which leads to coöperation and makes coöperation possible, especially in its higher forms. While coöperative behavior probably vastly preceded the inner, or subjective, process of socialization, yet it is true that the socialization of individual character does precede the develop-

⁸ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 304-312.

⁹ This is not to deny that imaginative acquaintance with persons through literature and art is a powerful stimulus in the development of the social character of the individual.

¹⁰ For development of this thought, see Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XX.

ment of the higher forms of coöperation among human beings. Coöperation and socialization thus develop together in human society. Every advance in coöperation must have correspondingly socialized character in individuals to support it. Practically, therefore, coöperation in human groups depends upon the socialization of the individual character of their members.

According to Professor Giddings, also, it is socialization which produces all rationally conscientious human behavior.¹¹ It may seem at first that socialization with reference to very small groups could not have this result, because the social spirit of small groups is often very narrow. Yet individuals by participating in the life of such groups acquire the social consciousness (the consciousness of the group); and as the groups in which they act become larger, either in imagination or in actual experience, their social consciousness enlarges. If the socialization of the individual is only with reference to small groups, such socialization may work at cross-purposes with the interest of society at large. Nevertheless, it is through the experience in the primary groups that we become socialized in our attitudes toward larger or secondary groups. These larger groups are made real to us very largely through our social imagination. Those things to which we actually adjust ourselves in group life are always the images of our fellow men, our realization of the reality of their existence and of our relations with them. Hence our participation in the life of larger groups is made possible by our experience in the life of small, face-to-face groups. Hence, it is these groups which teach us to identify ourselves with our fellows and perhaps ultimately with humanity at large. Thus Giddings is right in holding that the process of socialization in its higher phases becomes a process of moralization. The highly socialized individual becomes marked by his sense

¹¹ Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, Chap. VI.

of responsibility for the welfare of his group. We say that he is socially conscious because he thinks not so much of himself as of his associates. He not only identifies himself with his group but he holds himself responsible for the welfare of all its members, so far as it lies within his power. If the group of which he thinks is the largest possible human group, humanity, then his behavior becomes not only socialized in the highest sense but completely moralized. Hence the highly socialized individual, as Professor Giddings finds, is dependable and helpful in his social relations, mindful of the value of group usages, but also independent in thought, courageous, and willing to experiment, because he is mindful of the welfare of society as a whole. Hence his beliefs are subject to review and modification; he is tolerant and open-minded but insistent upon evidence, judiciously critical rather than faultfinding, inventive and creative.¹²

This process of the socialization of behavior must begin in the small, face-to-face groups of men. It is in these groups that the individual first learns to imitate others, or to do as others do; first learns to sympathize, or to feel as others feel; receives his first suggestions from associates, and learns to think with them. In other words, in these groups the individual first participates in social consciousness and is first subject to social control. Throughout life, moreover, the social control and social coercion to which the individual is subject is stronger in the face-to-face groups than in the non-face-to-face. Coöperation and all the primary social attitudes are learned in these groups. We may confidently say, therefore, that the primary groups must always remain the chief means of socializing the behavior and character of individuals, and that, consequently, the tone of larger, secondary groups will always depend upon the tone of primary group life. It has been well said that "the finer

¹²Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 287.

standards of conduct in large social groups, in industry and politics, will wait upon the growth of virtue in face-to-face intercourse."¹⁸

The whole complex system of existing human association and institutions, from one point of view, may be interpreted as so many devices for socializing the character and behavior of individuals. Government, education, moral ideals, and religion manifestly aim to cultivate attitudes and values in individuals which will socialize them with reference to certain groups, large or small. Hence we shall have more to do with the theory of the socialization and social control of the individual throughout our study. But it is important to note that the vital part of the process of socialization has always taken place and must continue to take place in face-to-face groups.

The Transmission of Culture

Culture, as we have seen, is a psycho-social product. It requires for its transmission, therefore, a psycho-social medium or environment. The face-to-face groups of men provide such an environment. The intercommunication within these groups sets before the individual, in the form of tradition, the social patterns received from the past. Spoken language conveys from individual to individual the patterns of behavior and the social values attached to these patterns. Objectively, the patterns of social behavior are placed before the individual in face-to-face groups by the behavior of other individuals. Suggestion and imitation are much more compelling than in non-face-to-face association. Thus in primary groups communication and example transmit tradition and custom, which together form the substance of culture, with the least change. Hence primary group life furnishes the indispensable medium for the transmission of culture with

¹⁸ Findlay, *An Introduction to Sociology*, p. 140.

the least loss. Of course, there exist many other agencies in civilized human society to aid in the transmission of culture. Such are especially schools, libraries, museums, and churches. But these are only aids to the primary groups in the transmission of culture. These and all special associations for cultural purposes can never play more than a secondary rôle in the transmission of culture, for it is in the primary group that the individual first participates in social consciousness and becomes a cultural being. It is obvious that if we wish to preserve a given culture or civilization we must see that our primary group life is kept in an efficient state for handing it down from one generation to another.

The Origin of Social Patterns

The origin of men's ideals has always been a problem which has perplexed social thinkers. The earliest view was that the origin of ideals was to be sought in special, divine revelations. Later philosophers have claimed that moral ideals originate in the intuitions of the moral judgment. Whatever truth there may be in these views, it is certain, as Professor Cooley has shown, that our primary social ideals grow up through our experiences in primary group life. The experiences in primary group life when at its best, in other words, have suggested to men the pattern to be aimed at in social life. As Professor Cooley points out, the social patterns or ideals contained in both Christianity and democracy come from primary group life—those of Christianity largely from the family, those of democracy largely from the neighborhood. Men have taken the patterns experienced or suggested by these primary groups and tried to realize them in larger human relations. Our social ideals have, therefore, grown up in part from the experiences of primary group life.

There are many other social patterns which have come from other sources. Thus occupations have furnished many

social patterns. Original human nature also may have furnished others. Many of these patterns from the economic and instinctive sides of life have come into prominence in modern culture. Whether the patterns from primary group life should dominate in our social life as a whole is, as we have already said, the great practical problem before our civilization. The primary group attitudes involve so much personal acquaintance, understanding, and sympathy among men that it has been said that it is impossible to apply them in the larger groups of men. If this is psychologically true, the sooner it is understood the better. Cultural evolution, however, has undoubtedly tended toward the gradual extension of the highly socialized patterns of behavior in primary groups to the total social life of humanity. Let us note the distinctive contribution of each of the three principal primary groups to our social ideals.

The Contribution of the Family

The family is a close, sympathetic group whose members are bound together by natural affection, by habit, and by biological necessities. In such a group mutual understanding, mutual sympathy, and mutual service must be highly developed. Consequently there is a high valuation of the personality of each member of the group. This high valuation of persons as such, and devotion to their welfare, is what we mean by "love." Hence the distinctive contribution of the family to our social ideals is undoubtedly that of altruism, or love, with its accompanying mutual service and mutual sacrifice. In the family group the natural egoism of the individual is first counteracted by the development of sentiments of sympathy, loyalty, kindness, and service to others. Thus the family group becomes the first medium in which social impulses and sentiments are evoked, social habits formed, and social consciousness awakened. Experience in family relations is, therefore, a step in the development of

that wider altruism demanded by society at large. But while all the virtues have their beginning in the family, the life of any particular family group may be very narrow. It is only when family life at its best becomes a pattern, an ideal, for social relations between persons generally, that the contribution of the family to social ideals becomes evident. A civilization which values persons as ends in themselves, which makes devotion to the welfare of persons the chief end of organized human society, would be following the family pattern. On the whole, the movement of civilization for the last few thousand years seems to have been in this direction. Our religion and morality have especially sanctioned this pattern.

The Contribution of the Neighborhood

The neighborhood is a less close-knit group than the family, but still one which requires toleration, free coöperation, and mutual service. In such a group the needs of a common life are best met by recognizing the substantial equality of its different units and by the cultivation of habits of discussion and of mutual aid. Independence goes along with voluntary coöperation. Sympathy, understanding, and friendliness are necessary, but coöperation and mutual aid are secured best upon the basis of the freedom and equality of its members. Hence the distinctive contribution of the neighborhood to our social ideals is undoubtedly that of coöperation upon the basis of equality and freedom. The neighborhood, in other words, has been the medium for the birth of the democratic spirit. A civilization which patterns itself after the neighborhood would have to keep alive habits of discussion and of voluntary coöperation. It would emphasize the importance of freedom and equality among its constituent units. The development of Western civilization during the last few centuries has been, on the whole, in the direction of the neighborhood pattern, so that now we are beginning to think even of the world as a neighborhood.

The Contribution of the Play Group

Play and amusement have always been important phases of human social life. The play group, though voluntary, has perhaps done more than any other group, with the exception of the family and the neighborhood, to stimulate social impulses, form habits of social coöperation, and develop social consciousness. Through play and amusement the young have always received not only a considerable part of their physical and mental development, but also a large part of their social education; while from play and amusement adults get rest and refreshment. Hence play and recreation groups are very significant in human society. They perhaps become even more important in higher civilization than in the lower forms of culture, because the needs which they meet become greater in higher civilization. Their distinctive contribution to our social ideals is that of fair play, teamwork, and social pleasure. Teamwork is necessary in many games and amusements, and habits of coöperation are thus developed. Team consciousness, or the consciousness of the unity of the play group, is developed. Loyalty and fair play are demanded. As play is an end in itself, social pleasure is another ideal which grows up. But play and amusement have another side. In play and recreation groups the appeal is to natural impulses. Hence there has always been a tendency in these groups, perhaps more than in any other form of group life, for the animal impulses of original human nature to bring about reversions in behavior to very low cultural levels. Consequently, the play group, like other groups, may have a very narrow and narrowing life. But its chief values, those of fair play, teamwork, social pleasure, and recreation, are, and will doubtless continue to be, very important for our whole culture. Indeed, these seem to become more and more primary ideals in our culture. With the growth of wealth and leisure, the last few centuries

especially have witnessed the tendency for the patterns of the play group to become increasingly general patterns for our social life.

The student will note that all these intimate, face-to-face groups presuppose and cultivate toleration, sympathy, understanding, and kindness among their members. This is so true that it is difficult to say what the distinctive contributions of each of the face-to-face groups to our social ideals have been. The general tendency of all is in the direction of sympathy, understanding, and mutual aid. It is only when we go outside of these groups that we find the attitudes of suspicion, distrust, antipathy, hostility, and hate emphasized. It will be noted, therefore, that in general men throughout history have had two distinct sets of social patterns, one which they followed within their intimate groups, or within groups which by the exercise of imagination they had come to regard as intimate; the other which they followed with individuals outside of their face-to-face groups, or outside of groups which had come to be regarded as intimate. The first set of patterns were those of toleration, sympathy, kindness, and mutual aid; the second set of patterns, followed with men outside of one's group, are those of suspicion, distrust, hostility, and conflict. The historical reason for this is that human sociability was originally evolved in narrow, face-to-face groups. This has given rise to a dualism in the social patterns for individual conduct. This dualism has run thus far through human history, in spite of the fact that various systems of universal ethics, like Christianity, have proclaimed one universal social ideal, or pattern of conduct, in all human relations. The persistence of this dualism in conduct is doubtless in part due to the original constitution of the human mind, but it is also probably due in large measure to the persistence of two distinct social traditions or sets of social patterns. Whether this dualism can be overcome depends obviously upon whether sufficient social imagination

can be developed in individuals to make them include imaginatively all men in their intimate groups.

Secondary Groups

Since the later stages of barbarism, the most striking feature of social evolution has been the development of large non-face-to-face groups, which we may call "secondary groups." They create many of the problems of our civilization because for some of them we have as yet developed no adequate means of control. The state, or nation, is the chief of these secondary groups, though scarcely less important are economic classes and religious sects. The first two of these groups are the result of the rise of warfare and conquest. The state, as we know it, is mainly an outcome of war; as are also economic classes. Through the conquest of one group by another political sovereignty was established and political organization developed.¹⁴ Through the same process economic classes, ranging from the status of the slave class to a class of nobility, were established. Religious sects, too, in part owed their universal nature indirectly to war, since they could scarcely have been established on a wide scale until the state came into being, and since everywhere their effort has been largely to harmonize the various conflicting elements in large secondary groups.

Though secondary groups are relatively late in origin, there can be no question but that they have contributed much to the behavior pattern of modern men. The state, especially, has set up standards of loyalty, of law-abidingness, of obedience, and of service which have had the greatest influence upon the behavior of civilized men. The autocratic or authoritarian state, especially, insisted upon all of its mem-

¹⁴ See Jenks, *History of Politics*, Chaps. VIII-X; also Oppenheimer, *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically*; also Beard, "The Evolution of Democracy" in Case's *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, pp. 539-544.

bers following these standards of conduct in their relations with the governing class of the state. The modern democratic state has not found it possible to dispense with these standards, as they are the obvious supports of every sort of political organization. The student should not fail to note that for the past four or five thousand years the state has been so ascendant that individuals more willingly sacrifice their lives for it than probably for any other group, with the possible exception of the family.

Economic classes also have made a considerable contribution to the patterns for human behavior. This was mostly noticeable when there was a slave class and a master class; but even with the disappearance of these two extreme classes, the sense of class distinction and class difference is still strong in modern society. Moreover, we still have surviving among us traditions which come from the time when there was a slave class and a master class. Master-class attitudes and values, that is, a master-class ethics, are still strong in certain sections of modern society, while servile attitudes and values survive in other sections. This fact alone explains much about class behavior. The behavior of economic classes, in other words, is not so much a matter of human nature as of class tradition. Modern economic classes, however, rest largely upon occupation. Occupational interests and activities have also had much to do with influencing behavior patterns. The average man not infrequently shows a tendency to see the whole world through his occupation, and hence to form his ideals upon the basis of occupational habits. This matter has been so much enlarged upon by a number of social psychologists, that we need not discuss it in detail at this point, especially since we will have to return to the matter many times later. It is the overexaggeration of the influence of occupation upon social ideals which has given rise to one sort of "economic determinism."

Historically, the religious sect or denomination has usually

been formed to propagate and conserve certain social ideals or behavior patterns. The great, universal religions, especially, have had an incalculable influence upon human conduct. The earlier religions which aimed at something like universality supported the pretensions of a master class or a conquering group. Such, in the main, seems to be the character of Brahmanism and Confucianism. Beginning with Buddhism and Christianity, however, we find universal religions which aim at the welfare of all and at the reconciliation and harmonization of social classes. Christianity, in particular, as we have already noted, has taken its patterns from the family and sought to impose them universally in human relations. As evidence of the influence of the religious sect, the student should not fail to note that next after the state and the family it has most often commanded the allegiance of individuals even to the point of death.

A typical, or rather hypertypical, secondary group of modern times is the great city. Here we see all the characteristics of secondary groups which distinguish them from primary groups emphasized. Instead of the close contacts and personal acquaintance which we find in primary groups, relationships tend to become impersonal and methods of communication very indirect. Thus in a great city very close neighbors are frequently not personally acquainted, and in spite of physical propinquity there is a tendency toward social isolation and loss of personal contacts. Under such conditions social relationships become cold and impersonal, and hence the sense of personal responsibility for one's fellows may sink to a very low level. Consequently control is sought through impersonal organizations, such as the government and its various agencies. Neighborhood life suffers disintegration, and to some extent the family and the church also suffer. Whether or not all of these phenomena are necessary accompaniments of the development of secondary group life upon a vast scale, such as we find in a great city, is a question.

It would seem that the renewal of family life and of neighborhood life within the great city might overcome some of these depersonalizing, unsocializing, and disintegrating tendencies. The instability of modern life has as one of its principal causes the growth of vast secondary groups, like the city, whose control we, as yet, only imperfectly understand. Distinct means of control will doubtless have to be devised for them; but primary group life as essential social life will furnish us essential principles which may guide us in the solution of the perplexing problems connected with secondary groups.

The Importance of the Form of Association, or the Type of a Social Group

The form of organization of a social group affects the whole life of the group and of its members, because the way in which a group is organized determines largely the sort of stimulation which an individual will receive from his social relationships. The form of the association, or the type of social organization, affects, therefore, both the behavior of individuals and the efficiency of the group. We would not expect, for example, two individuals who associated as master and slave to develop the same sort of characters that they would if they associated as free men. Nor would we expect a group of slaves and masters to show the same sort of efficiency as a group of free men. Again, we would not expect a polygamous family to have the same effect upon the character of its members as a monogamous family, nor should we expect the two groups to show the same sort of efficiency. Finally, we do not expect an autocratic or authoritarian state to develop the same character in its individual citizens as a democratic state, or the two states to show the same sort of efficiency. These examples are sufficient to show that the form of social organization is supremely important, both from the standpoint of its effect upon the personality

of individuals and from the standpoint of its effect upon group efficiency. We must not forget that individuals in groups form a mutual environment for one another, and that the nature of this environment depends in part upon the way in which the group is organized. Social organization forms a very important part of the culture of any group, and the knowledge of the forms of social organization has been quite as important as the knowledge of tool making. The whole history of human society has been, in one aspect, the history of testing out different forms of association or of social organization. Undoubtedly, one of the greatest practical tasks of social science must be to discover those forms of association, or of social organization, which are most likely to call forth the highest and best development of human personality. Hence, the theoretical and practical importance of studying the forms of association, or of social organization, and of getting some classification of these which will indicate their social value. We have already suggested several simple classifications which have been found helpful for social analysis. This work of classifying social groups according to the form of their organization is yet very incomplete, and perhaps never can be completed because of the developing character of social life. But some further classification may be helpful.

Classification of the Forms of Association, or Types of Social Groups

First of all, an evolutionary classification of natural social groups, or "communities," might be made according to the mechanism of social control within the group. Classifying groups upon this basis we find that the first or lowest form of association is the *instinctive* type, that in which the organization of the group rests upon instincts and the correlated selective processes of the natural environment which produced these instincts. Communities of this sort are wholly

below the human level. As the basis of control over collective life in them is instinctive and hereditary, they show little social change, have no social progress, and achieve no very complex types of social adaptation. Such are the communities formed by ants, bees, and many of the mammalia.

The second form of association is the *habitual* or *customary* type, that in which the mechanism of control is chiefly in custom and tradition. All existing savage communities of mankind are of this type, and we have every reason to believe that it represents the early human social condition. As the basis of control over collective life in such communities is habit or custom, they are rarely progressive, or progress very slowly. Such human groups are usually very simple in their organization and also small in the number of their individual members. In a certain sense, human groups, as we have seen, never escape the control of habit. Custom and tradition play a large part even in the most progressive, civilized human groups. This is especially true in the third type of group which we are about to mention. Nevertheless, other elements enter into the higher forms of social organization, and become increasingly important as the basis of control becomes something more than mere custom and tradition.

The third form of association is the *authoritarian* type, that in which the mechanism for control of the group life is chiefly despotic power, exercised by a small group of individuals over a larger group. Communities of this authoritarian type characterize the social life of barbarism and lower civilization. They are the result of a small group conquering a larger group and imposing its control upon the larger group. Such communities establish and maintain their unity through a fear-inspired obedience, which finally establishes habits of solidarity. This fear-inspired obedience may, of course, be religious as well as political in character, though such communities could hardly arise until the machinery of government had become established. Such authoritarian

societies have been the most prominent type among national groups down to very recent times.

Nevertheless, a fourth and higher form of association, or type of social organization, seems now to be emerging among civilized nations; that is, the *democratic* type, the type in which the mechanism of control is mainly in such indirect means as the education of the young, social standards, and moral ideals. In other words, the social control is through the intelligence and character of the individual members of the group. The control is placed within the individual rather than in external authority, but in the intelligence of the individual rather than in his impulses. This last form of association is evidently a type into which even the most civilized human communities are only just beginning to enter. Whether it will succeed or not will depend upon whether such indirect forms of social control as education and idealistic social standards will suffice to give to the individual members intelligence and character which will adapt them harmoniously to one another, so that the requirements of social existence can be met.

This evolutionary classification of communities according to the type of social control gives us a survey of the whole evolution of social organization to which we shall have occasion to return later. It helps us to understand the trend in social organization from organization on the basis of blind instinct to organization on the basis of reasoning intelligence in the individual. Sociology itself is but an instrument to make practical this last form of social organization.

Perhaps the most elaborate classification of social groups on the basis of the different psychological processes involved in their organization is that of Professor Giddings. First of all he divides all societies into instinctive and rational societies; the instinctive being limited to the bands, swarms, flocks, and herds of animals, the rational to human groups, since, as he says, "there is no human community in which

instinctive response is not complicated by some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of association." Combinations of instinct and reason, however, are of many gradations, and the particular combination found in any given human community establishes for it the dominant mode of relation between individuals. Upon this basis Professor Giddings would classify human societies into eight distinct types, as follows:

1. There is a homogeneous community of blood relatives, composed of individuals that from infancy have been exposed to a common environment and to like circumstances, and who, therefore, by heredity and experience are alike. Always conscious of themselves as kindred, their chief social bond is sympathy. The kind of type of society, therefore, that is represented by a group of kindred may be called the Sympathetic.

2. There is a community made up of like spirits, gathered perhaps from widely distant points, and perhaps originally strangers, but drawn together by their common response to a belief or dogma, or to an opportunity for pleasure or improvement. Such is the religious colony like the Mayflower band, or the Latter-Day Saints; such is the partisan political colony, like the Missouri and the New England settlements in Kansas; and such is the communistic brotherhood, like Icaria. Similarity of nature and agreement in ideas constitute the social bond, and the kind of society so created is therefore appropriately called the Congenial.

3. There is a community of miscellaneous and sometimes lawless elements, drawn together by economic opportunity—the frontier settlement, the cattle range, the mining camp. The newcomer enters this community an uninvited but unhindered probationer, and remains in it on sufferance. A general approbation of qualities and conduct is practically the only social bond. This type of society, therefore, I venture to call the Approbational.

The three types of society thus far named are simple, spontaneously formed groups. The first two are homogeneous, and are found usually in relatively isolated environments. The third is heterogeneous, and has a transitory existence where exceptional economic opportunities are discovered on the confines of established civilizations.

Societies of the remaining five types are in a measure artificial, in part created by reflection—by conscious planning. They are usually compound products of conquest or of federation, and, with few if any exceptions, they are of heterogeneous composition. They are found in the relatively bountiful and differentiated environments.

4. A community of the fourth type consists of elements widely unequal in ability; the strong and the weak, the brave and the timorous, exploiters and the exploited—like enough conquerors and conquered. The social bonds of this community are despotic power and a fear-inspired obedience. The social type is the Despotic.

5. In any community of the fifth type arbitrary power has been established long enough to have identified itself with tradition and religion. Accepted as divinely right, it has become authority. Reverence for authority is the social bond, and the social type is, therefore, the Authoritative.

6. Society of the sixth type arises in populations that, like the Italian cities at their worst estate, have suffered disintegration of a preëxisting order. Unscrupulous adventurers come forward and create relations of personal allegiance by means of bribery, patronage, and preferment. Intrigue and conspiracy are the social bonds. The social type is the Conspiratorial.

7. Society of the seventh type is deliberately created by agreement. The utility of association has been perceived, and a compact of coöperation is entered into for the promotion of the general welfare. Such was the Achaean League. Such was the League of the Iroquois. Such was the confederation of American commonwealths in 1778. The social bond is a covenant or contract. The social type is the Contractual.

8. Society of the eighth type exists where a population collectively responds to certain great ideals, that, by united efforts, it strives to realize. Comprehension of mind by mind, confidence, fidelity, and an altruistic spirit of social service are the social bonds. The social type is the Idealistic.

Professor Giddings has suggested that from these different types of association have sprung different theories as to the nature of human society; but it is obviously wrong to construct a theory of human society from the observation of one type of social group.

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CHAPTER V

THE UNITY OF THE GROUP AND GROUP ACTION

As we saw in Chapter I, the first problem of theoretical sociology is the problem of social unity. This is first in the problems of group behavior; for there is no such thing as a social group or group action without some degree of unity. We must understand how this unity is brought about, how it is maintained, and what is its essential nature. Just as in studying psychology we try to understand how the millions of cells of the brain and nervous system think and act as one, so in sociology we must try to understand how millions of individuals may think and act as one; how a collection of individuals succeeds in acting in a unified way. This problem has often been overlooked, or even denied, by students of human relations. Practically, however, it cannot be ignored. Practical statesmen, for example, have always concerned themselves with the unity of the national group. But national unity is only one form of social unity, and the unity of the family, the local community, the church, or almost any other essential group is of equal importance; for without unity no group can accomplish anything. This problem is sometimes called the problem of "social solidarity," though we generally use the word solidarity to express a high degree of unity; it is also sometimes called the problem of "social integration."

The Nature of the Interactions within a Group

A group, whatever else it may be, is a mass of interactions between the individuals who compose it. Primitively, that is

to say, in the most lowly forms of life, interactions must have been purely physiological or biological. Originally the unity of the group was a biological matter. It was an interdependence of individuals in the carrying on of a common life-process. We have seen, also, that these original biological connections between individuals developed, as we ascended in the social scale of life, into various forms of interstimulation and response which gradually became more or less conscious. Hence the interconnections between individuals became more and more psychic, and their interactions, becoming conscious, might be said to become more and more "mental interactions." When we reach the human world, mental interaction, or mental interstimulation and response, makes possible human group life as we know it.

It is hardly necessary to say that we do not mean by "mental interaction" that there is any direct connection or interaction between the minds of individuals. Each mind, so far as we know, is wholly unconnected with other minds, except through its relation to a common physical medium. Each mind responds, however, to the stimuli in this physical medium and among these stimuli are the symbols of thought and feeling created in the physical medium by the voice, the features, and the bodily movements of other individuals. These are reacted to and mentally interpreted. Thus communication between mind and mind becomes in some degree possible. This is what we mean by mental interaction.

The student should, therefore, carefully note that there are no *direct causal* connections between one mind and another.¹ Hence there are usually no direct causal connections between the behavior of one individual and another. However, the minds of all individuals in a given social group tend to respond in similar ways to similar stimuli. This is because these minds have developed under similar biological condi-

¹ For elucidation of this matter, see my *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 76, 77.

tions, and have acquired similar habits through living together and carrying on common activities in a common environment. Thus through the operation of natural selection in the species and through the process of habit formation in the group, the action and reaction of mind upon mind becomes an orderly and well-defined process. This is what we know as the "social process" in the social sciences, but ordinarily we call it communication, imitation, suggestion, sympathy, etc. It is the process of mutual adaptation and readaptation which goes on among the members of a group through mental interstimulation and response. Social life is thus essentially a process of mental interaction.² It is through the various forms of mental interstimulation and response that groups of relatively independent individuals can act together; but it is obvious that if a social group is to have any sort of unity these interactions must be regulated and controlled.

It seems hardly necessary to discuss whether the unity of a group is physical or psychical. In a sense it must be both. Originally, as we have seen, the unity must have been physical; but in human groups unity is certainly maintained almost wholly through psychic means. In human groups impulses, habits, feelings, perceptions, and ideas of individuals maintain the unity of the group. It is especially the *mental attitude* of the individuals toward one another which is the final decisive factor which decides whether a human group shall maintain its unity. Essentially, therefore, the unity of a human group is a psychical matter, although from a strictly scientific point of view we must speak of the unity of a social group as "psycho-physical." This statement would be equally true of the mind of an individual, since we know of no purely psychic processes which exist apart from physical processes. So if we speak of the unity of a social group as psychical, or mental, we mean only that the sig-

² Compare Chap. I of this book.

nificant things regarding it, the things which make it a social group, are psychical or mental.

Social Coördination

If a social group is to have any sort of unity it is obvious that the activities of its individual members must be adjusted to one another in some more or less definite way. Otherwise, the group cannot work together as a unit. We could not have group behavior, unless there was "grouped action," that is, settled forms of interaction among the individuals of the group.³ We might compare the social group to a machine. Now the unity of the machine is secured by the nice adjustment of its parts to one another. If this adjustment is not perfect, there will be friction and the machine will not work well, or perhaps not at all. So in a social group there must be an adjustment between the activities of its individual members, if the group is to work well as a unit, or even at all.

In other words, individuals, in order to form a group and carry on a common life or common activities, must *co-ordinate* their activities; that is, they must mutually so adapt their activities that these activities work toward a common objective aim. It is this coördination of the activities of individuals which makes group action or group behavior possible. It brings to a unity of aim the activities of all the individuals of a group. *Such a coadaptation, or mutual adjustment, of the activities of the individuals of a group may be called a social coördination.* Just as a machine will not

³ Compare the statement of Dewey (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 61): "In any case we must start with grouped action, that is, with some fairly settled system of interaction among individuals." Compare also the original statement of the writer (*Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 144): "The significant thing for the sociologist is not that mental interactions between individuals exist, but that they are regular; not haphazard, but co-ordinated and controlled."

work without the mutual adjustment of all its parts, so a group can do nothing without the mutual adjustment of the activities of its individual members. "Social adaptation" is a term also used sometimes to describe this process. It has also been called "the coimplication of activities," because the activity of one member of a group implies the activity of other members, from the standpoint of the total behavior of the group. It might perhaps be even better called a "dove-tailing" of the activities of the members of a group.

Social Coördination and Social Unity

It is obvious that it is the coördination of the activities of the members of a group which creates the unity of the group. It is not the mere fact of interactions between individuals which gives rise to the unity of the group. It is rather that these interactions are regulated and controlled so as to form a unified system of activity. A social group has unity only through the mutual adjustment of the activities of its members. Coadaptation or coördination of individual activities makes the group and its life. If we take this standpoint we shall have no difficulty in understanding group behavior. In a football team, for example, it is the coördinated activities of the members of the team which makes the behavior of the team. If the form of coördination or adjustment is to change, then there must be various forms of mental interstimulation and response until a new adjustment is reached. Thus the conscious life of the group centers about the process of coadaptation or coördination, just as the conscious life of the individual centers about the process of individual adaptation. If we take this standpoint of reciprocal adjustment or coördination of the activities of a group of individuals in their efforts to carry on a common life or a common activity, we shall have no difficulty in understanding the phenomena of group behavior, or the "social process" from the point of view of psychology.

Social Coöperation and Coördination

Coöperation is another word which might be used to describe group behavior and the formation of a group, if narrow meanings had not become attached to this word. The coadaptation which we find in social groups is an active process, a "working together" toward a common end. In this sense it is a process of coöperation; but it is not coöperation necessarily in the sense of mutual aid, much less in the sense of conscious and willing mutual aid. There are many adaptations between individuals which give rise to a system of regulated or coördinated activities which do not necessarily have mutual aid as their end. Even when two armies fight in a regular manner there may be said to be a "coimplication of their activities" and to that extent their activities may be said to be "coördinated." On the other hand, we do not ordinarily regard such cases of regulated conflict as cases of coöperation. Again, groups of individuals often live together in a condition of mere toleration. In such cases individuals may show a high degree of coördination or coadaptation of their activities, but we also speak of their lack of coöperation. Strictly speaking, however, the student of group life discovers some degree of coöperation in all of these cases; but popularly the word coöperation has come to mean "mutual aid," and even conscious and voluntary mutual aid.

We may therefore speak of four degrees or types of social coördination which are discernible in human groups. The first, and most harmonious type, is where all members of a group voluntarily coöperate, willingly render mutual aid, with a relatively equal exchange or interchange of services. This may be regarded as the perfect form of association or coördination.⁴ The second is a group held together by tolera-

⁴ See Novicow, "Mechanism and Limits of Human Association," Section III, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 314.

tion and some exchange of services more or less unwillingly rendered. The third is a group a part of whose individuals dominate and exploit, or selfishly use, the rest of the group. Here exchange of services is unequal, and coöperation tends to be one-sided. The fourth type is that of modified hostility, or regulated conflict, of which we have already spoken. Unmodified or absolute conflict would, of course, destroy all social adjustment. The last three types are frequently difficult to distinguish from one another and evidently overlap. They may be regarded as imperfect forms of social coördination, but are very common in human society. It is evident that coördination or coadaptation increases in a group as harmonious coöperation increases.

Social Coördination and Social Organization

The adjustments among the individuals that persist—become habitual—form the permanent organization of the group. Even when such adjustments are constantly changing, however, the group must retain some degree of organization if it is to remain a group. Thus we may say that the coördinations among the individuals of a group form the substance of its organization; or that social organization is the result of the coördination of adaptive activities. The group organization is all the coördinations or coadaptations among the members of a group, looked at collectively and as forming a system. It is the unity of the group looked at from the standpoint of its internal structure. But it is especially the *persistent* coördinations or coadaptations which we bring together when we speak of "social organization," or the organization of a group. If these coördinations or adjustments are settled and harmonious we may speak of them as the group's "social order."

Objective Expressions of Social Coördination

Social organization in general is one of the objective expressions of the coadaptations or coördinations within a

group. The type of the group, or the form of association, which we discussed in the previous chapter, is another one of these expressions. The objective expressions of social coördination cover all the visible uniformities and relations in group behavior. Social coördinations, in an objective sense, are simply the regular modes of social activity in a given group of individuals. Every social group has these regular modes of social activity, which, if they are persistent, we may term singly "social habits"—a term which covers all enduring social coördinations.⁵ The family, for example, illustrates the whole matter very clearly; for the activity of every member of a family group is coördinated in very definite and regular ways with the activity of all the other members of the group. If this were not so the family could not persist long as a group or maintain any high degree of unity. When we find such regular modes of social activity in small groups, we do not hesitate to call them "group habits." But the student should note that these regular modes of social activity in small groups are exactly the same as usages and customs in larger groups, such as communities and nations. For the usages of large groups Professor W. G. Sumner popularized the term "folkways." When such folkways or usages are considered important for the welfare of the group, they become the customs or mores of the group; and when customs have definitely behind them the established authority of the group they become "institutions."

Now all such forms of social habit, whatever we may call them, are extremely important for understanding, not only the behavior of groups, but also the behavior of individuals. For individuals have to adapt themselves to these group habits. They form, therefore, a very important part of the environment for the individual, and some would say entirely determine the social behavior of the individual. At any

⁵ See Chap. III, p. 90

rate, such group habits are very persistent in the larger and more permanent human groups, and are very difficult to change, for to change them means to change the type of adaptation, or of social coördination, for practically all the members of the social group. Thus the organized life of the group changes very slowly; and in large groups it frequently seems to the individual like the order of physical nature, something to which one must adjust one's self.

The visible forms of coadaptation between individuals are multitudinous, and as we have seen in a previous chapter, no exhaustive enumeration or classification of them has ever yet been made. Certain great types, however, have been defined and long known. Through abstraction we may possibly be able to reduce the multitudinous types of concrete social relationships to a few types. This may help in understanding the various types of social relationships. Thus, for example, in taking the various forms of the family which have been tried out in human history, and studying them as types of social adaptation, we shall get much light upon the whole matter of group organization.

Subjective Accompaniments of Social Coördination

If a group of individuals is to carry on successfully certain common activities through mental interstimulation and response, those individuals must maintain certain mental attitudes toward one another which will favor the quick and effective response of each to the stimulus which the activity of the others affords. Hence certain habits of feeling and of thinking, certain values and ideas, must develop in the group to facilitate group action or group response. In part these social values and social beliefs, with the corresponding mental attitudes in individuals, are the outcome of the adaptations in the group, or of group behavior; in part, they are instruments used to facilitate and control group action. Hence, every group has as a most important

part of its life certain group values or standards and group patterns of action. Briefly we may call these "social values" and "social patterns." These would be embodied in the tradition of the group. Corresponding to them will be the "social attitudes" in the individual members of the group.⁶ The family group, again, illustrates the matter. The life of the family group is controlled by certain social values and social patterns. The mental attitude of the members of the family toward these values and toward one another controls their behavior. The common feelings, ideas, beliefs, and values of the family group become controls over the activity of the group and at the same time are expressions of the common group life. Thus the adjustments between husband and wife, parent and child, are accompanied and controlled by emotional and intellectual attitudes. We cannot understand the life or behavior of any group without understanding the values and beliefs which are embodied in its tradition and in the habitual feeling and intellectual attitudes of its members. Hence the significance of these psychic processes for the understanding of social life.

Coördinating Feelings and Ideas

The feelings and ideas which are common to all members of a group are usually found to be "coördinating feelings and ideas"; that is, they are such as tend to maintain the unity and persistence of the group. Human social groups especially are characterized by the large amount of feeling and ideational elements which enter into their life. No doubt instinctive reactions are fundamental, since in animal groups the interactions of their individual members may be regarded as almost wholly instinctive. Instinctive reactions begin the process of coördination or coadaptation. But in human society it is the feelings and ideas which are attached

⁶ Compare Thomas, *The Polish Peasant*, Vol. I, pp. 20-35

to social habits and which become group traditions that are the significant things, and which we must understand in order to control social behavior. In small natural groups, such as the family, the feeling attitude may often be the chief thing, though even here the standards and ideas accepted by the members of the group play an increasingly important part. In large, civilized, human groups, however, such as modern nations, unity of action and life is secured largely through certain ideas and beliefs shared by most of the people. Even in such groups certain sentiments like patriotism and loyalty play an equally important part.

It follows, of course, that certain attitudes on the part of individuals are much more favorable to social coördination and to the maintenance of group unity than others. Among these coördinating attitudes confidence and mutual trust are fundamental and are necessary for the establishment of stable group life. Harmonious social relations beget confidence, but, on the other hand, confidence is necessary for all but the simplest relationships. If a group is to be stable, individuals must form a stable environment with reference to each other. Hence the knowledge or belief that we can rely upon the character of others, what we call our "confidence" or "faith" in others, is necessary for the establishment of stable relationships. People cannot live together without some degree of mutual trust. This is well illustrated in our economic life. Economists have often remarked upon the great importance played by confidence or mutual trust in the transactions of commerce and finance. It is scarcely necessary to add that this attitude plays an equally important part in all other phases of the social life. Without it the family could not exist, government could not be carried on, and social work would have no secure basis. Lack of confidence, on the other hand, is a disintegrating element in any group. "Faith" is one of the foundations of human society.

Sympathy and understanding are two other subjective

attitudes which are very important for group life. They are preëminently coördinating attitudes, and at the same time, are among the most striking products of harmonious relationships. Instinctive sympathy may be regarded, as McDougall has pointed out, as one of the primitive cements of social groups; while habitual sympathy accompanies the harmonious coördination of individuals in all the higher stages of life. Only individuals who sympathize with each other and understand each other are fitted to adapt themselves readily to one another. As sympathy and understanding are so important in human groups, groups of all sorts do all that they can to promote sympathy and understanding among their members. In smaller groups there comes in the social significance of convivial occasions, or of "society" in the narrow sense of the word, which are designed to promote acquaintance and understanding among the members of the group. Hence civilized societies take many artificial measures for the deliberate cultivation of sympathy and understanding among their members on account of the coördinating values of these attitudes. Individuals, moreover, conscious that their successful adjustment to their groups depends upon being understood and sympathized with by their associates, sedulously seek sympathy and understanding from one another. On the other hand, the lack of sympathy and understanding between individuals gives rise to friction within the group and may become the source of conflict and so of much of the tragedy of social life.

Examples of coördinating intellectual attitudes, or of coördinating ideas and beliefs, are perhaps a little harder to give. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that all the great groups of human history have had coördinating ideas and beliefs as an important element in their unity. All the great nations, for example, have had unifying ideas as to their mission, destiny, or work. These ideas have functioned to draw men together. The smaller groups have similar ideas con-

nected with their existence and purposes. It will be noted that ideas of very diverse character have had, under various circumstances, a cohesive power upon human groups; indeed, whether a feeling or an idea will function in a unifying or disintegrating way in the social life or not, quite entirely depends upon circumstances. Yet it remains true that there are certain ideas and beliefs which are normally unifying in their tendency. These are especially the mental patterns taken from the life of groups, especially primary groups, when they are most harmonious and at their best. The ideas and ideals taken from the family group and the neighborhood group, such as brotherhood, mutual service, social equality, and social justice, function generally to unite men. Indeed, it is a characteristic of the ideas and ideals which we call "moral" that under normal circumstances they tend to unite men; for the virtues bind men together into harmonious relationships, and the ideas which stand for them function in the same general direction. Morality is thus another foundation of human society.

These subjective accompaniments of the unity or integration of human groups show conclusively that this unity is essentially psychic or a spiritual matter. In the lower forms of life the unity of groups may be purely instinctive; but in human social life this instinctive control has been replaced by purposive, intelligent control. If we destroyed the spiritual element in human groups, if that were possible, no unity on the human plane would be left. Even if these mental accompaniments be only a means to perfect the adjustments of life, they are evidently the absolutely decisive factor in the social life of civilized men. Social values, social attitudes, social patterns, moral ideals play the decisive part in the behavior of civilized human groups. We are not, however, now discussing the "causes" of social unity, but only its objective forms and expressions and its subjective accompaniments.

Social Control

The collective control of social life-processes, which we may call social control, is evidently an aspect of social co-ordination or coadaptation; for we could have no harmonious coadaptation of the activities of individuals without some form of group control over those activities. As we have just said, the control in animal societies may be instinctive; but human societies undertake more or less consciously to shape and mold the habits, the desires, the beliefs, and the ideals of their members, so their activities may be easily and advantageously coördinated with those of the whole group. Thus arise the phenomena of social control. Except perhaps in its simplest forms, group action is impossible without some degree of group control over the individual. Human societies, therefore, from the first present more or less of the phenomena of authority and of social discipline. If the individual varies too greatly from the standards of his group, if he refuses to coördinate his activities in harmonious ways with the members of his group, he is punished. From childhood to the grave the individual is surrounded by stimuli of all sorts, chiefly in the way of possible rewards and penalties, to get him to coördinate his activities harmoniously with those of his group. This is what we may call "social pressure." As Giddings has said, "Upon the creating and perfecting of discipline, and upon the standardizing of behavior and the selection of character by means of discipline, society has directed conscious efforts from the beginning."⁷

All this, of course, involves some form of social constraint upon individuals, though they may not be conscious of such constraint. Some degree of social constraint must be present in all social groups whose members have been in any degree

⁷ *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 206.

individualized. With the greater individualization of the units of civilized human groups, apparently more and subtler forms of social constraint are necessary to get the individual to conform his conduct to the standards of his group. But groups often demand too much social conformity from their individual members. Constraint may exceed the limits of wisdom, may prevent fruitful variation, that is, it may maintain social coördinations which are no longer best adapted to life conditions. It may, in short, become needless repression. Thus arises possible conflict between the individual and the group. Yet it is evident that some degree of social control is as necessary and helpful for the individual as for the group.

Social control and social conformity are necessary for human social solidarity; but a higher type of solidarity is secured in a group where the conformity of the individual is voluntary and intelligent; where the control is a pressure which has due respect for individual welfare.

As social groups become what we may call self-conscious, then, they endeavor by definite policies to influence individual conduct so as to control and limit variations from the type approved by the group. But a certain amount of variation, of difference, in all social groups is necessary and desirable, not only for the division of labor within the group, but to preserve plasticity in its organization, so that readjustment and progress may be possible. Social control and social conformity have their real justification in the fact that groups have purposes which involve united or group action, and this is their only justification. Yet it is through collective or group action and achievement that civilization has been built up. From the first human society has been, on its constructive side, a great coöperative process which has involved ever more complex and harmonious coördinations of its individuals. Hence the great civilizing traditions have become embodied in great institutions of social control which

direct the main achievements of civilized human society. The part which these play in controlling and developing the social behavior of civilized men will concern us frequently later.

Limits of Social Coördination

Under this head of social control it is well to note that control over the social behavior of the individual cannot, in the long run, be a matter of mere external constraint. It is rather a matter of the development of socialized personality in the individual members of the group; for the mental and moral development of the individual members of a group limits the complexity of their social organization and hence their capacity for social coördination and social achievement. The higher types of social adjustment require a corresponding development in the intelligence and self-control of the individuals concerned. Hence the higher types of social organization require development of socialized personality in individuals. It is not true, therefore, that social evolution can proceed independently of individual development. The intelligence and character of the individual, therefore, set limits to social organization at any particular stage. If individual character and intelligence cannot be raised to meet the requirements which a higher type of social organization imposes, then social organization must drop back to a lower level. While a people's social organization may be much lower than its intelligence and moral character are capable of sustaining, yet it is an old truth, and one well worth emphasizing, that any great advance in social life must ultimately depend upon raising the intelligence and moral character of the individuals concerned.

Group Will and Group Individuality

In human groups the objective aims of group action become conscious, and also become, in time, deeply accentuated group habits. When groups in the face of great difficulties

attempt to do certain things, they can do them successfully only by the closest coördination of the activities of their individual members, by what we, in ordinary language, call "team work." This means that each individual must to some extent identify his personality with his group; that is, subordinate his will, his activities, more or less completely, to those of the group. Under such circumstances groups develop a definite direction and purpose in their activity. They develop, in other words, what we may call a "group will." This is the necessary result from coördinating their actions in certain definite ways to achieve a common purpose. So far as groups achieve unity of aim or of purpose they may be said to possess a group will; but we only mean by this expression that the wills of their individual members, or of a large majority of them, coördinate in a definite direction. A football team, for example, shows the coördination of the wills of its individual members to put the ball over the goal; and we rightly speak of this as the will of the team. Popular will in a nation is, of course, of the same character. There is nothing mysterious about group will; we see evidences of it constantly.

In the same way social groups may come to have quite as distinct characters as individuals. They develop a definite individuality through the fact that their efforts are habitually coördinated in a given way. These coördinations, and the corresponding social attitudes in individuals, become so habitual that they give a relatively fixed character to the group as a whole. Taking an old definition of character, that it is "the leading purpose in life plus the momentum acquired by habit," we see that it is quite as possible to speak, in this sense, of the character of groups as of individuals. Hence groups possess a definite individuality on the basis of their character. It is not surprising, therefore, that the law has tended to treat groups as "quasi-personalities," and that a considerable school of political thought sees

no other way of extending legal control over human groups than to regard them as quasi-personalities. This the law has long done with the legalized corporations, but it has not yet successfully applied the doctrine to other groups, though there is manifestly a good sociological basis for doing so.

Group Egoism

From the fact that groups behave as individuals do with reference to their life conditions, it follows that groups may develop tendencies to aggrandize and exploit and to accept no standards but their own success and selfish interest; that is, they may develop group selfishness. Like individuals, social groups tend to consider their own collective life as of paramount importance.⁸ Human history, for example, has illustrated the egoism and greed of national groups. Within the nation the egoism of various "interests groups," such as political parties and economic classes, has been scarcely less pronounced. All too frequently political parties set themselves above the country which they are supposed to serve. Even religious denominations and sects have repeatedly in history been guilty of making the interest of their sect the practical criterion of right conduct. Thus all groups, and hence all institutions, tend to make themselves ends in themselves, apart from the larger social life which they are supposed to serve.

From these facts has grown up the somewhat plausible theory that the egoism of social groups is unlimited. The existence of large groups, such as communities and nations, it is claimed, is possible only because a "balance of egoisms" of smaller groups is effected. The solidarity of a national group, for example, is claimed to be nothing but a "balance"

⁸ The student will find most suggestive material on the causes of group egoism in Dr. George E. Vincent's paper, "The Rivalry of Groups" in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January, 1911 (Vol. XVI).

of competing interest groups, and its government or political structure simply the result of the egoistic pressure of one group upon another. According to this view, governments in practice represent nothing but an equilibrium or compromise between conflicting interests.

That group egoism is a fact cannot be denied. But it hardly warrants an egoistic theory of the general structure of human society. In opposition to this doctrine of the unlimited egoism of groups, we must place the fact that under normal conditions individuals are not members merely of one group, but of many groups; and that their loyalty may be given as much to the larger groups as to the smaller groups. In other words, under normal conditions the whole personality of the individual is not surrendered to his party, his class, or his religious denomination; but his deeper loyalty is given to his country or even to humanity. Recent human history abundantly illustrates this. It is a fact that a larger and larger number of persons in civilized nations are seeking to coördinate their activities, not simply with their party, their class, their nation, or even their race, but with humanity as a whole. There is no justification for the doctrine of the absolute egoism of groups any more than there is for the doctrine of the absolute egoism of individuals. Human nature is such that, under the proper guidance of education and ideals, it can respond to the needs of the largest possible human group, humanity as a whole. The solidarity of humanity is a realizable fact, not a mere Utopian dream.

The Causes of Social Unity

If it is the coördination of individuals in activity which makes the unity of a social group, then what are the "causes" which bring about such coördination? What are the active factors which bring about and maintain the integration of the group? To some extent we have already touched upon this question in our discussion of the origin of animal asso-

ciation and of human society. We have also noted in previous paragraphs various elements which enter into social coordination, and which are accordingly factors in social unity. But we need to outline the different sets of factors or causes which affect the unity of social groups when viewed statically. We find not less than seven different sets of factors which affect the unity of social groups, even when we take a static or cross-section view of their existence, as follows:

1. *Environmental Conditions*

The least that can be said about environmental conditions as affecting the unity of groups is that they must be favorable to the aggregation and integration of individuals. This is so obvious that the danger in a scientific study of society is that the importance of these conditions will be over-emphasized. It will be well, therefore, if the student can see from the first that these conditions are among the less variable of the factors which affect social unity, and that hence, one cannot usually appeal to them to explain the fluctuations in the unity of a group which occur in relatively short periods of time. This statement is true of all of the first three sets of factors affecting social unity which we shall discuss. It should also be noted that environmental conditions rarely work directly and mechanically upon human groups. They usually affect group unity only indirectly through changing biological conditions, habits, instinctive tendencies, feelings and ideas. External conditions may change these in two ways, either through exerting a selective influence upon them, or through acting as modifying stimuli. In the first case, however, the effect of environment is seen only after the lapse of generations; but in the second case its effect becomes perceptible at once through the modification of habits, feelings, and ideas.

Aggregations of individuals occur only where external conditions of climate, soil, food, and geographical location are

favorable. Dense human populations have from time immemorial characterized fertile river valleys, indented sea-coasts, and, in general, localities where natural resources are abundant. These conditions favoring aggregation undoubtedly favor social unity; but, as active factors, their influence upon social unity is more often negative than positive. That is, if these external conditions are not favorable, groups tend to be scattered. Thus, a food supply sufficiently abundant permits the growth in numbers of social groups, and by permitting close contact between individuals gives biological forces, instincts, habits, feelings, and institutions their opportunity to knit the group together. On the other hand, an insufficient food supply may make it difficult, if not impossible, for these other factors to function toward group unity, and may tend to disrupt even the most closely knit groups. The case is the same with practically all the other natural conditions upon which human groups depend for the material means of life. The least that can be said of them is that these natural conditions must be favorable to aggregation if social unity is to have any chance to develop.

Besides these relatively fixed conditions in the external environment, however, there are other environmental conditions which exert a decided positive influence upon social unity. These conditions are, in brief, the dangers in the environment which beset groups. As Professor Ross says: "Danger tightens and security relaxes the bonds of all social groups."⁹ In primitive times the danger from the brutes below man doubtless served as a powerful stimulus to keep primitive families and hordes close together. To some extent this is true in the tropics even at the present day; but within historical times, no danger has threatened human groups comparable to that offered by conflict with other human

⁹ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 287.

groups. Among all the things in the environment of a human group, the most important are other human beings who may form possibly hostile groups. From the time that man became supreme over the rest of the animal world, human groups have been involved in a life and death struggle with other human groups. Only those human groups could survive, in this war with other groups, that developed a high degree of solidarity, or unity, among their members. Moreover, those groups that developed the highest efficiency in the conscious coöperation and coördination of all their members would have an advantage over other groups. Here we see two sets of forces working for group unity; one, a selective process which would tend to eliminate or disintegrate groups lacking in unity and coördination; the other a process of more or less conscious habituation and control, purposefully undertaken by the group to protect itself against its enemies. Both processes would tend to promote enduring social solidarity. The first process would do so through the development of impulses favorable to group solidarity, such as imitateness and organic sympathy. The second process, which is probably the more important for human beings, would lead to insistence on the part of practically all members of the group on the importance of coördinated activity, and to the establishment of social machinery in the group to bring this about. Through experience, the more intelligent groups of individuals would realize that some centralized control is necessary if the group is to succeed in successfully defending itself against the aggressions of other groups.

It may seem absurd that the greatest degree of coördination, unity, and solidarity in the larger human groups has resulted from war; but such is the fact. This cannot be denied, even though we may fully recognize that in the higher stages of human development war, or even unregulated competition between groups, is inimical to the realiza-

tion of the solidarity of mankind as a whole. Whatever promise social science may hold out of developing human social solidarity on the basis of higher factors in the future, it cannot be denied that in the past the stimuli arising from intergroup conflict and competition have been most potent in promoting the unity of human groups. Peace and security need not, perhaps, under all circumstances relax social bonds; not at least when humanity comes to understand that its struggle with the nonsocial and antisocial forces of nature and human nature demand as high a degree of coöperation, of conscious, coördinated activity, as the struggle of rival human groups. Nevertheless, we must recognize as a scientific fact the part which intergroup conflict has played in producing social unity in the past.

2. Biological Conditions

Of not less importance than environmental conditions among the factors working for group integration are biological conditions. To work for group unity biological conditions must be either similar or, if different, complementary, that is, creating a natural interdependence. Similar biological constitution makes it possible for individuals to live and work together; for under similar conditions similar individuals respond in similar ways to similar stimuli; and this coördinates their activities. Normal biological differences within the limit of the species are hardly less important as a means to group unity, especially when these differences are those of sex and age. The biological differences of sex and age function on the whole to promote harmonious association, because, as we have already seen, they create a natural interdependence among individuals and so bring about social unity. Reproduction necessitates a division of labor between the sexes and interdependence in life-processes. The biological differences of age necessitates parental care, which, because it is prolonged in the human species, has been a

prime unifying influence in human groups. These matters we have, however, fully discussed.

3. *Instinctive Tendencies*

These are, as we have already seen, natural impulses based on the hereditary structure of the nervous system. To work for social unity they must be either similar or complementary. The working of complementary instincts is sufficiently illustrated in the relation of the sexes and of parents and children. Similar instinctive tendencies give rise to similar responses in similar situations, and thus usually favor unity of group activity. That special instinctive tendencies favorable to group life exist in man and in many other animals can hardly be denied. If the instincts of all the animals of the same species did not fit into each other, so to speak, so as to furnish certain original coadaptations which are necessary for the maintenance of the life of the species, the species could not long continue to exist. As living in groups is a matter of the utmost biological significance, those species that have survived through this behavior must have had fixed in them, through natural selection, hereditary reactions favorable to this mode of living. Hence we find instinctive tendencies not only connected with sex and the family life, which we have already discussed, but also certain other tendencies, such as the impulses connected with defense and self-protection, which favor living in larger groups than the family. Whether or not man has a "herd instinct," as certain sociologists and psychologists have claimed, it is certain that a number of his natural impulses fit him to live in relatively large groups. The dread of solitude and the love of company shown by all human beings, whether savages or civilized, children or adults, work in this general direction. The love of the approbation of others also places in man a strong tendency to go with a group. Finally "instinctive imitation," that is, the impulse to copy without con-

sciousness of purpose, especially fits man for group life. All strongly imitative animals, without exception, live in groups, and whether imitation is an offshoot of gregariousness, or *vice versa*, does not particularly matter. The fact that all men show a passion to do as others of their group do, shows that they are by nature adapted to some sort of group life.

Mutual imitation is the great means in human groups of making acquired habits uniform. While all imitation in human society is not of this natural or instinctive sort, but may be purposeful and rational, yet the natural tendency to do as others do, to fall into line with one's group, facilitates coördination and unity in human groups. If the impulse to imitate did not exist as a natural tendency, but had to be taught, it would not be so easy to make uniform the activities of a group. With such a natural tendency, however, the falling into line with one's group becomes relatively easy and unconscious, saving the labor of thought and judgment on the part of the individual members of the group. A large part of the imitation which we find in human society seems to be of such an instinctive or unconscious character.

4. *Habits*

The habits of the individuals of a group must be either similar or complementary if the group is to maintain its unity. Similar habits, as we have seen, tend to insure uniformity of action in a group. Complementary habits favor the division of labor in a group. In either case coördinated activity results. The habituation of individuals to each other in a common environment tends to bring about mutual adjustment. Habitual coöperation in common work draws people together and unifies them. From one point of view, the whole matter of social unity, so long as it is not a result of mere natural conditions, is a matter of securing coördinating habits in individuals. Imitation, whether customary or con-

ventional, sympathy, coördinating ideas, and social control all work together to this end. At any given moment the unity of any human group may be regarded as a matter of habit. A high degree of unity in a group means that co-adaptive habits have been successfully established; while conflict within the group means, as we shall see, the failure to maintain such habits.

5. *Feelings*

The factors in group unity which we have thus far enumerated might be called the original or primitive factors, since they are found in all social groups, even in those below the human level. Behavioristic psychologists and many sociologists would apparently take into account no other factors in explaining the unity of human groups. However, as we have already pointed out, those controls over activity which we call feelings and ideas are much in evidence in human social life. Even though they come in only to reinforce or modify original and acquired tendencies, still so much in human society is built upon them that they deserve all the consideration which psychologically inclined social thinkers have given to them. Feeling, in the form of emotion and desire, sentiment and interest, reinforces or tends to inhibit instinctive and habitual activities. Thus the practical importance attributed to feeling in our social life cannot be regarded as a scientific mistake.

The feelings favorable to social unity must be either similar or complementary. Similarity of feeling tends strongly toward uniformity of activity within a group. Some feelings draw individuals together; others pull them apart, as it were. Feelings of antipathy and hatred, reinforcing natural impulses of conflict and avoidance, tend to dissolve social bonds. On the other hand, common feelings in a group favor the development of what we call sympathy. In its simplest or organic form, this is feeling as others feel, and such sym-

pathy usually functions to reinforce powerfully the unity of small groups based largely upon instinctive impulses. Thus the natural affection of the members of a family group for one another is a strong bond of unity in the family. Reflective or rational sympathy, which comes from the exercise of social imagination, reinforces the unity of larger groups based more upon habits. As sympathy, which we may justly term the social emotion, reinforces altruistic impulses, it greatly strengthens social bonds. Acquired sentiments of interest and loyalty, such as patriotism, especially help to bind together the very largest human groups. A study of the systems of interest, desire, and sentiment in human groups may be made to throw as much light upon their life as we can get from any phase of their scientific study. Even if, from the strictly scientific point of view, we must admit that these feelings are mere accompaniments of activity, still what we have just said is practically correct; for these feelings, and the neural processes associated with them, not only stand for, but actually reinforce the activities of group life. Sociological science cannot afford to leave the element of feeling out of account in its description of group life.

6. *Ideas and Values*

Even in the associations of animals below man cognitive processes of a low order undoubtedly work toward a group unity. Thus the "consciousness of kind" may be assumed to awaken natural impulses of coadaptation among members of the same species. Perceptions of resemblances and differences seems to work as means of attraction or repulsion throughout the animal world. Animals of like kind not only associate, but seemingly recognize that they are of like kind, and this perception reinforces their tendency to associate. Again, animals as well as men seem subject to mass suggestion. Suggestion serves to diffuse similar mental states throughout a group, and these states work out in similar

or imitative activities. It is neither the consciousness of kind nor suggestion which differentiates human society from animal association. Rather, as we have said, it is "culture," and culture is possible because man has developed as his characteristic control over action the concept, or abstract idea, or "mental pattern."¹⁰ It is the large use which human groups make of these conceptual processes, which we commonly call "ideas," that distinguishes them from animal groups. These make for the human individual, when put into spoken words or other means of communication, an artificial, psychic environment which constrains all his actions quite as much as the physical environment does the behavior of the animal. The web of intercommunication bearing social patterns and mental images becomes the environment to which the individual strives to adjust himself. Thus civilized man lives, so to speak, in an environment of images and ideas which is not less real to him than the physical environment. It is for this reason that language, both spoken and written, becomes a powerful instrument in maintaining the unity of all human groups. The group tradition embodied in the language of the group becomes thus also one of the most active agencies to maintain group unity.

On account of the importance of ideas, beliefs, standards, and values¹¹ for maintaining social solidarity, all human groups have endeavored to standardize these. They have endeavored to make all individuals of the group like-minded with reference to certain fundamental ideas, beliefs, stand-

¹⁰ In an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* for May, 1925, Dr. Hornell Hart argues that subhuman groups in some cases show a low degree of "culture," or "behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted." The cases seem mainly those of natural reactions socially or sympathetically excited (see Chap. XI), and the argument does not seem conclusive if culture is strictly defined. The importance of culture for human society is, of course, not affected, even if the argument is valid.

¹¹ Values, of course, are complexes of feeling and intelligence. See Chaps. III and XII.

ards, and values. Thus like-mindedness has come to be valued by human groups as supremely important for their unity. Manifestly, however, too great like-mindedness would produce too great uniformity throughout a group, would prevent the division of labor, would prevent the development of complex forms of coöperation, and so would prevent the development of higher types of group unity. Differences in ideas, standards and values, where these differences are complementary and favor an advantageous division of labor, also conduce to the unity of the group. No general principle can be laid down here; but in the main it would seem correct to say that groups need relative uniformity in the fundamental and essential beliefs and values of their members, while they may safely leave a large liberty in nonessential beliefs and values. Manifestly, if the ideas, beliefs, and values of a group, when they concern fundamental group policies, are greatly dissimilar or inharmonious, they tend to produce conflicts within the group and to destroy its unity of action. It is evident that one of the greatest problems of modern societies is: how to secure sufficient uniformity of beliefs and values in their complex populations to assure them unity of action when confronting a common problem. This is one of the great problems of practical social science, and we shall accordingly devote considerable attention to it later.

While beliefs and ideas may often function to disrupt groups, by the same power they may function to unite them. Hence the larger human groups have elaborate machinery of intercommunication to secure unity of action. This machinery includes spoken and written language, the press, public assemblies, and all means of intercommunication. A fund of ideas is constantly kept in circulation in a group to guide and control the behavior of individual members. This fund of ideas, beliefs, and standards in circulation in a social group is sometimes spoken of as "the mind of the group,"

though strictly this term should be applied to the whole psychic life of a group. Upon the basis of the traditional ideas, beliefs, and values, judgments of the group as a whole are reached as to the action which is desirable in any concrete situation. Thus the opinion of the group tends to preserve unity of action. These matters we shall have to take up further when we come to discuss the mechanism of social change.

7. Conscious Social Control

The unity or solidarity of human groups is in part maintained by the control which the group more or less deliberately undertakes to exercise over the habits, ideas, and feelings of individuals, so as to make them conform to the needs of the life of the group. Gradually this control becomes embodied in the so-called regulative institutions of human society, or institutions of social control. Such institutions, of course, are social and cultural devices which are a product of man's higher intellectual and social development; and they must not be thought of as something separate from the six sets of factors in social unity which we have been discussing. Their importance for the unity of human groups, however, is so great that they demand separate consideration. In high civilization they are the chief means of controlling the activities of individuals and they probably have more to do with the formation of the habits and ideas of individuals in highly civilized groups than all other influences, objective and subjective, combined. The pressure which they put upon the individual to conform his conduct to that of his group may, of course, exceed the limits of wisdom. Nevertheless, we must recognize that order and solidarity in vast, complex, human groups are impossible without specialized institutions for social control. However much they may seem to hamper the freedom of the individual, the constraint or discipline which they impose is of prime importance for the unity and

survival of all civilized human groups. While we shall need to consider their functioning in detail when we take up the problem of social order, let us here note briefly some of these institutions of social control and what they do to maintain social unity.

Roughly the chief specialized institutions of social control may be classified under the headings of government and law, of religion and morality, and of education. Government and law are directly coercive upon individual behavior. They have to do with the overt acts of the individual; they co-ordinate and control the activities of individuals with reference to matters of common defense, of internal order within the state, and of social welfare generally. The weakness of government and law as institutions of social control is that it has not been found practical to extend them directly to the control of the motives of individuals or even to the formation of their habits. The control of government and law is almost necessarily limited to the overt or external acts of the individuals. Despotic forms of government, to be sure, have attempted to do much more than this and to control motives, beliefs, and opinions; but in general they have not succeeded in doing this over long periods of time, and particularly not without invoking the aid of religion or education. The free societies of modern civilization tend to use only the latter, leaving the church entirely free with respect to its religious and moral teaching. While the power of government and law is limited, yet in all cases it is the agency of last resort to control the behavior of the individual in relation to his group. It stands, therefore, for the minimum of moral conduct on the part of the individual in relation to his group, rather than for the maximum. Nevertheless, it is a chief means by which civilized human societies maintain unity and order.

Religion adds a supernatural sanction to conduct, and so in all human societies has been found to be one of the most

effective means of controlling human behavior. Religious sanctions generally attach themselves to habits of action which the group believes to be safe and which conduce to individual and social welfare. In this way religion powerfully reinforces the customs or mores of social groups. Religious sanctions, however, may attach themselves not simply to customs, but also to moral ideals. Moral ideals have, indeed, had influence with the masses in every civilization hitherto only because of religious sanction. The self-sacrifice and self-control which high moral ideals demand get their justification to the individual only through some sort of religious faith. The higher types of religion combat the idea that the misery and suffering of life are without meaning or value. They encourage hope and loyalty to high social ideals. Thus they give stability to character in the adult, and so make possible high and stable types of social relationships. This is especially true of those religions which stimulate the altruistic impulses and feelings of the individual, upon which, we have already noted, the higher and more complex types of social solidarity depend.

Religion promotes social unity chiefly through its support of moral ideals. Moral ideals are simply social ideals of a certain sort. The moral ideals of low civilizations function chiefly to maintain the folkways or social habits, but those of high civilization through holding up a higher standard before individuals may function to secure higher types of social coördination. The virtues recognized by a group, therefore, may not only bind its members together in harmonious relations, but also promote a higher type of social solidarity than the group has realized. High moral ideals promote social idealism.

Systems of education have always been utilized by human groups to promote social solidarity. Even very primitive human groups take formal means, such as initiation ceremonies, to impress upon the young the value of the group's

customs and usages. Through all human history, groups have made use of various educational means of securing the conformity of individuals to their habits of living.¹² Religion and morality, and even government and law, have worked very largely through systems of education. The reason for this is obvious, for the educative process is fundamentally a control over the process of habit and character formation in the young. Human culture, as we have seen, rests upon acquired habit and character in the individual. Now as groups increase in culture and in size and complexity, many more habits have to be acquired by the individual, if the individual is to coördinate his activities successfully with his group. Hence the increasing importance of the education of the young as social and cultural evolution advances. As social life becomes more complex, unless the whole process of education is controlled effectively by the group, there is much greater chance of socially unfavorable habits being acquired. Consequently, systems of formal education, with differentiated institutions, have to be created by complex human societies to fit individuals for membership in such groups. These systems of education frequently work under the fiction that they exist for the training and development of the individual as such, regardless of the social life; but their real purpose is to control individual habit and character in the process of formation, so that adults will be efficient in carrying on the social life and will coördinate their activities harmoniously with their group. Education is a social control over human life.

Perhaps a word should also be said about systems of intercommunication as an important factor in group unity. These may be regarded as means of mutual education for the adults within a group. In large complex groups the co-

¹² The best available discussion of education as a social function will be found in Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, especially Chaps. I-III.

ordination of the activities of a vast number of individuals would obviously be impossible without a highly developed system of intercommunication between the individual units. Hence the development of means of communication has kept step with the development of civilization. Modern civilized societies could not survive, much less maintain their unity, without an elaborate system of intercommunication. It is not necessary to dwell in detail upon the coördinating and integrating effect of such systems and of all devices to promote ease of communication. Obviously these devices were not invented and popularized merely for individual convenience, as is often superficially assumed, but rather as necessary means of achieving social coördination and social unity in large and complex groups. We shall return to the importance of intercommunication for the life of groups when we consider social change.

The Causes of Social Disintegration

If the integration of human groups is secured by the favorable working of the seven factors which we have just discussed, then their disintegration should be brought about by the unfavorable working of these same factors. The factors which are effective for promoting social unity are also the ones which are effective in producing social disintegration when they do not work favorably. The forces which make social unity also unmake it. Unless environmental, biological, psychological, and social conditions are favorable the unity of the human group cannot be maintained. We have tried to note the conditions under which these various factors are favorable to social unity; and incidentally we have noted some of the conditions under which they are unfavorable. In general, we have seen that the higher types of social unity require, in order to endure long, high social intelligence and character in the individuals concerned. Hence in the complex civilized societies of the

present, the vital element in social unity is probably the working of the institutions of social control which we have just discussed. The failure of government, of religion, of education, means the failure of the individual in many cases to get a proper adjustment to society. The system of social control in a highly civilized group is, therefore, all-important for its unity and survival. Social control is the method of group integration in civilization.

The failure of the machinery of social control, in one or all of its forms, is probably the chief cause of both minor and major disintegrative processes in all civilized societies. Whether it be the disintegration of the family, of the community, of a nation, or of a civilization, the disintegrative process in every case is rooted in the failure to control habit, and so social character, in individuals. The failure of the machinery of social control to be effective over the character and intelligence of individuals means that a group, such as a national group, for example, will be unable to get the leadership, the social character in individuals, and the complex coördinations required for its existence; and hence such a group will tend to disintegrate. The causes of social disintegration are, therefore, cultural, that is mental and moral, and not primarily biological. This conclusion does not preclude the possible working of a "reversal of selection" in human society, producing individual biological degeneration, and so undermining society's biological foundation; but even such a reversal of selection implies some failure of the machinery of social control. Only the great cyclic changes of climate and other geographic factors, natural calamities, and the like are outside of the power of the machinery of social control. But such factors do not appear to be the significant thing in the life of the great civilized nations of the present. The solidarity and survival of these groups is mainly a question of the efficiency of their institutions of social control. *There is no necessary natural*

death of nations and civilizations. To this matter we shall return later when we consider reversions in civilization.¹³

Interest Groups and Social Disintegration

It is popularly supposed that the destruction of large groups is due to the formation within them of classes, parties, or sects, "interest groups," which behave in a selfish and disintegrating way toward the larger group. Such interest groups obviously play an important and necessary part in the life of great complex societies. In the form of classes they represent certain great permanent interests of the group which are the concern of the group as a whole. In the form of parties and sects they initiate and further political and social changes in the group as a whole. Through competition with other interest groups, each interest group achieves organization and a degree of unity in the way in which we have already described. In a large society individuals are necessarily exposed to different conditions. This fact, along with the variation in the original nature of individuals, tends to cause the formation of minor groups, whose interests and habits are more harmonious. The organization of such minor groups presents no peril to the larger group of which they are a part so long as the machinery of social control and of social readjustment *remains* efficient. As a rule these groups become a danger only when the interests which they represent are ignored or repressed by those who actually have the power of the machinery of social control in their hands. When thus repressed or denied, interest groups are apt to take on a revolutionary character, and may become serious disruptive agencies which threaten the unity of the larger group. This matter we shall take up again when we consider the question of social revolutions. But if the "interests" are recognized by the agents of authority and

¹³ See Chap. VIII of this book.

proper adjustments are made on the part of the whole group to accommodate these interests, then the minor group rarely becomes an agent of disintegration. For interest groups will rarely carry their egoism to the point where they threaten the life of the whole group, if their just rights are recognized; for the loyalty of their members, under ordinary circumstances, is much greater to the whole group than to the party, faction, or class to which they belong. But they may do this if they are not given adequate part in the control of the life of the group as a whole, or if the larger group has no adequate machinery of social control to socialize its members with reference to the whole group. It is, then, only when the machinery of social control is inadequate to socialize individuals and to adjust and harmonize the different interests of different groups, that we may expect interest groups to menace the solidarity of social life.

Let us now consider still other obstacles to social unity.

Conflict between Groups

The natural relation between strange groups is one of competition, and so of possible hostility and conflict. Conflict between groups which have never been coördinated and harmonized in the carrying on of the life of a larger group is, therefore, a normal matter. While larger groups are forming, however, out of smaller groups, a considerable degree of conflict may be maintained among these groups, and at times this modified conflict may break out into absolute hostility. The nations of Western civilization, for example, before the Great War were never fully organized or coördinated. Their attitudes remained that of conflict, supposedly modified, to some degree, by the acceptance of a common religion, common culture, and beginnings of international law. Such slight beginnings of control and coördination did not prevent actual conflict developing between them, and this conflict passed into an attitude of absolute hostility, because

their tradition was that of strange and hostile groups. The nations of Western civilization, in other words, had never recognized themselves as constituting one united group. Conflict between the separate groups under these circumstances was abnormal only to the extent that the continuance of the tradition of hostility and possible conflict among them was itself abnormal. It was, at least, unintelligent for these nations not to have recognized that they constituted one large group with increasing solidarity of interests.

Another situation in which the primitive conflict and hostility of strange groups may be preserved after a larger group has been formed is in the case of "caste societies." In such cases the separate castes or classes were originally separate groups and failed to lose their identity in the larger group because they are imperfectly assimilated and harmonized. The familiar historical example is the case where one people has conquered another, and the subjugated people is reduced to a subject nationality, or possibly to a slave class. In such cases the attitude of separateness and hostility is apt to continue indefinitely. A coördination or adjustment arises between such groups, but it is one of exploitation or modified hostility. The attitude of hostility persists beneath the surface of behavior, or is generated afresh by exploitation and oppression. Hence the whole psychology of group action has to be modified in the case of such compound societies, for we are really dealing with groups which retain more or less of their original separateness and which have never attained complete unity of life or harmonious mutual adaptation.

Conflict within the Social Group

Conflict within a social group, which has once attained relatively complete unity of life or the harmonious coördination of its members, should be sharply distinguished from conflict between groups which have remained more or less

separate and hostile. We are safe in saying that the former is socially abnormal and is the result of some maladjustment between the members of the group. Whereas, conflict between groups which have never achieved mutual adjustment may be regarded as socially abnormal only from an idealistic point of view. We are speaking here of hostile conflict, not of that degree of conflict and opposition which normally accompanies all readjustments within a group. Some degree of opposition and conflict within a group, whether small or large, is a normal accompaniment of the breaking down of old adjustments or habits and the building up of new ones. There is no such thing as the social conditions within a group remaining long unchanged. The conditions of life change, and the social adjustments which worked well yesterday will not work to-day. Hence the habitual adjustments between individuals must be continually changed, if true and right relations between individuals are to be maintained. The customs and institutions of society at large must accordingly be continually modified if they are to remain right and happily adjusted to conditions. Now normally this process of social readjustment goes on so gradually in a group that serious forms of conflict do not develop between its members. The modifications in the behavior of the different individuals in a group are brought about by such peaceful means as mutual criticism, discussion, and voluntary agreement upon group policies and action. But where these means of effecting social readjustment are not used because they are imperfectly developed, or where, for any reason, inflexibility in attitude and behavior may develop in some portion of the group, especially among its dominant individuals, trouble is bound to result. For under such conditions there will be a failure to construct new and harmonious coördinations between the members of a group in harmony with the new life conditions; and conflict of habits and attitudes is bound to ensue. Any failure on the part of any group to keep

its means of social readjustment and social control in the highest state of efficiency means that hostile conflict is apt to break out between the members of the group.

It is here that much of the tragedy of social life comes in; for it is here that the opportunity for hostility between the members of a once unified group arises, and hence also the possibility of the more or less complete disintegration of the group. Social habits have to constantly change to meet changes in the environment. Individuals are exposed to different stimuli and respond differently. Individuals also vary in their organic constitution and on that account their responses will also vary. It is evident that social habits of every group must, in order to meet these conditions, undergo constant readjustment. Yet there is a tendency in human groups, and possibly in human nature, to avoid making readjustments if possible, because the process of readjustment always involves effort and is to some extent disagreeable. Hence the conservative tendency in groups to keep adjustments which have once been made even after they are no longer useful. Members of a family group, for example, often get adjustments to one another which work well for a time. These adjustments become habitual attitudes, but the conditions of life change and these attitudes need to be changed to meet the conditions. But for various reasons certain members of the family may fail to keep a spirit of accommodation and to modify their attitudes in accordance with the new conditions. As a consequence, the old adjustments are maintained too long. They finally break down, and new harmonious adaptations may fail to be made, because the members of the family have grown too far apart. Consequently the family suffers a more or less complete disintegration which might have been avoided if the unity of its life had been maintained by the constant readjustment of the activities of its members in harmony with conditions.

Now it is the same in the wider social organization of nations, as it is in the more intimate relations of family life. Unless the unity of these large groups is maintained by constant readjustment of the habits and attitudes of all classes to accord with life conditions, conflict between classes is bound to develop. The attempt to retain fixity in institutions is, in other words, one of the chief causes of conflict within these large groups. Hostile conflict within such groups can be largely avoided by flexibility in institutions. Normally a people's institutions are continually changing; old forms of social adjustment and institutional life normally become gradually modified by the free intercommunication of ideas, free public criticism, and the formation of a public opinion. This process may be so gradual that a new institution springs with scarcely a break out of an old one. Conflict of ideas and opposition of parties are doubtless necessary and inevitable; but the necessary changes in institutions, nevertheless, are effected by peaceful means—sometimes without any high degree of consciousness on the part of the individuals of the group as to the import of the change. This type of peaceful social change disturbs least the unity of human groups and characterizes the most harmonious group life. It is possible only when the machinery of readjustment and social control within the group is kept at its maximum of efficiency.

But when this machinery of social readjustment and social control breaks down, the unity of the group is bound to be disturbed and may be destroyed. If, within a national group, for example, free intercommunication of ideas, free public criticism, free discussion, free formation of public opinion, free selection of leaders, and free determination of public policies are hindered, then the unity of the national group will either temporarily or permanently suffer; for institutions will remain unchanged too long. When they finally break down, under such conditions, conflict of a serious

sort between classes and parties is bound to develop. It is from such conditions as these that serious class conflicts spring up, and also those disturbances which we call "social revolutions" and which we will consider more in detail in another chapter. Here we would only emphasize that serious conflict, the conflict which destroys or threatens a social group, is a relatively abnormal condition if it arises in the group, and is due to the failure of its members to maintain harmonious adjustments.

Individual Social Maladjustment

Such conflict as we have just described is obviously the result of social maladjustment of a certain sort. The term, however, is usually reserved for the maladjustment which is exhibited by individuals who have fallen into the socially abnormal classes—the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes. Social maladjustment, in this sense, is a somewhat more complex matter and may arise from a variety of causes. It may arise from abnormal individual biological variations, springing from causes more or less independent of social conditions. These may be summed up in the phrase "abnormal heredity." It may arise from the failure of the educative process to give to individuals habits and character which will adjust them to normal social life. Personal education is here the source of maladjustment. Finally, social maladjustment may be due to faulty social organization, especially to defects of the economic organization of a group.

As we have seen, the regulative institutions of society, grouped under government and law, religion and morality, and education, exist to control the acquired character of the individual and to help him successfully adapt himself to the habits and standards of his group. Whenever these institutions of social control fail to do this, their failure shows itself in the genesis of maladjusted individuals. These

individuals are so imperfectly socialized that they cannot adjust themselves successfully to the institutions and order of their society. Defects in economic conditions and arrangements also may make it impossible for the individual to adjust himself successfully. Moreover, these conditions may totally destroy the individual's power of adjustment through compelling him to live in such circumstances that his normal bodily and mental powers become impaired. Therefore, through conditions in the physical environment, the lack of education, and the failure to get proper social standards, the individual may fail to become socialized. He may develop habits that put him so far out of adjustment with his group that he becomes more or less parasitic or even antisocial in his nature. It is mainly through these conditions that we have the genesis in civilized society of disproportionate numbers of dependent persons on the one hand, and of delinquent persons on the other, along with certain classes of more or less hereditary defectives.

It is evident that to control the social adjustment of the individual completely it would be necessary for the society to exercise control over the individual's heredity. In all probability, it will be found very difficult to do this for some time to come; but it should be comparatively easy for civilized society to control the acquired habits and character of individuals. Our imperfect social arrangements, especially the faults in our economic organization on the one hand, and in our training of the young on the other, are responsible for the larger number of social misfits in our present society. Such dependent, defective, and delinquent persons could scarcely bring about in themselves the downfall of nations or civilizations. But if their number increases sufficiently they may become a burden on the normal part of the population, and so a source of social weakness. Moreover, the conditions which produce them may affect the whole group, rendering its members incapable of a high degree of

social efficiency or of complex social adjustments. This shows the necessity of removing the causes of social maladjustment as far as we can. So far as this can be done, it will tend to make the whole life of civilized societies more normal. Philanthropic activity in modern civilized groups has, therefore, a significance in group life. It not only reclaims individuals for society and removes from free social life those that cannot be reclaimed, but it functions to maintain the unity of the group, by preventing its dissolution and disintegration through the action of conditions which are destructive to civilized social life.

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CHAPTER VI

THE CONTINUITY OF THE GROUP AND ITS CULTURE

SOCIAL continuity is the unity of society in time. The principles of group unity which we have just discussed apply also to the continuity of group life. Nevertheless, these principles work somewhat differently in social continuity, so that we may view them in a somewhat different manner. Moreover, human groups have a peculiar mechanism to maintain their historic and cultural continuity, and hence it will be necessary to consider the problem of social continuity as a separate and distinct problem. It is the second problem in group behavior, because we cannot understand such behavior in human groups without understanding the life history of the group on the mental side.

The Physical Basis of Social Continuity

One basis for the continuity of group life is, of course, the continuity of its physical environment. Through preserving the same physical stimuli the continuity of the physical environment helps in no small measure to preserve the continuity of group life. Thus the same geographic environment by furnishing the same stimuli and materials for culture may help to preserve habit and custom. Again, the selective influence of the geographic environment, operating over relatively long periods of time, may perhaps fix in a stock certain inherent traits which are favored by that environment. Even more important than the geographic environment, however, are the technical modifications which man has made in it, such as roads, canals, bridges, railways, buildings, and all sorts of physical tools. These favor the

continuity of habit and usage in a population and so help to preserve social continuity. Indeed, the whole technology of civilization may, from one point of view, be considered a mass of purposeful alterations in the physical environment to secure the continuity of social life. All of these things preserve similar stimuli which usually give rise to more or less similar reactions in individuals, even in a succession of generations, and thus make for social continuity.

The physical environment of a group may be changed, however, especially the geographic environment, and yet the continuity of group life may persist. Evidently more important as a physical basis for the continuity of the group is the continuity of the race, of the germ cells, which we call heredity. Heredity insures the inherent traits of the stock being passed along from generation to generation. Thus the original physical traits of the stock are preserved; and in as much as these organic traits include a nervous system with relatively definite capacities, we have transmitted by heredity, also, certain inherent traits of a mental character. The natural human tendencies and capacities of the stock are preserved. Thus every normal human individual is born with certain natural impulses, with the capacity to form many acquired habits, with the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, with the capacity to think and to reason, and to become a civilized, socialized person. It is evident that, without these inherent powers and capacities furnished by human heredity, human groups could have no continuity in their life. While these inherent powers and capacities, which make up original human nature, may vary somewhat among individuals, as we have seen, yet it must be emphasized that in all human individuals they remain practically similar, and that their similarity is a basis for social continuity. Moreover, they have been similar as far back as we can go in history or even into the remote prehistoric past. As we have already seen, it is improbable that there have been any

considerable changes in the physical and mental constitution of man since the end of paleolithic times. Here, then, in the continuity of life itself, which we call heredity, we have a physical basis for human social and cultural continuity.

Custom and Customary Imitation

Custom is more than mere habit. It is an outcome of the interaction of individuals. It is a continuity of habits acquired by individuals which, passed along from generation to generation, make possible the continuity of the life of the group.¹ This is a result, not so much of habituation to a common physical environment and technology, as of consciously teaching children to take on the acquired habits of their elders. It also results from the more or less unconscious imitation of the elders by the young. Thus this process of transmission of habit from generation to generation, which makes possible the continuity of culture, is brought about in human society through unconscious imitation and through the pressure of various agencies of social control. Not infrequently, children are compelled by various means of discipline to acquire the habits of their elders. This process cannot be understood, of course, apart from communication and tradition, yet the elements of imitation and of habituation through discipline are very large in the process, and perhaps even the chief elements to be emphasized.

Now custom may, from the point of view of objective behavior, be regarded as the main element in the continuity of human groups. It is doubtful if it can be said to exist below the human level; for nonhuman groups do not have

¹ Compare the more accurate definition of custom given in Chap. III, p. 90. Custom and tradition are often confused. Thus Dewey (*Human Nature and Conduct*) uses custom to include tradition, while Keller (*Societal Evolution*), Sims (*Society and Its Surplus*) and others use tradition to include custom. The distinction followed in this book is that proposed by Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 196. It is obviously in line with psychological and sociological clarity.

the machinery of social control to bring it about. The human child, however, is born into a relatively definite social organization with a definite culture and definite forms of social control. The group organization as a rule establishes the way the individual must act if he is to gratify his own inherent desires. In the mere social structure alone, therefore, apart from any modifications effected in the physical environment, there is a tendency to continue habit and so give rise to custom.

The environment into which the human child is born is chiefly an environment of human individuals. These have certain definite modes of behavior, certain definite social attitudes, and maintain certain definite relationships with one another. In brief, they have a definite culture. The child gets his social adjustments largely through imitating these individuals. He learns these adjustments through copying the actions of those around him. There are usually no other patterns for him to copy, and, as we have just said, all sorts of pressure is put upon the child to get him to conform his behavior to the behavior of his group. Customary imitation or the imitation of elders becomes his chief method of learning and about the only means of his social adjustment. Thus the life of a group or of an institution does not perpetuate itself automatically. It perpetuates itself by taking up and absorbing the incoming generations, securing their unconscious adjustment by imitation and by social pressure. Custom is, then, a way of living in a group to which people adapt themselves more or less unconsciously. It is the basis upon which the life of the group is carried on and this is the real ground of its authority.

Professor Hobhouse says that "custom as custom is a rule accepted uncritically and supported in any case that arises by general sentiment."² He speaks of it as "uncon-

² Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 47.

scious rule," in the sense that it is accepted uncritically. The individual rarely asks questions about it. Thus the mass of customs forms the groundwork of social life and enables the group life to move "on noiseless wheels." But just because custom represents mass habits which are difficult to change, when circumstances change, custom may become a serious obstacle to progress. It is under such circumstances that custom comes before consciousness and becomes an object of critical examination.

It is customs as the mores, however, that is, as usages sanctioned and supported by certain traditional beliefs, which become all-powerful in continuing group life. Hence it is the element of tradition which we must examine to find the distinctive thing in the continuity of human groups.

The Social Tradition

Physical environment, heredity, and habit will account for all of the continuity which we find in animal groups below man, even the most developed; but they will not account for the continuity which we find in human groups. For the continuity of human groups is dominantly cultural and historical. Another element has entered in, made possible by man's higher intellectual development; and that element is group tradition. By tradition we mean, in the sociological sense, all knowledge, beliefs, standards, and values handed down from the past. As Professor Ross says,³ tradition is dominantly a way of *thinking* handed down from generation to generation, while custom is a way of *doing* that which has been handed down. The chief vehicle of tradition is manifestly oral and written language. It is, therefore, a product of man's power to form concepts or abstract ideas and to preserve these through the definite means of inter-communication which he has developed. So far as we know,

³ Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 196.

no animal group has ever been able to form a tradition. Tradition is thus the distinguishing element in the continuity of *human* society. Hence all that is peculiar in the social evolution of man depends upon tradition. Culture, or civilization, is, in one sense, the development of tradition. As Professor Hobhouse says: "Tradition is, in the development of society, what heredity is in the physical growth of the stock. It is the link between past and future, it is that in which the effects of the past are consolidated, and on the basis of which subsequent modifications are built up." ⁴

Originally man must have started without a social tradition. Like the brutes he lived merely in a world of objects. The earliest men, in other words, began without accumulated knowledge and without definite beliefs or standards. But as soon as the power of abstract thought and articulate speech began to develop, men could accumulate knowledge and pass it along to their fellows. Now, the simplest tool requires knowledge and skill in its making. When this knowledge is transmitted from one individual to another it becomes social property and is gradually increased by the contributions of individuals. By accident or invention a tool, or a new type of tool, is discovered or invented. The knowledge of this is then spread; other individuals use the tool and improve its pattern. And so the process goes on; bit by bit the primitive group acquires knowledge and skill and transmits it. This is true not only of physical tools, but also of the relations of individuals and of the organization of the group. Thus knowledge, ideas, and standards are slowly accumulated, forming a social tradition which is at the same time the fabric of the civilization or the culture of the group. In this way man gradually builds himself up out of the perceptual world, the world of

⁴ Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 34.

objects, with which he began, into an ideational world, the world of culture.

As the social tradition grows in bulk it increases in influence. Men now come to live, not so much in a world of objects, as in a world of ideas—of pattern ideas—which immediately control their adjustments both to the objects of nature and to their fellows. Hence, with the growth of culture the world of objects grows of less and less importance in guiding man's behavior, while the world of ideas which comes to him through oral and written language, or possibly through imagination and reasoning, becomes of greater and greater importance in controlling human conduct. The world of ideas thus takes the place of the world of mere percepts for the civilized man; for the complex habits of the higher stages of cultural development cannot be built up and maintained in human groups without large accumulations of knowledge and a complex educational process for individuals.⁵ The knowledge and beliefs passed along by one individual to another greatly increase the variety and range of human adjustments, because the number of mental images or patterns which the memory of each individual can call up is vastly increased.

The growth of tradition, that is, the accumulation of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, standards, and values, has, then, gradually substituted a psycho-social environment for a merely physical environment in the life of civilized human beings. This does not mean that civilized man has a smaller world of real objects, but only a larger world of ideas; and that he approaches his world of real objects with values which have been furnished him by his social tradition. Every developed type of civilization or culture, therefore, is dominated by certain mental patterns which give it its particular form and color. The chief of these mental patterns we may

⁵ Compare Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Chap. I.

call ruling ideas or ideals. They are what the historian, Lamprecht, has called the "psychic dominants" of the culture or civilization. They are the "controls" of group behavior, and they have to change if the social life is to change. Embodied in the signs and symbols of oral and written language, they furnish the dominant element in the social tradition and largely make the social environment of the individual.

The substance of culture, as we have already pointed out, is custom and tradition; but the customs of human groups are practically always supported by traditions, that is, by the knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and standards of the group. Hence, the traditional element in culture is the main element. It is not too much to say that cultural evolution is in essence an evolution of pattern ideas, by means of which human conduct is controlled. It is these pattern ideas, patterns of action, lodged in the minds of individuals, which are the standard by means of which the members of the group measure and control their behavior. When such patterns of action have received the sanction of the group, they become the main control over individual behavior. Hence individual behavior is of a high type or of a low type, according to the custom and tradition of the group. As Professor Hobhouse says, "Any tradition will obviously call forth from human beings the qualities appropriate to it, and it will, in a sense, select the individuals in which those qualities are best developed, and will tend to bring them to the top of the social fabric."⁶ That is to say, the social tradition molds both the character of individuals and the behavior of the group. A cultural tradition of a high type raises the group to a high level of culture, if its individual members are persons of normal human powers; whereas, a cultural tradition of a low type keeps a group upon a low level of

⁶ Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

culture, or even may lower a group from a relatively high level to a lower level. This is what we mean by saying that man is preëminently a cultural being, and that his behavior must be understood through his culture.

Tradition thus furnishes the basis for the cultural and historical continuity of the group. It is tradition which makes us, in a cultural sense, the heirs of all the human past. With only trifling modifications what Professor Cooley says of communication is true of tradition also. "By the aid of this structure," he says, "the individual is a member not only of a family, a class, and a state, but of a larger whole, reaching back to prehistoric man whose thought has gone to build it up. In this whole he lives as an element, drawing from it the materials of his growth and adding to it whatever constructive thought he may express."⁷ Equally finely Professor Hobhouse says: "The tradition of the elders is, as it were, the instinct of society. It furnishes the prescribed rule for dealing with the ordinary occasions of life, which is for the most part accepted without inquiry and applied without reflection. It furnishes the appropriate institution for providing for each class of social needs, for meeting common dangers, for satisfying social wants, for regulating social relations. It constitutes, in short, the framework of society's life, which to each new generation is a part of its hereditary outfit."⁸ "Thus the continuity of an institution, and of a whole social system, consists in a living tradition in which at any given time the institution is moulding the lives and minds of men, but is also being itself remoulded by them."⁹

All this may be illustrated from the life of almost any social group. It is the continuity of tradition which gives a group a sort of immortality of its own. A football team,

⁷ Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 64.

⁸ Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁹ Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 212.

a regiment, or a nation may, through the power of its traditions, shape and mold the behavior of its individual units even though they are constantly changing; and this molding power of their traditions gives to these groups a continuous life. The crack British regiments, for example, lost all save a small fraction of their men during the Great War. Yet while their personnel was continually changing, these regiments retained their historical identity and continuity through the molding power of their traditions. It is the tradition of the group, in other words, which accounts very largely for the behavior of the individual members of the group, especially when he is consciously acting as a member of the group. It is this sociological fact which makes all students of social behavior confident that its possibilities have not yet been explored. The men that entered the crack British regiments to replace those that had fallen or been retired were probably not men exceptionally distinguished for bravery. They became brave through the discipline of the regiments which they joined; and the pattern of this discipline was in the traditions of these regiments.

The spirit of a group, its morale, its essential behavior depends, therefore, upon the nature and qualities of its traditions. In as much as these traditions are subject to modification, so also is the behavior of the group. Not only may the traditions of a group be modified, but new traditions may be given to groups. History illustrates this on a wholesale scale; as, for example, when the barbarians of northern Europe took up the traditions of Greco-Roman civilization.

Comparison of Tradition to Heredity and to Memory

It is evident that custom and tradition are very closely related, usually as the objective and subjective manifestations of the same process. Together they have been called by

some authors "social heredity," though the analogy suggested is a misleading one. For custom and tradition are social facts, not biological. The method of their transmission is not by means of the germ plasm, but through social interaction of individuals, that is, through mental interstimulation and response.¹⁰ The social inheritance is hence far more modifiable than the biological inheritance. Moreover, custom and tradition often become dissociated. Especially in modern civilization do we have certain traditional ways of thinking and of valuing, but with no well-established corresponding customs. Traditions which have no corresponding customs are, however, usually traditions which are not held universally by the group. These are especially apt to be traditions of social idealism.

More happily tradition in the group has been likened to memory in the individual. In one sense, of course, the basis of tradition is memory. But tradition depends upon the interaction of individuals, and not merely upon the neural processes associated with memory. What memory is to the individual, however, tradition is to the group; it preserves the sense of continuity and identity; it stores up experience and makes it available for the guidance of future conduct.

It may correctly be said, therefore, that tradition represents in social life, not heredity and instinct, but habit. Its basis is really habits of thinking and feeling which are passed from individual to individual through some form of mental interaction. It functions, moreover, to preserve the habits of the group, habits which the experience of the group in the past has led to group approval. There is only analogy between custom and tradition, on the one hand, and heredity and instinct, on the other; but there is substantial identity between them and habit.

¹⁰ Compare Keller, *Societal Evolution*, Chap. VII.

The Social Validity of Tradition

If groups live and control their behavior through their traditions, does this necessarily make these traditions wise? The answer is that the traditions or patterns of groups, like the ideas of the individual, may be wise or unwise. Many social traditions are unreflective, and are simply the result of adjustments made in the past with very little reflection or knowledge. When the patterns in a social tradition are erroneous there are only two ways of getting rid of their errors. One is through rational criticism and selection; but fully developed rational criticism arrived only with the advent of science. The only other way of getting rid of wrong patterns of group behavior has been through the competition and elimination of the groups affected by them. Consequently, errors in the social tradition may persist for an indefinite time, especially if they do not affect greatly vital organic processes. Such considerations show that natural selection has very little to do with the getting rid of erroneous traditions. Hence erroneous traditions like war, slavery, and human exploitation may persist in a culture for thousands of years. This is all the more possible because social traditions have added to them in the course of time the prestige of antiquity. Sometimes they come to be venerated as the wisdom of the past when they little deserve it. Moreover, the wisdom of the past itself is often inadequate to deal with present problems.

Yet it is obviously unwise for any nation, any group, or even any individual, to discard all the ideas, all the knowledge, beliefs, and values of the past as worthless. No one, indeed, can do this. It is not simply the main content of our political, religious, and moral ideas which is traditional, but also that of our scientific and technological ideas. The only difference is that the scientific and technological traditions are seemingly more open to revision than our political,

economic, religious, and moral traditions. The scientific attitude toward tradition would seem to be that the ideas, beliefs, and standards which have served society in the past have a presumption in their favor, but that they need constant reëxamination. Traditions long maintained have probably had some social utility. They are at least roughly adjusted to social desires or else they would not have existed so long. In many cases, however, the wishes of groups may have been mistaken. It is the business of science and common sense to pick the socially useful out of what has come down to us from the past and utilize it for the building up of the present and the future. Alleged truth needs always to be retested by experience.

Traditionalism

But this is not always easy to do. Social traditions are not only group habits of thought but they become enmeshed in the whole structure and organization of the group. The institutions of a group may be such as to favor certain traditions and to oppose any change in ideas, beliefs, or values, no matter how rational the change may be. It is this fact which makes long-standing traditions very difficult to change in human societies. Inflexible traditions of this sort are very manifestly a danger to the group in which they exist; for change is the law of life for groups as well as for individuals. When habits of any sort become inflexible, social disaster sooner or later almost inevitably results. Social continuity in human life is, of course, supremely important; but it is no more important than rational social change. What human societies need is continuity with change. They need, in other words, tradition but not traditionalism. Tradition must be kept distinct from traditionalism, and the student must bear in mind that the social or group tradition is never simple but is a system of many traditions, some of which may be in conflict with others.

The Social Mind

Many sociological writers use the term "social mind" or "group mind" to express the ideas and values which are in circulation in a group and which dominate the group's behavior. To a certain extent such a term is scientifically justifiable. In the strict sense, of course, individuals alone think, feel, and will. But a group carries on its life and activities, as we have seen, by means of the interaction and coördination of the thinking, feeling, and willing processes of its individual members. There is such a thing, therefore, as a collective mental life in a human social group, in the sense that there is a coördination and integration of these intermental processes, even though there is no such thing as a social mind in the same sense in which there is an individual mind. The term "social mind" is, therefore, only a convenient term to express the mental unity of the group. This mental unity of the group life, as we have seen, exists not only at a given time, but it is continuous. Its continuity depends upon the process which we have just described under tradition. The group tradition is, indeed, almost synonymous with the group mind. Just as the content of the individual mind at any given moment is largely memory, so the content of the social mind is very largely tradition. But in the ideas and values in circulation in a group at any given time there may be, in addition to those that have come down from the past, certain new perceptions and judgments concerning the existing situation. The social mind, accordingly, includes not only the social tradition but also the public opinion of the moment.

It may be objected that here is an even more vicious analogy than the analogy which is implied by calling custom and tradition "social heredity." The reply is, however, that in this case we have no other single term available to express the mental life of a group. This mental life, as we have

seen, does form a unity and a system not unlike the mental life of the individual, though it is not integrated in a single unified consciousness. It is, however, a system of ideas, standards, and values controlling the behavior of the group, persisting and changing like the ideas, standards, and values of individuals; because they are the ideas, standards, and values of individuals as well as of the group. But the ideas and values in the group mind do not include all those in the minds of its individual members, but only those that are circulating in the group, preserved in its system of communication, and in some degree sanctioned or approved by the members of the group. The social mind in the sense of socially prevalent ideas and values controlling group behavior is a very real thing, and has to be reckoned with by every one who deals with groups, whether football teams, crowds, publics, regiments, or nations.

The following quotation from Hobhouse will illustrate what we mean by the social mind and also the part which tradition plays in forming it: "Science is more than the living knowledge of any individual. It is social knowledge or social thought, not in the sense that it exists in the mind of a mystical social unit, nor in the sense that it is the common property of all men, which it certainly is not, but in the sense that it is the product of many minds working in conscious and unconscious coöperation, that it forms a part of the permanent social tradition going constantly to shape the thought and direct the efforts of fresh generations of learners—that, in a word, it has all the permanency and potency which the individual has not. We might easily apply the same reasoning to other departments of thought, to philosophy, to religion, to the literary and imaginative representation of life, and to the common-sense knowledge that at once expresses and helps to form the experience of ordinary men in ordinary relations. The thought of any society at any time is a social thought. This social thought

forms the point of departure for individuals who are brought up in it, perhaps go beyond it and contribute something fresh of their own, perhaps fail fully to assimilate and fall short of it."¹¹

Thus it is evident that such terms as "social mind" and "group mind" do not stand for objective entities, but are convenient terms to express the unity of the subjective side of the life and culture of a group.

The Function of Primary Groups in Social Continuity

As has already been pointed out, the primary groups play an especially important part in preserving custom and tradition in human society. The family group, especially, from its very nature is above all other human groups fitted to hand down from generation to generation definite habits, customs, and traditions. The prolonged immaturity of the child in the environment of the family leads him naturally to imitate his elders, while the discipline of the family group sometimes compels him to imitate them. The prolonged association of the child with the members of his family group is a prime factor in the continuity of social life. The same thing may be said about the neighborhood group. Both these groups preserve essential social customs and traditions; and within them tradition and custom have the greatest chance to work, because their habits and customs are usually closely correlated with their ideas and beliefs. In them the child learns social values and social attitudes by seeing them illustrated in practical human behavior. Consequently the culture of a group can break down, barring the physical degeneracy of the stock, only through the decay of these primary groups. The other institutions to preserve custom and tradition can scarcely work effectively except as they work through the family and neighborhood groups. The

¹¹ Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 95.

real basis of any civilization must be in the life of these groups because we know no other means so effective of preserving and passing along civilizing traditions. It should be remembered that they not only preserve the social patterns but furnish them. In a sense, every individual born into society has to be assimilated to its culture; and the face-to-face groups, because they generate sympathy and understanding and rest upon personal acquaintance and appreciation, have greater power of social assimilation than any other groups.

Social Assimilation

Social groups are continually taking up into themselves new elements. The life of the individual members of the group may be brief, and the new elements, whether they come by birth or from the outside, must be assimilated and organized into the life of the group. This process is known in sociology as social assimilation. The problems which it involves might have been considered when we were discussing the unity of the group, as social assimilation implies that the new elements become harmoniously coördinated with the group. However, they may be equally well considered under the heading of social continuity, for continuity is equally involved with unity in the problem of social assimilation. If a group fails to assimilate its new elements, not only is its unity impaired, but also its continuity. If it succeeds, however, in passing along to the new elements its customs and traditions unimpaired, then the continuity of group life is unaffected, as only the changes involved in normal social growth result.

In considering social assimilation it is well to remind oneself that even those individuals who are born into the group have to be socially assimilated. Thus it is not impossible that in the United States there are many who have been born here who have never taken up the essential national

social traditions of American life. They need Americanization quite as much as any foreign element. This may be true even though their ancestors have lived in the country for generations. If in some way in their family and neighborhood life essential American traditions have been broken down, they may remain far from American in their spirit. In the case of a complex nation like the United States this is all the more possible on account of the complexity of its traditions. Also it may well be true that certain elements have resided in the United States for generations who have never been thoroughly assimilated to American ideals.

On the other hand, it is obvious that those who are born in a group are usually assimilated most easily to the customs and traditions of the group. They necessarily learn the language of the group in early childhood, and with language come the principal patterns for behavior. Moreover, through prolonged immaturity and development in a given group, the individual has a better chance to learn its ideals and rules of living. He comes into contact at first hand with the group mind, that is, with the socially prevalent ideas and values of the group. He probably also feels more immediately the pressure of the group's customs, traditions, and opinions. Moreover, his acquaintances and friends are chiefly those of the group in which he is born, and the power of sympathy and personal attachment pull the individual strongly in the direction of his group. All these things and many others make it comparatively easy for an individual born in a group to be assimilated by that group. This is largely true even in caste societies where free intermarriage and social intermingling are not permitted between social classes.

The problem of social assimilation is usually thought of as the assimilation of foreign elements, persons that come from other groups, and especially from other nations. Such persons usually come with different habits and ideas from

those of the group which they enter; that is, their traditions and customs differ. Sometimes such persons lay aside easily their former habits and ideas, and hence are easily absorbed by the group which they have entered. This is possible where persons of two different groups speak the same language and have already the same fundamental customs and traditions. But when the language of the two groups differ, and still more when there is a wide difference in social customs and traditions, there is usually necessary a process of mutual accommodation which may take some time. Such a process necessarily results in changes in the absorbing group, but if these changes are wisely controlled they may be for the better. The culture of all human groups throughout human history has grown through the absorption of foreign elements. One method of social growth is by borrowing ideas and institutions from other groups. Such borrowing when wisely done usually results in social progress. Hence the absorption of foreign elements in the life of a group, if they can be assimilated successfully, is usually a stimulus to progress. This is the main reason why the most progressive societies have usually been made up of mixed elements.

The intermingling of unlike elements breaks up too great fixity in custom and tradition and introduces plasticity into the life of the group. If the group takes from its newcomers their best ideas and habits it may learn much; and on the other hand, the newcomers need to have presented to them the best ideas and habits of the group which they have entered. Such a process leads to the comparison of the ideas, beliefs, standards, and values of both groups. It develops the critical-mindedness of both groups, and hence usually results in the selection and preservation of the best in the customs and traditions of both groups, or stimulates the invention of new institutions.

Ideally this is the way in which the process of social as-

similation should go on. But quite evidently it can have such a happy result only if certain conditions are maintained. In the first place, an atmosphere of tolerance must be maintained in the absorbing group. Any attempt at coercion of the new elements is almost certain to create in them attitudes which will hinder their assimilation. In the second place, a certain degree of sympathy and consciousness of kind must be developed between the foreign element and the assimilating group; for both of these assist greatly in the mutual adjustment of individuals. In the third place, there must be frequency of personal contact between the foreign element and the population of the assimilating group so that there may be opportunity for mutual acquaintance, mutual understanding, mutual imitation, and the free exchange of ideas. In the fourth place, there must be association to some extent in common work and common occupation, or the division of labor will tend to keep the new element separate from the old and prevent the contact of which we have just spoken. Finally, social and linguistic isolation of every sort must be overcome, or at least minimized.¹²

If these principles of social assimilation are true, it is manifest that a free, democratic society, in which there is substantial equality between all members in respect to legal rights and economic and educational opportunities, should show greater power of social assimilation than other types of social life; and this history abundantly proves. The power of assimilation which the people of the United States have hitherto shown in respect to their foreign immigrants has been due to this fact. Professor Ross well sums up the five features of American social life which have given it great assimilative power,¹³ namely: (1) the toleration of the American people for traditions and customs other than

¹² Compare Bogardus, *Americanisation*, Part IV.

¹³ Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 241-243.

their own; (2) the individualism which puts the position of each individual in society upon a basis of his own personal worth; (3) the cult of progress, which leads even the custom bound to seek to adjust themselves to a changing future; (4) the conferring of equal political rights; (5) equality of educational opportunities, molding the young to American traditions and detaching them from those of their parents.

These are, indeed, some of the most important conditions of successful social assimilation, and when the American people have failed to assimilate their foreign born it is usually because they have departed from these conditions. However, freedom, tolerance, sympathy, understanding, and common work are not all that there is to the process of social assimilation. The conditions for successful social assimilation are the conditions which are favorable to the acquiring of relatively similar habits, similar ideas, and similar standards by all members of the group, and to the coördinating of their activities into an harmonious whole. When peoples differ too much from each other, this is difficult. It is obvious that a common language is needed for communication, and as the vehicle of the essential traditions of the group. Linguistic isolation is fatal to social assimilation. Equally so is territorial isolation when it interferes with social contact. Again caste and class lines, while they may not prevent a certain degree of assimilation of those born in a group, are fatal to the assimilation of a foreign element. Race prejudice is especially fatal to assimilation. Social assimilation is possible only in proportion as we make the conditions favorable to social coördination.

When there are too great differences in the traditions and social attitudes of groups mutual accommodation is impossible, and the tradition of one group or the other has to be given up, or else a relatively separate group is formed by the foreign element to preserve its own tradition. As

was said in discussing the unity of the group, there must be fundamental likeness between groups or else their differences must be complementary, and so useful. This is obviously not the case when it comes to the assimilation of barbarous groups by civilized groups. When such groups come into contact, there is usually little or no accommodation. Either the barbarous group gives up its traditions for the traditions of the civilized group, or else it tries to preserve them by forming a separate group. Either alternative is fatal to the culture of the barbarous group. On the other hand, when persons from civilized groups of equal or similar cultures mingle together there is usually mutual accommodation with respect to their customs and traditions. In the case of such accommodation, the assimilating group usually absorbs certain elements from the tradition of the foreign group, without in any way breaking the continuity of its life, but rather enriching its own culture. It is such assimilation by mutual accommodation which should be aimed at in civilized groups. Indeed the whole civilized world would have its culture vastly enriched if such a process of mutual assimilation could pervade all civilized nations. Nothing would do so much to overcome the provincialism and social isolation which now makes it largely impossible for civilized nations to coöperate.

Static Society and Civilization

We think of culture as normally dynamic; and it is true that every culture is undergoing more or less change. But many civilizations of the past have changed so slowly that we rightly call them static or stationary. The difference between a static and a dynamic civilization is clearly a matter of degree. But the slow movements of culture in some human groups demand explanation. Perhaps sociology and cultural anthropology are not yet able definitely to answer the question why certain human groups have remained for

a long time in a relatively static condition; while others are characterized by rapid change. The causes seem to be resident partly in the physical environment, partly in human nature, and partly in the form or type of social organization.

Taking these causes up in their order, it is certain that isolation, both physical and social, has played a large part in fostering static culture in certain human groups. Thus human groups isolated from other groups on islands or by mountains, deserts, or other practically impassable barriers, have generally tended to remain stationary in their culture. Nothing seems to break up the sway of custom and tradition like the multiplication of contacts between different human groups. Isolation, whether the result of physical or social causes, prevents the wholesome competition between habits, customs, and institutions which usually results in the selection of the best. Probably the greatest reason for the survival of certain peoples in the savage and barbarian stages of culture down to recent times has been their physical isolation. Nearly all of these peoples were isolated from the main developments of human life, side-tracked, so to speak, in out-of-the-way places. If the American Indian and the African Negro had not remained isolated from the development of European culture for two thousand years, it is improbable that they would have remained barbarous.

There is, of course, a possibility that different human types vary in the readiness with which they make changes, though we have no conclusive evidence upon this point. Some races in history have undoubtedly been less progressive than others, but this seems to have been due to physical and social isolation or to other social causes which we shall mention. But we must admit that it is more than a possibility that in some types of mankind there is a more venturesome, pioneering spirit which is favorable to change than in others. This is certainly the case with individuals, though

it may not be true of masses of men. In one way, however, race has certainly an effect upon changes in the culture of a group, and that is indirectly through the fact that physical differences of race tend to keep distinct ethnic groups apart. The lack of a consciousness of kind in such cases tends toward repulsion, and so favors social isolation and social stagnation in the way already described. Social contact is necessary for normal social development.

We must also, of course, allow for the tendency of habit to dominate in ordinary human nature and human society. Human beings are creatures of habit, and the inertia of habit works against change among all peoples and under all social conditions. Intelligence, as we have already noted, is one of the latest developed traits of human nature, while habit is as old as life itself. Now intelligence is the chief element in human nature which works toward change. It is the chief instrument of individual and social adaptation; but, as a rule, it functions in the mass of men only when their habits work poorly. The dominance of habit tends, therefore, to produce inertia in the mass of mankind, and so brings them under the sway of custom. It is usually only crises, emergencies, new situations, which call forth intelligent constructive activity, and these crises and new situations are produced by social contacts or by a changing environment.

Intellectual beliefs may also produce unprogressiveness in peoples. Such beliefs may be merely supports of habit and custom. Traditionalism, as we have seen, is the foe of progress. Hence certain social conditions and cultural traits may work powerfully to favor static civilization. Thus ancestor worship, teaching extreme reverence for the dead, for parents, and for elders generally, has been one of the most powerful influences making for the perpetuation of customs and a stationary condition of civilization of which we have knowledge in human history.

This illustration suggests that the chief reason for non-

progressiveness in semicivilized and civilized peoples must be sought in their institutions of social control; and such is the case. The institutions of social control associated with religion, government, and education have often in human history been such as to favor inflexibility in social customs and traditions. Despotism, with the aid of authoritarian religions, have frequently been the causes which have blocked normal social growth. Education, also, in the hands of authorities of church and state, has frequently become one of the chief instruments by which normal social changes have been prevented. When education inculcates a philosophy of life which favors submissiveness, conformity, and looking to the past for all wisdom, then it becomes a powerful means of preventing progress. Progress comes only with the plastic mind and the free spirit.

In general, where the unity of a group is sought through setting up rigid uniformities, culture will become static. Where the unity is secured in this way, individual variations will be discouraged or altogether suppressed. Changes in the culture and structure of such a society will be excessively slow, unless they are brought about by external pressure. Normal social growth becomes practically impossible in such a situation. Evidently there is danger in too much uniformity in a group, just as there is danger in too much difference. Individuality must not be suppressed or else the group life will be static.

It is manifest that we need continuity in our social life, but not stagnancy. The undue fostering of conservatism, the continued looking to the past for patterns, the failure to think about the future and about necessary adjustments which should be made, results, not in social continuity, but in social stagnancy. This, as we shall see, presents as great social dangers as the failure to maintain civilizing traditions. Social continuity is not inconsistent with normal social growth. Indeed, a healthy culture must provide equally for both.

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CHAPTER VII

CHANGES WITHIN THE GROUP: NORMAL

EVEN the most static human groups undergo some change. The habits of living which are adjusted to the conditions of to-day will probably not be adjusted in their entirety to the conditions of to-morrow. Hence, all social groups have continually to adjust themselves to new conditions; and so the relations of individuals within the group must also change. Therefore, the third problem which we must consider is changes in group behavior. But these changes are of two sorts, conscious and unconscious. The former characterize only the higher stages of social evolution; while the latter characterize more the lower stages. Much has been written on the mechanism of unconscious social change, and therefore, we need only to summarize the results; while little has been written on the mechanism of conscious social change, and hence we shall consider that problem more fully.

Unconscious Social Change

Three types of unconscious social change have been made out by sociologists and anthropologists. We do not mean by this phrase that such changes are necessarily unconscious, but only that they are not intended, not planned or purposeful.

1. First of all, we have the changes which are brought about in human society by the processes of organic evolution; that is, by variation and natural selection. These processes may change the hereditary biological qualities of individuals. Through retrogressive variation it is possible that the hereditary qualities of a stock may deteriorate. The same effect is produced by the "reversal of selection," which preserves

the weak and inferior while destroying the strong and intelligent. Such reversal of selection can be brought about by modern warfare, by selective migration, and by noneugenic practices. There can scarcely be any doubt that groups may be weakened greatly by such practices; and many students of culture believe that the peoples and cultures of the past which have perished, have perished largely from this cause. On the other hand, it seems improbable that the biological qualities of individuals have improved within the last few thousand years; while culture and social organization have greatly advanced. Social changes have, however, been effected indirectly by the selection and survival of certain groups as a result of competition with other groups. The stress of natural selection in human society has hitherto fallen more upon groups than upon individuals; but in this way it has indirectly effected culture and so the pattern of group behavior. The result of this natural selection of groups has been the elimination of groups of low culture and weak organization, with the selection and preservation of groups of high culture and better organization. For example, groups of Europeans have almost entirely displaced in the western hemisphere the aboriginal groups of American Indians; and this has resulted in a profound social change during the last three hundred years in the two Americas. Probably no such elimination of the aboriginal groups was, however, consciously planned by the invading Europeans. Intergroup struggle and competition, resulting usually in relatively slow selective changes, have, then, been factors in bringing about unintended changes in human groups.

2. The second type of unconscious change in human groups is that which results from the failure of one generation to imitate exactly the patterns set by a previous generation. Students of language have discovered that even under modern conditions slow alterations in language may result from the failure to copy exactly the language forms of a preceding

generation. Thus in English the sound of the vowels in some words has gradually changed from Anglo-Saxon times, owing to this cause. Phonetic decay in a language is largely due to this cause. There can scarcely be any doubt that it affects all human institutions and habits passed along from one generation to another. Imitation is the method of the transmission of these social uniformities, but there is always some loss in passing from one generation to another, and in time this results in considerable unintended changes, not simply in language but in all traditions, customs, and institutions. These changes proceed more rapidly among people whose educational facilities for handing down cultural achievements are very imperfect.

3. The most frequent source of unconscious social changes, however, are changes in the environment, physical or social. Such environmental changes bring about gradually adjustments to them through unconscious habituation. The group may, of course, consciously adjust itself to them, but in the lower stages of social evolution the adjustment is brought about largely by unconscious habituation. Environmental changes which produce such unconscious changes in group life are of many sorts. A very common one is contact with a different culture. From this different culture many things may be borrowed and diffused throughout the group with very little intention of making changes. It is more a process of unconscious imitation. In any case, a new cultural contact usually necessitates more or less readjustment within the group, because certain elements in the new culture have to be taken into account by the group. Another environmental change which brings about many unintended changes in group behavior is migration to a new physical environment. The Europeans living in America have kept their main European traditions, but on account of climate and other geographic influences they have made many unconscious adjustments to their new physical environment.

Another factor which often brings about unconscious changes in a group is the increase of population. Changes in the mere number of individuals in a group may make some social custom or institution adapted to a smaller group unworkable. However, the factor which brings about the largest number of unconscious social changes is unquestionably new inventions. These may be either physical or social. While the making of the invention is usually a highly conscious process on the part of the inventor, the adjustment of the group to the invention is usually largely unconscious or at least nondeliberate. For the most part, inventions are taken up by a group through a process of unconscious imitation. Inventions of new machinery and of new laws often bring about more or less mechanically, extensive readjustments in the relations of individuals which are quite unintended. Thus, for example, the invention and diffusion of the telephone and the automobile have resulted in changes in rural community life which were quite unintended, and these changes in turn have affected the life of the whole nation.

These instances are sufficient to show that unintended, non-purposeful changes are still proportionately very common even in the most advanced civilized society. However, there is a tendency to bring all these unintended social changes under the control of consciousness and intelligence, and indeed the welfare of civilized societies demands that this be done. Conscious, collective, intelligent control is undoubtedly needed for all social changes of importance. Of course, more or less consciousness may accompany the unintended changes which we have just discussed, but the consciousness is individual rather than social. That is to say, these changes are not deliberated upon by the group as a whole, discussed, and finally agreed to. When this latter is done we have what we may call a "group" or "social" consciousness. This method of the control of change through group consciousness

is very old, being found more or less in all human groups of which we have knowledge; but it tends to become much more common in the highly civilized groups, as rapid and complex changes are more characteristic of the advanced stages of social and cultural evolution, and such changes need conscious group control. Hence social changes are both more rapid and more conscious as social evolution advances. But even in the most advanced human group it is probably true that all social changes start in an unconscious way, that they are then brought to consciousness, and later deliberate efforts are made by the group to guide and control them. In other words, social changes start with some change in the environment or in the make-up of the group which makes the old habits of social behavior no longer well adjusted or even altogether unworkable.

Imitation and Social Change

Many social and cultural changes, as we have already noted, take place through a largely unconscious process of imitation. We have already spoken of custom imitation as working for the continuity of culture. Now we have to note that the imitation of a different culture, of a new invention, or of any innovation works for social change. This sort of imitation has been called conventionality imitation. It plays an especially large part in the unintended changes in modern civilized societies. New inventions, new ideas, and, so, new types of behavior are largely diffused in modern groups by this type of imitation. It is seen at its height in the changes in styles and fashions, but the imitation of contemporaries affects the whole of our social life and spreads variations in social behavior of every sort. Thus many unintended changes in social life as a whole may result. This is, in effect, a strong argument for more collective conscious control over fashion and other forms of conventionality imitation. There is now consciousness of fashion imitation on the part of individuals,

but no consciously adopted policy, as a rule, on the part of communities and nations.

It may be well to note before we take up the mechanism of conscious social change that conventionality imitation in a group usually proceeds from the social superior to the social inferior. Thus the patterns of behavior in a group usually work down from a superior few, gradually becoming diffused among the mass of the group by a process of imitation. This fact helps us to understand the mechanism of conscious social change because it shows the important part which leadership plays in the process; for in the most highly conscious social changes we shall also see this principle of the imitation of the leader or of a social élite. There is, therefore, no hard and fast line to be drawn between unconscious or unintended changes in group behavior and conscious purposeful changes. In discussing the mechanism of conscious social change it must not be thought that all members of a group always perceive fully the situation or the meaning of accepted programs of action. Such perception may be limited to a smaller number of leaders. Even in the most highly conscious changes of groups the part which suggestion and imitation may play in the mass of the group is very considerable. The mass of the group participates in the "social consciousness" only sufficiently to understand in a general way the social situation and to select policies and leaders to whom are entrusted the execution of the policies.

The Mechanism of Conscious Social Change

In human groups the process of intercommunication makes up the chief part of the mechanism for effecting conscious social changes, especially intercommunication in the form of oral and written language. Social life as a whole, as we have seen, is carried on by various forms of interstimulation and response between individuals. These forms of interstimulation include suggestion and imitation as well as

communication.¹ By means of these forms of interstimulation the relationships of individuals are modified and even radically changed. Thus old adjustments between individuals that no longer work well are gotten rid of and new types of adaptation are built up; and the mechanism for accomplishing this in human groups is largely the process of intercommunication, with suggestion and imitation playing subordinate rôles. If human groups had no need of acting together and of making common adjustments to their environment, such definite forms of communication as oral and written language would never have been developed. They are means for perfecting conscious coadaptive processes in human groups. In other words, the mechanism of intercommunication plays the same part as an organ of adaptation in group life which the nervous system plays as an organ of adaptation in the individual. The process of intercommunication conveys the stimulation which a part of the group receives from individual to individual, and thus the whole group is enabled to change its behavior. In other words, the forms of communication have their origin in the needs of, and exist for the sake of perfecting, group life.

Let us outline in a few words how intercommunication works to mediate and control the process of readjustment in a human group. At least five different processes may be pointed out which are always in some degree at work in a process of conscious social change: public criticism, public discussion, the formation of a group or public opinion, the selection of leaders, and social action. Public criticism is a process of discrimination of whatever is wrong or unadjusted in the habits of the group. In other words, public criticism marks the bad working of some social custom or

¹ The imitation school of social psychologists has attempted to reduce communication to a suggestion-imitation process; but psychologists no longer accept this view. See Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 4-7; also Follett, *The New State*, Chap. III.

institution. It discriminates the elements which are working badly, and these discriminations are communicated to the whole group from one individual to another. Discussion of a situation then develops in a group. At first this discussion will be of a critical nature, but in its later development it looks to a solution of the problem. New ideas are formed upon the basis of this discussion. The useful elements in the old situation are mentally discriminated, and certain ideas or views are finally selected as the solution of the problem. Thus we have the formation of a public opinion in the group which is a basis for a new policy of group behavior, a new coördination of the group. In order to carry out this judgment of the group, which we have called its public opinion, the group selects certain individuals that are judged to be especially fitted to lead in group action.

It may be objected that such a process of conscious social change is realized fully only in a democratic society. In reply it may be pointed out that this process has characterized, more or less, all human groups from primitive times, and that probably the chief argument for democracy, rightly understood, is that it frees and develops the normal process of conscious social change, making it the standard for all social change.

We should expect, therefore, that the most perfect examples of the mechanism for effecting conscious social change would be found in modern democratic nations, especially in their methods of effecting political changes. In the United States, for example, preceding a presidential election, those elements in the population who have perceived the bad working of the policies of the administration voice their dissatisfaction through the public press, through public meetings, and through private conversation. Country-wide discussion results. There is a gradual formation of a public opinion, a formulation of party programs, and a selection of leaders. The issue is finally decided by a majority or

plurality vote, this latter device being a relatively modern invention, as primitive and barbarous communities usually decide matters only through a unanimous vote. This process of effecting a change in the political administration illustrates in an organized and formalized way the method of highly conscious change in society generally;² only the machinery of voting and of deciding by majority has not been extended to all spheres of social activity.

Another illustration without the use of voting machinery and where the process occupied a much longer space of time may be found in the change which the early Christian church effected in European family life. This change was undoubtedly a conscious change, though it took centuries to bring it about. It was preceded by severe criticism of the family life of classic antiquity, it was accomplished by continued discussion of the problem of the family, by the gradual formation of a public opinion which was on the side of the church, and by a selection of political and ecclesiastical leaders in accord with the church policy. The matter may be said to have reached a final decision with the making of marriage one of the sacraments and with the establishment of the indissolubility of marriage in the canon law. Here it will be noted there was no vote and no organized or formalized process of making a group decision. The decision was reached, however, when the customs and traditions of the peoples were changed.

The significance of the descriptions just given of the method of conscious social change will become evident as we proceed. For the vital parts of this mechanism are essential to normal social life. Before we proceed to elaborate details, however, it may be well to call the attention of the student to

² In change by authority, the conscious change is effected by the same mechanism (by criticism, discussion, etc.) in the small group which exercises more or less autocratic power (see p. 139) over the larger group. The mass of the larger group are, of course, in a passive or submissive attitude and do not actively participate in the process of change.

the fact that this normal growth or change in a social group is very like the process of mental growth in the individual. This is necessarily so because the group is made up of individuals, and functions through the minds of individuals. The individual develops his mental life by a process of constant readjustment to his environment, by the constant replacement of habits which no longer work well by habits which are adjusted. In this process of building up new habits the individual uses the mental processes of attention, discrimination, the association of ideas, judgments of truth or falsity, and the like. So in the group the processes of public criticism, public discussion, the formation of a group opinion or judgment, the selection of new policies and of leaders, are used in building up new customs and institutions. They are so many steps in the process of the conscious readjustment of group habits. Obviously, the process of communication is fundamental to all of these other processes. Hence the importance in social life of the opportunities and means of free intercommunication. Let us also note that just as in the individual we find the highest consciousness in the transition from one habit to another, so in the group we find the greatest use of all of this machinery of mental interstimulation and intercommunication in the transition from one group habit to another, from one form of institution to another. The consciousness of the group, as well as individual consciousness, evidently centers about the fact of change or adaptation in social life. The process of intercommunication mediates the process of group adaptation.

Social Self-Consciousness

In a sense all consciousness is social, that is, the particular content of individual consciousness is derived from the social environment, or at least conditioned by that environment. The phrase "social consciousness," however, is used in several senses by sociologists and social psychologists. Professor

Cooley uses the term as the opposite of self-consciousness,³ that is, for the awareness of others rather than of self. Out of this awareness of others grows, of course, an awareness of the group as a whole and of its relation to other groups and to its environment in general. From this consciousness of the group naturally arises social consciousness in the narrower sense of the term, namely, a conscious state which is a heightened state of individual consciousness, in which each individual in the group is more or less conscious of the relation of his activities to the activities of the group as a whole. Social consciousness in this sense might better be called "social self-consciousness." Such consciousness usually arises when the group as a whole has to perform some more or less difficult task, and it is evidently a process which has to do with social change. It involves a heightening, both of the individual's consciousness of himself and of his consciousness of others; and in this way conscious control on the part of the group over any change in its adjustments is made possible.

Let us take the municipal ownership of some public utility as illustrating this social or group self-consciousness. The group as a whole may decide to take over and operate such a utility without being highly conscious of all the adjustments which are involved in the step if such municipal operation is to be successful. Hence the municipality may not succeed well in the conduct of its enterprise. Scandals arise in connection with public ownership. Public criticism and public discussion take place. Gradually the mass of citizens becomes educated regarding the matter, the group as a whole becomes highly conscious of the adjustments involved, leaders are chosen, decisions reached, and the probability is that thereafter the community will be more successful in the management of its enterprise. It is evident that such success is

³ Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 8-12.

gained only through the mass of the citizens devoting a certain part of their time, energy, and consciousness to the conduct of public business; and that continued success can be assured only if this continues to be done, or if a strong tradition can be established that the business should be conducted in a certain way which will assure success.

Now it is evident that this group self-consciousness has to do with the adaptation of the group as a whole to some situation, just as individual consciousness has to do with adaptation. It is only by developing such a group consciousness that the activities of the members of the group can be accurately coördinated when rapid and complex changes are required in the group behavior. The more complex groups, therefore, are apt to show more group consciousness of this sort. The city group usually shows more than the rural group, and the civilized group more than the uncivilized. Such a state of social self-consciousness makes possible better collective adaptation of all members of a group. Hence the desirability of developing this social self-consciousness to the highest degree, because it is only thus that human groups can gain collective control over the conditions of their existence. The social sciences themselves are but one manifestation of the increasing development of social self-consciousness, and are means for the stimulation of such consciousness for the end of collective control over the conditions of life. Other means of bringing about social self-consciousness are found in all the forms of oral and written language and all means of intercommunication, such as the press, the telegraph, the telephone, public discussions, and the like. All of these are means for developing social self-consciousness and getting it to function in the control of social behavior. The whole process of developing social consciousness, in other words, is one concerned with social change or the readjustments of social habits. From this point of view we shall be able to understand the meaning and functioning in our social life of

such processes as public discussion, public opinion, and social leadership.

The Function of Public Discussion

Public discussion in a group has two functions: first, the criticism of habits, institutions, policies, and social patterns; and secondly, the construction of new social patterns upon which to build new habits, institutions, and policies. Discussion works in the social life, therefore, very much as the processes of discrimination and association of ideas work in the individual mind. Its first function, as public criticism, is to pick out those elements in habits, institutions, and policies which do not work well. It is discussion of this sort, as Bagehot says, which breaks the bonds of custom.⁴ It serves as an instrument to break up old habits and institutions in a group because it points out wherein they work poorly. It undermines the confidence of the group in the habits, institutions, or policies criticized. It, therefore, prepares for change.

If discussion is allowed to proceed, the next step in its development is to discriminate the different elements in the social situation, to pick out those which are still valuable and which may be utilized in the construction of a new social habit, as well as to reject those which no longer work well. This constructive phase of public discussion always develops in social groups which have learned to settle their problems by discussion. Probably no phase of the social process more clearly illustrates the truth that social development is a learning process; for the process of public discussion is a process in which the members of the group mutually educate one another. They not only convey to one another perceptions of maladjustment, but also suggested solutions of the problem involved. The whole process not only puts a premium upon intelligence, but develops intelligence in the

⁴ Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Chap. V.

members of the group. Every member of the group is educated in the concerns of the group, and awakened to appreciate the situation in which the group finds itself. The process is evidently one which is socializing as well as educative.⁵ Leaders emerge who direct the discussion. The individual who can point out what is wrong and how the old elements can be readjusted in a way to meet the demands of the new situation is the one who can usually get a hearing. Thus all available ideas in the group may be compared, associated, and combined, until the stage is reached when the group is ready to form a rational judgment.

The process of public discussion may, of course, go on through various devices. It may go on largely through the press, especially through newspapers. It is usually more effective, however, when it goes on orally in face-to-face groups, such as public assemblies or discussion groups formed by friends and associates. The advantage of the face-to-face group is that there is easier interchange of ideas and hence easier understanding of them. As discussion, at its best, is a coöperative process in which there is action and reaction between minds, it is improbable that the public press as a medium of discussion can ever supplant the public assembly and the discussion group. In groups which settle their problems by discussion it is highly important, therefore, that the public assembly and the face-to-face discussion group be kept alive.

It is evident that if the process of public discussion is to be effective in finding solutions for group problems and in forming group opinion, freedom of thought and freedom of speech must be preserved. When public criticism of social habits, institutions, and policies is not tolerated, it is evident that their faults cannot be brought to the attention of the

⁵ Discussion will have this effect, however, only if the conditions of freedom and tolerance mentioned on pages 228 and 230 are maintained.

group. Tolerance of criticism is, therefore, the first condition for the effective working of the machinery of conscious social change, or rational social adjustment. It is only through tolerance of new ideas and through freedom of speech and of the press, that there can be the greatest opportunity for the coöperative working of the intelligence of the whole group in building up new habits, institutions, and policies. Through free public discussion not only can grievances of individuals and classes be brought to public attention, but the richest results of experience can be brought to bear upon a given social situation. Consequently, under such circumstances there is the greatest chance of a wise and rational solution of the practical problem involved. It is not an accident, therefore, that societies which have maintained the best conditions for free public discussion of their problems have, in human history, been not only most progressive, but most apt to show normal, uninterrupted social development.

The Formation and Function of Public Opinion

By public opinion we mean the more or less rational, collective judgment formed by a group regarding a situation. It is formed, as we have seen, by the action and reaction of many individual judgments. It implies not so much that uniformity of opinion has been reached by all members of the group, or even by a majority, as that a certain trend and direction of the opinions and judgments of the individual members has been reached. Of course, there is a certain core of agreement reached among the individuals of a group, or at least among a majority, but there is no absolute uniformity of judgment. As Professor Cooley says, public opinion is "an organization of separate, individual judgments, a coöperative product of communication and reciprocal influence."⁶ It is an organization and coördination of individual

⁶ Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 121.

opinions and judgments. Therefore, it does not necessarily represent, as has often been claimed, the intelligence and judgment of the lowest member of the group, or even of the mediocrity of its average individuals. As it is formed by the coördination and organization of individual judgments, it may well represent the matured judgment of leaders and specialists, after these have reacted with their public.

Public opinion should be sharply distinguished from popular emotion and public sentiment. Popular emotion and public sentiment may exist in groups in which there has been no discussion, but public opinion, as it is a more or less rational group judgment, cannot. Popular emotion depends for its formation upon the contagion of feeling. It is usually highly irrational, and is associated with emotional action on the part of the group, which is rarely constructive. Public sentiment is the mass of feelings associated with the well-established habits of the group. It is usually conservative, while public opinion is concerned with social changes, with making new social adjustments, and if formed through proper public discussion is constructive and creative. Being formed by a discussion process, it is the more or less rational judgment of the group. Much injury has been done to democracy by confusing public opinion with public sentiment and popular emotion. Many of the criticisms directed against the rule of public opinion are really directed against the rule of public sentiment and popular emotion. However, unless public opinion is rightly formed, it may also represent an irrational judgment.

The control of social change by what we call public or group opinion is not wholly modern. Savage and barbarous societies to some extent use the same means to control their group adjustments. Thus the clans of North American Indians frequently held public discussions to decide matters of tribal importance. But in savage, barbarous, and semi-civilized cultures the opinion of the group was so bound by

tradition and custom that public opinion in the modern sense could get no great development. Moreover, the principle of unanimity followed by such groups left no great freedom for the formation of public opinion. It is evident that habit, custom, and tradition, as well as the emotions and feelings of a group, may interfere with the free formation and functioning of public opinion.

Whether control by public opinion will be control by the worst or best minds in the group will depend upon the circumstances of its formation. In the first place, if public opinion is to be rational, it must be formed, as we have already seen, under conditions of freedom. Freedom of intercommunication and the encouragement of freedom of thinking are necessary for the formation of a public opinion of the highest degree of rationality; for only under such conditions can all the facts be brought to light, ideas compared, and individual judgments tested. Professor Giddings has rightly insisted that the highest type of public opinion depends for its developments upon such conditions.⁷ Low types of public opinion may, of course, exist even in groups where free discussion is forbidden. In such groups a public opinion may develop through more or less secret means of communication, but it is usually of a very low order of rationality; and hence it is either powerless to effect social changes, or, if it succeeds in effecting them, they are apt to be unwise. Under conditions of full and free discussion truth will have the best chance to prevail and public opinion will be powerful, because there will be general confidence in its rationality. The proper functioning of public opinion in a social group demands, therefore, the fullest development of the mechanism of intercommunication. In societies in which public opinion is thus developed and is allowed to function freely, it is on the whole one of the best safeguards against social catastrophe, since it controls

⁷ Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 138.

social changes in accordance with the mind of the group. It represents the free collective judgment of the group as a whole and the most rational attempt which the group is capable of making to control its own actions.

In the second place, if public opinion is to be rational, it must be formed under conditions which will favor the leadership of men of the highest intelligence. Only as public opinion is formed with proper appreciation of expert knowledge and of intelligent leadership, can it develop the highest degree of rationality. A great deal will depend upon the traditions of the group; upon the appreciation which the group has of the judgment of the expert or of the superior mind. It has often been remarked that the average intelligence cannot be expected to deal with the complex problems presented by modern social and political life. This is, of course, true; but the average intelligence is fully capable of being taught to appreciate the value of expert knowledge and superior intelligence. The mass of the people can be taught to appreciate good art, for example, though very few of them can be taught to be good artists; so the masses may be taught to appreciate wise social and political leadership and to coördinate their opinions with those of wise leaders, though the masses may not be capable of leading themselves. The rule of public opinion need not be the rule of ignorance, provided the group as a whole is educated to a point of appreciating intelligence and expert knowledge. Then the intelligence of public opinion will depend upon the intelligence of the leaders of the group. But since in democratic groups leaders are selected by the people, much obviously depends upon the education of the masses. The more that intelligence, and especially intelligence regarding social and political questions, can be developed in the masses, the more apt the masses are to seek for leaders with expert knowledge. The degree of rationality in public opinion will, therefore, depend upon three things: (1) the general organization of the group, as

to ease of communication, individual freedom of expression, etc.; (2) the general level of intelligence in the group, especially its system of social and political education; (3) the quality of its leadership, not only as to expert knowledge, but also as to efficiency in action and moral character.

Under this last point we may note that there is a third thing needed in democratic societies if public opinion is to be rational and powerful; and that is it must be formed under conditions of disinterestedness on the part of those who act as leaders. If selfish interests are allowed to control the channels of communication, if even those channels become so commercialized that people lose their confidence in them, there is little chance of public opinion showing a high degree of intelligence. It is important, therefore, that in our whole social life, between nations as well as between classes and individuals, channels of intercommunication be kept not only free, but also uncorrupted and even untainted by suspicion of corruption. Now these channels in modern civilization are mainly through the press. If the press is commercial, if its news service is tainted by suspicion of corruption in any form, if it is made to serve individual or class interests rather than to serve social welfare, it will fail to create the highest type of public opinion. Much responsibility in the complex social groups of modern civilization evidently rests upon the press as an organ for the formation and guidance of public opinion. How to secure a press with an adequate sense of its social responsibility is a problem. Means and methods yet remain to be devised by which the press can be kept free, and yet at the same time be brought to realize in the highest degree its social responsibility. Like the church and the school, the press must evidently be left freedom if it is to function efficiently. Yet owing to its commercialism, to class and party bias, and to its ignorance, it must be admitted that, even in the most advanced civilized societies of the present, the press is still far from being an

ideal instrument for the formation and guidance of rational public opinion. If there is a way out of this difficulty, the development of a professional ethics and of a high type of professional training among journalists must play a large part. In this way it may be possible to establish a press upon a social service rather than upon a commercial basis.

From what has been said it may seem as if democracy, or the rule of public opinion, is a hopeless counsel of perfection. It is no more so, however, than the development of the intelligence of the individual. The rule of public opinion is the rule of the group mind. It is inevitable in all higher social development. Just as the individual is bound to strive for freedom and to rule his own behavior by his own judgment, so the group is bound to strive to control its behavior by its own judgment. In other words, democracy is inevitable if progressive social evolution continues. All social life is bound to come more and more under the sway of group consciousness and collective control. It is perhaps a mistake to trace the origins of customs, laws, and institutions back to the public opinion of primitive groups, because customs and institutions have their origin in the lower stages of social evolution in instinctive reactions and in some cases in accidental adjustments on the part of primitive society. But public opinion is now coming to be more and more creative of customs, laws, and institutions. The rational judgment of human groups is now beginning to modify profoundly all human institutions. In other words, public opinion is coming to be the decisive element in customs, laws, and institutions. It is playing an increasing part in controlling all social adjustments. The problem before modern democratic society, therefore, is how public opinion can be developed to the highest degree of rationality as well as of power. The future of our civilization evidently depends upon the solution of this question; for it is the question of how far social self-consciousness can be trusted to guide and

control group behavior. We shall have to take up this problem again when we consider the part which intelligence may play in social life.

The Function of Social Leadership

Animal groups show leadership but very imperfectly developed. This is doubtless because they have few rapid, complex adjustments to make. Human groups, on the other hand, shape themselves in their thinking and acting through the pattern or example furnished by some leader. They show a high development of social leadership; and leadership increases steadily in importance as we ascend from the simpler primitive groups to the complex groups of the modern world. On account of the difficulty of the adjustments which they have to make human groups have to organize themselves about definite leaders, men who take the initiative in thought or in action. The method regularly used by human groups when they have to adjust themselves to new and complex situations is to copy the action-patterns proposed or illustrated by a few individuals. These become the leaders of the group. Without leadership human groups would show no more capacity to make wise adjustments than their least intelligent members. But by coördinating themselves about a leader, who thinks ahead and sets an example, human groups become capable of adjustments of the highest degree of intelligence. Hence the supreme importance of leadership in human groups. Nothing great in the way of progress is or ever will be achieved by human groups without leadership. The only thing they can do without leadership is to act upon an instinctive or habitual plane, and such action does not result in progress. Hence all the higher work of civilization is the result of pioneering minds who go on ahead and blaze the trail to further collective achievements.

Human groups have always recognized that certain individuals are better fitted than others in the group to cope with

new situations. Individuals vary in their capacities and abilities, and it is this variability of the individual which makes progress possible. The traditional knowledge, beliefs, or habits, of the group may vary in their expression in certain individuals in such a way that it is an advantage to the group if the variation is copied. Such variations usually manifest themselves in exceptional individuals whose mental capacities are probably somewhat superior to the average members of the group. These are the persons with the capacity for initiative and leadership. They are not necessarily geniuses, but show superior ability in thinking, in talking, or in acting. In part this superior ability is the result of training and experience, but in part, also, it is the result of inborn qualities. It is the acceptance of the leadership of such individuals which makes the process of conscious change result in superior adjustments in human groups. Creative personality is a fact in social life, the influence of which we should never overlook, even though explicit reference is omitted for the sake of brevity or of scientific form.

From the sociological point of view it must be emphasized that the social group always selects its leaders through one way or another. It may select them wisely or unwisely. It may select upon the basis of custom and tradition, or even upon the basis of mere impulse. But it may also make a more or less intelligent choice of its leaders. There can be no leadership, at any rate, without the adhesion of the group to its leader. The probability of the wise selection of a leader on the part of a group is greatly increased where the freedom of the selection is untrammelled. This obviously depends upon the freedom of choice, of discussion, and of expression, which we have emphasized as the essential part of the mechanism of conscious social change. When the conditions for rational judgment on the part of the whole group are kept favorable by the encouragement of critical thinking and by

the free interchange of ideas, there is the best chance of the selection of the fittest men. But beyond this, a group that wishes competent leaders must find means of training and selecting men in advance before the situation arises in which their leadership will be needed. Groups that thus find and train their leaders in advance have an immense advantage over groups that wait for leaders to turn up by chance. We have every reason to believe that leadership is not a product of chance, but a product of social training, social opportunity, and social stimulation, as well as of conscious social selection of individuals with naturally superior qualities.

The leader is, then, the one who is selected by the group to carry out its judgment. Yet social groups are always in continual reaction with their leaders. Whatever power may be entrusted to the leader is, therefore, always more or less limited by the reaction of the group. Instances of giving absolute powers to group leaders in some lines, especially military and governmental, are not unknown in human history, though absolutism, as a rule, has usually grown up by slow stages after successive delegations of power by a people to their ruler. Thus in time the habit and tradition of a leader with absolute powers gets established. The most unfortunate thing about such despotic leadership is that sooner or later it comes to be not truly representative of the will of the group. The most socially fortunate condition exists when leader and group are closely and voluntarily coördinated. When there is constant action and reaction between the leader and the group, the outcome is truly representative of the group's judgment and will. Under such conditions we have what we may call democratic leadership. The democratic leader is essentially a teacher of his group. He leads, not by compulsion, by artifice, or by fear, but by persuasion, and, if he is of the highest type, by rational persuasion. In this case the whole group is educated to accept the patterns of action proposed by the leader. The democratic

method of leadership and of selecting leaders is evidently superior to the autocratic.

Qualities Needed for Leadership

The success of enforcing a new policy or building up a new institution or social custom will largely depend upon the type of leader chosen. No problem is of greater practical importance for a group, therefore, than the problem of securing the highest type of leadership. Emerson said: "An institution is the lengthened shadow of a great man." While human institutions as we find them have usually had many "great men," or leaders, yet great men are always needed to carry out the will of the group when it responds to some social situation, which, from a scientific point of view, may be regarded as having more to do with the creation of the new policy or institution than the great man. Nevertheless, the leader is indispensable in consciously directed social changes and movements, and the better fitted he is for his task, the greater the capacity he has, the better are the chances of successful social achievement. Masterful leadership, it must be admitted, is necessary for the success of any great social movement.

What then are the qualities needed for masterful leadership? Evidently the leader must be fitted by capacity and training to guide the group in a choice of a policy and then to carry it out; but more than this, he must know the conditions which surround the group and which prevail among its members; he must know human nature, how to handle men, how to get them to coöperate and to coördinate their activities with his own. Evidently some of the qualities needed on the part of the social leader are: a high degree of social intelligence, a high degree of sympathy with his group, an efficient social imagination, moral and physical courage, capacity for enthusiasm, and, perhaps above all, complete consecration to the cause which he represents. It is generally

true that human groups seek leaders with such qualities. Leaders with meaner qualities of trickery and demagoguery may prevail for a time; but groups intelligent enough to understand their own welfare sooner or later reject such leaders. But leaders with the higher qualities, and especially with just the combination of physical, mental, and moral qualities needed, may not be available unless the group has carefully selected and trained them in advance.

The question of leadership in human groups, therefore, turns out to be a matter concerning which there may be a high degree of social control. There is probably no lack of competent individuals in every human group with ample natural endowments for leadership. Professor Lester F. Ward showed that the amount of leadership material in populations is much larger than is popularly supposed, and that the main problem before civilization is to discover this talent and train it.⁸ In other words, if we found and utilized all the available natural talent for leadership which is latent in human beings, there would be abundant competent leadership for every phase of our civilization. Higher institutions of learning are supposed to find and train leaders. They are doing so fairly efficiently along materialistic lines, but along lines which concern the higher social, political, and economic problems they, as yet, perform their task in a comparatively inefficient manner. It is needless to add that this is a matter of the utmost practical importance, not only because the capacity of civilized peoples for social progress might be increased almost indefinitely with expert leadership, but because the security of our civilization depends upon such leadership.

Group Action

We have already discussed group action and the group will as the coördination of the activities of the individual

⁸ Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Part II.

members of a group in a given direction.⁹ The social judgment reached in public opinion normally issues in some collective action. There must, therefore, be some method of reaching a decision for group action after public discussion and the formation of a public opinion. The primitive democracies of savage and barbarous society almost always reached their decisions by unanimous agreement. But such unanimity is not possible in the great, complex societies of modern civilization. Hence in most matters such societies are content to reach a decision through the agreement of a majority, large or small. Voting is a device to determine on which side the majority is. Policies and leaders are usually selected by a majority vote. This is especially true in political matters. Representative leaders are selected by a majority and commissioned to carry out the policy which the majority represents or to set in action the laws which the majority has determined upon. The minority acquiesces because it wishes to preserve the unity of the group. The popular will in such cases represents, not uniformity of will in all the members of the group or even in the majority, but rather a trend, an organization, of the many volitional attitudes of the members of the group, so that they issue in definite, unified group action.

Such methods of reaching social decisions are, of course, characteristic only of modern societies and even in these they are not found in all phases of the group life. Groups depend for unity of action in these other phases upon various informal means, such as suggestion, imitation, the pressure of group opinion, and the like. When unified action is secured through these means, it is because a vast majority of the group have the same or nearly the same volitional attitudes. Group action in this case has the advantage that it is supported by the mass of the group.

⁹ See Chap. V.

On the other hand, when a group decision is reached through a bare majority, there is always danger that the will of the group will not be behind the change which is to be made in some policy or institution, and the whole situation will remain, therefore, unstable. This means that a definite choice has not really been made by the group, but only a compromise which satisfies none of the different classes or parties. The enactment of prohibition in the United States illustrates the difficulties which confront complex groups which proceed to make great social changes upon the principle of majority rule. What is needed in such cases is the more adequate development of social consciousness regarding the situation by the group as a whole. With more fully developed social consciousness a social decision may be reached which is truly representative of the will of the group. When this is done, public opinion becomes established as a group tradition, and the social changes resulting settle down into social habits and become embodied in the customs and institutions of the group. Thus the process of conscious social change is completed.

The Alternation of Critical and Constructive Periods in History

The life conditions of human groups constantly change. Hence periods of relative stability in social habits and institutions are necessarily followed by periods of change, of breaking down, and of possible disorganization. These again are regularly followed by periods of reconstruction of habits and institutions, and so, periods of stability. But these periods need not coincide for all classes of institutions. A period of breaking down and of change in one class of social habits is not infrequently synchronous with a period of relative stability or upbuilding in another class. The complexity of civilized societies makes it impossible for movements toward change to go on equally in all phases of social life

at once, hence it is possible for societies to be progressing in some respects and retrogressing in others. However, on account of the interdependence of all the phases of the social life, the instability of one set of institutions may greatly affect the stability of all other institutions. Accordingly, historians have frequently noted what they term "critical" and "constructive," or "organic," periods in history.

Now periods of social change are, as we have already seen, necessarily periods of criticism and of disorganization; but if the social life is normal, if a social group retains its normal powers of readjustment, these are succeeded by periods of construction and of relative stability in institutions. Historians, especially Lamprecht, have recognized these facts, often without giving adequate recognition to the complexity of culture. Lamprecht, for example, finds that human societies are always organized about some dominant idea, which he calls "a psychic dominant,"¹⁰ but which we should call a "pattern idea" or a "social pattern." These dominant pattern ideas decay when the conditions of life change. Hence there results, Lamprecht tells us, a period of individualism and dissociation. After a time some new pattern idea emerges which becomes the "psychic dominant," or pattern, of a new historical epoch, and there results a period of synthesis, reorganization, and stability. According to Lamprecht this is the universal mechanism of the social or historical process. Substantially the theory is correct; but three criticisms may be made of Lamprecht's statement. The rhythm which we find in human society is the rhythm of habit and adaptation which we have been discussing. This Lamprecht fails to recognize. Again, modern civilized societies have not one single psychic dominant, or pattern idea, but many. To be sure, there may be a few around which the whole life of the group is particularly organized, but the complexity of the

¹⁰ Lamprecht, *What Is History?* Chaps. III, IV.

pattern of modern civilization, and even its conflicting elements, should be clearly recognized.¹¹ Finally, there is no such clear distinction, for the whole life of complex groups of modern times; between periods of dissociation and periods of reconstruction, as Lamprecht seems to imply. To some extent dissociation may be going on in one part of the life of a complex group, while reconstruction is going on in another part. Nevertheless, it is true that some epochs are characterized more by dissociation and others more by reconstruction or stability. The epochs which are characterized largely by dissociation we may call periods of transition.

Confusion in Periods of Transition

A certain amount of confusion may be regarded as normal in the transition from one type of social habit or institution to another. Just as it is impossible for individuals to make changes in their methods of living without possibility of confusion, so it is impossible for a group. It is all the more impossible for a group because it takes some time for a large mass of individuals all to discover the new stimuli, patterns, and values which are necessary for the building up of a new way of living. In periods of transition in any phase of our social life we must, therefore, expect some confusion as regards the patterns and values by which men control their conduct. If the period is one of general social change, or transition, there may be widespread confusion as to the ideals and values of life. Such is evidently the present condition of Western civilization, and even to some extent of the whole world. It is this confusion as to what ideals and standards should be taken for patterns for social action which constitutes, from a psychological standpoint, the

¹¹ There should, of course, be a harmonious synthesis, or as Professor Ross says, a "balance" brought about of these conflicting elements for the best social life. See Chap. XIII and also Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. LVII.

peculiar problem of our civilization, and hence the core of most of our social problems.

For example, the confusion in respect to family life in Western civilization at the present time illustrates this. The old authoritarian family of past generations will no longer work under modern conditions. As yet, however, the mass of the people have been unable to find any new pattern or ideal sufficient for the reconstruction of the family upon a stable basis. There is uncertainty and confusion as to what the new type of family life should be. Hence the family as an institution is in a state of confusion and disintegration to-day. This condition should disappear in time, provided our civilization retains its power of making new and superior adjustments. The danger of such social confusion accompanying the transition from one type of institution to another is that the confusion may continue too long, and that there may take place reversion to a lower type of social adjustment. Only the leadership and effort of the more intelligent members of a group can prevent this tendency toward cultural reversion.

Radicalism and Conservatism

The alternation of habit and adaptation in group life expresses itself in individual character. Some individuals in a group show more of the habitual or static aspect of social life, while others show more of the adaptive or dynamic aspect. The individuals who adhere to the old habits of their group we call "conservatives," while the individuals who are in favor of change are usually called "liberals" and "radicals." This is due partly to difference in individual organization and temperament and partly to the fact that individuals are exposed unequally to the conditions which favor social change. Whether particular persons in a group are conservatives or progressives will depend both upon their temperament and their individual social environment. Usually, however,

the influence of the social environment of the individual, and especially of his education, will be found to be most important. Those persons for whom existing institutions work badly will, under ordinary circumstances, become the advocates of social change; while those who find existing institutions personally advantageous tend to become conservative and to oppose change.

The absurdity of either extreme radicalism or extreme conservatism in social life should be manifest. No society could long exist in which habit wholly predominated, which was wholly static, or at least it would expose itself to grave dangers. On the other hand, no society that is in a constant process of readjustment, always without a settled condition of its institutions, could possibly achieve a satisfactory life. The most wholesome social life is evidently the one in which there is a just balance maintained between conservative tendencies, on the one hand, and radical or progressive tendencies, on the other. Both tendencies are necessary for that wholesome alternation of static condition and change, habit and adaptation, which makes the rhythm of normal social development.

Perhaps this balanced attitude of mind may best be described as a true "liberalism." The contrast between it and conservatism has been stated by a leading progressive thinker of the present in the following way: "The conservative fears greatly to disturb or change the existing order; he intrenches himself in its traditions; he is sometimes apt to defend its abuses. The liberal values it as a high stage already reached in the eternal pilgrimage of mankind, but looks on toward the next stage. He accepts progress; he believes in light and ever more light; he works for the continued betterment of this great society. What makes him a liberal is liberality toward new ideas and toward opponents, readiness to hear reason, and anxiety not to be misled by prejudice, nor to fall back on mere authority or coercion."

Another name for liberalism of this sort is the "scientific attitude."

Individualism and Collectivism

Of a somewhat similar nature are the manifestations of individualism and collectivism. In periods when social traditions and institutions break down, there is great opportunity for individual variation and self-assertion. At such times the individual becomes relatively free from the domination of traditions, customs, and institutions. He is thrown back upon his own impulses, feelings, and ideas. Hence we have great individual variations. On the other hand, in periods of social stability the adaptation of the individual to the social order, or his absorption in the life of this group, may become so complete that he may seem to lose in great measure his individuality.

Now individualism and collectivism in the social life are just manifestations of these tendencies of the individual to free himself from or become absorbed into the life of the group. Like radicalism and conservatism, they are tendencies based upon the alternation of habit and adaptation in social life; and like them, a just balance should be maintained between these two tendencies for the most wholesome sort of social life. If the individual is too completely absorbed into his group, if there is too much insistence upon uniformity of individual behavior within the group, the individual loses initiative, becomes a mental and moral weakling, and the group itself becomes static. As we have already pointed out, the most wisely organized social groups always leave opportunity for differences of individual behavior within certain limits.

On the other hand, if individual variation becomes too great, if the individual becomes too independent of his group, he may set himself up as a law unto himself, and we have the danger of exaggerated individualism. This may result

in unending conflict between the habits of the individuals composing the group, consequently in unstable relations between them, and possibly in the dissolution of the group. If the social group is to remain in a healthy condition, therefore, neither individualization nor socialization must be carried too far. Socialization must be of such a sort as to cultivate independent personality and judgment. It must aim at creating in individuals a strong mental and moral character which will spontaneously adjust itself to the highest needs of the group life. Individualization, on the other hand, must be such as to develop individual initiative and independent mental and moral character of such a sort as to fit the individual for the harmonious adjustment of his activities with those of other individuals.

The absurdity of either extreme individualism or extreme collectivism, in either social theory or social practice, is manifest. Both are abstractions from the social life process. Neither can exist in its pure form in human society. While the danger in our civilization at the present time seems to be mainly from extreme individualism, yet it is evident that the other extreme, a collectivism which would suppress individual initiative and emphasize only the conformity of the individual to the group, is a possible danger which threatens the future. This danger comes, not only from communistic socialism as one form of collectivism, but also from autocracy, whether it appears under the guise of militarism or of imperialism. A balanced civilization must aim at both stability and progress in our social life, and hence leave room for individual variation, while at the same time developing through education a high type of socialized character in individuals.

Dynamic Society and Civilization ¹²

We have already pointed out that the distinction between static and dynamic society is a matter of degree. The tend-

¹² For elaboration see Chap. XIV on "Social Progress."

ency for habit to predominate in the social life to the exclusion of adaptation, as we have already seen, manifests itself especially under very simple conditions of life where there are few crises or emergencies which call for a change in social habits. Also, as we have seen, under the powerful conservative influences of authoritarian religions and despotic governments, civilized societies may become static. But with the coming of more complex conditions of social life, through the growth of population, the migration and contact of peoples and cultures, the culture of civilized peoples tends to become dynamic.

A society or a culture is not to be thought of as dynamic because it suffers destructive changes due to international or civil wars or other catastrophes. A society that is dynamic is one that changes; but the change is not in the way of disaster but in the way of growth. Such changes are in large measure a development of the culture already existing, or at least organically related to it. A dynamic society or civilization accordingly shows progress in certain lines, though not necessarily a balanced progress which we can speak of as "general progress," or progress in the fullest sense of the word. If, however, we understand some of the conditions which give rise to dynamic societies and civilizations, we shall understand some of the conditions of social progress.

The first of these conditions is the freeing of the individual, especially the freeing of his mind. It is only through the liberation of thought that men are encouraged to criticize customs and institutions or to attempt to construct new ones. Mental plasticity in the individual must come before we can have plasticity in the group. The second condition is the encouragement of public discussion, and so of expression, on the part of individuals. Thus, as we have seen, there is possible a selection of types of thought, of action, and so of customs and institutions. The third condition is the develop-

ment of the tradition of social freedom and of social progress. With the development of a tradition of progress along many cultural lines new and higher social adjustments become possible. Thus a dynamic type of civilization emerges, and slowly a tradition of progress in every line of culture is built up.

Such free, reflective interference on the part of man with social conditions, institutions, and civilization does not necessarily tend to destroy social stability and order. On the contrary, even in the most progressive civilization, social habits are not apt to be discarded as long as they work well. Progress is not opposed to social order, as Comte long ago pointed out. The danger in a dynamic civilization is not in change or progress as such, but rather in one-sided change or progress. Development, if sound, must be well balanced. A dynamic society must seek normal growth and development along all lines, if it is not to suffer from ill-balanced or one-sided development. Progressive development of all the functions and institutions of the social life must be its program, and in such a program science finds no inherent perils. Dynamic civilization is, on the contrary, more durable than static civilization, because it makes possible the establishment of an equilibrium between the social life and changing conditions. In a progressive civilization, as soon as conditions change, whether in the objective environment or in knowledge and beliefs, socially adaptive processes will come in to restore the equilibrium. There need be no end, therefore, to a progressive or dynamic civilization.

But it may be asked is there not a goal for development, and is not a static condition of society and civilization bound to be reached sooner or later? The answer of social science is that, while hypothetically such a static condition of society and culture may sometime be reached, it is at present far in the future. The tradition of progress, once established in science, religion, and in the arts of life, opens

up ever new vistas of higher and higher social adjustments. Such ideals may be only slowly realized, but when they exist as a part of the general social pattern, they are ready to be utilized as instruments of progress as soon as the social situation calls for them. Thus we can see no end to human progress, unless the end comes through some disaster, as the result of ill-balanced development. There is, therefore, no necessary death of cultures or civilizations. If they die or even suffer serious setbacks, it is because mistakes in social adjustments were made. Dynamic civilization, if well balanced, is stable because it is a moving equilibrium in constant readjustment with the conditions of life.

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CHAPTER VIII

CHANGES WITHIN THE GROUP: ABNORMAL

It would be fortunate for mankind if the process of normal social change outlined in the preceding chapter were always followed by human groups. But in addition to these normal changes in group life, we find another sort, unusual, abrupt, and frequently accompanied by hostile conflicts within the group. These are the revolutionary changes. We may regard them as abnormal, since they are unusual and generally accompanied by results which are more or less destructive of the group life. Some authors, however, have argued that such catastrophic or cataclysmic changes in human groups are the normal method of their evolution. We shall have to consider this doctrine later, but we must first try to understand such changes. Evidently this is the *fourth* general problem in group behavior.

The Causes and Consequences of Social Immobility

If human groups could keep a high degree of flexibility in their organization, intelligently adapting themselves to meet all changing conditions, social development would probably present only the curve of normal growth. At least, there would never be any such thing as the breakdown of social order. Unfortunately, however, this flexibility and plasticity in institutions and social organization is rarely realized. The very method by which human groups get their organization, through the habitual coördination of the behavior of their individuals with that of some leader, or governing class, favors the development of immobility and

inflexibility in institutions, since usually a governing class is interested in maintaining conditions as they are.

The relatively static condition of simple primitive societies does not here concern us. For, as we have already seen, such societies are usually more or less isolated and in substantial equilibrium with their static life conditions. But this is not the case with those civilized societies which are in the main competition of life, or, so to speak, in the main stream of human evolution. In such a case, inflexibility in habits and institutions means that the group is apt to be thrown out of equilibrium with the constantly changing life conditions.

The sociologist should accordingly give careful consideration to the conditions under which social habits, institutions, and organization may become inflexible. In a general way this has already been indicated when we have said that through interference with the mechanism of conscious social change, normal social readjustments may be prevented. Leaders and governing classes often find it to their personal interest to keep social institutions and organization unchanging. Hence they frequently interfere through the agencies of social control with the mechanism by which conscious changes are normally brought about in human groups. The partial or complete destruction of any part of this mechanism, such as free thinking, public criticism, free public discussion, the untrammelled formation of public opinion, of free selection of leaders, is bound to stop, more or less completely, the process of rational social adjustment. The development of social life is thus checked or perverted. If this process goes on long enough, disaster is bound to come to the group in some form.

Usually this interference with the mechanism of social readjustment is effected through manipulation of the agencies of social control, such as government, religion, and education. The shortsightedness or selfishness of the individuals

in charge of these institutions leads them to attempt to block normal social change. Thus governments may create immobility in institutions by forbidding free thought, free speech, the right of assembly, and petitions by the people. Religions in human history have not infrequently so glorified the past, or sanctified existing institutions, as to make needed changes well nigh impossible. Systems of education under the direction of authorities of either state or church have often done the same. Economic interests also often oppose needed readjustments.

But beyond such interferences through the agencies of social control with normal social development, we must recognize the fact that the temper and attitude of a majority of the people may accomplish the same thing. If there grows up in the mass of the people an intolerance of free thought, free speech, and public criticism, rational changes in institutions, to say nothing of the whole social order, are rendered practically impossible. Intolerant public sentiments and beliefs may give rise, therefore, to inflexibility in habits and institutions in a society and stop normal social development. Whether racial traits in some cases may have something to do with social immobility is a disputed question; but in any case the establishment of a tradition of intolerance along any line, political, economic, religious, or educational, will account for most of the instances of social immobility and inflexibility in civilized societies. After 1830, for example, popular sentiment in our South became intolerant of criticism of the institution of slavery, opposing public discussion of the institution in any way. The result was that the institution remained relatively unchanged until a revolutionary war swept it away. It is well to remember, also, that "class interest," both of privileged and unprivileged classes, on account of the tendency to group egoism which we have already discussed, is liable to give rise to intolerance, and to attempts to suppress public criticism of class policies and actions

whenever it can, thus detracting from the adaptability and flexibility of the whole group.

Whatever the cause of social immobility, whether it be the impediments of despotic governments, authoritative ecclesiasticism, racial temperament, intolerant public sentiment, or class interest, it is bound, if long continued, to produce social disaster; because this is an on-moving world. Such disaster may, of course, come in two forms. The group may become weakened through maintaining a static condition and getting out of adjustment with life conditions; so it may fall a victim of conquest, subjugation, or absorption by another group. If this does not happen, then disaster will sooner or later come in the form of internal disorder and disruption, when the conditions of social life have sufficiently changed to make the old habits and institutions of the group no longer workable. It is this latter case with which we shall concern ourselves. We shall see how these conditions give rise to "social explosions."

The Psychology of Revolution

The motivation of revolt in large masses of men is always lack of adaptation. But lack of adaptation is the cause of practically all attempts at readjustment in human behavior, therefore, the question remains, what sort of lack of adaptation? Moreover, is the cause of the lack of adaptation to be found in individuals or in the social organization? Common sense has usually answered that the motivation for revolution is found in an oppressive social and political system. This view was happily phrased by President Wilson when he said, "Repression is the seed of revolution." It is not too much to say that this phrase nearly expresses the modern psychological and sociological view. By "repression" we mean any situation in society which constantly thwarts the expression of natural impulses and tendencies on the part of individuals. Such repression if continued gives rise

in individuals to what has been called by psychologists "a balked disposition."

Evidently the repression must be general enough to affect a very considerable proportion of the population. Moreover, it must be in connection with some phase of the group life or organization, which the masses of the group believe might easily be changed. If the repression seems natural and inevitable, like the poverty which is caused by general lack of prosperity, by hard conditions of life, by famine or public calamity, it rarely excites revolt on the part of individuals, but is endured with patience.¹ This may be true even in the case of a governmental system which has been inherited from the past, when there is comparatively little popular enlightenment. The repression that excites revolt may, of course, exist in any phase of the social life—economic, political, religious, etc. However, a political or economic system which is felt to be burdensome or repressive by some usually excites little revolt if expressions against it and statements of grievances are permitted and tolerated. The repression which stimulates revolution is usually the repression which forbids free expression, limits the freedom of intercommunication, intimidates free thinking and the free statement of grievances.

There are, therefore, two aspects to the causes of social revolutions, one which has to do with the repression which the individual experiences, the other which has to do with the partial or complete destruction of freedom of intercommunication and of the general machinery by which a group readjusts its behavior. As we have already seen, the process of intercommunication in society serves the same purpose as the connections in the nervous system of the individual. The process of intercommunication, in other words, serves

¹ For a careful discussion of the conditions under which repression gives rise to resentment and revolt, see Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, Chap. VII.

to distribute stimulations and ideas. When this process works freely, a stimulus felt by one member of a group is conveyed to other members. When a portion of a group has a grievance, other portions are made aware of this condition. General group discussion takes place and readjustment normally follows. But when the machinery of readjustment is lacking, or even when its free functioning is interfered with, the group is unable for a greater or less length of time to change its habits and institutions. Social inflexibility or immobility ensues. The forces which make for change, however, usually accumulate. Individuals are more and more thrown out of adjustment with the conditions of life, and more and more they feel the repression which social immobility or inflexibility entails. The immobility being forced upon the group, the group itself becomes unused to the process of readjustment. It is evident that if the breakdown of general social habits and institutions occurs under these conditions, a period of social confusion and anarchy is liable to result.

Accordingly the real cause or stimulus which provokes a social revolution must be sought in the system of social control. When that system is immobile, inflexible, and especially when it represses free expression on the part of individuals, that is, when it interferes with the free functioning of the process of intercommunication, of group discussion, of the free formation of group opinion and the free determination of group policy, it is bound sooner or later to bring about the revolt of large masses of the group. But before this can take place, the forces opposing the old institutions or policies of the group must embody themselves in a party of opposition or revolt. This party is composed in general of those individuals whom the changed conditions of life have most affected, and who, therefore, feel most the repression of the old social order. The interest of these individuals obviously lies in a change in the policy and behavior of the group. From these the attitude of revolt may

spread by imitation among those classes to whom the old social institutions seem repressive, either on account of their material interests or on account of their sympathies or enlightenment. The more sympathetic and intellectual elements of the group line up, therefore, with those who are oppressed. This gives the attitude of revolt prestige, and it spreads by imitation and suggestion to a larger and larger portion of the group. Thus the party of revolt grows until it comes to embody all whose ideal or material interests are in conflict with the existing order of things.

If those who are in charge of the system of social control of the group, or its ruling classes, are wise, they can usually forestall a violent overturning of the existing order by listening to grievances and making concessions. That is, the ruling classes may themselves take the lead in the readjustment of institutions along the line demanded by the party of revolt. Thus open conflict between classes may be averted. It is in this way that so-called "peaceful revolutions" are effected. Historically this outcome has been more frequent than the resort to open conflict between classes. If, however, inadequate concessions are made by the ruling class, or, in other words, if a system of repression and the relative inflexibility of the social order is maintained, then the motive to revolt persists and open conflict arises between the ruling class and the party of revolt. Thus come about those bloody struggles between privileged and nonprivileged classes for the possession of the agencies of social control, especially for political and economic power, which we term "social revolutions." Successful revolutions are characterized by a change in sovereignty, that is, by the shifting of the social control from one class to another, and often by fundamental changes in the social order.² Such social move-

² Compare Bauer's definition of revolution, "Revolution is the change of the constitution of society realized by violence." (Quoted by Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, p. 8.)

ments are a very striking form of group behavior, and are evidently of peculiar interest to sociologists and social psychologists. All the more so because a current social philosophy of the day regards this method of social change as a normal one. We may take as typical revolutions, in the sense in which we are using the term, the Puritan Revolution in England, the French Revolution, the Chinese Revolution and the Russian Revolution. All revolutionary movements and struggles, however, will be found to conform more or less closely to the psychology of these changes which we are outlining.

Inadequate Psychological Theories of Revolution

The "repression theory of revolutions," which we have just stated in outline,³ is often rejected, probably because it seems to throw the burden of responsibility for causing revolutions upon the conservative and ruling classes. It is said that revolutions start in social discontent and restlessness. But the writers who advocate this theory do not tell us where the social discontent and restlessness comes from. It is often said that false hopes are awakened among the masses by Utopian thinkers who present impossible social ideals. From these ideals people become discontented, and discontent with existing institutions is gradually diffused among the ignorant masses through the force of suggestion and imitation, until at last these ignorant masses develop an attitude of revolt. This theory assumes that the mass of the people are irrational and may be made discontented merely by suggestion and imitation when they really have no rational ground for discontent. The theory also assumes a force to suggestion and imitation in the social life, which we shall see in a later chapter they do not possess. While it is true that the mass

³ This theory is elaborated by Professor Sorokin in his book, *The Sociology of Revolution*, which uses the Russian Revolution as its background. It was first outlined by the writer of this book in 1899.

of men have no highly developed rationality, yet, on the other hand, they are inert creatures of habit and rarely manifest discontent, especially in the extreme form of an attitude of revolt, without considerable cause or reason. After all, the masses of mankind do not get discontented over vain imaginings, and are rarely stampeded by suggestions which are not in line with the situation in which they find themselves. People have more common sense than some social and psychological writers credit them with. Men rarely undertake civil war between classes any more than war between nations without very considerable incitement to conflict; in other words, without a serious breakdown in the coördination which normally exists between the behavior of different classes within a nation. *Agitators, Utopian and radical thinkers do not cause revolutions, but rather voice discontent which already exists.* Their ideas, however, are not only expressions of discontent, but may become vehicles for furthering discontent and so instruments of revolution. Hence we must notice the part which these play in revolutionary movements.

The Rôle of Destructive Criticism and Disintegrating Ideas in Revolutions ⁴

Criticism, as we have seen, marks the beginning of social change; it is a discrimination of something wrong in the existing social situation. Ideas, we have seen, are instruments of social readjustment; but they may be concerned with the tearing down as well as with the building up of habits and institutions. Hence revolutionary movements are always preceded by criticism of existing institutions of a destructive rather than a constructive nature, and by negative doctrines regarding many of the values connected with the social order criticized. These destructive criticisms and

⁴ See Sorokin, *op. cit.*, especially Chap. IX, for elaboration.

negative doctrines are taken by the party of revolt as weapons or instruments for attacking the established order. They also frequently become the watchwords and shibboleths of the party of revolt. They are more effective in weakening the old institutions and the position of the ruling or privileged classes than any other weapons of attack, for human groups control their behavior, as we have seen, by pattern ideas, and when the social patterns on which a given social order rests are undermined, its support outside of the use of sheer physical force is gone. This is well understood by the radical leaders of the party of revolt. They always make larger use of these intellectual rather than material weapons. They, therefore, try to line up on their side the intellectual and literary classes of the nation. If these classes are wholly won over to the side of the party of revolt, it is safe to say that the revolution is bound to come, if not by peaceful concessions, then by the use of physical force. When a nation's thinkers no longer support its social order, change is inevitable.

Mobs in Revolutionary Periods

It has been a favorite idea of some writers that revolutions are the result of mob action. Mobs often play a considerable part in revolutions, but it is certain that they have little to do with causing revolutions or with their final outcome. The conditions of confusion and excitement in revolutions simply favor the formation of crowds, and mob action. There is an absence, on the one hand, of the controlling habits, ideas, and sentiments which usually secure order in a population, and, on the other, there is a general reversion in the masses to relatively unreflective, emotional types of activity, hence to animal-like levels of behavior.⁵ Under such conditions individuals are extremely suggestible, and show a

⁵ Compare Sorokin, *op. cit.*, Chap. II.

lack of their usual inhibitions upon behavior. Hence mobs are easily formed, and a suggestion may suffice to incite them to the most extreme deeds. Plentiful illustrations will be found in the French Revolution, though all prolonged revolutionary periods have been characterized more or less by the existence of mobs. It is a mistake, however, to think that mobs initiate or carry through revolutions. Revolutions simply afford opportunities for mobs and other crowds to play a much greater part than they do in normal times; and this again is one of the dangers of revolutionary periods.

The State of "Chronic Revolution"

The duration of anarchy and mob rule in a revolution depends upon a number of factors. If the party of revolt is united upon a program, and if the population is not too greatly divided and has not lost its power of rapid readjustment, a period of anarchy and confusion may scarcely develop. Under such circumstances the reconstruction of new habits and institutions may go on rapidly under the guidance of the revolutionary party. Our own War of Independence may be taken as an illustration of this type of revolution. Too often, however, the revolutionary party is united in nothing except in its opposition to the old régime. It can find no principles or interests upon which it is united, and which it can use as a basis for a new social order. Moreover, the abuses and immobility of the old order may have left the mass of the population ignorant, degraded, and without the power of intelligent adaptation. Under such conditions the period of confusion, anarchy, and mob rule may continue for a long time. Frequent unsuccessful attempts may be made to set up a stable social order, but the state is, evidently, one which may be called "chronic revolution." The revolutions in some Central and some South American countries have not infrequently illustrated such an unhappy outcome.

The Sociology of the Dictatorship

Usually the only escape from such a state of anarchy and confusion is in the advent of a "strong man." The social order cannot be reconstructed upon the basis of ideal principles, but only about the personality of some hero. The appearance of "dictators" in revolutionary periods is, then, not difficult to understand. The dictator is intrusted with more or less absolute power, and anthropology shows that absolutism of this sort originates through the stresses and strains which accompany prolonged war. Now, in the civil war, which we call a "revolution," if it is prolonged, we have all the conditions favoring the rise of centralized, despotic, social control. When the revolutionists are unable to agree among themselves or to effect the reconstruction of the social order upon the basis of ideal principles, their only hope lies in despotic, centralized control. The revolutionary party turns to such a policy to insure its own survival. It, therefore, seeks for some strong man, often a military hero, who will command the primitive sentiments of personal attachment, fear, and loyalty of the masses. The personality of such a hero affords the most natural stimulus around which a new social order can be organized when other means of reconstructing social institutions have failed; for primitively, social organization was based more upon these personal sentiments than upon abstract principles of either social justice or social expediency.

We see, therefore, how dictatorships, such as "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in Russia, naturally arise in revolutionary periods. The dictator is simply a leader selected by his group to restore social order upon the primitive bases of personal prestige and the exercise of brute force, and hence he is clothed with absolute power. Such a man is selected by the group, and, of course, does not "hypnotize" his group, as has been sometimes alleged. The man may be wise, or

unwise, competent or incompetent, from the standpoint of critical science. He is given power merely in order to restore social order. Here again, we see the principle that the social leader must be selected by the group, if he is effectively to exercise power. The leader who is given power is, therefore, essentially created by the group. If such typical dictators of revolutionary eras as Cromwell, Napoleon and Lenin had never lived, they would have had their places filled by other, though probably inferior, men.

Reactions after Revolutions

The reason for the frequency of reactions after revolutions is now manifest. After futile attempts to reconstruct the social order, the easiest thing is to go back to the old habits and order which existed before the revolution began. This is the more easy because no revolution is ever absolute; it is never more than a partial destruction of old habits and institutions. New habits, we have seen, must be erected upon the basis of old habits. What remains of the old habits after a revolution must serve, then, as the foundation of new habits and institutions. If, however, no agreement regarding a new social order can be reached, then the only alternative is reversion to prerevolutionary conditions, if any stable social order is to be established.

Such reactions are, of course, connected with the difficulties of changing collective habits, which we have already touched upon. Any radical change in collective habits necessitates the assent of practically the entire mass of a group. A change may be initiated and temporarily established by a majority, or even by a minority; but for a change to become permanent in a free society the mass of the group has to be brought sooner or later to assent to the change; otherwise a new party of revolt may form which will start a counter-revolution; and the counter-revolution, if successful, brings a reaction to prerevolutionary conditions. It is not difficult,

accordingly, to understand the reactions after the Puritan Revolution in England and after the French Revolution. Reactions must, indeed, be deemed one of the reasons why the method of change through revolution is socially undesirable. However, the evidence of history seems to show that such reactions are only temporary. A population, keeping its power of adaptation, will, as a rule, at some later time proceed to make effective through peaceful methods the changes which it failed to realize through revolution.

Illustrations of the Theory of the Origin of Revolutions

That revolutions originate through repressive social, political, and economic systems is illustrated clearly enough by the cases of Russia and France. So far from the Russian Revolution having been the work of agitators and of Utopian idealists, as some have mistakenly claimed, the researches of its most careful students have shown conclusively that it originated in policies of repression which had continued for over a century. The Russian Revolution was destructive and terrible just because the repressions which had preceded it were severe and prolonged. Thus the people gradually lost faith in their ruling class and, at the same time, came to feel that their legitimate aspirations and desires were needlessly repressed and thwarted. The traditional loyalty of the masses for those in power in the political, the economic, and the ecclesiastical systems was undermined, and distrust and resentment took its place. The French Revolution also illustrates, not less clearly, the part which repression plays in causing social explosions. According to the testimony of all careful students, needless repression of reasonable popular demands for social and political changes, prompted by the selfishness and the stupidity of the ruling classes, caused the French Revolution.

The study of almost any great revolutionary uprising will illustrate the principles which we have stated. The Puritan

Revolution of England, the recent Mexican Revolution, and the Chinese Revolution also illustrate clearly the part which repression plays in causing such social disturbances. It would be a mistake, however, to think that repression and interference with normal social change are always the work of a governing class. As we have already pointed out, it may sometimes be the work of an intolerant majority, as was illustrated by the Civil War in the United States. Here, it will be remembered, intolerant popular sentiment prevented changes in the institution of slavery until a war of revolutionary character swept the institution away.

The Prevention of Social Revolutions

All that we have said implies that revolutions are impossible in a free, flexible, adaptable type of social organization. In a group in which intelligent public criticism, free public discussion, and free thought about social conditions and institutions are encouraged; in which there is no impediment to the free expression of opinions or of grievances; in which there is an adaptable, flexible public opinion, alert for social betterment; and in which there is untrammelled selection of social policies and social leaders, there can be no danger of a social revolution. That danger comes, as we have seen, when class interest, whether it be of the privileged or the non-privileged classes, interferes with the free working of the mechanism of conscious social change and establishes a policy of repression and intolerance. The burden of responsibility for maintaining flexibility of social life through the free functioning of conscious social change rests, however, especially upon the ruling classes, that is, those who are in charge of the institutions of social control. If those in power in a group, whether they represent a minority or a majority, will keep open the means of understanding and sympathy between classes; if they will keep in touch with the needs of all classes; if they will keep untrammelled public criticism

and discussion of public policies and all the means of forming rational public opinion and of selecting authorities to carry out the same, there will be no danger of revolution, in the sense of the violent seizure of power by one class from another class, being resorted to in any social group. In other words, a perfectly democratic organization of the group along with a fraternal attitude of classes toward one another will effectually do away with the danger of revolutionary struggles.

The history of almost any modern nation will illustrate these principles both positively and negatively. Perhaps the history of modern England will, on the whole, however, illustrate them better than that of any other nation. After experiencing two revolutions in the seventeenth century, and the revolt and loss of their chief American colonies in the eighteenth, the ruling classes of England learned their lesson and succeeded in avoiding political and social revolutions in the last decade of the eighteenth century and during the whole of the nineteenth, although during that period almost the whole of Christendom experienced revolution. England was free from revolutions because during all this period its governing classes kept English social and political institutions flexible and responsive to the social life of the English people. The adjustment was, of course, far from perfect; but it was sufficiently close to prevent any great development of revolutionary movements among the English people at home. However, because the attitude of the authorities in England was the reverse toward the people of Ireland and India, the very reverse was true with the Irish people and with the people of India. In other words, the individual liberty of thought, the free public discussion, and the democratic methods of social control which the English people developed in the eighteenth century saved English society from revolution during the nineteenth century. Social freedom and plasticity, in a word, favored normal social

development rather than revolution in English society during the nineteenth century. Again and again the danger of revolution was averted by a series of rational social changes or readjustments through social legislation. The very latest illustration of this plasticity of English society is, of course, the coming into power in Great Britain of a Labor government without any revolutionary disturbance.

The experience of history must lead the student of society to conclude, therefore, that needed social changes can be anticipated and so revolution and social disaster avoided. But first we must get rid of the illusion that repression is the means of preventing revolution. The truth has been shown to be the very reverse of this. Social revolutions are, we have seen, easily avoided, and are pathological and abnormal methods of social change. Whether or not human societies will continue to resort to such costly methods of effecting social changes in the future will depend, of course, upon the development of social intelligence in all classes. Here we may see clearly both the value and the limitations of the social sciences. They cannot, of course, predict events far in the future, as some of the physical sciences can do, because they deal with far too complex phenomena; but the social sciences can define the conditions under which social occurrences of a given type will take place. While they cannot foretell the social future, they may indicate the way of social health and security.

Catastrophic Change in Social Evolution

If revolution is not a normal method of social change; if, rather, it is the result of the breakdown of normal methods of social readjustment; and if as a method of change it is accompanied by grave disadvantages and dangers, we see that the popular doctrine that social progress often comes through revolution is subject to considerable scientific modification. It cannot be denied, of course, that, in

the past, social progress has often come through revolutions; but when these have involved bloody conflicts between classes it has come at too great social cost. The wounds of such internal conflicts as the French Revolution and the American Civil War have perhaps healed, owing to the recuperative power in the national life of the French and American peoples; but the good which they accomplished was bought at such price that dispassionate historians would doubtless agree that if the changes which they effected could have been secured in any other way, it would have been socially preferable. The social ruin and disaster which has resulted from every revolutionary struggle in human history makes it incumbent on the social sciences to point out a better way of social progress than by revolution.

Nevertheless, some recent social thinkers have set forth the theory that just as we have organic evolution by mutation, so we must have social evolution by social mutations, or revolutions. This is, of course, not a new theory; it is essentially what Karl Marx meant by his doctrine of "evolution through revolution." The appeal to DeVries's mutation theory in biology gives to this doctrine of the normality of revolutions as a means of progress but little, if any, added strength. Social evolution is not comparable, either in nature or method, to organic evolution. Human social evolution proceeds by a learning process, and the only advantage that might be claimed for the revolutionary method is that sometimes people learn rapidly from disasters and calamities. It is decidedly unsafe, however, to think that violence can do much toward the education of the race.

It must be remembered that there are distinct limits to the use of force in human society. When the use of force is motivated by good will, and this fact is recognized, as in the legitimate use of force by recognized governments in the exercise of their police powers, there is little danger; but this is not the case in the conflicts of classes. The violent

seizure of power by one class, to accomplish its ends, can rarely take place without bloody conflicts with other classes. Now, violence releases, as we have already seen, the primitive brute instincts of man which civilization with such difficulty controls. Violence, therefore, can rarely be successfully employed in the higher stages of civilization without defeating the very ends for which it is employed. Its employment starts a process of rebarbarization which is destructive to those higher social values which civilization has so painfully built up, and by which men have slowly learned to regulate their conduct. If long continued, violence results in the total destruction of those coöperative attitudes which have produced civilization and which make progress possible. The method of social change through revolution must be regarded, therefore, as involving too great a risk to be tolerated by an intelligent people. All that can be said in condemnation of war in general applies with equal force to civil war. Civil wars and international wars, when prolonged, seem to be the chief cause of serious reversions in civilization; but such reversions constitute another problem which we must now consider.

Reversions in Civilization

There is no reason, so far as the student of social life can discover, why social evolution should not be continuous and progressive, with only the rhythms which necessarily result from the replacement of old by new customs and institutions. There is no necessary decay and death of civilization. Culture results from a learning process, which conceivably might go on continuously from generation to generation with only the "plateaus," which indicate relatively complete periods of adjustment, such as we find also in the case of the learning of an individual. However, this has not been the actual course of human history. Western civilization especially shows periods of the decadence or breakdown of civilization.

The breakdown of civilization at the end of classic antiquity was so serious and complete that not more than a tithe of the knowledge of the arts and sciences and of the great cultural traditions in general of the classic world survived. It is said, indeed, that such common knowledge as how to compute the square surface of a triangle—knowledge which every Greek and Roman schoolboy possessed—had been completely forgotten. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that all of the knowledge possessed by the Greeks and the Romans, even in a technical way, was completely recovered. This example sufficiently demonstrates that serious setbacks, or reversions, in human culture are possible.

While we have detailed historical knowledge of only one such reversion in civilization, the anthropologist and archæologist find abundant evidence, in many places in the world, of buried or extinct civilizations. All the evidence seems to show that in all ages human culture has been essentially a fragile affair, subject to numerous setbacks and reversions. This is what we should expect if we understand thoroughly the nature of culture as essentially a learning process, which may be subject to many interruptions. It is a common view that the breakdown of the civilization of classic antiquity was due to the fact that the territory of the civilized peoples of the Mediterranean was invaded by the barbarians of northern Europe; that ancient civilizations were unstable because they were surrounded by barbarians, and that modern civilization will prove stable because there are no longer any barbarians to threaten it.

It must be acknowledged that all buried civilizations of the past were surrounded, when they flourished, by a ring of barbarism; but this fact does not prove that the main cause of their decay was that they were overwhelmed by the barbarians. On the contrary, internal disorder and disunity, in all the cases of which we have knowledge, especially in

the case of the Greeks and Romans, preceded the overthrow of the civilization by surrounding peoples of lower culture. Greek and Roman civilization went to pieces at the touch of the barbarians because it was a rotten shell. It is a reasonable inference, therefore, that reversions in civilization of the serious sort are connected with the internal disorders in national and cultural groups, that is, with the failure of those groups to adjust themselves, harmoniously and successfully, to changed life conditions. But let us see more minutely what are the causes of such reversion.

Causes of Cultural Decadence

Let us note, first of all, that serious retrogressive movements are more liable to occur in higher civilization than in lower civilization; for a high civilization is achieved and maintained only through the most delicate and refined instruments of social control—only through the influence of ideal social values and standards. The decay of a civilization is evidently a process of the decay of those higher controls over behavior which civilization devised and upon which all high civilization rests. There is no reason to think that there could be reversion to the lower levels of culture without the decay of the higher civilized standards and values which have been set up as controls over conduct. There is also no reason to think that this decay is spontaneous or mysterious in any way, or that it comes about simply because civilized conduct is “fatiguing,” as some have claimed.⁶ On the contrary, it must be due to the breakdown of civilizing traditions in the various groups which are the bearers of these traditions. This breakdown may come through the

⁶ The facts of history give little or no support to the theory of some psychologists that all civilized conduct is “fatiguing,” and that we can spontaneously revert to barbarous or savage levels. Reversions are not shown in history without greater or less decay of civilizing standards, resulting from the causes mentioned. See Patrick's *Psychology of Relaxation*, especially Chap. VI.

failure to keep up the standards, the morale, of the group, through the luxury and self-indulgence which accompany the growth of wealth and power, or through internal disorder and strife in the group, which releases brute impulses, diverts energy to nonproductive uses, destroys the accumulations of the past, and interrupts the process of learning and so the transmission of culture in the group. These causes usually work together.[†]

The various steps in decadence will show more clearly the causes of reversions than any abstract discussion. The *first* step in cultural decay seems always to be the decay of private morals, through luxury and self-indulgence, usually accompanying the growth of wealth and power. This is to be observed particularly in the family group and in personal relations. Then comes, *secondly*, a decay of public morals. Officials who have lost their standards in private morals naturally become corrupt in public office. Their corruption weakens the confidence of the population in their government and other agencies of social control. The *third* step is to be observed in the growth of social disorders and in the strife between classes. Individuals and classes losing their confidence in their officials and their agencies of social control resort more and more to extra-legal methods of settling their disputes. Riots, mobs, and crimes of various sorts increase. Strife between groups representing opposing interests arises and cannot be overcome because there is no basis for restoring harmony, either in the attitudes of individuals and classes or in the machinery of social control. The *fourth* step in decadence inevitably appears if civic disorders continue to grow, and that is civil war between classes. It would be a mistake, of course, to confuse revolutions and civil wars with reversions in civilization. They are only one

[†] Compare what was said on the causes of social disintegration in Chap. V. Reversions in civilization are, of course, the same process carried to its limits and affecting large cultural groups.

factor in cultural setbacks; but if continued long enough they may be a very large factor. A *fifth* factor, however, seems to be necessary, and that is continued international wars. It will be remembered that after Rome had been weakened by the decay of its private and public morals, by civic dissensions and by civil wars, the final blow to its civilization came through a long series of both civil and international wars. It is certain that it is prolonged civil and international strife which in human history has chiefly caused great setbacks in high civilization. War, however, gives only the finishing stroke, and probably war does not occur in a high civilization without some decay of its higher values, not, at least, long and devastating war. War is the Nemesis of a corrupt civilization.

Reversions in civilization occur, therefore, because the constructive processes of group life, the higher activities of social life, are interrupted by strife and disorder. Thus, the tendency towards anarchy, which we see in all revolutionary periods, if indefinitely prolonged, would break down the traditions of civilization, and social life would come to rest at a substantially lower level. The same result, of course, could come about through prolonged international war. If strife, confusion, and anarchy continue long in any group the learning process which maintains culture must be interrupted, and the reversion must be serious. Not only will there be temporary reversions to barbarous levels of conduct on the part of individuals and of the group, but civilizing traditions may themselves be for a time forgotten. Even the greatest reversions in civilization, however, we have every reason to believe, can be but temporary. As civilization rests upon the learning process, sooner or later people must learn even from their mistakes and calamities; and thus, the cultural process starts afresh. But if great setbacks in civilization can be avoided, humanity will obviously gain much. We should probably be at least five centuries ahead of where we

are in our culture if there had been no breakdown of Greek and Roman civilization.

If the danger of serious setbacks or reversions in civilization is real, then is there danger of a reversion of modern civilization to barbarism? The sociologist can, of course, only give a hypothetical answer to this question. It is easily possible that serious setbacks to Western civilization may result from the condition of disorder and unstable equilibrium in which Western nations now find themselves. Nevertheless, perhaps no complete return need be feared; for it would take centuries to break down all of the civilizing traditions in Western civilization. If, however, through the failure of classes and nations to make rational readjustments of their mutual relationships, a series of civil and international wars should result, then Western civilization would not only be stopped in its development, but would soon begin a rapid decline. This is all the more true because physical science has made war now so much more destructive to life, property, and moral character than it formerly was. Modern civilization, because of its greater knowledge, has more weapons of self-destruction and may, therefore, if it does not secure harmonious adjustments between its groups, more easily destroy itself. However, this greater knowledge, if turned in a social direction, and applied to the solution of the problems of human living together, may also make it easier for civilized groups to adjust themselves harmoniously if they will. What our civilization evidently needs, to save it from self-destruction, is to be awakened to a realization of the fact that there is greater advantage for races, nations, and classes to live together harmoniously in relations of peace and mutual coöperation than to live in strife, endeavoring to exploit and despoil one another. But before they can learn this lesson they will have to learn how to adjust their relations among their own individual members; that is, they will have to learn the first principles of

human living together and be willing to apply them to their own social life.

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 COOLEY, *Social Organization*, Chaps. XXX-XXXIII.
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 SIMS, *Society and Its Surplus*, Chap. X.
 WALLAS, *Our Social Heritage*, Chap. VII.
 WILLIAMS, *Principles of Social Psychology*, Chap. XXIX.
 WOLFE, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method*, Chaps. VI, VII.

CHAPTER IX

INSTINCT AND GROUP LIFE

THE social life of animal groups below man is usually recognized to be very largely of an instinctive character. If human society is an outgrowth of this animal social life, as the hypothesis of organic evolution supposes, then there is nothing in the transition from the subhuman to the human to cause the loss of the instinctive element, even though other elements in the social life are developed and gradually grow in importance. As we have seen, the instinctive or organic reactions of man must have furnished the original beginnings of his social life, just because the psychic life of all animals began with the action patterns which are furnished in the heredity of the organism. We cannot deny that instinctive reactions furnish the starting point for human behavior without throwing over the whole hypothesis of the continuity between the animal and the human; in other words, the hypothesis of organic evolution.¹

However, the question still remains for sociology and social psychology as to just the part played in civilized human social life by instinctive tendencies. This is, of course, in a sense the old question of the influence of heredity *versus* environment in human social life; for the word instinct, we have seen, if taken in its broadest sense, stands roughly for the inherited tendencies or predispositions in the behavior of man. It is impossible in the present state of our knowl-

¹ Compare the discussion of instinctive tendencies or reactions in Chap. III; also the discussion of intelligence as controlling and modifying natural impulses in Chap. X.

edge to determine accurately the part which each of these two sets of forces plays in human society, but it is possible in a general way to see how each works and the peculiar influence which each exerts. It is very important in the social sciences to distinguish the "original," the "hereditary," or the "instinctive," from the "learned," the "acquired," or the "cultural." To this problem we shall now address ourselves. How much is inborn in man's social behavior?

Wrong Uses of Instinct in Social Theory ²

Crude recognitions of the part played in the social life of man by inherited reaction tendencies, or "instincts," have pervaded social theorizing almost since systematic reflections upon the nature of human society began. For example, a special "social instinct" has often been invoked to explain the origin of society; but modern science can find no evidence of the existence of such a special instinct. In general, speculative thinkers have not hesitated to invoke the action of special instincts whenever they have met anything in human relations or institutions which baffled them. Thus we find mentioned in social literature special "political instincts" of man, special "religious instincts," "economic instincts," and the like. The student need hardly be warned that such a procedure is highly unscientific. Even the use of such a phrase as "the properties of human nature" is to be avoided; for modern psychology would resolve "the properties of human nature" mostly into inherited reaction tendencies, or else into acquired reactions built up through habituation to a specific environment.

In recent sociological literature we find not less crude uses of the conception of instinct. Thus one writer would apparently explain the movement of the Industrial Workers of the World as caused almost entirely by balked instincts

² Compare Professor Bernard's discussion of this matter, especially in Chap. VII of his book, *Instinct, A Study in Social Psychology*.

of the wandering laborers in our Western states.³ A much more reasonable explanation of the movement could be offered in terms of traditions, ideas, propaganda, and general social environment, though this is not saying that instinctive tendencies might not have a part in such a movement. Again, some writers would apparently explain the whole cultural development of man in terms of one or two instinctive tendencies, such as the so-called "instinct of workmanship,"⁴ or the "creative impulse." It should be needless to say that psychology and sociology offer no justification for the explanation of such complex processes in so simple terms. Social behavior is always a complex of many factors.

The most common, crude use of the conception of instinct is to be found, however, in the popular opinion that whatever man does is the result of an original human nature with which he is endowed by heredity; that human culture therefore is like the spider's web, a structure whose pattern is inherited in the nervous systems of the individuals producing it. According to this false social philosophy, if men fight or make war, if they lie, cheat, or steal, if they are kindly and coöperative, it is all the result of the inherited action patterns in their nervous systems.

Recent Theories Regarding the Social Significance of Instinct

Roughly speaking, there are three different schools regarding the social significance of instinct at the present time. One school of social thinkers would make the instincts of man the sole sources of human motives, the sole springs of human action. This view is championed by Professor William McDougall;⁵ but its most extreme advocates are generally certain minor writers, such as Trotter.⁶ Trotter

³ Carlton Parker, *The Casual Laborer*, Chaps. II, III.

⁴ Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, Chap. I.

⁵ McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. II.

⁶ Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 1-65.

would apparently account for the most striking characteristics of the social behavior of man upon the basis of a single instinct—the gregarious or “herd instinct.” The very antithesis of this view is represented by the environmentalists and institutionalists, who would explain social behavior wholly in terms of the situation or environment. According to these thinkers behavior is simply a function of the environment. This extreme school is perhaps best represented by Professor Josey⁷ and Professor Kantor. Professor Kantor would make the institutional situation and stimuli the adequate explanation of all social behavior among human beings.⁸ According to him, all the social behavior of man is “institutional.” A third school, which includes the bulk of the sociologists and social psychologists, occupies a midway position. This school would explain the social behavior of civilized men mainly through their culture or their social environment, but would keep instinctive tendencies for the background upon which habit complexes are built up through experience. This school does not find any pure instincts in human behavior, but only instinctive tendencies. According to this theory, just as physical and chemical factors still persist and condition even the highest manifestations of life, so inherited reaction tendencies are still powerful in the direction and control of human activities, even though these latter are mainly controlled by culture and environment. Perhaps we may say that this school, while recognizing the biological, the racial, or the instinctive factor in human behavior, would make it the last rather than the first thing to be appealed to in scientific explanation. *This is the view which is accepted in this text. Hereditary bent is one factor in determining man's social behavior.*

⁷ Josey, *The Social Philosophy of Instinct*.

⁸ See his article, “The Institutional Foundation of a Scientific Social Psychology,” in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 674-687 (1924).

The Nature of Human Instincts

Adult human behavior shows no "instincts" in the popular sense of the term. So far as we know, there are in man no "inborn or inherited automatic action patterns," if we except certain reflexes like winking. Many of the instincts of the lower animals, especially of the insects, seem to be, however, of this type. Instincts in this sense are largely automatic and incapable of modification. Except for the simpler reflexes they are unknown in man.⁹ Man's development has not been in the direction of a predetermined automatism, but rather in the direction of intelligent, purposive action. In this sense there is truth in the assertion that instinct and intelligence represent divergent evolutions in animal behavior. However, this is not saying that intelligence is incompatible with inherent tendencies or proclivities. We may not find the hard and fast, inflexible type of hereditary reactions in man and the higher animals; but this is not saying that hereditary reactions are not found in man as well as in the lower animals. On the contrary, modern biology gives us every reason to believe that man's hereditary endowments are richer than those of other animals. Moreover, all that we know of human behavior forbids us to believe that man's hereditary endowments are simply of the nature of hereditary capacities. *There seem*

⁹ "Purely instinctive behavior is almost unknown in the case of the higher animals, and especially in man. There is much reason to believe that it is only on the first occasion on which an example of innate behavior occurs that it can be regarded as purely instinctive, and that directly this behavior is modified by experience, even by the experience derived from the first performance, it is no longer purely instinctive. It might seem that such a view as this might lead us to reject the concept of instinct when dealing with man, but there is so much reason to believe that different forms of human behavior depend in varying degrees on innate dispositions that we cannot ignore the factor of heredity." Rivers, *Psychology and Politics*, p. 31.

also to be a great number of hereditary reaction tendencies or proclivities of varying strength. The nervous system of man, as we have seen, is largely made up of inherited structure. While many of its connections are acquired after birth, many are found ready-made at birth, while many more regularly appear in the course of the normal development from childhood to maturity. The bulk of biological and psychological opinion inclines to the view that the native impulses, or purely natural tendencies of man, are due to these hereditary connections established in the nervous system by means of organic variation and natural selection, just as the grosser bodily traits of a species are established by the same means. Certainly if we accept the conclusions of modern biology, we cannot escape the conclusion that all processes of life have an organic basis and therefore ultimately an inherited basis. Moreover, the general theory of organic evolution necessitates the conclusion that the nervous system of man is richer in inherited connections and qualities than that of any other animal.

However, the modern theory of heredity, especially Mendel's law, is obviously against the conclusion that a few simple traits or reaction tendencies which we can call "instincts" are sufficient to cover man's neuro-psychic heredity. The modern theory regards the inherited nature of man as made up of a great many, almost an indefinite number, of unit traits. There is justice, therefore, in Professor Bernard's conclusion that the inherited equipment of man "does not consist of Mr. McDougall's seven or twelve or thirteen or more instincts, nor of Professor James's forty or fifty instincts, but of hundreds or even thousands of much simpler processes, reflexes, etc., which underlie habits and are lost in them in their completed form."¹⁰ In other words, man has an indefinite number of inherited reactions or instinctive

¹⁰ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, p. 671 (1924). Compare also Bernard, *Instinct*, p. 522.

tendencies, a rich neuro-psychic heredity, upon which he builds a correspondingly rich experience and habit structure. Man's heredity is the most complex in the animal world.

The matter will become simpler, perhaps, if we remember that the hereditary level of behavior is made up apparently of three subordinate levels: first the chemo-tropic, or the reactions of simple and relatively undifferentiated tissue to chemical or physical stimuli; second, the reflex, or fixed, relatively unconscious reactions of inherited automatic action structures, such as the instincts of the insects; and third, native impulses or instinctive tendencies made up of chains or series of purposeful reflexes exceedingly variable and modifiable. The so-called instincts of man are of this latter type. They are accordingly not fixed and unalterable, but are subject to intelligent modification according to changes in the environment. They are little more than a complex series of more or less generalized inherited tendencies which fit man to cope with his environment fairly well from the start, but the most important function of which is to form a basis for the development of habit, character, and intelligence. "Native impulses" or "instinctive tendencies" are, therefore, happier terms for this hereditary element in human behavior than the term "instinct."

However, it should not be overlooked that most of the psychologists, when they have employed the word "instinct" in discussing the elements in human behavior, have meant very nearly what we have just called a native impulse or an instinctive tendency. Thus Drever, in his discussion of instinct in man, insists that, psychologically, instinct must be regarded as impulse; not all impulses, to be sure, but impulse "when and so far as it is not itself determined by previous experience."¹¹ Professor Dewey also would use the term instinct in a similar way, though he prefers the

¹¹ Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 88.

term impulse on account of the frequent misunderstanding of the former term.¹²

Practically all psychologists, with very few exceptions, recognize, then, the importance of instinctive tendencies as an element in human behavior. Those who would give the greater weight to experience and environment in explaining the actual behavior of men would find the chief importance of instinctive tendencies or native impulses to be in the furnishing of raw material out of which habits are formed. Even so, however, we do not get rid of the importance of instinctive tendencies or of the original nature of man. The question remains how far this hereditary element in behavior can be dissociated by scientific analysis from the vast mass of habits, attitudes, and values which most psychologists and sociologists recognize as constituting the bulk of the behavior of civilized men.

If, again, we remember that the instinctive element stands for the purely animal factor in human behavior, this analysis will not be so difficult, though science knows of no way as yet to make it exact. Let us remember, however, that man's instinctive tendencies or animal impulses only started him on the pathway of his social and cultural evolution; that instead of following the pathway of instinct or animal impulse, man succeeded in becoming human and in developing culture to the extent that he followed the divergent pathway of intelligence; and that, while his animal impulses persist, man, through use of intelligence, has been making new action patterns other than those inherited in his nervous system, and in this way has been remaking himself and his world.

The Marks of Instinctive Tendencies

If we wish to detect the instinctive element in human behavior we will, then, first of all, study the behavior of ani-

¹²Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 105, note.

imals closely related to man. When such behavior is universal in a given species under all environmental conditions, we rightly believe that it has an inherited basis. Universality of behavior among human beings would also, accordingly, seem to be another presumption for an instinctive element in human behavior. But universality as a criterion of the instinctive among human beings must be accepted cautiously. Tool making, for example, is universal in the human species. While it may have an instinctive element in it, it may also be produced by the higher intelligence which universally belongs to man as a species. Universality is, alone, an unsafe criterion. Again, we should expect the natural or animal impulses to show themselves more clearly in early childhood before the individual has accumulated experience or felt the prolonged pressure of environment. This third criterion is also unsafe to use, however, unless it is used along with the first two mentioned.

There is a fourth indication of the instinctive or hereditary element in human behavior. The primary human emotions, such as anger, joy, grief, and fear, are universal among all men. They exist in all human beings regardless of culture or specific environment. They vary from individual to individual only quantitatively, or in their intensity, not qualitatively. We must conclude, therefore, that they are closely associated with certain hereditary reaction tendencies. These reaction tendencies are, of course, not always of the nature of gross bodily movements, but may be in the glandular secretions and in the movement of the visceral organs. While there is no reason to think that all hereditary reaction tendencies have emotions attached to them, as some psychologists have claimed, yet apparently some do. Therefore, the emotions and the instinctive tendencies of man are closely associated. When the emotions are deeply stirred or greatly roused we call them "passions." Common sense has usually associated the passions of men with their animal impulses;

and scientific analysis shows that there is good reason for this belief. The student does not need to be told that the passions of men may at times play a great part in human behavior, even in group behavior; so therefore, also, does the instinctive element. Here, then, is another means of analyzing out the instinctive element in human behavior under certain circumstances.

The Psychological Conception of the Instinctive Element in Human Behavior

The conception of human instinctive tendencies at which we arrive, therefore, is that they are not like the hard and fast pattern reactions of some of the lower animals, but are simply the inborn tendencies of human nature. For the purpose of the sociologist it is sufficient to lump all of these inborn tendencies together and call them "instinctive tendencies."¹³ We have to recognize that there are in man no definite specific instincts so well marked that we can point them out and say that this form of behavior is due to that particular instinct and that form to another instinct. Specialized instincts and instinctive activities of this sort do not exist in the human species, unless we include in these terms the simple reflexes which are purely individualistic in their reference.

Another point which the student will do well to bear in mind is that, on account of the complexity of man's nervous system, all sorts of combinations of instinctive tendencies with one another and with habits and intelligence are pos-

¹³ Even emotional reaction patterns, so far as they are inborn, may conveniently, for sociological purposes, be grouped with other inborn tendencies. See previous paragraph. It may be pointed out that "instinctive tendencies" even in this broad sense may be grouped under two heads, "hereditary organic predispositions" and "hereditary nervous predispositions," the former being connected more with the gross structure of the body, the latter more with the structure of the nervous system.

sible. The particular combination of instinctive tendencies made will, in most cases, depend upon the circumstances in the environment. In general there are indefinite possibilities of combination and synthesis of all the elements in human nature. Instinctive tendencies coalesce, run into each other, and reënforce each other in such complex ways in the actual behavior of men that the only figure in external nature, perhaps, which we can find to express it is the coalescing, crossing, and reënforcing of currents in a very complex electric field. Not only do various instinctive tendencies unite in certain modes of individual behavior and of social adaptation, but they shift in their combinations of one with another, so that in civilized society it is impossible to make out any very simple and clearly defined social behavior which we may call instinctive. This is all the more true because of the fact that in human societies instinctive tendencies are always conditioned by the culture of the group and are frequently overlaid with a mass of habits, customs, and traditions which make the discernment of the instinctive element not possible through observation, but only through logical inference. It is for this reason that some social psychologists say that there is "instinct" but that there are no "instincts," and that others say that "instincts are hypotheses rather than facts."¹⁴ The reply is obviously that science is concerned with hypotheses as much as with facts, and that the hypothesis of inherited reaction tendencies is quite as necessary to explain human behavior as the hypothesis of heredity is necessary in biology to explain bodily structure. There is just as much use for hypothesis in the one case as in the other. Obviously, however, even after we have our hypothesis made so carefully that it seems to cover all the facts that we are seeking to explain, we should not appeal to such an hypothesis to explain facts that can be more easily

¹⁴ Compare Faris, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 184-196.

explained by observable facts. In other words, explanation through the animal impulses of human nature, or instinctive tendencies, like explanations through race, should, as we have already said, be the last resort in social science instead of the first.

Instinctive Tendencies as Factors in Present Social Life

The practice of nineteenth century sociologists was to explain social situations and social behavior in terms of human "desires," and the desires were called the "social forces." Some recent social thinkers continue this practice, and explain social situations in terms of human wishes or desires. Thus, Professor W. I. Thomas finds that there are four fundamental human desires which characterize all men, and which he thinks are adequate to explain conscious social behavior. These four fundamental desires are: (1) the desire for new experience, (2) the desire for security, (3) the desire for recognition, (4) and the desire for response.¹⁵ It is scarcely necessary to say that almost no psychologists would agree that this is an exhaustive list of fundamental, universal human desires. The list might easily be added to,¹⁶ and, after all, the classification seems less secure from a biological standpoint than the usual classification of all impulses and desires of a fundamental nature into those connected with nutrition, reproduction, and defense.

The great objection to the use of the human wishes, or desires, as adequate scientific explanations for human social behavior, however, is that wishes or desires are always com-

¹⁵ See Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 488-490; see also Thomas's statement in *The Polish Peasant*, Vol. I, pp. 72, 73.

¹⁶ Compare the list proposed by Snedden in his *Educational Sociology*, pp. 244-245. It might be difficult in Thomas's classification to find a clear place for such fundamental human desires as these for strength, health, knowledge, and beauty. Professor Small's classification (see p. 114) seems equally valuable for sociological purposes.

plexes of instinctive tendencies, habits, and intelligence. Hence they do not complete the psychological analysis of a situation. It is not difficult to show this. They are such indefinite mixtures of these three elements, with, of course, the fourth element of feeling added, that nothing is gained in scientific clearness by the use of such terms of explanation. The word "desire," for example, is extremely ambiguous. As some use it the element of impulse would be emphasized; as others use it the element of feeling would be emphasized. In nineteenth century writers it was the element of feeling which was emphasized.¹⁷ Professor Bogardus, however, rightly insists that the desires which are fundamental and universal in all men must represent universal "life urges";¹⁸ and therefore they presuppose a universal biological element. In other words, if desires or wishes are universal regardless of culture or environment, there must be in them an inherited reaction tendency. As Professor Bernard points out, only the name has been changed.¹⁹ Desires and wishes still need to be explained, and the explanation of these, as they are partly the result of habit and environment, is not wholly a matter for the psychologist.

We pointed out in Chapter III that the factors in social situations, or the social forces, are always complex. Among these factors we always have original human nature. And instinctive tendencies along with inherited capacities make up original human nature. Therefore, instinctive tendencies are among the original social forces. We come again, therefore, to the conclusion which we have already reached, that

¹⁷ Compare Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 52-54; also *Pure Sociology*, pp. 99-105 and 124-132.

¹⁸ See *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. IX, p. 58 (Sept., 1924).

¹⁹ See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, p. 672. It may also be remarked that the use of Freudian terms, such as "defense mechanism," etc., should not conceal the fact that names have merely been changed.

the social behavior of men is always an indefinite mixture of instinctive tendencies, habits, and intelligence.

Instinctive Tendencies and Human Institutions

We are now prepared to see what share, if any, instinctive tendencies have had in shaping human institutions. Evidently many factors other than purely animal impulses must enter into the formation of what we call an institution, since we do not find what we may properly call institutions below the human level. The organization of animal groups, however, we have seen, is largely a matter of instinct, habituation to the environment playing only a minor part. But human social life and organization, we have also seen, is genetically related to animal social life. In other words, social organization was once quite entirely a matter of instinctive reactions; and even though human social organization may show many other factors at work, it is scarcely probable that the instinctive element is still not important, if, as Professor Bernard contends, "the reflexes and the instincts are still powerful in the direction and control even of human activities."

Instinctive Tendencies and the Family

The part which instinctive tendencies play in human institutions is made evident by the well-known fact that there are many foreshadowings of human institutions below the human level. Thus, the family is an institution in human society; but the family group exists as a more or less permanent social unit, not only among certain of the anthropoid apes, but also among many other animals. The foundations of the family life of human beings, therefore, are evidently instinctive, even though the family, as we know it, is always an institution established by the sanction of certain modes of behavior by human groups. We find in the family manifestations of two great primary instinctive tendencies of hu-

man nature, sex attraction and parental love. These instinctive tendencies practically dominate the family life, whatever its varied institutional forms may be. Not only is sex attraction the basis for entering upon family life in a free society, but parental love is perhaps the largest factor in the stability of the family group among all peoples. This is a reasonable inference from the fact that in the United States, where relatively free divorce exists, divorce is four and five times as common among childless couples as among those who have children. Parental love is, of course, only one factor in the situation; but we have no reason to doubt that it is one of the strongest natural bonds between the parents and that it has an instinctive or organic basis. Thus we see that instinctive tendencies play a very great part in the institution of the family.

What was meant when we said, in a former chapter, that animal impulses, or instinctive tendencies furnish the beginnings of adaptations between individuals, and so the primitive basis of social organization must now be clear. We see, also, that natural impulses furnish persistent motives which run through the family life and through nearly all institutions. From one point of view, indeed, the institution is a device to harness and control natural impulses so that they will serve the welfare of the community. This is often difficult to accomplish, and we often find strong tendencies to revert to the pure animal impulse, even in the most civilized human communities. For example, the rational control of sex and parental instincts through laws and moral standards relating to marriage and the family has always been, and probably always will remain, one of the most perplexing problems of civilization. The most that intelligence and culture can do to control such instinctive impulses will never free human society from their dominance in one sense; the most that can be done is to regulate their expression in ways which will work to social advantage. A wise society will,

indeed, as we shall see, work with, rather than against, such fundamental impulses of human nature.

Instinctive Tendencies and the Larger Human Groups

Just as the family life has at work in it certain original impulses of man, so also other natural groups owe their origin more or less to these impulses. Man, like most of the other higher animals, has always, so far as we can discover, lived in groups larger than the family. The reasons for this we have already pointed out. The necessities of defense, the advantages in obtaining a food supply and in caring for offspring, led men from the very beginning to associate in groups larger than the family. We do not need to assume, therefore, any special gregarious impulse in man; yet man's whole original nature as given him by organic evolution seems to be set towards sociability. In protecting himself against wild beasts, in obtaining a food supply, and in defending himself against his human enemies, man has found it absolutely necessary to live in groups larger than the family in order to survive. The family life with the care of offspring also placed a premium upon group life. Ages before man appeared, natural selection brought it about accordingly that most of the higher animals should live in comparatively large groups. Their safety lay in such a life. Thus it is not surprising that we find in man powerful natural impulses which lead him to seek the companionship of his fellows, to keep closely at home with his own group, and to follow his group in practically all things. We do not need to assume any special "herd instinct," because so many instinctive tendencies are involved in this tendency to live in large groups; but that man's social tendencies are natural and not merely the result of habit, reflective intelligence, and the pressure of environment can scarcely be doubted.

We should remember what has already been said about social tendencies, at least so far as the smaller natural groups

are concerned, having been bred into man through natural selection and thus affecting practically all of the impulses of his nature. We saw that group life has been absolutely necessary for the survival of the human species. The full social consequences of this fundamental fact of man's original nature have not been explored. But man's love of companionship, his fear of being alone, his sheeplike tendency to follow his group, his passion for conformity, all must have been built more or less upon original animal impulses associated with the living in relatively large groups. Yet, as we pointed out, man's sociability is always narrow when it is of the instinctive rather than the rational sort. It should also be noted by the student that no less than three of the fundamental human desires listed by Professor Thomas are more or less connected with group life; namely, the desire for security, the desire for recognition, and the desire for response. These are fundamental human desires only because the original nature of man is a group nature. It may not appear that the desire for security has anything to do with living in groups; but at least living in groups is a means of security; while the desire for recognition, or the love of approbation of others, and the desire for response presuppose group life. These last two have every mark of being among the most primitive of human traits, since they manifest themselves in children at a very early age, and are found among many of the higher animals.

Instinctive Tendencies and Human Conflicts

Another instinctive tendency whose workings illustrate the influence of natural impulses upon human institutions is that of combativeness. Practically all of the higher animals show well-developed fighting instincts. Most of them fight only when attacked or when in competition for food or mates, and the fighting is usually by individuals and not by groups. Some animals, however, have developed their

fighting instincts into predatory instincts. Many writers would class man in this latter group, but the evidence on the whole seems to place him in the former. The predatory tendencies of human societies are probably complex outcomes of their traditions, habits, and environment rather than of mere natural impulses. Existing predatory tendencies of highly civilized people are probably to be ascribed to predatory traditions from the stage of barbarism, which have not yet, unfortunately, been eradicated from our civilization. They are not, as is often said, simply manifestations of original human nature. However, children and adults both show such strong combative impulses when attacked or in a competitive struggle, that we are forced to regard fighting as a very strong inherited reaction tendency in the human species. This tendency is probably seen at its purest in the fighting of two boys rather than in the combats of human groups. It should be noted that the fighting impulse, like many other natural propensities, seems to differ in its strength in the two sexes. That it is stronger in the male than in the female is shown quite conclusively by the fact that little boys from their earliest years, regardless of their training, are more prone to fight than little girls.

Now while the fighting impulse in man is natural and connected with the fundamental process of defense against enemies, most of its manifestations in group behavior are the result of cultural development. Reflection leads to the organizing and training of this inherited reaction tendency so that it will work for the good of the whole group, especially for the protection of the group against its enemies. Hence the development of methods of organizing and exploiting this natural tendency of man for the good of the group. Without the fighting tendency in the original nature of the individual, military institutions and warfare could never have got their hold upon human societies; and, as we have already seen, government has developed largely in connection with

military institutions. Thus the fighting impulse has had a large influence upon the development of human institutions and especially upon political organization. The extreme perversion of this impulse is seen when fighting becomes a habit carried on, not for the sake of defense, but for predatory gain or even for its own sake. The exploitation and organization of the natural combative impulses of man are, therefore, practices which are fraught with the gravest danger to civilization.

This danger in the course of civilization has become recognized within national groups, but not sufficiently between such groups. Within national and smaller groups the fighting impulse has always been recognized as an impediment to social harmony. The removal of unnecessary stimuli to this impulse has accordingly been one of the great aims of social policy and social reform. While this problem has never been more than partly solved by the great groups of men, our present world-wide civilization has given rise to an even greater problem; namely, the avoidance of occasions for conflict between nations and the getting rid of the war system which organizes and exploits the fighting impulse of the individual.

The fighting impulse is, however, socially too valuable to be got rid of, even if that were possible. As in the case of other natural tendencies we must try to discover ways of securing its expression in accordance with social advantage, which means, ultimately, in accordance with the advantage of humanity at large. The fighting impulse does not need to be exercised against human beings. Its legitimate expression in civilized society is in combating moral and social evils which prevent humanity from realizing its ideals, and, as William James suggested, in combating those forces in physical nature which offer impediments to man's progress. Physical conflict between individuals and groups of individuals does not need to be encouraged in human society in order

to keep the fighting impulse alive. Such conflict makes the problem of its control within rational bounds much more difficult.

Instinctive Tendencies and the Economic Life

Still another instinctive tendency which illustrates the importance of such tendencies in the social life of man is the possessive impulse or greed.²⁰ Many animals below man show this instinct highly developed, though they have rarely the intelligence to exercise it successfully. Animals not only seize and store food, but sometimes have their feeding grounds from which they drive intruders. Some even appropriate objects and hold them when they are of no particular use to them. Children and savages, as well as civilized adults, show similar tendencies. The tendency to appropriate may be shown by the group not less than by the individual. All groups of men lay claim to certain feeding, camping, or hunting grounds. The desire to possess whether on the part of the group or the individual is evidently an outgrowth of the impulse to appropriate. The development of private property as an institution, and also of group or public property, has depended upon this tendency in human nature. Just how it will express itself will, of course, depend upon conditions. Private property as an institution has been an historical development, and, in the form in which we now have it, is a relatively late and extreme development due to the traditions of Western civilization. However, the impulse to appropriate has manifested itself so uniformly under all conditions of human culture that it must be considered a permanent tendency in human nature which must be taken into account in organizing the relations of men to things and to one another. It manifests itself as much under systems of common ownership as under systems

²⁰ Also called the acquisitive impulse. See Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*.

of private ownership. The rational control of this instinctive tendency in accordance with human welfare is accordingly one of the great problems of our civilization, and one which we are as yet far from successful in solving, probably because we have developed traditions which are not favorable to its rational social control.

Conclusions

Now these four illustrations of the part which animal impulses or instinctive tendencies play in the family, in the larger groups of men, in the conflicts of individuals and groups, and in man's economic life are sufficient to show that innate propensities of human nature affect very greatly even existing social institutions and social organization. They must be taken into account, therefore, in any attempt at the reconstruction of our institutions and our civilization. What we have just described, however, is not the working of specific instincts determining definite social behavior, but rather the welling-up of groups or complexes of natural human impulses, or instinctive tendencies, in various fields of group behavior. The hereditary factor in human behavior may not yet be fully understood from the standpoint of psychology, but it undoubtedly is there, and it is a task of sociology and social psychology to show how it can be controlled. This problem is, as yet, far from a satisfactory solution from a scientific standpoint; but at least three conclusions stand out which are worth bearing in mind because they may help us. (1) Natural human impulses are the raw materials for human institutions in the same sense that they are for the habits of the individual. (2) The intelligence and the innate propensities of man work together in all human institutions. This general truth is unquestioned by those who understand human psychology. What remains to be done is to show just the way in which these work together in general and also in particular cases. (3) Human institu-

tions are a series of devices to control man's animal impulses to social advantage. The higher civilized social life is only possible through the control of these impulses by more or less rationally devised institutions. However, institutions are not always devised as rationally as they might be and, therefore, fail to control natural impulses to the best social advantage. This problem we shall take up later.

Instinctive Tendencies and Culture

The student will remember that we have defined culture as tool making, institution making, and value or standard making. Culture, in this sense, is entirely an acquired character, as is shown by the fact that none of the brutes possess it, though this is not saying that the production of culture does not utilize man's instinctive tendencies or native impulses. Culture conditions man's natural impulses but it does not supplant them. The way in which these natural impulses express themselves will, however, as we have repeatedly pointed out, depend upon the culture of the group.

But the question remains, how did culture get started? If we include language as well as physical tools in culture, it is evident that culture is coeval with man and started at the very beginning of the existence of human society. It could not have been produced by accumulated experience. It must have sprung, therefore, from the original nature of man. But this original nature has in it capacity for intelligence as well as natural impulses. Because all men everywhere build cultures, so far as we can discover, we are probably justified in accepting Wissler's conclusion that, "man builds cultures because he cannot help it; there is a drive in his protoplasm that carries him forward even against his will."²¹ But this is not saying that culture is produced simply by instinctive tendencies. The instinctive tendencies of man, as

²¹ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 265.

we have seen, do not differ greatly from the animals nearest to him. Yet none of these animals build cultures. Obviously, culture is a complex of instinctive tendencies and intelligence. But it depends even more upon man's capacities to form habits than upon innate propensities. Given the capacity for intelligence, the inherited reaction tendencies of man, and man's power of habit formation, and culture would inevitably develop as we have tried to show already in Chapter II. Of course certain hereditary reactions or natural impulses, such as curiosity and constructiveness, would play a considerable part in the formation of culture. The inherited speech center in the brain had even more to do with the production of culture in primitive human society than such so-called instincts as curiosity and constructiveness, or the instinct of workmanship. Probably the first form of culture was language and the first "tool" the spoken word. Culture from the beginning has been a series of devices, we may admit, to mediate and control man's natural impulses; but the guiding, creative factor has been man's capacity to profit by experience, or his intelligence. We cannot accept the view, therefore, that all culture has been developed to satisfy original natural impulses or instinctive tendencies. If this had been the case there never would have been any conflict between culture and natural impulses such as we find. Neither can we accept the doctrine that the general pattern of man's culture has been fixed once for all by his instinctive tendencies, much as the general pattern of a spider's web is fixed by heredity for a given species of spider. On the contrary, we must always remember that culture in all of its aspects, whether language, tool making, art, religion, or government, has been built up by a learning process. This process changes not only the particular form of language, tools, art, religion, and government, but may change even the general pattern of culture. Thus war, we have seen, was not always a part of human culture. According to the best re-

searches of anthropologists, it seems to be a relatively late and intrusive element.²² For the last ten thousand years, however, war has been a very prominent, if not a dominant, factor in culture. But if man learned to make war, he can doubtless learn to unmake it, or to get rid of it.

Just as we concluded regarding human institutions that they represented complexes of instinct, habit, and intelligence, so we may conclude regarding culture. From the beginning, however, culture has been in one way or another a means of control over man's instinctive impulses. Even the very devices of culture, which have been invented to secure the gratification of natural impulses, have reacted upon those impulses and more or less controlled their expression. Consequently, there has been opportunity for culture to become repressive of natural impulses and so there has appeared a discrepancy between culture and the original nature of man.

Instincts and Existing Civilization

The instinctive tendencies of man are not sufficient to adapt him to any high degree of culture or civilization. They would be much better guides if we were still living a wild life in the woods than they are in the complex civilized society of the present.²³ It must be remembered that the natural impulses of man have not changed essentially during the last twenty-five thousand years, during which time our present civilization has grown up from the feeblest beginnings. If any modification has taken place in man's natural impulses during this time, it is not certain. These impulses could be changed only by changing man's natural heredity. There can be scarcely any doubt that this fact explains some of the difficulties which highly civilized societies experience in securing such adjustments by individuals

²² See Perry, *The Growth of Civilization*, Chaps. VII, X.

²³ Compare Thorndike's statement on page 96; also Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part V.

as are required by the conditions of their life. As Sir Francis Galton has remarked, "Man was barbarous but yesterday, and therefore it is not to be expected that the natural aptitudes of his race should already have become moulded into accordance with his very recent advance. We, men of the present centuries, are like animals suddenly transplanted among new circumstances of climate and of food: our instincts fail us under the altered circumstances."²⁴

Moreover, there is not much prospect that man will be able to alter, on an extensive scale, the original tendencies of his nature; on the contrary how the animal impulses of man's nature may be rationally controlled in accordance with social advantage must always remain a practical problem for human society. This, indeed, is one of the main problems on which both psychology and sociology seek to throw light.

Many writers have held that modern civilization, on account of its mechanical industry and the many other artificial conditions of life which it imposes upon the individual, is out of harmony with man's natural impulses. As we have seen, the culture of a group necessarily controls the way in which the natural impulses of man get expression. It may direct them wisely, or it may repress them needlessly. A great many writers think that our present civilization needlessly represses and balks man's original impulses. This produces a large amount of discontent and unhappiness. It is evident that if man's original nature adapts him more to a wild life in the woods than to a complex culture, it will not be easy to get an adjustment between this original nature and the conditions of modern civilization.²⁵ Even so, however, something can be done in the training of original nature, which we have seen to be readily modified, and also something can be done to make social conditions less re-

²⁴ Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, p. 337.

²⁵ See the careful discussion of this problem by Professor Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part V.

pressive of harmless natural impulses than they frequently now are. While we cannot return to the conditions of primitive life, we may find outlets for man's natural impulses which will be at the same time advantageous for both society and the individual. Professor W. F. Ogburn points out that this is to be done, in part, through recreations and amusements.²⁶ Many of the failures in adjustment to culture may be avoided if we provide in recreations and amusements proper outlets for the natural and harmless tendencies of human nature. Thus rational recreations are devices of great value to society in bringing about adjustment between human nature and culture.

It is easily possible to overemphasize the repressive element in culture. Probably when a culture is well-balanced, or rationally developed, no great degree of repression will be found to exist in it necessarily. It should be remembered, however, that all higher civilization involves discipline, control, and restraint upon the individual; but it is probable that such discipline, control, and restraint fall as much upon unsocialized individual habits as upon unsocialized natural impulses. It is easy for any of us to get a "balked disposition" in our complex civilization, because we constantly run up against things which are opposed to our habits, desires, and impulses. The remedy in most cases would seem to be in the education, or rather reëducation, of the individual, not in the change of culture and of the social order. The overstressing of the instinctive element in the social behavior of man quite naturally inclines to the view that social organization and civilization should be so developed as to harmonize with man's natural or instinctive impulses. This is practically the position of the followers of Freud, though it is a much older doctrine and is to be found

²⁶ Ogburn, *op. cit.*, Part V. Professor Patrick in *The Psychology of Relaxation* had earlier pointed to the same conclusion.

fully developed in the writings of Rousseau. But if we had a civilization which harmonized with man's natural impulses it would be more nearly on the level of barbarism than our present civilization. A culture which was adjusted to the natural man would probably be a very barbarous culture. Rather, the proper social development of our culture should take us further from the instinctive level toward the rational level. Not impulse, but intelligence, must be the ideal of civilization.

However, it must be acknowledged that the existence of a strong natural propensity in human nature furnishes a presumption in its favor, and that the principle of economy would dictate that it should be utilized, if possible, to the advantage of society. This is what all sensible developments in civilization have tried to do. It is the rational modification of man's original tendencies which has built up civilization. The problem of civilization, therefore, is to find suitable ways of expressing natural impulses in accordance with the demands of an increasingly complex and more delicately organized social life; or, to put the problem positively, to find ways of harnessing man's animal impulses to work with and for civilizing standards. If any particular natural impulse can find no useful place in our civilization, however, there should be no reason why its expression should not be forbidden altogether, or suppressed. We have seen that man's natural impulses or original tendencies are modifiable. Even the most imperious of human instincts, the sex instinct, has been denied expression in many thousands of individuals in every civilization, either as a result of economic or religious conditions, without serious harm either to the individuals concerned or to their groups. Nevertheless, as we have just acknowledged, the principle of economy would seem to indicate that the wiser procedure in our social life is not to suppress natural impulses unnecessarily, but to find ways in which they may be expressed in accordance

with social advantage. This can be done with practically all of the more important natural tendencies or urges of human nature. Mere repressive measures and policies in human society are never as wise as measures and policies which will utilize to the fullest degree all those springs of human energy which we term instinctive tendencies or native impulses. Thus, it would be manifestly very foolish for society not to make use to the fullest degree of that natural impulse in the women of its population to care for children which we call "the maternal instinct": rather society should aim to utilize that natural impulse to the fullest extent possible, controlling it and, of course, enlightening it to meet in the most rational way the social need for the proper care of childhood. Education, rational direction, and rational social expression are evidently what are needed for man's natural impulses.

Reversions to the Brutelike Level of Behavior

Until we understand how to control man's natural or animal impulses to social advantage, we must expect, perhaps, to find, every now and then, in our social life reversions to a more or less animal level of behavior. These reversions are apt to occur under all conditions of emotional excitement, such as occur in crowds, in wars, and in conflicts of all sorts between individuals or groups. They may also occur, however, owing to the failure of the agencies of social control, that is owing to the decadence of religion, moral standards, government, law, and education. Reversions to the animal-like level of behavior are favored by any decadence of the great civilizing ideas and values of higher culture. When these restraints drop away, men easily revert to the instinctive level of behavior. This is one explanation of the existence of social evils. Many of the evils of society, however, are not due to man's animal impulses but to wrong habits, wrong traditions, and bad judgment. Nevertheless, from

one point of view, it is true that many of the animal impulses of human nature are a constant drag upon civilization, and we cannot understand the existence of evil in human relations without taking this into account. Therefore, all emotionalism, all conditions of excitement which remove the restraints of culture upon our natural impulses, should be avoided so far as possible. Natural impulses, in other words, have to be under constant supervision and control, if they are not to interfere with rational social conduct. It is especially for this reason that hostile conflicts between individuals and groups are particularly to be dreaded, because they favor reversion to the animal level of behavior. Not only do wars and revolutions favor such relapses toward barbarism, but mobs also. The brutal deeds of mobs are to be explained by the fact that under the conditions of excitement in such a crowd, even the most civilized men may revert to the instinctive level of behavior. It is safe to conclude that conduct of the highest type is only possible in human society when reflection is possible, and when at the same time the individual is conscious in the fullest degree of the social value of the standards which civilization has set up. Therefore, those persons who claim that the native impulses and emotions are good guides in social behavior would hurry society back again into barbarism.

Instinctive Interests and Beliefs²⁷

Interest, in the psychological sense, is the feeling side of attention. Now we attend to many objects because of our inherited reaction tendencies. From this it follows that all human beings have powerful instinctive interests. This being so, it also follows that the natural impulses of man are enlisted on the side of some beliefs rather than others.

²⁷ Instinctive beliefs are spoken of by many writers as "rationalizations" of instincts or natural impulses.

Modern psychology has demonstrated that the old theory that our interests and ideas are simply the result of our environment is radically false. Beside the acquired interests which the individual takes on from his environment, he has also powerful instinctive interests. Now these instinctive interests affect the development of his ideas and enlist his adherence to some beliefs rather than to others. What we think is largely an outcome of what we do; and what we do is influenced by our inherited reaction tendencies; so that what we think is also powerfully influenced by these tendencies.

Ideas which are repressive of natural impulses do not get, therefore, a ready acceptance from men unless some strong, compelling reason is given for accepting them. The doctrine of celibacy, for example, has never found acceptance among men unless a strong supernatural sanction has been attached to it. The natural impulses of men are against the acceptance of such a doctrine. Neither will men in general accept the doctrine that slavery is better than personal liberty, unless some strong reason is given for accepting such a belief; for this is again an idea which is opposed to man's natural impulses. Again, optimism as an attitude is probably natural, since it is seen commonly in savages and children; it is only reflective thought which brings one to such beliefs as pessimism or meliorism. These illustrations are sufficient to show how much natural impulses bias our interests and beliefs. This is not saying that intelligence may not oppose natural impulse, or that reason is the slave of instinct and emotion. But it is saying that psychologists have discovered that our beliefs, like our actions, are mixtures of instinct, habit, and intelligence.

This is true, perhaps, of even our most philosophical beliefs. We may, perhaps, therefore rightly speak of instinctive beliefs. It is no argument, however, against the validity of a belief because there is a strong element in it of natural

impulse. Probably many of the most valued traditions of human society have this element. Many hold that the belief in God is such an instinctive belief. Speaking of the universal religious beliefs of mankind, Professor Gilbert Murray has said, for example: "It is only of late years that psychologists have begun to realize the enormous dominion of those forces in man of which he is normally unconscious. We cannot escape easily from the grip of the blind powers beneath the threshold. Indeed, as I see philosophy after philosophy falling into this unproven belief in the Friend behind phenomena, as I find that I, myself, cannot, except for a moment and by an effort, refrain from making the same assumption, it seems to me that perhaps here too we are under the spell of a very old ineradicable instinct. We are gregarious animals; our ancestors have been such for countless ages. We cannot help looking out on the world as gregarious animals do; we see it in terms of humanity and of fellowship. . . . And it may be, it may very possibly be, that in the matter of this Friend behind phenomena, our own yearning and our own almost ineradicable instinctive convictions, since they are certainly not founded on either reason or observation, are, in origin, the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd leader in the great spaces between the stars."

We may not, of course, accept this as an adequate scientific statement, but it is sufficient to indicate what practically all scientific psychology has concluded, that there is a biological or instinctive element even in our most cherished beliefs.

Instincts and Social Progress

In as much as animal groups show no social progress, it would seem improbable that the social progress of man has any of its springs in his instinctive tendencies or native impulses. It would seem that these must be regarded as the

conditions rather than the causes of man's social and cultural progress. Even so, the peculiarities of human natural impulses would undoubtedly be important conditions without which social progress would be impossible. It would be well also to recall Professor Dewey's theory that the very richness of man's natural impulses is one of the things which makes social progress possible. This richness of natural impulses tends to break up, according to Dewey, the tyranny of custom. It would seem certain that there is much truth in this theory and that richness of hereditary tendencies would be necessary in any animal capable of social progress. A species like man which undergoes rapid change or progress must have great complexity of natural impulses and capacities in order to adapt himself to constantly changing conditions. We may also, perhaps, say that the complexity and plasticity of man's natural impulses make them adapted, so to speak, to the future, and so make possible man's adaptation to much more complex environments than those under which he developed.

The common biological view of instinct as static is therefore probably not quite correct. There are probably instinctive "drives" connected with many of the cultural activities of man which favor social progress.²⁸ For example, such natural impulses as animal altruism, curiosity, acquisitiveness, and constructiveness have been positive rather than merely negative influences in man's cultural evolution. This statement is especially true of man's sympathetic and altruistic impulses which he shares with some of the brutes. If man had not had a relatively high degree of natural altruism toward the fellows of his immediate group, even the narrow sociability and coöperation of primitive life would have been impossible. Of course the natural, altruistic impulses of man are not sufficient for the demands of our complex civili-

²⁸ Compare Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Chap. XII.

zation and our world-wide human society; but it should not be overlooked that altruistic impulses, as well as egoistic, are native to man, and that upon the basis of natural altruism man has laid the foundations for social coördination and coöperation of a wider and wider sort, which he has built up through habit and intelligence. This perception emphasizes the conclusion that man's progress depends upon much more than his intellect. Rather, while we may admit that man could never have entered upon the pathway of progress without higher intelligence, the facts which we have presented seem to show that natural human impulses have also had much to do with social progress; at least that they are indispensable conditions of progress; and therefore that progress is an outcome of the whole nature of man, working together as an organic unity in relation to its environment, and not of any single factor in human nature.

Instincts and Social Reconstruction

It follows from what has been said that the instinctive tendencies of man cannot be disregarded by those who are seeking the improvement of social conditions upon a scientific basis. It is safe to assert that no permanent improvement can be made in human social life which does not take natural impulses into account. While such impulses may not be adapted to present social conditions, they are, nevertheless, raw material out of which the acquired habits of individuals must be built up. Many psychologists hold that all acquired habits are secured by the bending and training of native impulses. It is, at any rate, safe to say that plans for social reconstruction which ignore the natural impulses of man, which attempt to get a higher state of social life without building it up out of lower types of reaction, are destined to failure. The recognition of the part which instinctive tendencies play in human social life is therefore necessary as a basis for scientific social work and all scientific

plans of social reform. Any plan of social reorganization which is made without regard to man's natural impulses will certainly meet with as great failure as any plan of individual education which is made without regard to inherited tendencies and capacities. But in as much as human impulses are indefinitely modifiable through education, when wisely dealt with, they present no insuperable barriers to any sane plan for the ultimate amelioration of social conditions. Indeed, sane plans for the reorganization of human society will try to bring social organization more into harmony with man's natural impulses, as we have already seen, rather than try needlessly to repress them. There is nothing, therefore, in the instinctive tendencies of man which puts any permanent obstacle in the way of carrying out rational measures of social reconstruction; but the recognition of the power of natural impulses or instinctive tendencies points to the conclusion that the one safe method of social reorganization is through education, especially through the education of the young. When the instinctive element in social behavior is thoroughly understood, it can be controlled through education and in this sense transcended.

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CHAPTER X

INTELLIGENCE AND GROUP LIFE

THE distinctive character of human social life, as we have already seen, is due to the factor of intelligence. While impulse and feeling may be the primitive bases of social life, these elements can go but a little way in explaining the complex social life of man, and especially of civilized society. Human society is not controlled chiefly by ready-made native reactions, but is largely a product of human experience, that is, of what man has learned through the ages by means of his intelligence. We must seek to understand a little more clearly, if possible, therefore, the exact rôle of human intelligence as a factor in human social life.¹ Modern science has doubtless rendered impossible the intellectualistic views of human society which prevailed in the past; but it has rendered equally impossible the anti-intellectualistic views which have been in fashion during the last quarter of a century. It will be well, however, to consider first the intellectualistic views of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Intellectualistic Views of Human Society

According to Auguste Comte, the founder of Sociology, "ideas govern the world or throw it into chaos," and "all social mechanism rests upon opinion."² In accordance with this view, Comte held that the law of the evolution of human society is the law of the evolution of man's intellectual con-

¹ Compare what was said in Chapter III on intelligence and rationality.

² *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. I.

ceptions. He found that these conceptions passed through three stages or states, the primitive or theological, the transitional or metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. He held that there were three general states of society corresponding to these three stages in the development of intellectual conceptions. All of man's intellectual conceptions pass from the theological to the scientific. Social behavior is undergoing, according to Comte, a similar transformation. We are now just entering the positive or scientific stage. It will be noted that according to this view everything in human society depends upon the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge. Just in proportion as men are successful in getting exact, scientific knowledge of phenomena, in that proportion human society will become transformed in a rational direction.

There may be much truth in this conception of Comte; but it would no longer be accepted to-day as an adequate scientific statement. It is much too simple. It makes the character of man's social life depend quite entirely upon the progress of exact knowledge. We now know that instinct, feeling, and habit also are factors in all social behavior, and that intelligence is only slowly learning to control these other factors and can never eliminate them.

Recent Theories as to the Social Function of Intelligence

Various and conflicting views as to the part played by intelligence in human social life have been set forth by recent thinkers. In the sociological writings of Lester F. Ward, for example, we find the view that the intellect, or the intelligence, is not a true force in the social life. While Ward holds that the distinctive mark of human society is achievement or invention in the broadest sense of the term, yet he would not give to intelligence the dominant place in the social life. He holds that it is not a true "force," but

only a *directive* agent. He compares its action to that of the rudder of a ship. The true social forces, according to Ward, are the feelings and the desires. Ward says that intelligence is a "factor," but not a "force."³ However, we have seen that there is little sense of speaking of "forces" in human society except in the sense of active factors. If human intelligence is not an active factor in human association, it would be difficult to point one out. However, intelligence is a modifying factor rather than an original impelling force. Ward was right in holding that we must seek the original impelling forces of human association in the feelings and desires, or, the "instinct-emotions." If we include in intelligence, however, the physiological processes of the cortex associated with it, it is surely entitled to be regarded as a phase of behavior and as much of a force as feeling and desire. Both intelligence and feeling have been developed to mediate and control activity, and both have to do with the adaptive processes involved in human behavior.

Some recent social psychologists would place intelligence on the same level as impulse as a factor in human behavior. They argue that it is as natural for man to think as to act, and that both impulse and thought are equally natural to man. They hold, in other words, that intelligence is one of the original inherent dispositions of man which works along with his other native tendencies, and somehow or other dominates them, especially if cultivated and organized.⁴ This is true both of the individual and of society.

Neither of the above theories are in accord with the most careful conclusions of scientific psychologists. The facts of comparative psychology seem to show thought to be neither merely a directive agent of feeling, nor an original inherent disposition of the organism comparable to instinct. They seem to show that intellectual processes have arisen as con-

³ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chap. XVI, p. 463f.

⁴ Wallas, *The Great Society*, Chap. III, p. 36f.

trols over activity in relatively late stages of development, and that they come in where there is some conflict or lack of adjustment between instinctive or habitual activities, on the one hand, and the environment on the other. In other words, intelligence is a sort of a bridge between different types of activity or action. Intelligence in the individual is an adaptive process,⁵ accordingly, and so has to do with changes in behavior. It is a form or phase of behavior, but one which arises only when original impulses or ready-made habits are insufficient to cope with the situation. Intelligence is, therefore, neither an original impulse nor a mere directive agent of feeling—it is problem-solving ability which has been developed by the organism when the ready-made reactions of instinct and habit no longer suffice to meet the situation.

As soon as we view human intelligence as a phase of the process of adaptation and as a control over that problem, the part that it plays in human society becomes plain. Roughly, we may say that, in the social life, impulse has to do with its earliest beginnings, habit with order or organization, and intelligence with change. Primitively, impulse and habit suffice, because primitively the environment was not sufficiently complex to give rise to any need for intelligence. It is true, therefore, that primitively action preceded thought in social development; but this does not prevent intelligence from later modifying and controlling social action. Intelligence comes in the development of social life just to the extent that there is a need for it. As the adjustments of social life have become more complex, there has been greater need of thought to control these processes.

The intelligence, we remember, especially in its human manifestations of imagination and reasoning, is the final and

⁵ As an adaptive process it is, of course, a capacity rather than a ready-made reaction.

supreme device produced by organic life for controlling adaptive behavior, and so for modifying both behavior and the environment. It controls behavior by recognition and appreciation of the environment; that is, it penetrates to an understanding of the meaning and relations of phenomena, by valuing first one reaction, then another. It may do this either in actual experience or imaginatively. Through memory, imagination, and reasoning, the human mind gradually builds up an environment of its own of images, ideas, and values, to which it reacts quite as to the real environment. Physiologically, this probably means that the cells of the cortex acquire certain habits of reaction which influence, and even modify profoundly, the subsequent behavior of the organism. More accurately, perhaps, we should say that on account of man's memory, imagination, and reasoning, the real environment comes to the human individual loaded with certain values and meanings, and that these values and meanings very largely determine his reaction to a given stimulus. Thus, intelligence controls and modifies instinctive and habitual reactions through substituting in their place reactions controlled by intelligent judgment. These latter may in time become fixed habits, perhaps as strong as any of the original impulses, and, as it were, "second nature" to the individual.

Manifestly, what the intelligence does for individual behavior it can do for the behavior of a group. As we have already seen, through social tradition and its vehicle, the web of intercommunication, human groups build up a psycho-social environment which in time becomes more important for the life of the group than the environment of real objects. This psycho-social environment of ideas, values, and standards, in circulation in the group, the individuals in the group respond to quite as they do to the stimuli in the physical environment. The psycho-social environment, or, in other words, their group's tradition and opinion, is quite as real to them as the sensations and percepts coming from stimuli

in the physical environment and it modifies their activities just as directly.⁶

Put in other language the "collective representations" and the "social mind" of the group is quite as real a control over group behavior as individual intelligence is over individual conduct.⁷ We all appreciate this whenever we become conscious of group opinion, group sentiment, group standards, group tradition, the mores, or whatever we may call these various aspects of mental life in the group. Intelligence, therefore, is continually modifying the behavior of human groups, and there is good ground for believing that this modification can continue indefinitely as long as it stays within the limits of group efficiency and survival; for civilization has been the gradual substitution of a psycho-social environment of ideas, standards, and values for the purely physical environment, as a basis for the control of group behavior. We shall try to show how this is so.

So far as science knows, there is no higher guidance afforded to human groups than the guidance of the highest available intelligence. A few writers, however, have maintained that society is guided by a *suprarational* force or agent, which some call "intuition" and others have called "the emotion of the ideal."⁸ When intuition and the emotion of the ideal are examined, however, they are found either to be made up of instinctive and emotional elements, which are less to be trusted than intelligence, or else to be manifestations of imagination and reasoning. We know of no better guide in human affairs than human intelligence in its highest development. This is the guide which science, philosophy,

⁶ As illustration, the effect of the British Constitution or of the American Constitution on political behavior in Great Britain and in the United States respectively might be cited.

⁷ This is the fundamental principle of Durkheim's sociology. See his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 436, 437.

⁸ Kidd, *The Science of Power*, Chap. V.

and rational religion offer to man; so when we study the rôle of intelligence in the evolution and organization of human society, we are studying the influence of these three agencies just mentioned.

The Nature of Human Intelligence

As problem-solving ability, intelligence was not ~~created~~ merely by instinct and emotion to serve their ends. Rather it is a mutation⁹ in organic life, a new method of solving the problems of adaptation of living creatures over and above the method of ready-made reactions. While capacity for it is inherited, intelligence itself is largely acquired by each individual. Intelligence is, therefore, more or less opposed to the ready-made types of reaction. It is intelligence which saves us from the tyranny both of instinct and of habit. But this statement does not mean that it is necessarily opposed to instinctive tendencies or to habits. If intelligence is developed to serve the individual organism, it may, of course, work with instinctive tendencies and with habits, or it may oppose them. That will depend upon the environment and upon the degree of its own development. Human intelligence is still incompletely developed. Intelligence, we have seen, is not exclusively an individual matter in its development. Its development largely depends upon the culture of the group—or the psycho-social environment. Hence, whether it works with certain instinctive tendencies, or with certain individual habits, or against them, will depend very largely upon the culture of the group or the psycho-social environment.

The culture of the most civilized human groups is, however, as yet far from perfected. The culture that we know, as we have already seen, is far from completely intelligent or rational. It not only shows the bias of the irrational

⁹ The word "mutation" is not here used in the technical biological sense, but in the general sense of "great change."

natural impulses, but also of irrational group habits handed down from the past. If we remember these things, we shall have no difficulty in understanding that the intellectual beliefs of men are rarely completely intelligent; for impulse and habit affect belief. Men guide their actions by their beliefs. The actions of men we have seen are indefinite mixtures of instinct, habit, and intelligence. This being so, we should expect that *the beliefs of men also are indefinite compounds, in which may be found elements of instinct and habit, as well as of intelligence.* For this reason, human society is only gradually becoming intelligent, and rational processes are only gradually freeing themselves sufficiently to control efficiently group behavior and social life.

Rationalization

The process of bolstering up natural impulses and established habits by intelligent reasons is called by some writers "rationalization." This is perhaps an unfortunate use of the word. The word should really stand for the making of our beliefs and actions completely intelligent or rational, rather than for finding more or less rational excuses for them. This so-called process of rationalization of beliefs and actions is, however, not difficult to understand. It is simply making intelligence, especially reasoning, subservient to natural impulses, feelings, and established habits. There can be no doubt that many of the arguments often offered in support of existing beliefs, customs, and institutions of present society are in the nature of such so-called rationalizations. One of the services which psychology and sociology can perform for the benefit of mankind, therefore, is to point out the tendency of the intelligence to be used in this way. It is hardly necessary to say that the truth or value of anything is not to be established by using the intelligence in this manner. Impulses, feelings, and established habits of the individual, as well as the customs and institutions of social

groups, may have their justification; but the justification should not be sought by making intelligence and reasoning subservient to them. It is hardly necessary either to point out that intelligence can free itself by its very nature from the control of these insidious influences. Intelligence arose as a superior method of adaptation. Because it arose as something superior to impulse and habit, it may act more or less in opposition to these. This it does through its power of selection, playing one impulse off against another.

Rationality

Sharply to be distinguished from this so-called rationalization is rationality. This is simply intelligence in its highest and fullest development. As we have already seen, it is a form of controlled imagination. The control comes through the testing of hypotheses by experience. In reasoning, we perform, as it were, mental experiments. Instead of working with objective forces, we work with their symbols. There is, therefore, much chance of error creeping in unless we can test our conclusions by objective realities, or experience. This, of course, we cannot always do; but the reasoning process is the one means by which man has advanced his knowledge beyond mere observation and penetrated into the secrets of the unknown. Invention and discovery manifestly proceed through imagination and reasoning. They involve the making of hypotheses and the testing of those hypotheses. Not only has science been developed this way, but also art, institutions, and social organization. In proportion as man has been able to develop reason, in this sense of performing experiments in his mind and then testing them in experience, he has been able to achieve all that is enduring in his culture and character. It is for this reason that we regard the work of reason and the development of rationality as the distinguishing marks of man.

Intelligence and Human Institutions

If institutions are ways of living together that have been reflected upon and sanctioned by the judgment of the community, it follows that they are largely products of human intelligence. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, all the other elements in human nature also affect them. Hence, we have seen, human institutions are only partly intelligent or rational. Just because they represent group habits which have come down from the past, they very often represent the work of the intelligence in past situations, perhaps under conditions which no longer exist. Ideally, it is evident that the human institutions should change as new knowledge is discovered, but practically institutions never do this. Since they are group habits, they change, as a rule, only when practically the entire group becomes convinced that they work badly and need to be changed. Hence, the element of rationality in a given institution at a given time may be very small. This is all the more true because an institution may have got its start in the past under conditions of comparative ignorance. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that institutions which have long survived, have had to be based more or less upon experience, and therefore have a considerable element of intelligence in them. It is very far from the truth to say that human institutions are necessarily rational, but it is equally far from the truth to think that they do not have a considerable element of rationality in them, especially when they have been tested by the experience of generations. We should always remember the general principle that institutions exist in human society to substitute an objective social control of conduct more or less rational, for the impulsive, subjective, individual control. In other words, human institutions have slowly developed toward a more or less rational state.

The Rationalization of Institutions

We do not mean by this phrase, the offering of rational excuses for the existence of institutions, but rather the making of institutions themselves rational. If institutions, as we find them in human society, present the mixture of impulse, habit, and intelligence, which we have said, then it is a problem how far they can be made rational; that is, how far the rational element may be made to dominate in them. Some social thinkers have held that rational selection among human institutions is impossible, because we have no way of testing out the rationality or nonrationality of their adaptation to human needs, the way we may test physical tools. It must be admitted that the rationality of an institution cannot be as easily tested as the rationality of a physical tool. It may take generations to test the rationality of an institution, while a few trials will usually test the rationality of a tool.

There is no doubt that man first began to rationalize his conduct with reference to the manipulation of material objects. Primitive man could hardly have been expected to have used his rational judgment any further. Therefore, primitive man's beliefs, behavior, and institutions often appear highly irrational to us. But when once the rational tendency has got started, it tends as a habit of mind, to extend over other phases of human behavior than the manipulation of material objects and the adaptation to the physical environment. We may see this clearly enough in individual experience; and the history of the race furnishes enough illustrations to warrant our extending the generalization to society. Thus, astrological notions were once current among the peoples of Western civilization. The progress of physical science, however, while not directly disproving these astrological notions, has wiped out such superstitions very largely, both from among the educated and from among the masses.

The influence of the rationalistic attitude cultivated by science has indeed tended to undermine the whole mass of popular superstitions which once existed among the peoples now included in Western civilization.

It follows that it is not true that social beliefs and social behavior can be rationalized only through testing their adaptation ~~or~~ nonadaptation to material needs.¹⁰ The testing of social beliefs and social behavior as to rationality is not necessarily upon a material plane, though it is always through human experience. Religions, for example, may become more rational without any change in the material life of the group, or without reference to material needs. The idea of God, for example, which is finally accepted as true by a group, is not necessarily such an idea as will secure the greatest material advantages; but rather the idea which will best unify and harmonize the life of the whole group with all the conditions of existence. It might well be argued that some form of nature worship would best suit the material needs of human groups; but nature worship has been given up by the most cultured human groups, because the idea of God as a Father has been found best suited to the *social* needs of human groups. Thus, human history shows that human institutions have become gradually rationalized, and that this rationalization has not been simply the result of rationalizing the economic activities of society.

Man's experiences with the material world prove to be only the starting point for the rationalizing process. Rational habits of thought and action once set up in society may extend indefinitely until they bring all phases of life under their sway. There is good reason to hope, therefore, that the influence of the scientific attitude will ultimately rationalize all phases of human social life. As the rational tradition

¹⁰ This seems to be the position of Keller, *Societal Evolution*, Chap. V.

becomes through science established, art, morality, religion, government, family life, and even social amusement will become more and more permeated by its influence; for it is characteristic of the human reason as the highest instrument of human adaptation that, while leaving a legitimate place for all things, it demands supremacy in order to secure the harmony of all elements in life by assigning to each its proper place. From the dawn of human history until now, the reason of man has been working for such supremacy, though not without many interruptions. This is what the progress of science means. If science continues to progress and to expand its influence, a relatively rational state of human society must some time be reached.

We are justified in concluding, therefore, that the largest generalization which we can make about human history is that it is, on the whole, a movement toward the increasing supremacy of human intelligence and toward the progressive rationalization of human knowledge and human behavior. Human intelligence in its higher development is a pioneering activity and, in the form of science, is our only sure means of exploring the unknown. In its highest form as reason, and in its social manifestation as science, it is the ultimate and final factor in human social adaptation, the one in which we must put our faith for the future, though this conclusion does not bar us from giving due consideration to all other factors. Human institutions may be counted upon to move, therefore, in the direction of intelligent adaptation, though not, of course, without interruption. But human institutions are a part of human culture. To understand their relation to intelligence, we must see how culture and intelligence are related.

Intelligence and Culture

The factors in the physical environment have never produced cultural evolution in any of the animals below man.

This fact alone is sufficient to indicate that culture, or civilization, has been built up, not through the influence of these external physical factors, nor through the instincts and emotions of man, but through man's superior intelligence or ability to learn. The work of the intellectual centers of the brain of man in inventing tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, improvements in communication and transportation, and in discovering the laws of phenomena and the properties of things, has been the real basis upon which the structure of civilization has been reared. In other words, culture or civilization comes through the process of learning, and hence is an achievement of human intelligence. The accumulation of knowledge has enabled man more and more to master physical nature and to control his own nature. The secret of his mastery of physical nature has been his learning to make adjustments to nature, not passively, of course, but actively, by modifying physical objects and the operation of physical forces. By observing and comparing physical objects and processes, man came to understand in part the workings of the forces resident in them. Thus, through his learning, through his intelligence, he has been able to control nature and to build up an artificial physical environment which we call material civilization. In a similar way, we shall see, he is slowly learning to control and modify his own nature through building up an artificial social environment.

Mental Patterns and Their Diffusion

But something more than human intelligence has obviously been at work in the creation of human culture. Culture is a group matter, not an individual adjustment. It necessitates the communication to a whole group of the superior action-patterns developed by some individual. Now man shares with the brutes certain fundamental instinctive adjustments and also the capacity to modify conduct intelligently through the formation of habits. As an individual he possesses the

power of abstraction or rationality; but in addition he possesses superior means of intercommunication with his fellows, in the form of articulate speech. It is this last possession of man which has been decisive in his creation of culture. It became for man the basis for a new type of social evolution. It made it possible to develop a type of social life which is almost wholly a matter of acquired habit, of acquired intelligence, and of acquired values; in other words, a matter of culture.

Superior skill and knowledge acquired by an individual, whether as the result of accident or of reflective intelligence, might by means of articulate speech be communicated to other members of his group. Thus all the individuals of a group were able to profit by the experience and intelligence of one individual, and in this way the conduct of the entire group might be changed through the attainments of one fortunate or exceptionally intelligent individual. Nor were these newly acquired adjustments by a group lost by the death of the generation in which they were learned. Through passing along the pattern of the activity or the adjustment by means of intercommunication, or tradition, each succeeding generation could acquire the knowledge and skill, or the habits of modified adjustment found advantageous in the experience of past generations.

Cultural evolution is fundamentally an evolution of acquired coadaptive habits, but its method is the method of social intercommunication. In other words, the vehicle by which culture is transmitted in human society is the web of intercommunication among human beings which we call language. Thus the ideas, standards, and values, in brief the "mental patterns," which control the formation of coadaptive habits circulate in a human group and make possible its culture. Nothing like this is found in the groups below man, for the reason that the patterns of action in the animals below man are shut up, as it were, within their nervous

organization as individuals, or communicated, if at all, only by means of the imitation of one animal by another. But among human beings, the patterns of behavior have escaped, so to speak, from the individual brain, and are transmitted from individual to individual, not simply by imitation but by the spoken word or language. Thus articulate speech together with written language, storing knowledge, custom, convention, and tradition, became the main control over the behavior of human groups, making their behavior cultural rather than merely instinctive.

It is evident that culture or civilization is made up not simply of acquired habits but, on its inner side, of the ideas, standards, and values which are *patterns of action* in the minds of individuals. It is evident also that these mental patterns in the minds of individuals, when communicated through language, are the means by which the members of the group control their behavior as a group and develop their culture. If we take the making of a stone implement as a concrete example, we find that it is invariably made with a pattern in mind. If the actual stone implement made conforms to the mental pattern, we may properly call it the objectification of an idea. Such patterns for the making of stone implements become a part of the group's tradition, and are communicated from individual to individual. There, of course, goes along with them more or less imitation of objective bodily movements. The superior imagination, reasoning, or skill of some individual may improve the pattern which he has received from others and, consequently, the tool which is made. Thus a further step in tool making and so in culture would come about.

Now this process of the formation of mental patterns for the making of physical tools illustrates the whole process of cultural development. Practically the same process is used in the making of human institutions, that is, of sanctioned and systematized ways of living together. Man has

learned to perfect his institutions just as he has learned to perfect his physical tools. It has been a process of imagination and reasoning, of trial and error. When man has made errors in the making of his physical tools, however, he has been able to detect these errors readily through experience; but when he has made errors in his institutions, these are not so easily detected. Hence, in the case of institutions, errors may persist for thousands of years and possibly for thousands of generations. But human history is a process of striving on the part of man to perfect patterns for human relations as well as for tools. It is these patterns for human relations which are, of course, of particular importance for social and cultural evolution.

Invention and Discovery

The processes which we have just described are those of invention and discovery. They are manifestly the processes by which material civilization has been built up. They are also the processes by which the spiritual side of culture has been developed. Invention and discovery, so far as we know, do not exist below the human level. If they exist at all in animal societies, the general level of individual mental development and the lack of definite means of communication render them of no social effect; hence, animal societies are nonprogressive. On the other hand, all human societies show invention and discovery from the very beginning. Such primitive inventions and discoveries as the control of fire, the making of stone tools, the cultivation of plants, and the domestication of animals, must be considered as great in their social and cultural significance, if not greater than any modern inventions and discoveries. Peoples in savagery, not less than those in civilization, seem to have undertaken very deliberately invention and discovery. In every case these processes have depended upon man's power of abstraction, his use of his imagination and reasoning. This is as

true even when circumstances have greatly favored inventions and discoveries, as it is in the case of accidental adjustments. If men had not had the imagination and rationality to perceive the advantage of these happy accidents, they would not have preserved and diffused the knowledge of them. Hence, we may say that, if necessity stimulates invention and discovery, it is nevertheless the mind of man which gives birth to them. More strictly, perhaps, we should say it is the condition of the culture of the group. The existing conditions of knowledge and skill in a group, in other words, frequently make some invention or discovery by some individual of the group almost inevitable. This statement, however, does not detract, as we shall see, from the importance of the superior individual in making the discovery or invention.

Now the part which invention and discovery play in our material culture, or in the making of physical tools, is duplicated in the development of human institutions. It should not be forgotten that new conceptions of human relationship, new forms of social organization, new ways of human living, have played no less important a part in the development of human culture than the invention of tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, and means of communication. Invention is not confined to the putting together of material forces in new ways, nor is discovery confined to understanding the workings of physical nature. New modes of associating and coöperating, or of adjusting the mutual relationships of individuals, are invented as well as machines. Human nature and human relationships present fields for scientific discovery as well as physical nature. In describing the history of culture, it is easy to dwell upon man's conquest over physical nature through his technical devices; but it is quite as important to know the successive forms of association, of institutions, and of standards of social conduct with which man has experimented. Civilization has been built up through

invention and discovery in this largest sense. Human institutions, in this sense, are all inventions, even language itself; that is, they are intelligent perceptions of certain ways in which advantages may be realized and disadvantages overcome. They are, of course, not arbitrary inventions or mere matters of taste. Rather, institutions are like physical tools, in that they have to be based, in order to be successful, upon certain perceptions or understandings of nature and human nature. But, as we have already said, this does not preclude the possibility of many errors and imperfections in them. These errors and imperfections will have to be eliminated, however, by further intelligent perceptions of ways in which advantages may be realized and disadvantages overcome. The process of building a successful civilization or culture is, at bottom, no different from the process of building a successful machine.

The Accumulation and Diffusion of Knowledge

Civilization has depended upon the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, not only of physical nature, but also of human nature and of ways by which men may live together more harmoniously and satisfactorily. When this knowledge is put in the form of certain social standards and values, or social patterns, and diffused throughout the group, we have seen that it is called the social tradition. At first this knowledge lacked exactness, or from our point of view, was filled with all sorts of absurd mistakes and superstitions. Very gradually, however, means were discovered of testing the beliefs which were embodied in the group tradition, and so of sifting out its errors. This was largely the work of critical judgment and of reasoning brought to bear upon experience. Hence the social tradition has been gradually refined through the long ages of human culture and freed from its errors. But this process is still very far from complete. Only within the last few centuries has man discovered

trustworthy methods of making his knowledge exact and of detecting error. These methods of discovering trustworthy knowledge we call collectively the scientific method. Very slowly at the present time science is extending the field of exact knowledge from physical nature to human nature and human relations.

.The efficacy of knowledge and standards in guiding social activities is often doubted at the present day. But this doubt is probably due to the fact that in the past social ideas and standards have so often been without an adequate scientific basis, that is, they have been built up on some other foundation than that of scientific facts. It is noteworthy that the ideas and standards put forth by the older and better established sciences have not suffered from this skepticism. If we wish ideas and standards regarding our social relations to be accepted and to have the same power in our social life which the ideas and standards presented by the physical sciences have in our technological life, it is evident that they should be built upon the basis of scientific facts, and not upon mere sentiment, æsthetic appreciation, or even moral aspiration, as they have been too often in the past. When our social ideals and standards shall be constructed upon the basis of established knowledge, they will undoubtedly receive general acceptance, first by the educated, and then by the masses; and they will become as powerful in their influence upon the social behavior of men as the ideas and standards of physical science now are upon their technological behavior. Thus, the advance of our culture upon its social side depends upon the accumulation and diffusion of social knowledge, just as its advance upon the technical side has depended throughout history upon the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge of the facts and laws of physical nature. Such accumulation and diffusion of social knowledge, we may safely conclude, is not only essential to the establishment of right social standards, but to any proper adjustment of

the relations of individuals, classes, nations, and races in a high civilization.

Intelligence and Social Progress

Our whole argument, thus far, has been to confirm the time-honored view that man's superior intelligence has been the active agent in his social progress. All the other factors in nature and human nature assist, but it is chiefly the accumulation, progressive rationalization, and diffusion of knowledge which has enabled man to master nature and to improve human relationships. However, it has been questioned whether this process has led to the improvement of human relationships. We are confronted, by those who raise this question, with the well-known fact that intellectual people and intellectual ages often show antisocial and antimoral tendencies. Thus the most intellectual people of antiquity, the Greeks, seem to have had little practical social genius, as their social life was characterized from early times by social disunity and disharmony, and at length by corruption and degeneracy. Again in our own time, the discoveries and inventions of science have not always led to a better social state. Often they have been exploited for the most antisocial purposes. There is, therefore, an apparent antagonism between social progress, or the improvement of human relationships, and the intelligence. This has led some social thinkers to advocate the view that the intelligence or reason is individualistic and destructive of social bonds, and has to be restrained for the good of the social life by some "suprarational" factor, such as altruism. Although the statement may sound absurd, it must be acknowledged, therefore, that it is a fair question whether good will and harmony in human society is fostered by the development of intelligence.

In reply to this question, several things may be said. In the first place, it must be remarked that the antagonism

between social and intellectual development is more apparent than real. Very largely it springs from the fact that the intelligence is concerned chiefly with social change, and social changes are usually more or less disturbing, temporarily at least, to social order. Again, the existence of unsocialized intelligence in society may be acknowledged as a fact without accepting the conclusion that intelligence and reasoning in their ultimate development are opposed to the highest interests of human society. Like any other part of man's nature, human intelligence is capable of exceedingly narrow and unwholesome development. All instruments of adaptation, even the highest which nature has produced, fail at times. The existence of unsocialized thinking no more implies a necessarily unsocial nature of thought processes than the existence of unsocialized desire. There is no scientific ground upon which psychologists can approve, then, of the view that the reason is essentially individualistic and egoistic in its activities. On the contrary, when the intelligence and the reason are broadly enough developed, they are found to be universal relating activities or principles of universal interconnection, and as such, tend to bring men into mental agreement, and so into harmonious relationships. It is only when the intelligence and the reason are made subservient to such individualistic factors as feeling and impulse, or to material interests, that they become inimical to the highest and best development of social life. Rationality is a dissolving force in society only to the extent that it is one-sided, exaggerating certain factors in life at the expense of other factors. Of the reasoning which takes account of all factors we have no need to have fear of the results in social progress.

Social Imagination and Social Progress

As Comte pointed out, human intelligence will become socialized in proportion as it is turned upon the study of

human society itself. It is unsocialized very largely at the present time only because it has been used so exclusively for the study of physical nature and the promotion of individual success. Through the study of social conditions and of the problems of life for all classes and conditions of men, an efficient social imagination will be developed in the individual. In this way we may learn to identify ourselves in thought with our fellow men, no matter how remote from them we may be. Learning to identify ourselves in thought with our fellows helps us to understand them, and so helps us to develop rational sympathy for them. Thus intelligence becomes an aid to social understanding and to social good will. Todd is right in saying that a great part of the moral progress of mankind has come through the increase of social imagination. The highest sort of social intelligence, therefore, enables us to identify ourselves not only in thought but also in feeling with our fellow men everywhere.

Whether intelligence works in a social or antisocial direction is, accordingly, altogether a matter of education. Superior social adjustments may be brought about through the development of the socially efficient imagination. If our social imagination is broad enough, our capacity for social adjustment will be greatly increased, because man is a creature who adjusts himself to his environment through the mediation of his intelligence; and when his imaginary environment is as wide as humanity, it is safe to say that he will adjust himself to it quite as he does to his physical environment, though of course such an environment will be so complex that it will demand high powers of intelligent adjustment. If we wish the harmonious social adjustment of all humanity, it is evident that we must, for one thing, develop in each individual as a basis for such adjustment an efficient social imagination and high general intelligence. This is not saying that the will and the emotions are not

factors for social progress equally important in their way with the intelligence; it is only saying that the intelligence, particularly in the form of social imagination, must lead the way.

The Intellectual Freedom of the Individual and Social Progress

While absolute freedom of the individual is destructive to the group life, certain forms of freedom are essential for social progress. Among these is intellectual freedom. The mind of the individual must be free to think, if it is to form rational opinions or judgments, and to guide conduct intelligently. It should, of course, be taught to think critically and correctly, that is, scientifically or objectively. But it should not be coerced, hampered, or intimidated in its thinking. Within the limits which right reasoning sets for itself, everything should be done to encourage free thinking, if we wish social progress. This does not mean that people will always think helpfully and correctly. On the contrary, they will often think incorrectly. But as we have already seen, if the free expression of ideas is encouraged, ideas can be compared, criticized, and rationally evaluated. Under such a process of public discussion wrong ideas will tend to be detected and eliminated, and the truth will have the best chance to be perceived and to be accepted. Therefore, human society needs to be tolerant toward new ideas and even toward great variations in belief. It is only through tolerance towards variant ideas and opinions that a group can expect to get before it the widest possible range of ideas for selection and so have the best chance to progress. As we implied in a previous chapter, the surest way to promote social progress is to keep social institutions plastic by encouraging within reasonable limits the innovating individual, by keeping open the channels of intercommunication and of public criticism, and by seeing that every new idea and policy

has a fair chance to be tested out in the forum of public discussion. Accordingly, intellectual freedom for the individual has been found in all human societies to be a prime condition for social progress. Social science would therefore agree with the democratic ideal which would emancipate intellectually all classes of men and teach them to "think for themselves."

There are, however, grave dangers and difficulties in carrying out this policy. In a comparatively ignorant stage of popular culture, such as ours undoubtedly is, many people who are just beginning to learn to use their minds will think most decidedly wrongly. The masses will often follow after so-called intellectual leaders who appeal to their impulses, emotions, and passions, rather than to their reason; and the task of guiding them in accordance with reason may at times seem hopeless.

Evidently if we are to allow people the liberty to think for themselves we must adequately educate them. The remedy for the evils of intelligence is more intelligence; because intelligence is evil only when it is partial. In part, this better education will be accomplished by encouraging people to think and to express their ideas. If we insist upon people thinking for themselves and upon more thinking and better thinking, there will come a time when the appeal to reason will be stronger than any appeal to passion or to prejudice; and people will make wiser selections of their intellectual leaders. If the rational habit of mind, or respect for intelligence gets established in any social group, the intellectual élite will then be able to lead the masses of men to social achievements which are now undreamed of. The problem of intellectual leadership is evidently fundamental in the whole problem of the relations of the intelligence and social progress.

Intellectual Leadership and Social Progress

We pointed out in Chapter VII that human groups guide themselves in their thinking and acting according to the pattern or example furnished by some leader. Man, because he is social, is essentially an imitative animal. That is, he follows leaders. Group behavior is almost always a matter of following a leader. In other words, the method used by human groups to adjust themselves to new situations, especially when these situations are complex and difficult, is to copy the action-patterns, proposed or illustrated, by the relatively few individuals who are the leaders of the group. Intellectual leadership is necessary for successfully effecting any complex change in human groups. Hence it follows that nothing great in the way of social progress is ever achieved by human beings without leadership. We have seen also that it is only exceptional individual minds which are capable of producing ideas that are socially valuable. Hence all the higher work of civilization is a result of pioneering minds who blaze the trail for social achievement. But these pioneering minds are not wholly the spontaneous products of nature. They are, at least in part, the products of the psycho-social environment.

Genius undoubtedly has its biological side in organic variation; but we should also not overlook the training which the exceptional individual mind usually gets from the social environment. Men of ability and of genius take from their environment perhaps even more than they give back to it. A "great" man is usually a focusing point of many, and sometimes of nearly all, of the tendencies of his age and nation. In other words, *it is the stimulation of the social environment which develops his talents or genius.* When we look over a list of great men we usually find that their greatness consists in being able to sum up in their own personalities the striking tendencies of their time. The fruitful ideas of

genius are therefore quite as much social products as products of individual mental superiority. Indeed, if this were not so, they would not have been taken up by the group in which they were developed, and we would have heard nothing concerning them.

These familiar sociological facts, while they make impossible the acceptance of the great-man theory of human history, do not detract at all from the importance of intellectual leadership in civilized societies. It is the man of intellectual ability who first produces the new ideas, standards and values by which complex social adjustments are made. These ideas and standards are then copied imitatively by the mass of the group. The change is evidently effected through the mediation of the intellectual leadership of a few and the intellectual appreciation of the value of the new ideas or standards by the many.

Not all the new ideas of individuals, however, are taken up and generalized by the group in which they occur. They will be taken up only if there is felt a need for them, an appreciation of their value. Just how much influence the ideas of an intellectual leader will have in a group will depend, therefore, upon its culture and social situation. Hence, only the ideas and inventions of a leader will be generalized for which the group is ready. The leader and his new ideas or inventions are quite evidently selected by the group. This means that if the ideas and ideals of an intellectual leader are to be fruitful socially, such a leader must be in close touch with the life of his group. In other words, his ideas to be accepted must be found to be adapted to the group life. Hence, it happens that the inventions of a particular age will be only the inventions for which that age or stage of social evolution is ready. The great man who manages to perform a great work for his time is always one who is socially selected. It is, therefore, the selection of the group which finally determines who shall

be the accepted intellectual leader or, in other words, who shall be judged as a genius or a great man. In some cases, however, the social selection comes only after the death of the individual. In such cases there is still social selection, only of a spiritual rather than of a living leader. It need hardly be pointed out that this is the reason why the memory of the lives and achievements of men of ability is so highly prized among the more highly civilized peoples.

But the ideas which are the inventions of exceptional minds and which are accepted or "selected" by social groups are of all degrees of social value. We must recognize that intellectual ability has the power to mislead human beings as well as to lead them aright. This is not because the ideas of the intellectual leader are ever literally imposed upon his group; but when the influence of superstition, ignorance, and excitement, or the lack of social freedom is strong in a group, wrong intellectual leaders may easily be selected and wrong ideas or standards accepted. Even highly civilized society sometimes accepts ideas so reversionary as to lead straight back toward barbarism. The social value of the ideas of intellectual leaders, accordingly, can only be determined finally through testing them in actual social experience. But undoubtedly very much could be done to secure better intellectual leadership in present society, and so better social ideals and standards. The diffusion of the scientific spirit among the masses would help much. When all social ideas and ideals are adequately tested by comparison with historical facts and checked up through all other sources of scientific social knowledge, society may be saved much bad leadership and harmful influence from erroneous ideas and standards. This is evidently a matter of supreme importance in our present complex civilization; for the accepted ideas and ideals of a social group, its mental patterns, are its most priceless possession. For upon these the whole structure of its culture and social order must rest, while

the socially fruitful new ideas and ideals which are the inventions of genius are the priceless instruments for raising the social life of human groups to still higher levels.

Collective Achievement

If a social group desires progress and if it appreciates the intellectual elements which enter into progress, quite evidently it should not depend upon happy accidents of individual achievement. It should enter upon a rationally planned program of achievement by the group as a whole. This the late Professor Lester F. Ward called "collective telesis."¹¹ To enter upon such a program of rationally planned progress and collective achievement, a group would evidently need to do at least three things along intellectual lines: first, to find and train efficient intellectual leaders; second, to organize and make available all of the knowledge and intelligence of the group; and third, to diffuse the scientific attitude and general social intelligence throughout the group, to assure its response to intelligent leadership.

As regards the first of these conditions of collective achievement, we have already seen that Professor Ward and others have demonstrated that there is no lack of leadership material in human societies; that the problem is rather the finding and proper training of such leaders.¹² This should be really the work of the higher institutions of learning. To some extent, they have entered upon such a program, but not in any adequate way, especially along the lines of the spiritual needs of our civilization.

As regards the organization of knowledge and intelligence, the most highly civilized nations are evidently proceeding in this direction, though haltingly; for this is the meaning of the fostering of science along various lines and the organization and systematic development of higher edu-

¹¹ Compare Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chap. XX.

¹² Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Part II.

cation. But much still remains to be done. All available knowledge should be so organized as to be socially available not only for technological achievements but also for legislation and the general guidance of social policies. Such organization of knowledge and intelligence would stimulate invention both in the ideal and material realm. With wise organization and control of the intellectual side of life, human society might furnish itself with a never-ending supply of socially valuable inventions which would become a basis for continual social progress.

But in a democratic society this would avail little unless the masses were taught to appreciate intellectual achievement, the scientific attitude, and the value of intelligent guidance in all group matters. As long as the nonscientific attitude prevails among the masses of our people, along with much social ignorance, we must expect that social achievements will go slowly and that social progress will be greatly hampered. In one sense, therefore, the first two conditions of collective achievement depend upon the diffusion of the scientific attitude and social intelligence among the mass of the people. This quite evidently brings us to the general problem of social education which we will consider in a later chapter.

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CHAPTER XI

IMITATION AND GROUP LIFE

IN addition to communication through language,¹ there are three other forms of social interaction of such great importance in the social life that they demand further and more specific consideration. These are doing as others do, thinking as others think, and feeling as others feel. These have been named imitation, suggestion, and sympathy. But these names are not as exact as we could wish. Evidently they are three closely related processes, and in studying them we shall see the importance in human groups of similarity of action, similarity of thinking, and similarity of feeling.² They are so important for the social life that whole social psychologies have been built upon their study, without much regard for other elements in either individual or group behavior. We shall begin with the study of imitation, relating it more or less to suggestion, but reserving until the next chapter our study of sympathy.

The Nature of Imitation

The word "imitation" is used to cover a variety of psychosocial processes. In a broad sense, all of the processes which

¹ Language has other elements in it, according to linguistic psychologists, than suggestion and imitation, though some suggestion-imitation theorists have attempted to reduce language and all communication to a suggestion-imitation process. See note, p. 220.

² Compare what has been said in other chapters, especially V, VI, VII. Recent psychological criticism has shown that what sociologists and social psychologists have in the past called "imitation" is made up of so many distinct but unrelated processes that if it were not for traditional terminology we would probably not even retain the term.

we have just mentioned are imitative. It will aid clearness, therefore, if we speak of imitative action, instead of imitation, for the motor side of the processes just mentioned. We shall discover that imitative action itself presents many varieties. We shall find that it may be on the level of instinct, of habit, or of reflective intelligence. Many different kinds of imitation or of imitative actions have been pointed out by sociologists and social psychologists. But we find the term ordinarily used for three different sorts of imitative action in human beings.

1. In the first place, there is imitation in the sense of the natural impulse to do what we see others doing. The example of one releases some reflex action in another as is often seen among human beings, for instance, in yawning. This tendency extends far down in the world of animal life. Even among the birds we find instinctive tendencies set off by the sight of the behavior in another individual of the same species or group, although we do not find in the case of the lower animals the learning of new types of behavior by imitative action, as we do among human beings. The brutes do not learn to any extent by imitation, but imitative action frequently occurs among them as a method of instinctive response. The seeing of the action of another individual of the same species, in other words, may excite similar behavior from a similar instinctive basis. In such cases it is usually said that the instinctive response is excited sympathetically. In a similar way an habitual response may also be excited sympathetically. The response is, of course, a more or less unconscious process, and we have no right to think that there is conscious copying of the behavior of one animal by another. For this reason, this type of imitation is sometimes called "unconscious" or "involuntary." In the very lowest animals, we may note, this sympathetic or social method of exciting instinctive responses is unknown. In these lower forms instinctive reactions can be

excited only through appropriate physical stimuli in the environment, and not socially or sympathetically. But among many of the brutes near to man, such as dogs and apes, we often find this sympathetic excitation of instinctive and habitual tendencies. Such a method of exciting instinctive reactions, of course, implies a previous development of group life. It occurs only among social animals.

It seems certain that many of the imitative actions of human beings are of this purely impulsive or unconscious sort. We have a natural impulse to do some acts which we see others doing, even apart from our habits and intelligence. This is most clearly seen in the case of children in such acts as crying and shouting; but there can scarcely be any doubt that example in human society is very powerful in awakening practically all the animal impulses of human beings. Neither individual nor group behavior can be understood unless we bear this in mind. This is one reason why examples of behavior on the animal level are so demoralizing in human groups. Particularly would it be difficult to explain the behavior of crowds unless human beings in crowds, like herds of animals, may have their instinctive tendencies excited sympathetically.

2. In the second place, we often call "imitation" those actions which are manifestations of the desire for conformity to the behavior of one's group. The desire to conform one's own conduct to the conduct of one's group is very strong in all human beings. It is perhaps partly a natural impulse, springing from the love of the approbation of others, but is even more largely a matter of habit and of intelligence. In many people it frequently becomes a passion to do as others do. It is more highly conscious than the first type of imitative action already described, but is still essentially nonrational. Indeed, it is distinguished from the third type by the fact that it is largely without consciousness of the purpose of the imitative action. It is dominated by emotional

and impulsive elements, the mere desire to go with one's group. If there is a general neural tendency to imitate and, in addition, a gregarious or herd instinct in man, as Professor McDougall has claimed, their combination would explain the great strength of the desire to conform one's conduct to that of one's group. Trotter would explain this and, indeed, all imitative action, through the strength of the herd instinct alone in man. But the desire to conform can be explained equally well through habit and group pressure. It is safe to conclude that the copying of others for the sake of conformity, or being at one with one's group, is a matter of natural impulse and of habit, since very few people can give intelligent reasons for doing so. When reasons are given they are usually found to be not true reasons, but rationalizations, in the sense in which that word was explained in the preceding chapter. Yet this type of imitative action is one of the most important features of human social life. It is illustrated by both custom and conventionality imitation, but is probably best seen in fashions in dress and in manners. This sort of imitative action is imitation at its purest.

3. A third sort of imitation is rational imitation, or the copying of the action of another, not merely because it satisfies some impulse, nor yet for the sake of social conformity, but because it is in accord with some rational purpose to do so. We imitate rationally when we exercise rational judgment in our choices, even though we follow the example of some one else. When we adopt some improved tool or method to accomplish something, the imitative action is rational. Such rational imitation, doubtless, grows in part out of the preceding sorts of imitation, but it is quite different from them on account of its large rational and purposive element. It is no longer mere imitation, but a rational response which is imitative in form, just as the first kind of imitation was an instinctive response imitative

in its form. Rational imitation is closely connected with the higher development of the social life of man. It is a method of learning, and hence has been a chief factor in the development of culture.

The Connections of Imitation with Other Mental Processes

Imitation is but one form of interstimulation and response, or social interaction. It is an outcome of both instinct and habit, and is mediatory of both of these fundamental aspects of mental and social life. Without the imitative tendency to guide the expressions of instinct, habit, and intelligence in human groups, anything like harmonious social life would be impossible. For imitation in the broad sense is nothing but that type of mental interstimulation and response which results in uniformity of behavior in the interacting individuals. It is, therefore, closely connected with other processes which tend toward mental uniformity. It is especially closely related to suggestion, which is a process tending toward uniformity in thinking in a group, and to sympathy, which tends toward uniformity of feeling in a group. Indeed, we might define these various terms, respectively, as socially induced action, cognition, and feeling. Imitation, suggestion, and sympathy are thus all closely related processes, and may perhaps be regarded as the motor, affective, and cognitive aspects of one psychosocial process, which is sometimes called "social contagion," and which for want of a better name we may call "mental induction." This does not mean that wherever we find one of these processes, we must necessarily find the others also; but it does mean that these three processes of imitation, suggestion, and sympathy are continually associated in actual social life.

An illustration may perhaps serve to make this point clear. A crowd of men in a panic may show all three of the processes we are discussing working together. Some would

say that the panic is the result of one individual imitating another; others would say that it was the outcome of sympathy, the emotion of fear being sympathetically shared by all; still others might say that the panic was the result of mass suggestion. All three answers are manifestly partly right, for in a panic there is always the suggestion of danger, the sympathetic communication of the emotion of fear, and the imitation of the action of one or more leading individuals by the crowd as a whole. Here, then, we see the three processes working together as three sides of what is practically one process.

Imitative action is also always closely related with certain other mental processes. This is obvious from the fact that individuals are more apt to imitate other individuals of their kind or of their group than those outside of their kind or their group. The consciousness of kind, of race, of nationality, of class, and of social set usually exercises control over imitative actions. It is very seldom that we find imitation wholly outside of one's group, and almost never the imitation of one species by another species. Moreover, imitation in human society is very largely the imitation of leaders or of authorities. It is usually said to be a law of imitative action that imitation proceeds from superiors to inferiors. It would be difficult to explain this fact of the social inferior so uniformly imitating the social superior, if we did not remember that man is a social animal and as such follows leaders, not merely when there is a rational ground for doing so, but even when there is no rational ground. Again, in educated and self-controlled persons, imitative tendencies are guided and held in check by the reason. Thus we see that imitative tendencies are constantly modified and controlled by a great number of other elements, some in human nature and some in the circumstances of environment.

Accordingly, the student should at all times be careful to

bear in mind that there is no general instinct of imitation; that imitative action is a method of expressing many instinctive tendencies; that it is also a method of expressing habits and even the very highest form of rational choice. *Imitation is simply a name for one of the types of interaction between individuals, which may be either on an instinctive, habitual, or rational plane.*

The Nature of Suggestion

By suggestion we mean the process of communicating an idea from one individual to another, when the idea is accepted more or less uncritically or without rational ground. The state of mind which is necessary in order that suggestion may work is called "suggestibility." It is the tendency to believe without proof and to act without sufficient reason. It is the state in which an idea or image, particularly one that is associated with some original tendency or strong habit, becomes more or less isolated in the mind from inhibiting and controlling processes; and hence it tends to work itself out automatically. Hypnotism is an extreme example of the working of suggestion and suggestibility. The normal individual in everyday social life, however, is more or less suggestible. The critical faculties are rarely fully awake. Most of the thinking of the average individual is suggested thinking, just as most of his action is imitative action. Suggestibility is a normal and necessary accompaniment of group life.³ The social animal must be ready at all times to respond to the ideas communicated to him by the fellow members of his group. This is well illustrated by what is called "primitive credulity" among savages, but it is not less to be found in civilized groups. Even in the

³ This was exaggerated by Boris Sidis in his *Psychology of Suggestion* into the theory that man is "social because he is suggestible." The reverse, that he is "suggestible because he is social," is, of course, more nearly correct.

most highly civilized groups individuals are found to respond more or less uncritically to their fellows, that is to say, credulously.

We must admit that no high development of group life is possible without suggestion and suggestibility; but we can scarcely agree with those who claim that man is "social because he is suggestible." Suggestibility represents the receptive, plastic side of consciousness with reference to the rest of the group. It is evidently the cognitive side of the same social process which manifests itself actively as imitation. Suggestion is the stimulus, we may say, and imitation the response. It is a form of stimulus and response which makes for unity of thinking in the group. It thus tends also toward uniformity in behavior. While, like imitation, suggestibility has its pathological manifestations, it must be regarded as a normal and necessary quality in social behavior.

The psychology of suggestion is essentially the same as that of imitation. Suggestibility manifests itself particularly in connection with the great subconscious tendencies of original or acquired human nature. It particularly manifests itself in connection with the instinct-emotions and with deeply established habits. People are more suggestible along the lines of natural impulses and of emotions than they usually are along the lines of habit. Therefore, emotionality is one of the conditions favorable to suggestibility. Ignorance is another condition favorable to suggestibility, because the ignorant mind is rarely critical. We find these conditions favoring heightened suggestibility particularly in crowds and among ignorant masses of people. Because the psychology of suggestion is so nearly the same as that of imitation it will not usually be necessary for us to discuss suggestion as a separate process.

The Imitation Theory of Society

In 1869 Walter Bagehot published a pioneer work along sociological lines entitled *Physics and Politics*. In this book Bagehot set forth the theory that "the main force which molds and fashions men in society as we now see it is unconscious imitation." Since then, many sociologists and social psychologists have put forth suggestion-imitation theories of social life. Perhaps the chief representative of this trend in sociology was Gabriel Tarde, an eminent French sociologist, who in 1890, in his *Laws of Imitation*,⁴ put forth the theory that human social life must be interpreted fundamentally in terms of the suggestion-imitation process. Tarde believed that the influence of one mind upon another was entirely through this process. He claimed that imitation is "the elementary social phenomenon," "the fundamental social fact."⁵ He went so far as to say that imitation is the criterion of the social, and that "society is imitation."⁶ Social unity, according to Tarde, is wholly the result of the suggestion-imitation process. It is, he said, "the effect of that suggestion-imitation process, which, starting from one primitive creature, possessed of a single idea or act, passed this copy on to one of its neighbors, then to another, and so on."⁷ While Tarde left a place in his social psychology for conflict and for invention, yet he found the essential elements even of these phenomena in the suggestion-imitation process. He believed that the laws of imitation are to sociology "what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics."⁸

⁴ Translated into English by Mrs. Parsons.

⁵ Tarde, *Social Laws*, p. 56.

⁶ Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation* (Eng. trans.), p. 74.

⁷ Tarde, *Social Laws*, pp. 38, 39.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Professor J. M. Baldwin⁹ and Professor E. A. Ross¹⁰ developed and elaborated this theory among American sociologists. They guarded themselves against Tarde's extreme formulas, and maintained only that imitation was the method of social organization and development. The individual develops individually and morally, Baldwin said, by imitating the mental attitudes and behavior of those about him, while society changes through the imitation of the thought or action of some individual who is accepted as a leader. Thus the new thoughts and actions originate with the individual; but these are generalized or diffused through the group by the process of imitation.¹¹

It is not necessary to criticize in detail this imitation theory of human society. As a theory it unduly simplifies the social life by slighting the influence of factors other than suggestion and imitation. Important as suggestion and imitation are in social life, there is no evidence to show that they are more important than many other factors. Habits are not wholly acquired by imitation, and it is not true that the learning process is fundamentally an imitative process. It is a process of habit formation, but many psychologists would minimize the importance of imitation in this process of learning.¹² We cannot interpret the social life of man in terms of one of its very general aspects or processes, apart from all the rest of the processes of group life. If we should do so, we would get a very abstract and one-sided view of the social life—one separated from the great forces of organic and cultural evolution, which have made even the imitative process itself; for man is social,

⁹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*.

¹⁰ Ross, *Social Psychology*.

¹¹ Baldwin, *op. cit.*, Chaps. II, III, XII, XIII.

¹² See Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. I, and Pyle, *The Psychology of Learning*.

not because he is imitative, but because his whole nature has been evolved under conditions of group life. In other words, he is imitative because he is social, rather than social because he is imitative.

Imitation as a Factor in Human Society

Imitative action is not the basis or foundation of social life. The association of animals shows us clearly enough that something more fundamental than imitation is involved in the origin of group life. Collective life, social relationships, coördinated activities, exist far below the level of imitation. Imitation, accordingly, cannot be even the exclusive method of carrying on group life; but it is an instrument which social life has developed to perfect its coördinations, its unity. Probably Professor Baldwin was right when he insisted that imitation is the chief means of propagating *acquired* uniformities of action in human groups. All groups that have developed to the point in which *acquired* uniformity of behavior becomes important develop imitative action as a means of group adjustment. Imitation is thus one of the basic things in the development of those higher types of social or group life which depend upon acquired uniformity. This is so because it is the type of social interaction which results in uniformity of behavior. It is, therefore, the great and indispensable means of bringing about unity in the group when uniform action above the purely instinctive level is necessary or desirable. Since imitation makes for social uniformity, it makes for social unity, except in those very numerous cases where unity rests upon difference rather than upon similarity.

It is manifest that imitation must come in to build up most social usages and social adjustments. It is, therefore, a prime means of bringing about the social assimilation of unlike elements in a group. If, for example, we wish to assimilate the foreign born in our national life, we must

get them to imitate the models or patterns of behavior of our national group. Assimilation, however, is more than a matter of mere imitative action. Imitative action simply facilitates the absorption of the standards and attitudes of the group by the newcomer.

We cannot agree, however, that it is imitative action alone which unifies the group. As we have already seen, imitation is only one factor in group unity. Unity depends not so much upon uniformity as upon coördination or coadaptation, and imitation is only one of the forms of social coördination possible between individuals. Unlikeness of activity favors the division of labor in society and, when not carried too far, favors social interdependence, or unity in a group, even more than uniformity of activity. Hence in the more highly civilized human groups imitative action is less necessary to secure unity than in the lower civilized. It is nonrational imitation which especially favors uniformity in behavior in a social group; but nonrational imitation is often unfavorable to the higher developments of civilization. In high civilization we need to teach even the masses to think critically and to show independent judgment. The cultivation of rationality in human society means something far more, therefore, than the promotion of imitative action.

Imitation and the Diffusion of Social Patterns

Whenever and wherever a model or pattern is furnished, the imitative process makes easy the development of the group in that direction. Now as human culture depends upon the accumulation and diffusion of action-patterns in human groups, it is evident that the function of imitation in helping to bring about their diffusion is very important indeed. Through the imitative process habits useful to a group may be diffused throughout its members in a short space of time. A new tool, idea, or standard originated by

one member of the group has only to be copied by the other members in order that the whole group may participate in the benefits of the new invention. Thus the imitative process is a short cut by which the individual profits not only from the inventions of the present, but also from the cultural acquirements of the past. In this way, through what is technically known as conventionality imitation and custom imitation, the whole pattern of the cultural group is carried from generation to generation and even diffused to other groups. Undoubtedly, through this process civilization has not only been preserved but diffused. Some anthropologists think that the diffusion of cultural patterns from some primitive center which originated then has been the essential process of cultural development for mankind as a whole. These anthropologists would agree substantially with Tarde's imitation theory of society.

But this theory leaves out of account the part which originality and invention play in the development of culture. Tarde, as we have seen, would explain originality and invention through the imitative process, but psychologists generally would not agree with him. Moreover, the imitative process is more useful in the lower and middle phases of culture than in higher civilization. A people may become civilized, for example, by borrowing their culture from another people, that is, by imitating a civilized group, but such borrowing rarely develops a social life which shows the strength and cohesion which it would show if there were more originality and self-development. We shall return to this question again, and here it is only necessary to point out that both unconscious and rational imitation play a great part in diffusing social patterns, but that the imitative process has its limitations as a developer of culture, just as we have seen that it has its limitations as a promoter of group unity.

Fashion

Both the power and the limitations of imitation in human society may be well illustrated by considering fashion; for, as we have already said, fashion is imitation at its purest.¹³ Fashion is the copying of the behavior of members of one's group, not for the sake of utility, but for the sake of conformity. Fashion may have in it an element of utility, but its real motive is the advantage of social conformity. It is perhaps best seen in dress, but it affects all the methods, or styles, of living and thinking. There are fashions, for example, in behavior, in manners, in morals, in houses, in furniture, and even in ideas. Because all of these things press upon the individual with the weight of the mass-suggestion of the group, it is very difficult to avoid conforming to them. And yet they may have very little genuine utility, value, or truth in themselves.

It is a mistake to set fashion always in opposition to tradition and custom. In the past in small, isolated communities the only fashions which obtained were usually the customs of generations. They were none the less fashions, however, because they were clearly imitations on the basis of social conformity. In the larger communities of the present, more or less in contact with the whole civilized world, fashion becomes chiefly an imitation of contemporaries rather than of the past. In such communities, owing in part to their emancipation from the domination of tradition and custom, owing also to the accumulation of wealth and so to possible competition in social self-exhibition, fashions change often with great rapidity. As soon as a fashion or style has become general in the mass of a group, those who maintain their social prestige by "conspicuous consumption," or by other means of attracting attention to themselves, feel

¹³ See Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chap. VI.

that they must change their style of dress, of behavior, or even of general living, in order that they may assert their superiority to the mass. Here evidently the egoistic self-assertion of a few comes in to modify the tendency toward social conformity and to set new standards. The few, to whom the masses have come to look for standards along some given line, change the fashion in order to assert their superiority or perhaps to gain economic advantage. The masses of the group, with their habitual tendencies to follow their leaders, imitate the few who assert their superiority. Again the few change the style, and again the fashions in the group change. While this results in great variety in the social life, it also results in much economic and vital waste and not infrequently in social confusion. How rationally to control fashion imitation along all lines has accordingly become one of the great problems of modern civilization. The mere fact that such a problem exists shows the power and the relative independence of the imitation process in human society. Imitativeness is a force to be reckoned with in human affairs.

It must be admitted that fashion imitation has a good as well as a bad side. New ideas of great social value, superior social standards, and even superior modes of general living may, to a certain extent, be spread by fashion imitation; that is, they may become diffused among the masses because they are imitated as fashions from social superiors rather than because their utility or value is rationally perceived. As a matter of historic fact, superior religions, moral codes, artistic productions, and even mechanical inventions have often been thus diffused through the power of fashion imitation. As a rule, such things have to become "the fashion" before they can become embodied as a part of the social tradition. Fashion imitation here shades, of course, imperceptibly into the broader "conventionality imitation," that is, any imitation of contemporaries, of which fashion imitation

is manifestly a part, and which we have already discussed as a factor in social change.

The Behavior of Crowds

Another good illustration of the influence of suggestion-imitation in social life is seen in the behavior of crowds. Crowds are of many sorts, ranging from the mob to the ordinary audience, and a whole literature has been written regarding their psychology. We have space here only to make a few points to illustrate our theory.

In the social and psychological sense, we have a crowd only when we have some unity in the activity of a large group of individuals gathered together in one place. This unity of activity usually comes through some stimulation which excites emotionally the whole mass of individuals in the group. This stimulation at the same time serves to fix the attention of all the members of the group upon one object or in a given direction. Under such conditions of emotional stimulation a group of human beings usually becomes highly suggestible. Moreover, the fixation of attention and the emotional excitement which characterize the psychological crowd serve to inhibit the free working of rational thinking and even of those habits, ideas, and standards which normally guide the individual in ordinary social life. Moreover, the presence of a great number of individuals in close proximity not only increases nervous excitement and suggestibility but also serves to make the individual lose his sense of responsibility. He becomes simply an anonymous unit in a mass. A group of individuals in such a condition is very manifestly apt to behave in an exaggerated manner, differently from what they would in ordinary life. Acquired habits, the control of reflective thought, and the sense of individual responsibility drop away, and individuals are left only with their impulses, emotions, and the example of the crowd itself to guide them. The emotions which are

strongly stimulated also exert a strong inhibiting influence upon other emotions and impulses.

It is no wonder, therefore, as Professor Allport says, that "the reaction of the individual in the crowd is a primitive, unsocialized response."¹⁴ He adds that the deeds of crowd members are not rationally controlled because thought processes in crowds are used only to *serve* instinctive impulses or emotions, and not to direct them. Hence, civilized men often act like savages in crowds. The crowd becomes a mere creature of impulse, liable to follow any extreme suggestion in the line of the emotion which has been excited, because critical thought is inhibited. Crowds thus become capable of performing the basest deeds, though at the same time for the same reason they may act heroically. Social and moral conduct of the highest sort, however, is impossible for the crowd, because its actions are simply the result of a suggestion-imitation process acting upon the level of mere impulse and emotion. Hence, crowds are always intolerant and irrational. They are, therefore, not to be trusted to advance the work of civilization. So far as possible, crowds in the psychological sense should be avoided, or else kept under such control that critical-mindedness and the sense of individual responsibility are kept alive. This is very difficult to do, and Professor Ross's judgment of crowd behavior will always remain valid, when he says:

"It is safe to conclude that amorphous, heterogeneous assemblages are morally and intellectually below the average of their members. This manner of coming together spells deterioration. The crowd may generate moral fervor, but it never sheds light. If at times it has furthered progress, it is because the mob, with its immense physical and emotional force, serves as an ice-breaker to open a channel for pent-up humanity, as a battering ram to raze some moldering,

¹⁴ Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 317.

bat-infested institution and clear the ground for something better. This better will be the creation of gifted individuals, of deliberative bodies, never of anonymous crowds. It is easier for masses to agree on a Nay than on a Yea. This is why crowds have destroyed despotisms, but have never built free states; have abolished evils, but have never instituted works of beneficence. Essentially atavistic and sterile, the crowd ranks as the lowest of the forms of human association."¹⁵

Perhaps these words of Professor Ross should be remembered more in connection with those amorphous crowds which so readily degenerate into mobs, than in connection with more or less organized groups. The essential evil in the crowd is the heightened suggestibility which comes from emotional excitement. This it is which makes a crowd reactionary in its social behavior. Primitive impulses come to expression, and, as Professor Ross says, it matters not under such conditions whether it is a crowd of sages or a crowd of hoodlums. In either case, its members tend to revert to the animal level of behavior. That civilized men are capable of such behavior is a forceful illustration of the power of suggestion and imitation in human society under certain conditions. It is also further evidence that the conditions and forms of human association need to be carefully watched, and that individual character is not alone sufficient to guarantee good social conduct, apart from these conditions.

Imitation as a Factor in Social Order

Both conventionality imitation and custom imitation may be powerful influences in favoring social order. The imitation of one's contemporaries, as we have seen, helps to bring about the unity and order which we find in human

¹⁵ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 126.

groups. This is especially true where the social intercourse of the members of the group is close and intimate. Under such circumstances social groups of all sorts readily fall into similarities of activity and habit which they pick up imitatively from one another. This serves greatly to aid in keeping the life of the group as a whole harmonious.

It is chiefly custom imitation, however, which acts as a conservative factor favoring social order in human groups. The social importance of usages, of customs, and of traditions in preserving social continuity has already been pointed out, and the importance of these processes is, of course, the importance of imitation. We noted how from a very early age the child absorbs imitatively the examples of behavior and character furnished by his associates in his primary groups. In many cases these imitative absorptions from early environment remain the dominant elements in the character of the individual throughout life. Thus are to be explained, without any doubt, the peculiar, local traits which we find in nearly all communities. National peculiarities are very largely acquired by the participation of each individual in the customs and traditions of his country. Even in the industrial and technological realms where rational utility is supposed to reign supreme, usages, customs, and traditions are found, upon careful analysis, not less than in other phases of social life, only more under the control of intelligence.

Social order and organization are, accordingly, very largely conserved through imitative processes. Only the simpler forms of social organization may be supposed to spring directly from human needs or from mere habituation to physical environment, without the intermediation of imitation. In all other cases, imitation acts as a mediating process by which social and cultural forms, and so the order of groups, are preserved.

Imitation as a Factor in Social Progress

The "imitation sociologists" have rightly emphasized the important part which the imitation of new inventions by the mass of individuals plays in social change and social progress. There can scarcely be any doubt that this is the method by which the most striking advances have been made in civilized human society. As we have already seen, the imitation of gifted leaders has been a factor of supreme importance in the social progress of all civilized communities. The importance of this imitation of superior individuals, if borne in mind, will help to clear up some of the obscurities which have surrounded another sort of imitation which has played an important rôle in progress—namely, the imitation of one group by another, or "borrowing."

*The Diffusion of Culture*¹⁶

This latter sort of imitation, the imitation which results from the contact of groups, especially those of dissimilar culture, has been one of the most powerful influences in human history. Civilization has been spread very largely through the imitation of the culture of one group by another. So far as we know, no civilization has ever been developed by a people without borrowings from other peoples. In the history of existing modern nations these borrowings have been so extensive that no modern nation can be said to have developed its own civilization. Western civilization as a whole was constituted by borrowings from the various peoples of antiquity, especially the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans; and in the course of its development it has borrowed extensively even from the civilizations of the Orient. Hence, it is a safe conclusion that every existing culture in the world has borrowed to a greater or less degree from other cultures.

¹⁶ See Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Chaps. VIII, IX.

Now the mutual imitation resulting from the contact of dissimilar cultures has been, on the whole, favorable to social progress. Such mutual imitation has favored the development of social plasticity in customs and institutions, and so has given a chance for rational social selection. Under such circumstances many new social adaptations are made, and if the general condition of intelligence in the group is high enough, these adaptations are usually of a higher type, that is, progressive. The mutual borrowings of the various peoples of the earth have, therefore, not only brought about social changes, but also furthered social progress. Exchange vitalizes culture not less than industry.

The rise and spread of the Christian movement in the early centuries of the Christian Era affords an excellent illustration of the part which the imitation of standards of conduct has played in human progress. There can be no doubt that Christianity, as a set of moral and social attitudes, spread over western Europe largely through an imitative process. Such attitudes, however, failed to spread in Africa and in Asia to any great extent, probably because their spread was limited by certain cultural conditions. In other words, antagonistic usages and customs were met to a greater degree in Africa and in Asia. The acceptance of Christianity by Western peoples, however, has been effective for social progress, not in proportion as its attitudes and standards have been blindly imitated, but in proportion as there has been intelligent assimilation and understanding of these attitudes and standards and intelligent application of them to the social life. In the Christian movement many factors other than mere imitation were evidently at work. As we have already said, the learning process, whether on the part of groups or individuals, is only in part an imitative process. Moreover, it is not pure imitation or fashion imitation, which in the long run is effective for social progress, but rather *rational* imitation. In other words, the imitative process, if it is to result

in better social adaptation, must work in combination with critical intelligence.

*Ethnographic Parallels*¹⁷

The study of social origins illustrates in a very striking and conclusive way both the importance and the limitations of the imitative process as a factor in social and cultural evolution. In spite of the position of one school of anthropologists, there is no good reason to believe that all human civilization has been diffused from a single primitive center. Early civilizations started not in one center, but apparently in many centers. Thus we have no reason to suppose that the bow and arrow were invented as weapons but once, and then spread to all the rest of the world by borrowing or imitation. The evidence seems to show that the bow and arrow were invented several times independently by different peoples. Again, if we take the cultures of the American Indians before the discovery of the two Americas by Europeans, we find no less than fifteen distinct culture areas. While it is improbable that these were unconnected, yet some of them were so distinct that we must consider them distinct centers of origin and invention. It is right to trace connections or borrowings between cultures when they are contiguous or when we can show such borrowings to have existed historically, but we should not assert a connection when there is no evidence. Peoples widely distant in space are often found to have developed closely similar customs and institutions. In some cases evidence of cultural contact and of borrowing have been established; but in many other cases there is no such evidence. Thus, there is no evidence to show that the widespread custom of deforming the skull, which existed among barbarous peoples in at least a half dozen widely separated centers, has spread from some single center.

¹⁷ See Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chap. IX.

How then, shall we explain these "ethnographic parallels" which we find among peoples widely separated? The reasonable supposition is that with similar desires and intellectual capacities human nature has worked out similar ideas and practices, especially in approximately the same stages of culture. Unless we can show that similarities among different peoples are the result of borrowing, they are especially to be explained as adaptations to similar environments. For example, we find similarities in the cultures of the peoples inhabiting the arid plateaus of both North and South Americas. There is little evidence that these similarities were due to borrowing; they appear to be adaptations to similar physical environment. Again, many of the common traits of American Indian groups were due simply to the lack of animals suitable for domestication on the American continent. In general, similarities in the social organization, religion, and technologies of all peoples are to be explained quite as much through the general traits of human nature and the general level of culture, as through imitation of one group by another group.

Accordingly, neither borrowing nor originality, neither imitation nor invention, should be overstressed in interpreting social evolution. Both have played a great part in social development, and it is a psychological mistake to derive one from the other; for originality and invention are closely connected with organic variation. It is a mistake to construct a sociology which leaves human creativeness and variability out of account. But it is equally a mistake to ignore the importance of imitation as a factor in social development; for while heredity, environment, habit, and intelligence continually condition the working of the imitative process in human society, yet within the limits imposed by these it is an important and relatively independent factor. Imitation, as we have repeatedly said, is only a method for bringing about social adaptation; but because in human groups it is

one of the most important methods of social adjustment, group life and human history cannot be understood apart from it.

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CHAPTER XII

FEELING AND GROUP LIFE

IN the chapter immediately preceding this, we noted the close connection of sympathy, in the sense of feeling as others feel, with the suggestion-imitation process. Also in previous chapters we have noted the close connection of feeling in general and of special processes in which feeling predominates, such as interest, desire, emotion, and sentiment, with human behavior and with group life.¹ We shall now need to analyze a little more closely the part which feeling plays in human relations.

The Function of Feeling in Group Life

Feeling, as we saw in Chapter III, is the most primitive evaluator of activity. Probably before even perceptions were formed, action was sensed as either pleasant or unpleasant. Consequently all of the more primary elements in our mental life and in behavior have strong feeling tones attached to them. This is especially true of our relations with other individuals, and so with group life. We saw in Chapter III how feeling was attached both to instinctive tendencies and to habits, and how it might act accordingly in a conservative, a reversionary, or a progressive manner. We do not wish to dwell upon this matter further, but rather to call attention to the fact that all our social life and social behavior are not only embedded in feeling, but largely guided and controlled by feeling. This is particularly true in the case of primary groups such as the family and the local community, but it is also not infrequently true of very large secondary

¹ Compare Chaps. III, V.

groups, such as the state, the religious sect, and the political party. Our world might be more ideal, perhaps, if it could be controlled more nearly by intelligence; but as feeling is the primitive evaluator of action, there can be no doubt that the mass of men, especially those intellectually undeveloped, are controlled more by feeling than by thought. We may recall Professor Cooley's remark that "sentiment lies deeper than thought."² Not only primitively, but even at the present time the behavior of groups is largely controlled by feeling. If this is so, those who would direct and control group behavior must know the feelings and emotions and become skillful in their handling. This has always been true of the great leaders of men, and the scientific guidance of human society must also take feeling into account. It may not be quite true, as Benjamin Kidd asserted,³ that civilization rests upon emotion rather than upon reason. For we have already noted that feeling is an accompaniment rather than an originator of activity. Nevertheless, because feeling gives value to activity, and because our valuing attitudes are largely feeling, it is feeling which chiefly sanctions behavior, at least for the mass of men. In other words, feeling is a subjective process within the individual which powerfully reinforces or inhibits action. Practically, therefore, we can do nothing great without the drive which feeling furnishes to action. From the earliest times, therefore, group life has in one way or another sought to organize and control feeling, to stir up enthusiasm and emotion in one direction or another, to cultivate some sentiments in the group and to discourage others.

Feeling and Social Values

This is particularly seen in the process of group evaluation. Certain values have to be diffused throughout the individuals

² Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 177.

³ Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 124.

of a group in order to secure uniformity of response. These values diffused throughout the group are "the social values," and are very largely the social side of individual attitudes and behavior.⁴ The social values of a group, in other words, are those attached to group usages, customs, and institutions. They secure uniform attitudes toward practically all these regularities in group behavior. When the social values of a group are known, we can predict the behavior of the group along any line with practical certainty. This is particularly illustrated on the economic side of group life. Markets and exchanges are very largely devices to get at the valuing process along various economic lines in a group; and from the values registered in market prices we know approximately what the action of a group will be with regard to some commodity or service.

While society has devised no such machinery as yet to register its moral, political, and educational valuations, yet it is scarcely open to doubt that the valuing process in these other phases of social life plays the same rôle that it does in the economic phase. In other words, social values underlie the social attitudes and social behavior of men. These values become a highly conscious matter in the higher phases of human culture. They may be attached to patterns of action not yet realized as well as to usages, customs, and institutions already established. The values of a group may in other words be forward-looking and idealistic, or they may be simply customary and conservative.

Feeling and Social Motivation

A motive is any spring of action. We have already seen that some psychologists and sociologists have held that the

⁴ This is following Thomas's analysis, *The Polish Peasant*, Vol. I, pp. 20-35. From the point of view of the individual, however, value is the more subjective and attitude and behavior the more objective side of the same process.

native impulses or instinctive tendencies are the sole source of human motives; but the better scientific opinion is that *any active mental process or element in behavior may become a conscious motive*. Without denying the power of natural impulses as motives on the lower levels of social behavior, it is certain that many higher motives are possible. Feeling is especially apt to become prominent as a motive in consciousness, because when our natural impulses or habits are impeded we experience conscious desire; and the main element in desire is undoubtedly feeling. If it is a natural impulse or instinctive tendency that is blocked we will probably experience emotion; for emotion as we have seen is a complex of sensation, perception, and feeling attached to instinctive reactions, or rather, which results when these reactions do not work smoothly. As such reactions have a very strong drive to action, so also have the accompanying emotions. It is for this reason that emotion is considered by many writers to be the great motivator of human behavior. This is probably correct in all great crises of life, whether individual or social; but in the ordinary affairs of life, as we have already seen, we are more apt to be motivated by our ordinary desires, sentiments, and values, which hardly reach such intensity that they deserve to be called emotions, though there is of course a feeling, if not an emotional element, in all of these processes.

It is safe, at any rate, to recognize the fact that feeling is much more than a mere accompaniment of action, but that it reinforces action and thus plays a great part in the motivation of behavior; and that in all crises the great achievements of groups are largely accomplished through the direction of collective emotion. We may probably also agree that "ideas do not have potency of themselves; they derive this from their emotional connections."⁵ At any rate, ideas derive their potency from their connections with feeling and

⁵ Stratton, *Anger: Its Moral and Religious Significance*, p. 4.

impulse. It is also true that the higher energies of men, as James said, are locked or set free by the gates of the emotions.⁶ If we wish to move men we must find ways of appealing to their feelings and emotions. But a question remains, namely, what feelings and emotions should be appealed to?

Typical emotions which have been appealed to in order to bring about desired group behavior in the past have been fear, anger, and sympathy. Perhaps it should be recognized that the appeal to any emotion may have some justification if it is certain that group welfare demands it. However, social psychologists have come to recognize that certain feelings and emotions tend better to unite men, and therefore to secure the higher development of social life, while other feelings and emotions tend towards social disintegration. The emotion of anger and its corresponding sentiment of hatred, for example, while it may tend to unite a group against its foe, will hardly tend, if directed against human beings, toward the integration of all men into one group. Such primitive emotions as fear and anger as a rule therefore do not work towards the higher developments of social and cultural life. It is only when these primitive emotions are brought to support the more socializing emotions of sympathy and love that they may favor higher social and cultural development.

Accordingly we must recognize the division of our emotions into the socially constructive and the socially destructive or disintegrating. In motivating social action, the appeal should be primarily to such socially constructive emotions as sympathy and love, and only secondarily, if at all, to fear and anger. In other words, under most normal human circumstances such primitive emotions as fear and anger, on account of their socially destructive and brutalizing effect, should be kept in the background and made to support the

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

more socially constructive emotions. This is the more true because all the higher social virtues and achievements depend upon friendly impulses and coöperative attitudes. Professor Stratton has perhaps summed up the matter very well, if we take the standpoint of group life and consider its relations to feeling. He says, "The affections, the appreciations—of one's self as well as of others—are the primal forces of life." He goes on to say, "Not even pure intelligence, if one could have it free from all affections, could supply their motive power and leadership." And he concludes, "There are four great emotional impulsions: two that are originitive and leading, namely love and self-interest; and two that are ancillary and supporting, namely anger and fear."⁷ If we accept this position, then it becomes clear that the motivation for social action must be sought largely in the feelings and the emotions, and especially in the sympathetic feelings and emotions. We must accordingly try to see the part which sympathy plays in human group life.

The Nature of Sympathy

Sympathy is a word which has been used so broadly that hardly any two writers attach to it the same meaning, and consequently there has been confusion and vagueness as to the rôle of this feeling element in the social life. There are at least three main types of sympathy in human society; and although they are closely related processes, let us distinguish carefully these three distinct kinds of "sympathy."

1. First, sympathy is often used by social and psychological writers to denote what we have called induced feeling, or "feeling as others feel." This is often called popularly "contagion of feeling," but the better scientific term would be "organic sympathy." It is to be seen in all of the higher gregarious animals. It is easily observed in children and in

⁷ Stratton, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

large masses of human beings, such as crowds, in emotional circumstances. All human beings are apt to reflect the same mood of feeling which they find in their associates. When some one gets angry, another is apt to get angry too; when some one shows fear, others are apt to show fear also. This is probably a conditioned response, but it is also a suggestion-imitation process. Sympathy in this sense, as we have already said, is the feeling side of imitation, or doing as others do. Such organic sympathy is, however, very important in group life. McDougall has called it "the cement that binds animal societies together."⁸ It is, in any case, important as a reinforcement of those uniform activities which help to unify a social group. Like imitation, it is one of the simplest types of stimulus-response and one of the simplest forms of social adaptation. Such organic sympathy may also be regarded as the feeling side of like-mindedness, which we have seen to be so important for the unity of human groups; and it depends not only upon organic similarities but, as Professor Giddings has pointed out, upon the perception of similarities. Even in this broadest sense, however, sympathy is not so much the basis of group life as a psychic means of maintaining and developing the life of groups. Like imitation it implies a previous development of group life.

2. A more common meaning given to the word sympathy among sociological writers is that of friendly feeling, or feeling *for* others. Perhaps a better name for this sort of sympathy would be "compassion." This word, indeed, was originally the exact Latin equivalent for the Greek word "sympathy."⁹ It has come, however, to have a more limited meaning, and distinctly stands for an emotion of an altruistic character. Popularly, however, sympathy is used in nearly

⁸ McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 93.

⁹ Latin, *con*, with, *passus*, suffered; Greek, *sym*, with, *pathos*, suffering.

the same sense, only with a somewhat wider range, covering all sorts of altruistic feelings from friendly feeling to compassion and pity. In other words we may use sympathy as a collective term for various altruistic feelings and emotions.

Sympathy in this sense is not a mere feeling as others feel, but is altruistic feeling. McDougall, who calls this type of sympathy "active sympathy,"¹⁰ argues that it is based upon the gregarious, or herd, instinct. It is certainly closely connected with the family life and with group life generally. It accompanies not only the instinctive reactions connected with group life but also the habits. It is usually non-reflective in character because it is so closely associated with the natural impulses and habits connected with group life. Indeed, sympathy in the sense of friendly feeling may be said to be the feeling which accompanies harmonious association and reinforces man's natural and acquired impulses toward association and coöperation. It leads spontaneously to helping the members of one's group and to mutual aid. It is preëminently "the social emotion" in the sense that it is the name for the emotional attitude which normally accompanies harmonious association and coöperation. Such sympathy is important in the social life as a basis for all the forms of natural affection between individuals, such as friendship and family affection, and also as a basis upon which are built up many altruistic sentiments. Finally, it is important as the basis of rational sympathy.

3. The third type of sympathy is rational or reflective sympathy. It is simply the second type developed, guided, and controlled by reflective thinking. Usually, however, the thinking is not in the form of reasoning, but in the form of imagination. We put ourselves imaginatively in the place of some other person or persons, and thus we are able to understand them and to sympathize with them. The de-

¹⁰ McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-172.

velopment of rational sympathy in society depends, therefore, upon the cultivation of social imagination. It is doubtless for this reason that Ward argued that all sympathy comes from reflection, and that sympathy is "a rational faculty."¹¹ The correct statement, however, would be that sympathy is primarily organic, then impulsive, and only in its later and higher developments does it become reflective. The imagination and reasoning, acting in connection with natural sympathetic emotions, serve greatly to stimulate and develop the latter; but this does not change their essential character. We could not sympathize with people even reflectively if we did not have an organic basis for sympathy. Rational sympathy is, therefore, no more egoistic than other forms of sympathy. We should not be able to identify ourselves with others imaginatively if we did not have some natural altruism to begin with.

Rational sympathy is the most valuable form of sympathy in all the higher phases of social development, because it is subject to rational control. It can, moreover, be cultivated through the social imagination. It is indispensable in building up the higher social and altruistic sentiments which have characterized the most advanced civilizations. Experience has shown that through the cultivation of rational sympathy we most surely direct the activities of individuals in an altruistic rather than an egoistic direction. It is the chief means of motivation of rational altruism.

The Relations of Sympathy and Altruism

Many psychologists have said that sympathy is not altruistic and that there is little or no relation between sympathy and altruism. This is, of course, true if by sympathy is meant only "feeling as others feel," or organic sympathy. On the other hand, a recent questionnaire in a large city elicited the fact that four-fifths of those who contributed

¹¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 423.

to its organized charities said they did so because of sympathy. Evidently these people were using the word in a different sense. The whole controversy as to the relations of sympathy and altruism illustrates the difficulty which constantly arises in the social sciences from the use of the same term in various senses. Hardly any one would deny that there is a close connection between compassion and altruistic behavior. Of course, sympathy as a form of feeling is not the root of altruistic impulses. These are given to us in our organic make-up. All feeling, as we have already emphasized, is an accompaniment of activity, not its original basis. Therefore, the roots of altruism must, of course, be sought in the life-process as a whole rather than in any form of feeling or emotion. However, feeling as an evaluator of activity motivates behavior and modifies an activity either in the way of reinforcing it or inhibiting it; and this is as true of sympathetic feeling as of any other sort.

Therefore, sympathy in the sense of compassion, or even of friendly feeling, does play an important part in the motivation of altruistic behavior. Whether such sympathy is unreflective or rational it accompanies altruistic behavior and reinforces it. It is safe to say that the development of altruism, in the sense of that attitude, whether natural or acquired, which is favorable to others and especially to the welfare of large groups, is impossible without sympathy. Especially are those higher forms of altruistic behavior which civilization finds it necessary to encourage impossible without rational sympathy.

Practically it is correct, therefore, if we use the word sympathy in the popular sense, to regard sympathy as the feeling side of altruism and altruism as the active expression of sympathy. "Love" is often used as a popular term for altruism, and it has the advantage of indicating the large feeling element in altruistic action. For "love" usually implies both a valuing of others and a devotion to their wel-

fare. Our love for a person is our valuation of that person plus our devotion to that person's welfare. It may, of course, be upon a very selfish basis; but in so far as it becomes unselfish, it has to be based upon social sympathy, upon identifying ourselves in feeling with others. All the higher, more ethical forms of love, therefore, imply compassion and reflective sympathy. This is especially true of the love of humanity, as only through social imagination and reflective sympathy can we come to value human beings whom we never see and be devoted to their welfare. Altruistic sentiments in general, and humanitarian sentiments in particular, can be built up in human groups only through the cultivation of social imagination and reflective sympathy. The growth of good will, and especially of philanthropic activities, in civilized human society must be regarded, accordingly, as a development due very largely to the increase of sympathy, especially of rational sympathy. But we have here again the circular type of reaction, because it is not less true that the increase of philanthropic activity increases sympathy and good will.

Our conclusion must be, consequently, that sympathetic feeling is psychologically a very important element in the social life in the way of reinforcing altruism, or action favorable to others. It is hardly possible for good will to exist among the members of a group without understanding and sympathy. Even sympathy in the lowest sense of common feeling produces solidarity of feeling in the group as a whole, and so helps to maintain the unity of the group; while the other forms of sympathy, through suggestion-imitation, spread good will in the whole group. If we desire to develop good will in all humanity, human groups must be persuaded to cultivate more widely and more actively an intelligent sympathy with one another.

The Connection of Sympathy with the Consciousness of Kind

Professor Giddings has pointed out that sympathy is intimately related in all of its forms with what he calls the "consciousness of kind." Indeed, he speaks of it as a *phase* of the consciousness of kind in its broadest sense.¹² Using this phrase in a more restricted sense, however, meaning by it simply "the consciousness of similarity," we may ask, "What is the relation of this intellectual process to sympathy in its various forms?"

There can be no doubt that the relation is a close one. We have already pointed out that organic sympathy is not only based upon organic and mental similarity, but is stimulated by the perception of such similarity. The second and third types of sympathy are also closely associated with consciousness of physical, mental, and moral similarity. Our failure to sympathize with people is often due to our failure to appreciate their similarity to ourselves. Apparently the whole development of sympathy and altruism in animal life has been mediated by the consciousness of similarity. Even in such low forms of life as a school of fish, there is probably some consciousness of mutual resemblance which aids in keeping them together. In nearly all forms of animal life some recognition of kind, of species, seems to accompany sex attraction and parental care, though some experiments would seem to show that in such lower forms of life, such consciousness, if it exists at all, is very vague and indefinite. There is scarcely any doubt, however, that it is the activities connected with the reproductive process and with living together in groups which have genetically given rise to sympathetic feelings or emotions. If the consciousness of kind mediated these activities, it would also mediate the accompanying sympathetic emotions.

¹² Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 278-289, 297.

It will be easier to see this if we turn to human beings. In general, we find it difficult to understand or sympathize with others unless we think of them as essentially similar to ourselves. This is because we can only think of others more or less in terms of ourselves. When apparent differences between two social classes, such as the Negro and the white, or the uncivilized and the civilized, are great, it is very difficult to get sympathy and understanding between the two classes. Indeed, this can usually be brought about only by getting the more cultured class to see that the less cultured class is, after all, not so different. Some perception of resemblance, in other words, seems absolutely necessary as a stimulus to sympathetic emotion.

For this reason, Professor Giddings has laid it down as a law that sympathy between two individuals or between two groups is proportionate to their resemblance, or rather to their consciousness of resemblance, whether actual or potential.¹³ Probably there is no such law, for we often see two similar individuals, who are quite conscious of their similarity, yet lack sympathy for one another; and it is notorious that individuals of different sex or age with complementary differences often sympathize with one another more readily than with persons of their own sex or age. Sympathy seems rather to be proportionate to the harmony of the adjustment or coördination between individuals or groups; and we have seen that this may be promoted by differences as well as by similarities. Yet there can be no doubt that the consciousness of resemblance is closely connected with sympathy in all of its forms. Such consciousness in man acts as a stimulus to his altruistic impulses and thus excites, at the same time, sympathetic feelings. It is, indeed, the intellectual counterpart of sympathy, and may perhaps be considered the intellectual side of the same process. Both sympathy and the consciousness of kind are

¹³ Giddings, *op. cit.*, pp. 297, 298.

psychic means of promoting group unity and, as such, have a very close connection.

The Sympathy Theory of Society

Even older than the imitation theory of society is the sympathy theory. It was first explicitly formulated in 1759 by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Smith defined sympathy as "fellow feeling," and held that all of the moral sentiments were built up on it as a psychological basis.¹⁴ Social and political organization, accordingly, in so far as they were moral, also rested upon sympathy.

On account of the obvious importance of sympathetic feeling and altruistic behavior among animals that live in groups, Darwin, also, pointed to sympathy as the chief factor which might explain the moral life of mankind and the moral aspects of human society.¹⁵ Developing these ideas of Darwin, Sutherland, in his *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, set forth the thesis that "the sympathetic type is the one which is more and more distinctly emergent as we ascend in the animal scale";¹⁶ and he finds that, so far as human society is concerned, "the law of sympathy has been the law of progress."¹⁷ He agrees with Smith in saying that "sympathy in general is the ultimate basis of all moral feeling."¹⁸

Lester F. Ward, also, in his sociology, found a large place for sympathy. It will be remembered that he makes feeling the primary force in human social life. He finds, consequently, that sympathy, as that phase of feeling which is favorable to others, is the basis for all the higher developments in the social life. He holds that it is sympathy which

¹⁴ Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I.

¹⁵ Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Chap. IV.

¹⁶ Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Vol. I, p. 291.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

makes possible altruism and all humanitarian advances in human society. Hence, according to Ward, the essentially progressive forces in human society are the sympathetic feelings.¹⁹

Broader and more carefully worked out are the theories of Professor Giddings. In his *Principles of Sociology*, published in 1896, he set forth a more synthetic theory which, however, recognized the large place which sympathetic feeling plays in human relations. He found the basis for the social life in what he called "the consciousness of kind," which he recognized as a mental state which included the element of sympathy, but also included elements of perception. His thesis was that social unity, social organization, co-operation, and all advances in social adaptation rest upon the consciousness of kind as their chief psychological basis. In his later works sympathy and the consciousness of kind, however, are subordinated to the more fundamental conception of similarity, both physical and mental, as the basis of social or group life; but the consciousness of kind, beginning with organic sympathy and ending with the higher types of sympathy, affection, and the perception of likeness, he still finds to be the chief psychological factor in all social relations.²⁰

There can be no doubt that all the mental states which Professor Giddings groups together under the term, the consciousness of kind, are very important for the social life, and their importance has not yet been adequately recognized by all psychological and sociological writers. However, all of these sympathetic mental processes concern only one side of group life. Sympathy and the consciousness of kind must be regarded as one very important factor, or set

¹⁹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 422-426; 450-454.

²⁰ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 275-355. Compare, however, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chap. XV.

of factors, in group life, but no single factor or set of factors in human nature can furnish an adequate statement for the social life as a whole.

Sympathy as a Factor in Human Society

We are now prepared to see just how much sympathetic feeling and altruistic sentiment are a factor in human relations. We have already pointed out that the feeling attitudes of individuals toward one another are social attitudes, and are very important in initiating and maintaining types of adaptation between individuals. Common feeling motivates, reinforces, and fixes the common activities of a group. Sympathy in the sense of common feeling, therefore, conduces to the unity of the group; for the unity of feeling reinforces the unity of action. In the sense of altruistic or friendly feeling, sympathy is a mental and social attitude favorable to the development of the higher and more harmonious types of social adaptation and coöperation. Thus it is the form of feeling which is especially favorable to group life. It motivates mutual aid within the group. It makes easy complex adjustments which require some sacrifice on the part of individuals. It is, in brief, favorable to the development of those higher types of relationship and of coöperation among individuals, without which the development of higher civilization would be impossible.

Much coöperation exists in human society, to be sure, which is apparently simply the result of the division of labor, and is not accompanied by sympathetic feeling or altruistic sentiments among the coöperating individuals. But it may be pointed out that such coöperation presupposes a certain amount of common feeling among the individuals concerned, and a general high level of development of altruistic traits in the group. We do not mean to imply that coöperation is inconsistent with self-interest, but rather simply to point out that the higher and more complex types of coöperation

cannot be developed in human society upon a basis of self-interest alone. Professor Giddings and others have clearly shown that they depend upon a high degree of socialization of the individual, and that the conscious forms of coöperation depend, in some degree, upon the consciousness of kind and upon sympathy.²¹ Those who advocate the doctrine that the forms of coöperation demanded in civilized society may rest upon self-interest alone as a sufficient psychological basis, without any sympathetic or altruistic feeling being enlisted, are making a serious sociological mistake. Stable coöperation of a complex sort has never existed and can never exist, in human society without some degree of sympathy and altruism. To this point we shall return later.

The great work of sympathy in human groups is to mediate the formation of good will among their members. Sympathy and imagination enable each individual to put himself in the place of the other individual. Human groups prosper in the long run only through their members reciprocally conferring benefits upon one another, and altruistic feeling diffused through the group is the surest way to bring this about. It is only in this way that human societies can develop the good will among all their members which is essential to their peace and highest prosperity. As long as, and to the extent that, good will remains important in human relations, so long and to that extent will sympathy remain important.

The Social Function of Charity

Charity, in the sense of the help of the socially weak and unadjusted, illustrates, as a concrete expression of sympathy in human relations, the social function of this feeling element. When guided by intelligence, charity strengthens social groups by helping those who are out of adjustment with their social life to adjust themselves; by helping the weak,

²¹ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 352-355.

in other words, to become strong and efficient members of their groups. Charity functions, therefore, to increase both the unity and the efficiency of social groups. Rescuing those overtaken by calamity, caring for the sick and the injured, and helping the weak generally increases immensely the sense of group solidarity. Hence, all human groups, from savage to civilized, have had some sort of system to care for their weaker members.

But charity also illustrates the limitations of sympathy as an instrument for bringing about the highest type of social adjustment. Unwise charity often leads to great evils in society. It may perpetuate the degraded and the unfit, and encourage the wicked and worthless. In other words, unless sympathy is guided and controlled by intelligence, it may produce more misery in society than it can relieve. There is much evidence to show that maudlin sympathy is demoralizing both to individuals and to social classes. Manifestly the type of sympathy needed in the complex social life of the present is rational sympathy, a sympathy, moreover, which is so rational that it seeks guidance in scientific knowledge. The form of charity which is especially needed in modern society is, of course, the form which will seek to remove the sources of misery by searching out and removing its causes.

We shall not get rid of the need of sympathy in human society, however, by getting rid of the causes of misery. For human society will always need sympathy among all of its members for harmonious human living. Sympathy is practically a means of developing both social order and social progress in human groups. Let us see briefly in what ways sympathy functions to promote both of these.

Sympathy as a Factor in Maintaining Social Order

In Chapter III we pointed out that feeling was a very powerful conservative factor in human relations, and it

remains only to discuss the influence of sympathy as a feeling factor. While the actual achievement of the organization of groups is not the work of sympathy, yet after any human group has become organized, the rôle of sympathy as a social bond between the members of the group becomes of primary importance to its stability and order. Almost any human group will illustrate this. The family group is especially knit together by bonds of sympathetic feeling; but so also are the community and all other genetic groups. All social groups and classes, accordingly, seek to cultivate sympathy among their members; for the cohesive power of the group might be lost if sympathy did not support it. Individuals, also, conscious that their successful social adjustment in their groups depends upon winning the sympathy of their associates, seek understanding and sympathy from one another. All of this, of course, helps to maintain a settled and harmonious order in human groups. The whole moral life of human groups is, we must admit, closely associated with sympathy in all of its forms. Adam Smith was right to this extent, that morality, as we understand it, could not exist in human society without sympathy. It is especially in the form of altruistic feeling that sympathy reinforces the sense of moral obligation. Pure self-interest may prompt the meeting of moral obligations to some extent; but in the long run such obligations are discharged only in proportion as the altruistic impulses of human nature, which sympathy reinforces, are cultivated and developed. Consequently, we need a high degree of sympathy in human society if we are to have anything like a moral social order. Good will is a prerequisite for such an order in any human group; and sympathy, we have seen, is the form of feeling which mediates the development of reciprocal good will among the members of a group, and motivates that reciprocity in the conferring of benefits which vitalize the life of the group.

The Sentiment of Kinship

In primitive societies we find a high development of what is known as the sentiment of kinship. This must be regarded as a sentiment built upon the basis of organic and rational sympathy plus the consciousness of kind. It was the most conspicuous social bond in all genetic human groups down to very recent times, and played a very important part in maintaining their unity and continuity. This has also been called the "blood bond," which in all uncivilized, and sometimes in civilized, groups has been the chief symbol of the solidarity of the group. Unquestionably this bond was built up on the consciousness of kind, or kinship, and on the natural sympathy between the members of the group. This sympathy and the sentiments built upon it came in time to function, not only to maintain the solidarity of the group, but also to maintain all the habits and customs which had become associated with the group's life. This spreading of sympathetic feeling to everything connected with a group's life made the sentiment of kinship a powerful conservative social force, helping to maintain institutions and customs from generation to generation. Indeed, the sentiment of kinship blending with veneration for ancestors often made progress next to impossible, except as circumstances in the environment compelled readjustments in the group life.

Sympathy as a Factor in Social Progress

The student will remember that in Chapter III we insisted that feeling marks the beginning, as well as the establishment, of activities. It has to do with the selection of the impulses which are allowed to develop, and so with the motivation as well as with the guidance and sustaining of developed activity. Hence, conscious changes for the betterment of human society can be satisfactorily brought about only if the feelings are enlisted upon the side of a change;

for it is feeling which largely motivates the new adjustment, at least upon its individual side. Now, the sympathetic feelings are obviously those which can be most easily enlisted upon the side of changes in human groups. Ward was right, therefore, when he insisted that the great humanitarian reforms of the nineteenth century were to be explained largely through "the growth of sympathy in the human breast." The appeal on behalf of those who suffer wrong and oppression has always been largely an appeal to sympathetic emotions. Any reform movement in human society, to be successful, must appeal to the sympathetic emotions; but, of course, it is the higher and more rational forms of sympathy which must be relied upon as truly progressive forces in the social life.

The appeal to mere emotion may result in sympathy working the harm which we have just pointed out. It is altruistic sentiments developed upon the basis of rational sympathy, such as ethical love and the love of humanity, upon which civilized society has rightly placed a premium. It is the growth of these sentiments which has played a conspicuous part in alleviating misery and opening the doors of opportunity to all classes in Western civilization. The great increase of sympathy and altruistic sentiment in modern society, we have every reason to believe to be one of the best guarantees of continued progress and the ultimate adjustment of classes, nations, and races in our world.²² For progress comes from the diffusion of culture and the goods of culture from a few. A few pioneers achieve a certain

²² The best biological thought of the present is coming strongly to endorse this position, as may be seen in the writings of Conklin, Thomson, Patten, and Kellogg. Thus we find Herrick saying (*op. cit.*, p. 308): "Altruism and idealism grow, expand and propagate as truly as do cunning, acquisitiveness, selfishness and greed; and when once society has definitely set its face toward the higher standards of relationship, no single community can obstruct the general movement."

level and then diffuse their achievements to the many. This has been the history of cultural progress. Hence it is not too much to say that, throughout all human history, human progress has come, through the development of individuals, classes, and nations which have been backward or undeveloped. In other words, progress has come through a leveling-up process in communities, nations, and civilizations, which has gradually extended the achievements and cultural level of a few to the masses of men. It is not too much to say, therefore, that progress in our human world must come through the development of the undeveloped resources in human beings, through the opening of opportunities to those backward in social, intellectual, and moral development. We now see the justification for an earlier generalization, when we said that progress comes through the increase of altruism as well as through the increase of knowledge. The increase of good will among all elements in humanity is quite as important for continued human progress as the increase of knowledge and intelligence.

The Cultivation of Sympathy and Altruism

It becomes an important practical question, therefore, how the higher forms of sympathy and altruism can be cultivated in modern society. In the first place we may note that sympathy may increase simply as activities become more widely extended and interdependent, simply because feeling follows action. To a certain extent the growth of sympathy, like the growth of all feeling, may be merely a result of the growth of activities realized. If we want people to have similar feelings, for example, we have usually only to get them to act alike. Again, if we want one individual to entertain friendly feelings for another, it is notorious that one of the best ways to accomplish this is to get that individual to do something kindly for the other. In human history sympathetic feeling has often lagged behind and been

a resultant of altruistic activity rather than otherwise. One way to cultivate sympathy and altruism, therefore, is to embark deliberately upon a policy of acting in a friendly, helpful way toward others.

But we may cultivate sympathy and altruism through the development of intelligence also. We have pointed out that sympathetic feeling may have, and usually does have, a very real part in initiating altruistic behavior in human groups. Sympathy may motivate altruism; for in man activities of many sorts are gone through imaginatively before being realized in actual practice. Thus, the appropriate feeling tone may be cultivated, and thus, practically, feeling may select in advance the impulse which at some future time may be developed. Sympathy, in other words, may be cultivated through understanding and imagination. Through the development of our consciousness of mental and moral similarities and identities between ourselves and our fellow human beings, we come to understand them and to sympathize with them. While probably not inevitable, sympathy is apt to arise spontaneously between those who perceive their mental and moral resemblances and who understand their similarities in nature and in destiny. Thus the direction of the intelligence to the perception and understanding of our likeness with our fellow human beings increases our sympathy for them and motivates altruistic behavior. The growth of intelligence regarding humanity expands our consciousness of kind; hence such knowledge has been very largely responsible for the expansion of sympathy and altruism in the modern world. Accordingly another way of cultivating sympathy and altruism is to bring about the expansion of our knowledge of our fellow human beings, and especially of their likenesses in nature and destiny to ourselves.

Probably the greatest means of cultivating sympathetic feeling and good will in human society, however, is through

ethical religion. All the higher ethical religions have insisted upon the essential kinship of all mankind, and at the same time, upon the essential oneness of men in moral condition before the Deity. Christianity, especially, has insisted upon the brotherhood, that is, the essential kinship, of all mankind. It has endeavored to make the sympathies and sentiments natural to the family group the standard for all moral and social practice. It has declared that the bonds of sympathy, altruism, and love which are naturally characteristic of the family should be the bonds which should unite all humanity. The great expansion of sympathy and altruism in Western civilization has been very largely due to these idealistic teachings of Christianity. Christianity has thus been one of the most powerful factors in the development of modern humanitarianism. Science must recognize, accordingly, that the sanction given by ethical religion to humanitarian sentiments has been most powerful in promoting their growth. This is, indeed, what we should expect if we understand the essential psychological nature of religion, as the embodiment of the ideal values and standards of a group. The religious sanction attached to those standards undoubtedly gives them an emotional power which they could not otherwise possess. A religion of ethical love, or of the love of humanity, is accordingly supremely important for order and progress in higher civilization.

The Coöperation of Feeling and Intelligence

We have seen that the feeling which most needs to be cultivated in human groups is sympathetic feeling, and in humanity as a whole, the love of humanity. We have also seen that sympathy and love are just as capable of being cultivated in human society as intelligence. If, however, they are cultivated apart from intelligence, and if intelligence and sympathy are not made to coöperate, the total social result may not be one of progress. For example, the nine-

teenth century witnessed the very great increase of humanitarian sentiment, and also a great increase of knowledge and intelligence. Nevertheless, the increase of humanitarian sentiment and of intelligence did not prevent the calamity of the World War. The reason for this is not far to seek. In the first place, the altruistic sentiments cultivated by the nineteenth century were often narrowly limited and partial. In the second place, the intelligence cultivated by the nineteenth century was mainly directed toward the mastery of physical nature. Consequently, the altruism and the intelligence of the nineteenth century were not brought together and made to work together. Oftentimes, one undid the work of the other. Obviously, intelligence should be placed at the service of good will or altruism, and good will should be guided by intelligence if we are to expect the best social results to follow. Intelligence should be developed in the service of social good will rather than by itself. What humanity needs is obviously an intelligent love which is not limited by class, nation, or race. We shall have stable and well-balanced progress only when intelligence and good will are made to work together for the welfare of all men. As Professor Dewey has well said,²³ "The separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy of our present human world."

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CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL ORDER

The Problem of Social Order

By social order we should mean something more than social organization, or even social unity. A low degree of organization or unity might exist in a group without order. When we use the term "order" we refer to the ideal aspect of social organization or social unity. Social order means a harmonious relation between the individuals or the parts of a group. As the problem of social order is the problem of attaining a relatively ideal group life it is a practical and ethical problem. It is not a problem in pure science, but rather an application of the theoretical principles which we have been considering. The problem is: How can relationships between individuals, classes, nations, and races become harmonized? To answer such a question we shall need knowledge of the principles of sociology and social psychology; yet it is evident that we shall be dealing more or less with questions in social ethics.

In a certain sense we have already discussed in the preceding pages the problem of social order. It is evident, in the first place, that all of the factors which enter into social organization or affect social unity must also enter, more or less, into this problem of social order. In many cases, we have already pointed out the bearing of certain factors, such as instinctive tendencies, habits, traditions, imitation, and sympathy, upon social order. The student should, therefore, review all that has been said in the preceding pages concerning the working of these different factors in association,

in order to see clearly how each of them affects the problem of social order, or the harmonization of human relationships.

Such social order as we find in animal groups below the human level is almost entirely an outcome of the effects of geographical conditions, biological constitution, and similarity of instincts, habits, and feeling in the individuals of the group. These same agencies, of course, are often powerful influences in bringing about social order in human groups. We have already seen that harmonious coördination between human beings is aided by favorable conditions in the physical environment, by similarity of biological constitution, and by similarity of instincts, habits, feelings, and ideas in individuals. While a natural social order may result from the working of these factors without intelligent group control, they are mainly the presuppositions of social order in human groups rather than determining factors.

For in all human groups we find at work to maintain social order something we find in no animal group, namely, conscious control by the group itself over individual behavior. In all human groups, in other words, there are more or less conscious and deliberate means used to coerce and to control the individual. These means become organized into behavior complexes which are more or less consciously sanctioned by the group as a whole. These behavior complexes become the habits, customs, and institutions of the group. The social order of all human groups is, therefore, in a sense artificial. It is a product of the culture of the group. It is not simply the natural or spontaneous order springing from instinct, unreflective habit, imitation, and sympathy; but there are added to these original factors consciously accepted customs and institutions. This is shown by the fact that the mores of even the lowest human groups are held by the group to be necessary for social welfare. We see, therefore, that the order of human groups is an achievement of culture rather than a product of nature; that it is espe-

cially a product of agencies of social control which have been devised and sanctioned by the group. We have already considered briefly the bearing of some of these agencies upon social unity; we shall now need to reconsider them briefly in order to see their work in bringing about social order.

Social Control

If the social order of human groups is largely a result of conscious social control, we need to consider very briefly, before we take up the working of the various agencies of control, the nature, phases, and limits of social control. The growing complexity of group life as social evolution advances calls for ever-increasing means of control over individual behavior and character if conflict between individuals and classes is to be avoided and relations among all parts of the group harmonized. This is the reason why human groups find themselves compelled to devise various means of controlling individual behavior and character. Yet evidently a danger is inherent in this whole process of social control, or of the ascendancy of the group over the individual; for the control of individual behavior and character may be such as to prevent normal changes in the group, and so block social progress. Order may result from such control, but at the expense of normal social development, and the price is too costly; for we have already pointed out that such a procedure is bound to result, sooner or later, in social disaster.

Another difficulty in the problem of social control is to get the individual to conform his behavior to the requirements of the group life without stirring up his antagonism and opposition through too much restraint. Just how compulsion shall be applied to the individual to get him to conform his habits of thinking, feeling, and acting to those of his group is the practical problem of control which has confronted all human groups. We shall see that groups have

tried all sorts of means, from the most brutal and despotic forms of government to the most subtle control through suggestion and education. The means of control employed by human groups, in other words, are not always rational.

When the sociologist considers the need of social control, and at the same time the original nature of the individual, he is not surprised to find that human institutions in their efforts to solve this problem have often failed in the past, or that some individuals in the complex social life of the present have come to take a purely negative attitude towards some, if not all, of the agencies of social control. This negative attitude which we find in some individuals at the present time is no doubt due, in the main, to the natural revolt which springs up in individuals when institutions are unduly repressive or when other abuses arise in connection with them. Nevertheless, this negative attitude is hardly rational since, as we have seen, all social organization is necessarily more or less compulsory and restraining in its effect upon the individual. It is evident, moreover, that in very complex social life, the adjustments which the individual is required to make in order to act harmoniously with his group are so difficult that they require increasing collective supervision and control. In other words, we need more social control, not less of it, as social evolution advances; but of course we need more rational and socialized forms of control.

Socialization

A reconciliation of social control and the necessary freedom of the individual is found in the process of socialization. External forms of social control depend upon constraint of the individual, while socialization would place control within the individual. Socialization involves the achievement of self-control on the part of the individual, so that he consciously and voluntarily modifies his behavior and shapes his

purposes to promote the welfare of the whole group. We might say, therefore, that the socialization of the individual, when achieved, results in *social self-control*. We have already seen that the highly socialized individual has a sense of responsibility to his group and, if his socialization is broad enough, to humanity as a whole. He is, therefore, dependable and helpful in social relations, mindful of the value of social usage, but also independent in thought, courageous, willing to experiment, but with full responsibility for the results. He is tolerant, his beliefs are subject to review and modification; he is open-minded, but insistent upon evidence, critical rather than faultfinding, inventive and creative. Hence, in the process of individual socialization we have a method of social control which is suitable to the highest civilization. It creates personal character. In its highest forms it results in the moralization of the individual. It is hardly necessary to add that agencies of social control when properly developed proceed largely through undertaking the socialization of the individual.

Social Morale

The socializing process, when carried to its full and complete development, when it eventuates in social self-control, issues in what has come to be called "morale." It is the morale of a group which especially influences its order. As we have seen, individuals, through participation in the mental life of their group, have their behavior more or less transformed and made to conform to the group standard. If the group spirit is high, the morale of the individual is high, also; but if the group spirit is low, the morale of the individuals is low. Groups always try to discipline and standardize the conduct of their individuals. It is this discipline and control of the individual by the group which brings about the morale of the group. Morale is, therefore, an outcome of the socializing process. Its highest type, mani-

festly, can only be realized when the spirit of the group is one of service to all humanity. But even if no such lofty moral aim animates the group, it is often able, by its spirit, to bring about a remarkable morale among its members. Kidd claims that this group morale is capable of accomplishing anything to which it may be directed over long periods of time. We must certainly agree that the possibilities of social discipline, of social self-control, of social morale have not yet been tried out and are far from being realized in our human world. We see, on the other hand, abundant evidence of the evil results of a lack of social morale in our present human world. It would seem that a rational purpose of all agencies of social control should be to build up the highest type of social morale in individuals. If government and law, religion, moral ideals, and education do not do this they are far from being what they should be. However, we should recognize that the mental life of the group as a whole, or the group spirit, as we have already pointed out, has even more influence on social morale than the special influence of agencies of social control.

Let us now take up the chief agencies which have been employed to harmonize the relations between individuals, classes, and the greater groups of men. As we have already seen, these are government, law, religion, morality, and education. Are all of these agencies needed at the present time in order to secure the high degree of social order which our civilization requires? Or may some of them be dispensed with? Further, how may they be so organized and made to work as not to become impediments to social progress?

Government and Law as Means of Social Control

From one point of view government may be regarded as the chief means of social control in human society in that, as an agency to enforce law, it must be the last resort in controlling conduct in any group. While government, as we

understand the word, probably began as a means of control in time of war, it has extended its control over practically all human activities. Much older than government is law, which is rooted in the habits and customs of human groups. In practically all human groups that we know, however, organized government has taken over the enforcement of law. Both law and government evidently concern themselves immediately with only overt or external behavior. It is only indirectly, as we shall see, that they can take into account things other than objective behavior. For this reason, they represent the minimum rather than the maximum of control which is necessary for the harmonization of group life. They signify what the group will tolerate.

Negatively, the functions of government and law are those of social restraint, to enforce certain social inhibitions and to inflict penalties for their violation. These are what are known as the "police functions" of government, and many nineteenth century writers tended strongly to limit government and law to these functions. But it is a great mistake to think of government mainly in terms of its police powers or to think of it mainly as a repressive agency in society. Whatever may have been the origin of government, practically all writers now agree that its function is constructive, and only incidentally repressive. Positively, government and law exist to harmonize and integrate the activities of the members of the group, first with reference to securing internal order and then with reference to social welfare generally. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the first function of government is "the integration of society." At any rate the social welfare conception of government and law is coming, in all scientific treatises, to replace the negative conception.

As soon as we emphasize the positive functions of government and law to promote social welfare, we can no longer think of these agencies as merely static. They are organs

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As soon as we emphasize the positive functions of government and law to promote social welfare, we can no longer think of these agencies as merely static. They are organs

of adjustment standing above the individuals, classes, and minor institutions of the group, functioning to harmonize the relations of all of these, and so to secure justice to all and to promote the welfare of the whole. Government and law exist to secure social order, but they need not interfere with social progress. They should not so much repress individual and group activity as promote unity and co-operation. In other words, the functions of government under this welfare conception become, as John Stuart Mill said, "coextensive with human interests." It should undertake to do whatever it can do effectively for the welfare of the people. Even if we limit the action of government and law to objective behavior, it follows from the welfare conception that that government is not best which governs least, but rather that which governs most, provided it does so in socially wise ways, so as neither to destroy individual initiative nor to block social progress. This perception has led some social thinkers of the present apparently to endorse the idea that government and law will ultimately absorb and direct all social activities. Such an extension of the functions of government would, however, be impracticable, and would probably be dangerous, even if practicable, because it would overcentralize the system of social control. How far government and law should go in the direction and control of social activities depends upon circumstances. The only safe rule to follow is that of the demands of public welfare.

It is evident that one of the great practical problems of modern civilization is how to increase the efficiency of government and law as regulative agencies. This problem is far from solved even in countries the most advanced politically. The best of modern governments can scarcely be said to be adapted to the work of securing a high degree of social order, welfare, and justice among the conflicting elements of our complex industrial communities. The New

World especially has lost, in part, its tradition of the place and importance of government and law in the social life; and we sometimes say that its trend has been toward lawlessness. The nations of Europe, on the other hand, may seem in some cases to have exaggerated the importance of government and law; but their governments have often been autocratic, and are far from efficient as organs of social justice, to say nothing of social progress.

On account of the tendency of all social groups to be egoistic and to regard themselves as ends in themselves, governments may easily be developed so as to be inimical to the establishment of harmony between the classes within the nation, or of a harmonious world order among the nations. For governments may champion the selfish interests of one class at the expense of others, or of one nation at the expense of humanity. But as we have tried to show, this need not necessarily be so. Government need not be the triumph of the selfishness of one class over the selfishness of another. As an organ of social adjustment for the whole group, it stands in its essence above the contentions of individuals and classes. Its very function is to bring about a just and harmonious adjustment among these.

Nor need the government of any particular nation be opposed to the establishment of a harmonious world order. It is a psycho-social principle that loyalty to one group need not weaken, but may rather strengthen, loyalty to a greater group of which the smaller group is a part. Thus, loyalty to the government within the nation may be entirely consistent with loyalty to humanity, if the national government be made to serve the wider life of humanity. It must be admitted, however, that in democratic nations a government above mere class or national egoism is possible only on the condition that the individual citizens are dominated by ideals of intelligent patriotism and of the service of mankind rather than by mere selfish class or national interests. It is ap-

parent, therefore, that ideal government must be built up through agencies other than government itself.

On account of the tendency of governments to become the representatives of selfish class or national interests, some have advocated the idea that government and law will be dispensed with when social evolution becomes sufficiently advanced. It is said that they are only necessary evils, and are impediments to the unity and welfare of all mankind. This is the doctrine known as "anarchism." Is this anarchistic ideal of no government as a social goal the one to which our knowledge of social evolution points? This question was often answered affirmatively in the nineteenth century, even by those who did not call themselves anarchists. Such an answer, however, shows an utter misunderstanding of the nature of human social life and of the trend of social evolution. Government and law instead of being less needed in the future will become more needed, even though social progress continues and the development of individual character keeps pace. For the more complex adjustments required in social life as social evolution advances need increasingly efficient means of control over individual and group behavior, if social order in our human world is to be preserved. This is why we favor an extension of the functions of government further than our forefathers deemed wise. The whole view of the functions of government which modern sociology has developed leads, as we have pointed out, to the welfare conception of government and law; and social welfare is bound to become an increasing concern as social evolution advances.

Yet government and law by themselves are inadequate means of social control. The control which they can effectively exert must be largely over overt or external acts. It is unwise to use government and law to control the attitudes, motives, beliefs, and intentions of individuals, and all attempts of governments in the past to control these effectively

have ended, as we have seen, in social disaster, because such attempts lead to the undue repression of individual liberty. Government and law alone do not, and can not, go deep enough to secure the highest type of social order, or indeed any type which is adequate for the social life of the present. Their control is too crude and external, too late in beginning with the individual, and too intermittent in its pressure upon him. Hence all governments have sought the aid of religion and education to supplement their efforts in securing social order. Because of the relatively external nature of government and law, they are effective as means of social control largely in proportion as they support, and are supported by, religion, morality, and education. Probably the chief support of democratic government is education; hence the chief function of democratic government should be to support education.

Religion as a Means of Social Control

Government and law fail as means of social control because they fail to reach the springs of human action; they fail to socialize the motives of individuals. Evidently human groups need a means of bringing their values and standards to the consciousness of the individual in the most intense way, if they are to control the behavior of the individual effectively. This means of control human groups have found in religion, because it adds a supernatural sanction to the patterns of conduct sanctioned by the group. These patterns become, when sanctioned by religion, not only social patterns, but divine ideals or commands. Thus they are impressed upon the individual consciousness in the most intense way, and hence become a powerful means of social control. As many able writers on religious psychology have shown, religion is essentially an idealization of social values and a projection of them into the universe. Thus it gives social values not only a character of universal and absolute

validity, but also a meaning and sanction which make them more effectual in controlling social behavior.

Negatively religion presents itself as a form of social constraint. In its earlier development it especially associates itself with all the "taboos" or prohibitions of the social group, or of its dominant class. It invokes the fear of supernatural agencies who will punish the violators of these prohibitions. It, therefore, creates an imaginary environment which constrains the behavior of the individuals. Religion is thus a method of reinforcing habits of action which have been found to be safe by the group, or which are believed to conduce to the group welfare. It is a powerful support, therefore, of social order, but at the same time, it can be easily exploited by a dominant class in its own interests. This conservative aspect of religion has been perceived and emphasized by so many writers that some have tended to ignore its other social aspects. But despite the fact that it must be acknowledged that religion has often been made an impediment to progress and an instrument of class oppression, this conservative aspect of religion has led some writers, even those of strong antireligious bias, to find in it, though uncritically, the analogue of instinct in the animal world or of gravitation in the physical world. In any case, religion even in its lower phases manifests itself as a harmonizing and order-preserving element in human groups; and it does not lose this essential trait even in its highest developments.

But it is a mistake to think of religion mainly in terms of its static or conservative aspects. Progressive religions are exceedingly rare in human history, taking it as a whole; but there is no necessity for religion being opposed to progress in the higher stages of cultural evolution. It may, indeed, become a chief stimulus to progress. The values which religion sanctions can as easily be those not realized as those which are customary. It can as easily attach its sanction to ideals and attitudes which are progressive as to those which

are static.¹ The higher forms of religion, the ethically idealistic religions, become instruments of social order in a higher sense than merely sanctioning an existing order. They attach their sanction to moral and social ideals beyond the existing order of things.

There is, therefore, an intimate connection between the higher types of religion and social idealism. This is shown sociologically in many ways. The higher religions have, for the most part, taken their ideals from the family life; and we have seen that primary social and moral ideals in general come from the primary groups, such as the family. In general, as we have said, religion is an idealization of the higher social values of human groups. If the values of the group are conservative, then, of course, its religion becomes conservative, even to the extent of becoming a stumbling block to progress. If, on the other hand, the social values of a community are progressive, then its religion, too, will become an instrument of progressive social order. Religion may not create progress, but it may greatly aid it by sanctioning it. Those religions which stimulate the altruistic impulses and feelings of the individual lay a foundation for social progress. They educate the will and the emotions so that they are brought into line with social intelligence. Thus they make possible higher types of social order in which the relations between individuals become more harmonious because they are more sympathetic. In proportion, therefore, as religion sanctions altruistic conduct on the part of the individual, in that degree it helps not only to harmonize the relations among the group, but also to secure the establishment of a *just* social order. It thus aids prog-

¹ The old theory that religion is primarily based upon fear is, of course, an exploded myth in psychology. The higher religions are based much more upon gratitude, love, and compassion, and, as pointed out in the previous chapter, these are sentiments favorable to progress.

ress. It is evident that if we wish to harmonize the relations of all individuals, classes, nations, and races, we must have a religion which will sanction those values which attach themselves to the life of humanity as a whole; that is, a humanitarian religion. Such a religion would be a powerful aid in promoting good will among men, and so in the establishment of an ideal world order.

The higher religions are also favorable in other respects to social order. They give a fuller meaning to life and stimulate hope and courage; they also strengthen endurance in suffering and prevent social pessimism and degeneracy. Religion is, therefore, intimately associated with the morale of a group. By strengthening loyalty to high social ideals religion not only promotes social idealism in the group, but also increases stability of character in the individual, which in turn makes for harmonious as well as stable relations among individuals.

It is no part of the business of sociology to pass upon the truth or falsity of any religious belief; but as a science it cannot ignore the social effects of religion. Are these socially favorable effects which we have just pointed out only incidental, and can they be just as well secured by some other means of social control? So far as social psychology can discover, there is no substitute for religion as an instrument of social control. Man must have confidence in his world, he must have faith in the system of things, if he is to work harmoniously with that system. He must believe in the possibilities and the value of life, if his energies are to be fully released. He cannot believe that the universe is a "fool's house" which will make his highest endeavors but foolishness in the end, without coming to despair of social idealism. He is under the psychological necessity, in other words, of projecting his values into the universe, and this, as we have said, is essentially the religious attitude of mind. But the values projected are social values, and when thus uni-

versalized by religious feeling they come into consciousness again with reënforced validity and intensity. They thus become, as standards, more effective for the control of social action. It is no accident, therefore, that religion has been so intimately connected with social order throughout human history, even to the extent that the decay of religions has usually been associated with the decay of particular types of social order.

The belief that society in the future will be able to do without religion rests, then, upon about as unsatisfactory a psychological and sociological basis as the belief that society will be able to do without government. Religion will become more necessary as social life becomes more complex, for the reason that there will be more necessity for social control; that is, greater need of reënforcing social values in just the way which religion does. One of the gravest and most disturbing signs in the social life of the present, therefore, has been the decay of effective religious beliefs. Hence, too, one of the greatest practical needs of present social life from the standpoint of social order is a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life. Much has still to be done, evidently, to secure such a religion; for narrow ecclesiastical forms and religious beliefs which are predominantly theological rather than ethical in their content are still the rule in the modern world. What is needed is a socialized religion, a "religion of humanity," which will make the service of man the highest expression of religion. We need to get rid of medievalism and reactionary conservatism in our religion. The real business of religion is to create a righteous world. The higher forms of Christianity are developing in this direction.

The church, as the concrete institutional expression of religious life, while often backward and socially inefficient, so far from being an outgrown institution in society, evidently has before it a field of social usefulness such as never ex-

isted in any past stage of social development. As the organized embodiment of the religious life of the people, it ought to be the public conservator and propagator of all ideal social values. This is its distinctive function. This means that it must become largely an educational institution, "an ethical culture society" in the best sense, an intimate group in which the highest ethical culture will be diffused to all who come within its influence. Until we get in every community a church which is thus efficient socially, we cannot expect to develop and maintain a high type of social order.

Morality as a Means of Social Control

As we have just implied, religion secures its social effects chiefly by giving a supernatural sanction to ethical standards and ideals. Like religion, morality goes to the innermost motives of the individual and secures social order through the socialization of his inner nature. In other words, it controls behavior at its source. No social order, so far as we know, has ever existed long in any human group without being based upon some accepted moral standards or code of the group. The group sanctions for conduct, which we have called the mores, are coextensive with human society. It is not difficult to understand why this is so. Proper moral ideals and proper moral practices, or virtues, are necessary for human beings to live together in harmonious relations, and if high enough standards in these could be realized, that would probably assure the harmonization of relations among individuals. What we call the moral is, indeed, nothing but the social raised to a more or less ideal plane. But moral ideals are often one thing and social practices another, and one of the constant problems before human society is how to get these two things to coincide.

This was simple enough in the more primitive forms of society; for the only morals which such groups knew were a sharing of customary standards. While we are still prone

to identify moral standards with customary standards, yet on the whole, we now believe that morality is essentially a sharing of ideals. Hence, the discrepancy which arises in our society between social practices and our professed moral ideals. This conflict between our customary standards and our moral ideals is, of course, due to the fact, which we have already pointed out, that we are undergoing a transition from a lower to a higher stage of social evolution. The significance of our moral ideals is that they are largely patterns for social behavior and social relations not yet fully realized. We shall be able to make our moral ideals moral customs only when our present moral ideals are more fully accepted as patterns for social behavior.

It would be a step in this direction if we could secure the general recognition of the fact that the virtues do bind men together in harmonious social living; that without justice, honesty, veracity, and loyalty, for example, there can never be anything in civilized human groups more than a shabby semblance of social order. Moral codes and standards, while they may seem to be largely negative and in the nature of social inhibitions, are nevertheless the positive basis upon which social order rests. Even the very fact that these codes and standards change from age to age proves to the social psychologist their intimate connection with social order; for this fact proves that they have to do with maintaining a given social order under given conditions.

However, we sorely need a more progressive morality and moral standards than those which are prevalent among the mass of the people in modern civilization. As the social life becomes more complex higher types of morality are needed. Negative and repressive moral standards need to be replaced by positive, constructive ideals. The virtues that suffice for a population living under relatively simple conditions of life are rarely adequate under more complex conditions. Standards of conduct have to be continually raised to secure the

higher types of social order needed as civilization advances. The problem is again how to secure a corresponding rise in the level of social practice in the group; for practice tends to lag behind standards.

A step in securing correspondence between moral ideals and social practices is to be found in the universal recognition of the social nature and social importance of morality, especially, as a means to social order. As long as our society countenances such doctrines as those of Nietzsche that morality, especially altruistic morality, is an impediment to social progress, we must expect grave social disorders to result. The tendencies toward immoralism in the modern world are among the gravest signs of social decadence. Like all other forms of social control, morality, instead of being less needed as culture develops, is more needed. Only it must be a morality which keeps pace with the changed conditions of life, one which is progressive and not merely repressive and conservative. The ethical problem of the present is how to expand our narrow class, national, and racial standards into a morality which is truly humanitarian. To secure the recognition of a completely universal morality, the principles of which shall be regarded as binding in all human relationships, and which shall put the claims of humanity above those of any minor group, is the first step toward ending the social disorders of our present world.

Humanitarian Ethics

If only such a system of ethics is adequate to support our complex civilization, which ethical system among those popular to-day accords best with the results of psychology and sociology? The ethics of pleasure, or the hedonistic system of morals, which would put the pleasure of the individual as the highest good of life, is very obviously antisocial and anarchistic in its effect upon society. It works toward individual gratification and self-indulgence rather than toward

social conservation and social achievement. It is, therefore, essentially destructive of social order. This has usually been seen by the more careful social thinkers. On the other hand, "self-culture" ethics, or the ethics of individual self-realization, has often been commended as in accord with the demands of social progress. But self-culture, or self-development, may easily become regardless of the welfare of others, and when it does so, it becomes as essentially anti-social and destructive of social order as hedonistic ethics. Moreover, self-development, as a practical moral ideal, has frequently worked in our civilization toward the exploitation of society for the benefit of special classes and privileged individuals. Any purely individualistic ideal of self-development must accordingly be condemned from the standpoint of social order. Both the hedonistic and self-culture ethics of the nineteenth century must be considered as inadequate to meet the needs of our complex civilization.

It is evident that we need a system of ethics which will state the moral ideal in social terms. If humanity and its welfare is to become the unit for moral living, then *the moral ideal must be pictured, not as a perfect individual, but as a perfect society consisting of all humanity*. Such humanitarian ethics will teach the individual to find his self-development and his happiness in the service of others, and it will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from regarding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of humanity. It is only such ethics which will tend to put an end to the series of endless conflicts between classes, nations, and races which the modern world is witnessing.

Such a system of ethics would be both constructive and synthetic from the social point of view. It would be constructive because it would tend to preserve and develop all the values connected with world-wide social order and progress. It would be synthetic, because it includes all elements of permanent value in human life. It includes, for example,

the ideal of self-development, because the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life is the first condition for the realization of such a moral ideal. It also includes the happiness of the individual as a necessary element in the moral ideal, for the most harmonious social life can be secured only by the widest diffusion of happiness in human society. Thus, a humanitarian system of ethics, or the ethics which make the service of humanity the end sought by the moral life, is synthetic of all that is worth while in the hedonistic and self-culture ideals; but it avoids the social dangers inherent in those ideals because it emphasizes not self but humanity as the unit of the moral life. Such a system of ethics alone can secure that high development of sympathy, understanding, and altruistic behavior which is needed if harmonious relations among individuals, classes, and races are to be developed and maintained.

But systems of moral ideals and moral standards are important in human society only in so far as they affect the character and the conduct of the individual. It is individual character of a high and stable type upon which an ideal social order must rest. We have now, therefore, the problem of considering how this high type of individual character can be produced.

Education as a Means of Social Control

The social character of the normal, adult, human individual is not a matter of heredity. It is a product of the psychosocial environment, and is formed mainly in the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence. The education of the young, therefore, furnishes the most subtle and the ultimate form of social control because it controls in the developing individual the formation of habit, and so personal character. Hence, education must be the chief means of socializing the individual and the main reliance of civilized human

society in securing higher types of social order. If properly carried out, personal education should furnish to the developing individual at the plastic period of life a controlled, artificial environment, especially a psycho-social environment of the proper ideas, standards, and values. It can, accordingly, mold individual character in almost any direction which heredity makes possible. It can secure more difficult forms of social adjustment than government, law, religious, or moral sanctions can secure by acting upon the adult individual; for it secures social control through self-control, that is, through socializing the attitudes and values of the individual. It can, moreover, function more easily to secure a social order which is *progressive* than the other great means of social control; for government, law, religion, and moral codes tend to become static. So too, under certain conditions, do educational institutions; but in theory we can as easily educate for a social order higher than the one which exists as for any social order which exists.

Of course, the education of the individual is given by more institutions than the school. The home and the church are also educational institutions of the utmost importance. But the formal education of the school is becoming more and more of central importance in the education of the young. Hence it is to the education of the school that we must look largely for the solution of the problem of social order. Obviously, the education which will bring about a high degree of social order must be something far different from the commercialized education which now prevails. It must be a thoroughly socialized education which will coöperate with, and have the coöperation of, all the other agencies of order in our society. Government and law, religion and moral ideals must work through education to have their full social effect in sustaining social order. The school should, therefore, in its education, work to conserve and develop these instruments of social order. Social education should not

be thought of as separate from these other means of social control. Rather it is simply a method by which the other means may be more successfully realized.

Hence, a problem of social education is how the positive and constructive sides of government, law, religion, and morality may be made evident to the individual, and the individual brought to coöperate in a rational way with these agencies of social control. To some extent our education is undoubtedly doing this, but the problem would seem to be in the main still one to be solved. Education itself must become more popular among the masses; and at the same time it must popularize the work of government and law, of religion and morality. Education has too often become popular through giving up its character as a means of social control and appealing to the individual merely as a means of selfish success in life. But a socialized education must evidently attempt not only to give a social view of government and law, religion and morality, but also to bring these means of social control to their maximum state of efficiency.

Social education should teach the individual to regard these great civilizing agencies not so much as instruments of restraint as means of social development. As long as these agencies for social control remain in their present low state of development we cannot expect the realization of any high degree of social order. In every civilized nation they are as yet far from a rational stage of development. This is in part owing to social indifference and ignorance; but it also in part is due to the growth in modern civilization of negative doctrines regarding government and law, religion and morality. These doctrines have become widespread in our civilization largely through sociological ignorance, and are a real impediment to securing and maintaining a high type of social order. While such doctrines doubtless originated in the main from the abuses of government and law, re-

ligion and moral standards, yet it is time that scientific students of human society and scientific social education should unite in demonstrating to all that none of these agencies of social control can be dispensed with, and that, therefore, the only rational question is how we can secure the best development of these means of social control. Evidently only when social education concerns itself with bringing these agencies of social control to their highest state of social efficiency can we expect the realization of the highest state of social order. What is evidently needed is that institutions of social control should be more understood from the point of view of their social meaning and purpose; and to accomplish this should be one of the prime aims of social education.

Like-Mindedness and Social Order

Among social thinkers Professor Giddings has especially emphasized that a stable social order must rest upon like-mindedness. That he is essentially right in this view has been clearly implied in our discussions in previous chapters. Indeed, if social order of any sort is to be established in a group, there must be fundamental likenesses among its individuals in the primal elements of human nature. There must also be fundamental likeness in acquired habits. There must also be sympathy and mutual understanding among all the members of the group. A natural, spontaneous social order, as we have already said, rests upon these fundamental psychic similarities in individuals. In the more complex human groups there must also be similarity and agreement with regard to the more fundamental standards and values of life. The higher types of social adjustments between individuals, as we saw in Chapter V, rest upon and are mediated by coördinating ideas and feelings. A stable social order of high type, therefore, necessitates a high degree of like-mindedness among the individuals of the group.

Yet there is a danger of exaggerating the importance of like-mindedness in social order. Differences as well as similarities among individuals are necessary and advantageous in complex groups, as Professor Giddings himself has fully recognized. Complementary differences, as we have seen, conduce to harmony of relationships among individuals. Without such differences we could have no division of labor and no complex organization in human groups. Moreover, if there were no differences in the beliefs and behavior of individuals we should have no variation in the social life, and hence, as we have seen, no progress. There can be no question, therefore, as to the value of differences in ideas, ideals, standards, and behavior in the progressive societies of the modern world. We undoubtedly need to appreciate more the value of these differences and to be more tolerant of them; for they have value not only for social progress, but also for social order.

However, these differences, if they are to work for social order, must be of such a sort that they will fit together in an organic whole. This is what was meant when we said they must be complementary differences. It is undesirable from the standpoint of social order that individuals should be mere copies of each other in their personal character, if such a thing were possible. But there is an extreme social disadvantage if there are too great differences between the individuals of a group in their mental and moral make-up. There must be fundamental resemblances if there is to be harmonious coördination of their activities. When their standards and ideals of life are too far removed from each other, conflict in the resulting habits which these represent is inevitable. Moreover, when these conflicting standards and ideals relate to fundamental social conditions, there can be no doubt that their disharmony is certain to bring disharmony in the group and is opposed to the development and maintainance of any high type of social order. Comte was

perhaps the first sociological writer to emphasize this fact. He pointed out that the social disorder of his time was largely to be attributed to the disagreements that existed in social life concerning fundamental things. Hence, he declared, "Stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order."

The Conflict of Ideals

With Comte we must say that stability in our institutions cannot be assured as long as the present conflict between ideals of life continues. People are now, not infrequently, utterly divided regarding the most fundamental values of our social life. In the main, however, there would seem to be only one safe method of bringing them into lasting agreement regarding the ideals of life; and that is through the development of our scientific knowledge regarding our social life. It is the task of social science to settle upon the basis of established knowledge the disagreements in opinions and beliefs among individuals. If there is no hope through science of bringing men to more unanimity and more genuine unity in their opinions regarding the values and ideals of life, then there is no hope of solving the problems of our civilization through science, and also no hope of any high, harmonious type of social order emerging from the strife of the present.

Of course, in practice, science alone cannot bring about this desirable agreement among men with regard to the ideals and standards of life and conduct. The truths of science must be fostered and applied in the actual work of life by government, law, religion, morality, and education. Nevertheless, the work of science is the chief hope of all rational minds of establishing standards which will be accepted by all because they rest upon established facts. In the long run, therefore, the work of social science should be supremely important in establishing order in human rela-

tions; and among the sciences dealing with human social life, the work of sociology is particularly important, because it deals with the most general and fundamental relations of individuals. When science in general fully recognizes that its social task is this work of correcting erroneous opinions and standards, and of synthesizing ideas and values so that the true view of human life shall emerge, we shall not lack sufficient like-mindedness in civilized society nor, ultimately, a high and stable social order.

Conflict and Social Order

In recent years, a certain school of sociological writers have tended to make conflict a normal, if not an ideal, element in all social life. If nothing more is meant by conflict than the normal competition between individuals, interests, and ideals in the social life, there is little objection to this belief. Conflict of this sort is the natural condition of the selective process and is not inconsistent with social order of the highest type. It is a struggle for higher and more advantageous adjustments, and usually results in good both to the group and to the individual. There is an element of necessary conflict in ideas, tendencies, and behavior in all social change and adaptation, as we have seen. It is upon this basis of conflict, or competition, between individuals, ideas, standards, and habits that selection is made. Such competition in a group must be considered, therefore, a necessary method of progress in no sense opposed to social order. At its highest and best, it becomes a generous rivalry or emulation in the realization of the highest possible social values.

But those who glorify conflict in human life do not mean this normal competition of life. The word is ambiguous, and the conflict school of sociologists seem to mean by it the primitive, unregulated struggle between individuals and groups—what we might more properly call “hostile conflict,”

in which individuals or groups attempt to injure or to worst one another. Now conflict in this sense is not only opposed to social order, but is the antithesis of social order, because there can be no harmonious relations between individuals or groups when conflict of this kind exists. We have already pointed out that conflict of this kind is abnormal in the life of a group,² marking the breakdown of normal social adaptation and reversion to a primitive, brutelike level. Such hostile conflict, to be sure, may result in social order, and even in social order of a higher type, through the elimination of lower types of groups or individuals. This fact may be conceded; but it should not obscure the further fact that this is a primitive method of securing order which modern civilized societies might advantageously dispense with. It is a brutal and unnecessary method, because the socializing and civilizing agencies of the present may secure rational social adjustment of groups and individuals without resort to such means. Brutal and unregulated forms of conflict are destructive to higher culture and therefore should not be tolerated within the pale of civilization. They usually defeat the very ends for which they are employed, because they are apt to prove so destructive to the finer social sentiments and to the higher social values that they result in more or less reversion toward the social forms of barbarism. Force, and especially violence, is impotent to establish harmony in our human world. There is, therefore, little hope of social order of the higher type issuing from hostile conflicts. This is true of any form of unregulated struggle or conflict in society, whether between individuals or groups. The process of civilization has been a continual replacement of unregulated forms of struggle or competition by regulated, socialized, moralized forms.

² See Chap. V.

The Problem of World Order

The problem which especially confronts our civilization is whether it can replace the lower, unregulated, brutal forms of struggle between human groups by the higher, regulated, moralized forms of competition. As long as war between nations lasts, and even as long as settled antagonism and hatred between classes and races continues to exist, there can be little ground for hoping for the establishment of any high and stable social order. The attitude of hostile conflict is a negative and destructive element in human relations. It is a sign of dissociation or of social dissolution. Accordingly, one of the greatest tasks before our civilization is to put an end to the lower and more brutal forms of conflict and competition between individuals, classes, nations, and races and to establish peace and harmony among them, and coöperation in the work of life.

How can this be done? The development of rationality and good will in individuals is obviously not sufficient, because there is no assurance that such individual rationality and good will will express itself in group behavior. Moreover, if such a development is wholly individual there is no guarantee of its persistence. To become effective for social order good will and rationality must be organized into human institutions. All human communities have found this to be necessary in establishing any sort of social order. If we wish world-wide social order, we may reasonably conclude that the same principle will hold true. The good will that exists among the individuals of civilized nations must become organized if it is to become effective for world-wide peace and order. Unorganized good will is no more effective in human society than any other form of unorganized power. A world order presupposes, therefore, some organization among the civilized nations. If we wish to prevent war, we must have the forces to prevent hostile conflict so organized

that they may become effective in controlling the behavior of nations. We must find a way to substitute law for war.

Within the nation and the state, and even within every community, there is also need of more organization of good will if social conflicts between classes are to be avoided and social coöperation assured. While this organization may be achieved perhaps in part through voluntary agencies, it would seem more economic and efficient to make it largely a public matter and to use the agencies of social control already in existence to organize this good will; that is, the agencies of government and law, the school and the church. We come, therefore, again to the conclusion that these agencies of social control must be perfected before we can achieve any high degree of social order, and that social order in higher civilization is quite entirely dependent upon the organization and efficiency of these agencies of social control. Until these agencies are perfected the world cannot hope to escape from its present disorder. We cannot, at any rate, get world order from conflict, nor any stable and lasting order through force. Such order can come only through the understanding, the agreement, and through the established opinions, sentiments, aims, and organized coöperation of all the nations. To this end, if it is to be realized, government and law, education and religion, must each make its contribution.

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CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL PROGRESS

The Problem of Social Progress

Social progress is not strictly synonymous with social evolution or social change. Progress implies an amelioration of the conditions of human life. A theory of social progress is, therefore, beyond the limits of strictly pure science, since such a theory looks to the practical. The theory of progress is as much ethical as sociological, and perhaps the sociologist must leave to ethics the final determination of what social progress is.

But the social sciences have certainly much to do before ethics can construct the final norms for determining progress. The differences between various types of social change, the factors that work in each, the possibility of their control, the nature and consequences of such changes, will have to be determined largely by sociologists before ethics can set up its norms of progress. As we have repeatedly pointed out, there is no valid reason for any absolute separation of the work of the various social sciences when it comes to these points where their work naturally and logically overlaps. We have seen that the ultimate motive for the development of all science is practical, to give man control over the experience of life. Sociology and social psychology must become ethical, that is, they must have a forward and practical look, if they are to be useful.

What light can they shed upon the social changes of the future, upon the direction of those changes, and upon means of controlling them? In particular, what is the relative im-

portance of the human and the nonhuman factors in bringing about social changes which we judge progressive? Can the human dominate the nonhuman elements, so that man's social destiny may be said to be, to some extent at least, in his own hands? That is, can social progress be rationally planned and scientifically controlled? Are human culture and human society modifiable through "taking thought"? If sociology cannot give some sort of scientific insight into these questions, it is certainly, as Ward long ago insisted, the most useless of all sciences; for why should we study social changes unless for the sake of controlling them? And why should we seek to control social evolution unless we can get some relatively definite scientific criterion as to the direction which it should take?

It is hardly necessary to tell the student that this book has been an endeavor to furnish a scientific basis for answers to these questions. We have tried to show that sociology is vitally related to human life and destiny, and that this is particularly true of its psychological phases. Practically all that has been said, therefore, has a bearing upon the theory of social progress. We have tried to show how the foundation for man's social progress was laid by organic evolution, especially in his superior capacity for intelligent behavior. We have seen also that the native impulses and feelings of the individual, especially the so-called altruistic impulses and feelings, have been indispensable conditions of social progress. We have seen how man's power to learn, how the slow accumulation of knowledge, standards, and values, has been the basis for each successive advance of culture; how imitation has served to diffuse and generalize inventions throughout mankind; how the expansion of the consciousness of kind and of sympathetic feeling have made possible wider and more harmonious adaptations among individuals and groups. Our *whole* theory of social progress must, therefore, be sought in all the preceding chapters. Nevertheless,

there remain certain conceptions to clear up and certain generalizations which need to be drawn in order to make clear our theory of social progress.

The Nature of Social Progress

We shall attempt no formal definition of social progress. Professor Hobhouse has said that social progress means "the growth of social life in respect of those qualities to which human beings attach or can rationally attach value."¹ But what social changes do we attach value to, or should we attach value to? For one thing we attach value to changes which bring increasing control over life and its conditions. Mechanical inventions, economic prosperity, increased skill in combating disease are considered marks of progress because they give man greater control over physical nature and enable him to adjust himself better to his environment. Discoveries within the realm of physical science are for the same reason usually regarded as marking progress. But we also call changes in political conditions and in social standards which enable us better to control and harmonize relationships between individuals and groups indications of progress. They aid man to control the social conditions of his life. New means of coöperation, new forms of association which better harmonize the interests of individuals and reduce conflict among them, new knowledge of human nature or of ways of living together, are regarded as indications of progress because they mean increasing control by man over himself and his social relationships.

We must define social progress, accordingly, in terms of social control.² This perception enables us to see that social progress is not opposed to social order. Social order, also, we saw, is an outcome of social control, and is, of course, a

¹ Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 8.

² Compare Professor Faris's statement, quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2d edition, p. 961.

condition of progress. The control which we call progress, however, is of two sorts; first, control over physical nature, and, second, control over human nature and human behavior. These two sorts of control are not rigidly to be separated from one another. The control over physical nature we usually call material civilization, while the control over human nature and human conduct we call moral civilization. This correlation of progress with civilization, or culture, brings forcibly to our attention the fact that all that we call social progress in human groups is really cultural progress of one sort or another. When we see that social progress is essentially cultural progress we can scarcely remain skeptical as to its reality, and it will not perhaps be difficult to understand its exact nature.

For all culture has been a development by man of means of control over physical nature and over human behavior. Culture is the double mastery of man over physical nature and over himself. On the physical side it has moved from the making of the simplest tools to the most complex mechanical devices of our present civilization. On the social side it has moved from the purely animal or instinctive form of association to the most elaborately devised social and political systems. All this movement in culture has meant greater control by man over his physical and social environment. It has given him, therefore, greater capacity to survive, greater efficiency in the tasks of life, and finally, it has made possible greater harmony in the relations of individuals and of groups. Progress must be defined in terms of control, but it is control having a certain direction; namely, the increasing of men's capacity to survive, the increasing of their efficiency in achievement, and the increasing of harmony in their relations with one another. Perhaps these three tests of social progress are as good as can be devised; namely, increased capacity to survive on the part of individuals and groups, increased efficiency in work of both individuals and

groups, and increased harmony among individuals and groups in their relations with one another. In brief, social progress is control over physical and human nature, which increases rather than subtracts from the sum of human values.

Many other marks or tests of social progress have been proposed by sociological writers. Some sociological writers of the nineteenth century gave an entirely subjective definition of social progress. They claimed that it might be adequately defined in terms of the increase of the human happiness; that it consists essentially in passage from a state of social hardship, fear, and discomfort to a condition in which comfort and happiness are generally diffused throughout society; or, as others phrased it, in passage from a "pain-economy" to a "pleasure-economy."³ We would not deny that true social progress must work ultimately for the increased happiness of mankind. But such a subjective criterion of progress cannot be accepted, as increased general happiness is at most only one element in social progress. Popularly, of course, such a hedonistic criterion of social progress appeals to the unthinking; but from the general theory of feeling which we have presented, it is evident that an increase of happiness in social life can be regarded scientifically only as an accompaniment or outcome of the processes which make for progress, but not as a certain criterion of progress.

Other sociological writers have proposed objective tests of progress. Some have made the chief criterion of social progress increased complexity of social organization. But it is doubtful if increased complexity of social structure has any close connection with progressive social change. It is entirely conceivable that complexity of social structure might increase without increased rational control over the condi-

³ Compare Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 161, and Patten, *Theory of Social Forces*, Chaps. IV, V.

tions of life; that is, with decrease in the capacity for survival, in social efficiency, and in social harmony. Such a purely morphological conception of social progress is not adequate for scientific purposes, even though we acknowledge that increasing complexity of social organization has in general marked the changes which we call progressive. Other sociological writers have claimed that social progress consists in the increase of the division of labor and of interdependence in the social life; but the criticism which we have just made of the conception of progress as increased complexity of social structure applies in principle also to this conception.

More scientific are the concrete tests for social progress which have been proposed by Professor Todd.⁴ He proposes a variety of criteria of progress, such as an expansion of the numbers of men; increasing health and longevity; increasing wealth; greater emphasis upon intellectual values; wider participation in all material and intellectual gains; wider concepts of truth; greater liberty, greater order, and finally, greater solidarity in mankind as a whole. These concrete tests are of undeniable value, but they surely can be reduced, as we have already said, to two: increased control over physical nature and increased control over human nature and human relations, such as will increase the sum total of human values. Since all social progress is cultural, it is in the nature of collective achievement in these two directions. It means a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence, whether the conditions to be met are physical or social. Hence, social progress means better adjustment of all factors in the life of a group, whether internal or external, to a wider, more universal environment. It means increasing rational control over all the conditions of life. The conception which we finally come to is this: *social progress is increasing rational*

⁴ Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, Chap. VII.

control over all of the conditions of social existence, whether these are internal or external, resulting in greater capacity for survival on the part of individuals and groups, in greater efficiency in performing the tasks of life, and in greater harmony among individuals and groups in their relations with one another.

It is evident from this provisional definition of social progress that the ultimate subject of progress must be humanity as a whole rather than smaller social groups, because if the relations between the various groups which make up humanity are not harmonized, if humanity as a whole does not show more mastery over itself and its environment, social progress will defeat itself. In other words, social progress cannot be permanent unless the results of progress are gradually diffused throughout humanity. Social progress requires better adaptation to a universal environment, and this means that humanity must be its subject. This is not saying, of course, that relative social progress may not take place within smaller social groups, but only that it will be unstable unless it is shared ultimately by the largest possible human group, humanity. This matter we shall discuss further in the last chapter of this book.

It is also evident from our definition that social progress to be permanent must be well-balanced. If there is lack of control over some of the conditions of existence, this lack of control is bound, sooner or later, to affect the control achieved along other lines. For example, our control over physical nature cannot be permanent if we do not achieve control over human behavior and human relations. This is perhaps a sufficient answer to those who say that there is no such thing as general social progress, but that there is only progress along certain lines and in certain directions. This may be true for a time, but human culture must move as a whole if it is to remain well-balanced. One-sided or unilateral progress, sooner or later, is bound to defeat itself.

All progress must, of course, be in concrete lines and in specific directions; but the general level of culture and of social well-being as a whole must be raised, sooner or later, if the whole social life is not to be thrown out of equilibrium. It is ill-balanced progress which proves an illusion.

If we accept provisionally this conception of progress in terms of man's control over himself and over physical nature, for the positive increase of social well-being, then certain questions remain: What causes social progress? What factors determine that social changes shall be progressive rather than retrogressive in their nature? How may these factors be controlled? These questions have been discussed to some extent by nearly every social thinker from the time of Plato down to the present. Nearly every possible theory of social progress has been set forth, but most of these theories have been what we might call unilateral, that is, they have been based upon the perception of some single factor at work in progressive social changes. We cannot review all of these theories, but it is necessary to pass some of them briefly in review before attempting to set forth a sociological theory of progress.

The Anthro-Geographical Theory of Progress

Certain social thinkers have found the causes of human progress in certain favorable conditions, or in crises, in the natural physical environment, such as in the conditions of climate, soil, food, topography, and the general aspects of physical nature. Perhaps no one has ever believed that these geographical conditions are adequate alone to explain human progress; but certain thinkers would make these conditions preponderant or determining in social progress.

Buckle, in his *History of Civilization in England*, gave a classical expression to this view. He endeavored to show that indirectly geographical conditions operating through economic conditions would determine social progress. The

geographical conditions in Europe have been favorable for man's mastery of physical nature, he argued, and so have been the prime factors in the development of the European civilization. For that reason, he thought, no high development of civilization which would be permanent could be expected outside of Europe. Other writers of this same general school have held that climatic conditions which stimulate the energies of man, such as are found in Europe and in parts of North America, are the prime causes of social progress; or that the conditions of food supply in relation to men's needs determine social progress. Food supply, these writers say, is the immediate stimulus which gives rise, through the efforts made to control it, to invention and discovery and all control over nature and human relations. Food supply, moreover, determines the size of the social group, and this determines its culture. The equation of food and population offers, therefore, these writers say, when its full reactions upon the social life of man have been examined, the explanation of the really significant movements in human history.

That favorable conditions, and also crises, in man's natural physical environment do play a part in his social and cultural development, there can be no doubt, and in Chapter II we tried to point out briefly, but carefully, just what their part is in the social life-process. But a geographical theory of social progress is too simple to show all of the active factors that work in that process. If it were an adequate explanation, geographical conditions should make progressive societies out of animal groups. Social progress does not always take place when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable physical conditions in the past prevented social retrogression. The civilization of Greece and Rome went down, although geographic conditions did not appreciably change. The truth is that geographical conditions are only conditions, and not causes, of social progress.

Physical nature furnishes the materials and perhaps, to some extent, the stimulus for progress; but the real causes must be sought in man himself. Physical nature is static; but culture and social life are dynamic. Cultures are often radically changed without appreciable changes in the physical environment, or at least in geographic conditions; on the other hand, geographic conditions are often changed through the migration of peoples without appreciable changes in their culture.

In conclusion, we can say that the geographical determinists, in general, have failed to show any definite and certain connection between changes in climatic and geographical conditions and well-known historical social changes. In the early history of human society the influence of geographic conditions upon social and cultural changes appears to have been more marked; and throughout human history, as we have already pointed out, both favorable conditions and crises have played a large part in the development of human civilization because they have acted as stimuli to human behavior. There can be no doubt that the natural physical environment through selection, habituation, and stimulation has been a very large factor in human social evolution, and that it has furnished the framework within which that process has taken place; but in itself, it is quite inadequate to explain social progress.

The Biological or Racial Theory of Progress

Many social thinkers have held that the determining factor in social progress in human groups is that of race or biological constitution. Quite evidently the geographical theory neglects this internal factor of blood or heredity. From the standpoint of biology this theory evidently has a great advantage. For modern biology explains the difference in the life of various species of animals mainly through their biological constitutions. Why should not this theory

then explain quite adequately the difference in the life and culture of various human groups?

From all that we know about biology it would seem certain that racial heredity is a factor in social evolution; and that even the biological peculiarities of individuals enter very largely into social reactions. This we pointed out in Chapter II, and we may acknowledge that without sound physical heredity there would be but little hope of continuing human progress. We cannot admit, however, from our scientific evidence that the advocates of the biological theory of a social life are right, when they claim that the quality of civilization is entirely determined by the matter of breed or race.

Even if we admit the very large importance of individual and racial heredity, biological nature is inadequate to explain social progress, because, as we have repeatedly pointed out, human groups have so much in their collective life which does not come to them in a biological way. We have seen that so much is acquired by each individual in his lifetime, that all that we call culture is thus acquired, and that social tradition plays such a large part in passing along the possessions and the achievements of the past that the biological constitution of the individual does nothing more than furnish the potentialities of social and cultural progress. The human child is born a savage, or perhaps, we might say, a mere animal. All that he does in the way of distinctively human development, so far as his behavior is concerned, is a matter of individual acquirement. His biological constitution furnishes him only the basis upon which his social and cultural progress takes place. Doubtless this foundation must be sound if a sound superstructure is to be reared; but racial progress and social progress are two very different things.

This becomes plain enough when we compare the condition of European society to-day with its condition four

thousand years ago. So far as we know, the biological constitution of the European peoples four thousand years ago was not different from what it is to-day, except that the heredity of the various stocks was then probably somewhat sounder. During the four thousand years the social progress of Europe has been enormous; but we have no right to speak of any corresponding racial or biological progress. The physical constitution of our early European ancestors evidently furnished the potentiality of social progress; but as it has not changed appreciably within that period, it cannot be regarded as the active factor in the many progressive and retrogressive social changes that have taken place in Europe during the last two or three millenniums.

It is evident that race like geographic environment is static, while human society is dynamic. If neither race nor geographic environment is sufficient to explain social progress when taken alone, may they not be adequate when taken together? May we not say that the races of men are like trees, each bringing forth its fruit, in the form of a particular culture, in due season in accordance with its nature and environment? Such a statement shows a psychological and sociological misunderstanding of the whole nature of social progress. It implies a simple organic conception of the social life, rather than a psychological and cultural conception. As we have just pointed out, race and geographic environment are among the most static and unchanging factors in the social life. They are conditions rather than causes of social progress. They furnish potentialities rather than active factors in social progress. Both psychologically and sociologically there is no evidence to sustain the belief that culture and social progress are the result of the co-working of merely two factors, race and geographic environment, though we may admit that they are most important among the original physical conditions.

The Economic Theory of Progress

Among the most popular theories of social progress with historians and social scientists at the present time is the theory that social progress depends upon economic conditions, that is, upon the system of industry and technology, of the production and distribution of material goods, at a given time. In many circles of social thought of the present time this theory is the dominant one, not only of social progress, but also of social evolution. Its popularity is largely due to that vague, popular belief which identifies economic prosperity with social progress; but its spread and acceptance have been largely due to its advocacy by the Marxian socialists under the name of "the materialistic conception of history," though they have been aided not a little by the work of certain economists who have advocated the same theory under the name of "the economic interpretation of history."

The original statement of the theory, in the words of Marx, was that "the method of production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life-process in general."⁵ With Marx, the theory was essentially one of the determination of consciousness and of human behavior by the material conditions of life. The methods by which the means of subsistence were produced and distributed in society, he argued, would in the end determine the ideals and standards of the general social life. Hence, all other social processes are dominated eventually by the economic process. For example, government and law, religion and morality are only superstructures growing out of economic conditions, and in the long run will change with these conditions. Accordingly, social progress is determined by the methods of getting a living, of producing and distributing wealth. In the hands of Marx and his followers this doctrine was con-

⁵ Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, Author's Preface, p. 11 (translation by Stone).

verted into an instrument of revolution; for the practical inference which they drew from the doctrine was, of course, that if economic conditions are made right, other social conditions will spontaneously right themselves. This is the form in which the theory is popularly held, for as we have pointed out, there is a strong tendency in our society to identify economic prosperity with social progress, or at least to believe that social progress will take care of itself if economic prosperity is diffused to the masses. The masses also believe uncritically that a just economic order which will assure an economic surplus to every one will be a sufficient guarantee of human progress. Some scientific social thinkers, who should be more critical, apparently agree to these propositions.

In recent years this economic determinism, as we may rightly call this view of human society, has been combined with the Darwinian theory. It is said that all of man's progress must come in a form of adjustment to his material environment, and that as a matter of fact the material environment to which he adjusts himself at the present time, so far as it is not merely geographic, is economic. Our system of industry and its technology, in other words, furnish the environment to which adjustment must be made by individuals and groups. Selection, whether natural or rational, it is said, must work upon the basis of this environment. There may be variations; but in the long run social life and culture must conform to its material basis, and this material basis is the economic system. Thus economic determinism issues with a new dress, clothed, so to speak, in the robes of the Darwinian theory, and proclaiming that the norm to which social adjustment must be made is that of the economic system prevailing at any particular time. Our only hope of social progress lies, therefore, in changing the economic system which is the norm of adjustment in social life at any given time.

As thus stated, the theory is a clear theory of the environmental determinism of social progress, though there might still be some mystery as to the nature of the forces which change the economic system. Perhaps it is for this reason that the theory becomes, with many writers, a confused jumble of objective and subjective factors. In these writers, not only do objective economic conditions, technologies, and "goods" fall under the caption of "economic," but also human interests, desires, and ideas. However, the more scientific advocates of the theory state it mainly in objective and environmental terms. They hold that human interests, desires, and ideas are mere reflexes of economic conditions, and that the system of industry and technology at any given time is the basis upon which all else in the social life builds itself up as a superstructure, and which in the long run determines the whole character of the social life. This statement corresponds with the popular statement of the theory which we noted above; namely, that if objective economic conditions were made right, other things in human social life would spontaneously right themselves. The "other things" in social life, in other words, are considered more or less of a reflex of objective economic conditions.

That there is much psychological and sociological truth in this theory, the preceding chapters of this book have certainly indicated. There can be no doubt that much of the stimulus for social changes comes from the crises and maladjustments in what we may call "the system of social maintenance," in other words, the economic system. There can also be no doubt that that system does furnish, at any particular moment, an environment which demands and even necessitates more or less adjustment to it on the part of individuals and groups living within the system. Thus our economic or industrial order does furnish the great framework, the main outlines, of our civilization. For understanding the main distinctive features of our culture, or of any culture, we must

turn, in a great degree, to its technology and industrial organization. Admitting all of this, the question still remains, is this an adequate theory of social progress? Are the psychological factors involved in social change mere reflexes, as this theory claims, in the long run determined by objective economic conditions?

While we may grant that the theory of the economic determinism of social progress includes important factors neglected by the two preceding theories, yet it overlooks even more important factors. It is not in accord with some of the fundamental principles of sociology and social psychology which we have pointed out. It regards the organism as passive rather than as active and creative. The mind of man is regarded not as an active instrument of adaptation, but as a more or less passive reflex of the environment. Behavior and ideas are, according to this theory, merely a function of the environment, and not, as we have seen, a function of both original human nature and the environment. In order to qualify as an adequate scientific theory of social evolution, this theory must prove itself to be an adequate theory of the determination of behavior and consciousness by the material conditions of life. This it has not yet done, and it must be doubted if it can do so for many reasons: (1) because of biological variations which spring from the forces resident within the organism; (2) because of the part played by native impulses in determining the interests and behavior of the individual; (3) because of the creative nature of the human individual. In other words, the organizing and creative or constructive tendency of the higher phases of the human mind, such as imagination and reasoning, is quite left out of account by this theory. Psychologically, therefore, the theory is built upon an inadequate foundation. It assumes the discredited psychology of the nineteenth century as a necessary presupposition.

Sociologically, the theory is equally weak. Scientific social

study has shown that the most important source of the ideals and standards for group behavior are not economic conditions, but the interrelations of the members of the group. The source of social ideals is personal and social rather than economic. As we have already seen, for example, the source of the primary ideals is the life of the primary groups, such as the family and the neighborhood. These groups are found everywhere in all stages of industrial development; and hence they dominate the more intimate standards and ideals of social life far more than the particular industrial system.

In other words, this theory makes the wrong assumption that the primary adjustment which the individuals of a human group have to make is to things; whereas, in reality it is to other human beings. The norm of adjustment for individuals of a group is not to the economic or the industrial system, but to their psycho-social environment as a whole. If this were not so, material culture should have developed in advance of language, religion, and morals; but as a matter of fact, we find these latter phases of culture developing in early human society not infrequently in advance of the system of material technology. Thus, anthropology clearly shows, for example, that language got its development much in advance of the industrial system or system of technology. The Fuegians have a highly elaborate language of over thirty thousand words, while their technology is the very simplest. Again, the Bushmen of South Africa have a very elaborate language with a rich vocabulary and oral literature; but their system of technology or of industry remains but little in advance of that of primitive man.

Human history shows that cultural traits of various sorts often change quite independently of technology or of industry. In the history of the world, peoples' moral, religious, artistic, and scientific ideas have often changed without appreciable changes in their systems of industry. Thus the

Jews apparently reached the stage of henotheism, if not of monotheism, while they were yet in the pastoral stage of industry. On the other hand, peoples have not infrequently changed their systems of industry without appreciable changes in their fundamental moral, religious, and artistic ideas. Thus the Chinese, even though they left the pastoral stage of industry more than two thousand years ago, have remained ancestor worshipers down to the present—a form of religion which is supposed to be closely correlated with pastoral industry. The only scientific conclusion which we can reach, therefore, is that there is no such exact correlation between the different phases of culture and social life as economic determinism presupposes. *Socially prevalent ideas, standards, and behavior are not necessarily reflexes of economic conditions.* Rather, to understand why they prevail we must usually turn to the social tradition or to the psycho-social environment.

Yet there may be much practical truth in this one-sided sociological theory, because it does emphasize one important set of factors in the social life which have often been overlooked. The social life of a group must have a certain harmony about it if the group is to maintain its unity. While some elements of culture will fit together, others will not. Hence, a change in the method of getting a living frequently does necessitate extensive readjustments in the whole life of the group. Perhaps the same cannot be said for changes in scientific knowledge or in moral, religious, or artistic standards. Sometimes changes take place in these latter without appreciable changes in the material life of the group. Nevertheless, changes in these things are apt, also, to bring about changes in the whole social life. Our habits of response to certain classes of stimuli affect, to a certain extent, our habits of response to all other classes. This is because of the unity of the personality of the individual and of the interdependence of all phases of the social life. But while it follows

that the economic phases of social life must affect, to a very great degree, all other phases, it does not follow that they determine them in any definite way or to any such extent as the economic determinists have thought. Economic conditions in the main are conditions rather than causes of social progress. Critical scientific study leaves the doctrine of economic determinism, in the sense that economic factors dominate the whole of social life and culture, without adequate scientific foundation.

But, it may be asked, is not the economic factor in the social situation the one that changes, and, consequently, the one to which we must look for the explanation of social change? The reply is that it is not the only factor in the social process which changes, and that changes in other factors are often antecedent to economic changes. Indeed, as we have seen, the processes of invention and discovery are those by which the material aspects of human culture, such as technology and industry, have been built up; and these processes, while dependent upon general social conditions, and especially upon crises in the system of maintenance, are, nevertheless, essentially psychic and personal in their nature. The economic situation furnishes stimuli; but, as we have seen, scientific psychology does not find external stimuli to be the full explanation of any response. We saw in Chapter X that the intelligence of man, manifesting itself in the invention of tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, and improvements in the means of communication, and in discovering the laws of phenomena and properties of things, has been the real basis upon which the structure of civilization has been reared. And we must remember that human intelligence is not concerned alone with things and with man's relation to things, but even more with the relations of men to one another and with the standards and values which guide and motivate conduct. The real motive force for social progress, then, lies within the individual and

within the life of the group, and not in the objective conditions in the physical environment. These latter are, as we have said, the conditions, but not the causes of social progress.

But this conclusion does not exclude the view that there is a certain justification for the predominatingly economic character of the social consciousness of our time; for we must admit the essential dependence of all higher forms of civilization upon economic conditions. In a sense, the dependence of man upon economic conditions increases as civilization advances; for with the growth of technological and industrial systems, the economic environment comes to have a good deal of the same relation to civilized man that the geographic environment had to primitive man. In other words, the type of civilization becomes very largely dependent upon economic conditions. Like the physical environment, the economic system presents the platform upon which social progress must continue. But, also like the physical environment, the economic system is not so much a rigidly determining element as the basis upon which we act. It furnishes certain conditions and certain stimuli to development in certain directions without which a right development of the whole social life would be impossible. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that the emphasis upon the importance of economic conditions in our social life should just now be obscuring the importance of spiritual factors; but there can be no question, from the standpoint of social psychology, that before many of the higher mental and moral adjustments can be successfully made in our social life, economic conditions will have to be made favorable to these adjustments. This may be only a preliminary step, perhaps, in true social progress, but *it is a step which must be taken before we can have a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its social existence.*

Hence the sociologist and social psychologist must be heartily in favor of all those social reforms which aim at

securing economic justice in our present society. He must be in favor of removing those social and economic inequalities which hamper the normal physical, intellectual, and moral development of the individual. He must favor, in other words, the securing to each individual of the economic minimum which is necessary for right living and social efficiency. He may heartily unite with social workers in approving such movements as that for compulsory insurance against the contingencies of life, such as sickness, accident, unemployment, old age, and invalidity; the movement for a minimum wage sufficiently high to make possible a human standard of living; the movement for labor legislation which will protect the worker against accident, disease, and too long hours of labor, and remove children from industry; the movement for reforms in our present system of taxation, such as will furnish adequate revenue for social needs and at the same time serve to redistribute wealth and equalize opportunities. All these and many other economic reforms are necessary preliminaries for the highest degree of social progress. The industrial poverty which characterizes our civilization ought to be abolished, and there is no reason why it cannot be without social revolution. Full recognition of the importance of psychological factors in our social life does not lead, then, to unduly minimizing the real importance of objective economic conditions. It leads us rather to see that material progress is only a part, though a necessary one, of general social progress. When the material conditions of life have been properly cared for, there still remain mental and moral adjustments to be made, which, indeed, must be made to keep step with material progress if civilization is to realize any harmonious development. It is the overlooking of this fact which makes the economic theory of progress psychologically, to some extent, a danger in present society.

Psychological Theories of Progress

The theories of progress which we have thus far discussed emphasize what we may call the relatively nonhuman factors; for they place the determining factors in progress and in its control largely outside of man. This is true even of the economic theory of progress, especially when stated in its most rigid form. For its extreme advocates have represented the succession of methods of getting a living and of technology as something inevitable and almost mechanical. The psychological theories of progress, on the other hand, have usually represented social progress as within human control, for they emphasize one factor or another within the mind of man as the instrument of progressive adaptation.

We have already seen that *progress is essentially a learning process*, a process in which man learns gradually better ways of living through better control over external conditions and over his own behavior. We have also seen that this process of increasing control depends upon human inventiveness, and that human inventiveness, in turn, depends upon imagination and reasoning. The imagination of man has enabled him to make new patterns to guide his behavior, and so to make new tools and new institutions. But the imagination and reasoning have to act upon the materials furnished by experience. Hence, knowledge has to accumulate through experience before imagination and reasoning can devise new controls over physical nature and human behavior. Mistakes, of course, may often be made in these new devices. Whether they furnish a superior means of control or not, can only be told by testing them out in the real world. Hence we may say that the method of man's progress has been *experimental*. It has been a method of trial and error, but, with the accumulation of knowledge and experience, less and less of blind trial and error. Through his imagination man has been able to test out experimentally

in advance the effect of his new patterns of behavior and of his new values. This is particularly true since the advent of the scientific method, though we should not overlook the fact that reasoning has always consisted, to a certain extent, of performing experiments in imagination. Thus, as we have tried to show in the preceding pages, the intelligence of man in its distinctively human phases of imagination and reasoning has been the supreme instrument of adaptation and control in human social life; that like all instruments of adaptation, however, it has at times functioned inadequately; but that we may expect it to function more adequately just in proportion as it perfects itself through the accumulation of tested knowledge. The accumulation of knowledge is then one of the positive bases of all social progress.

Scientific sociology thus shows us the element of truth and the limitations of the so-called ideological theory of progress. It shows us that the accumulation of knowledge and the resulting growth of intelligence is one of the dynamic factors in social progress, but not the only factor; that human history is not primarily a movement of ideas, but an evolution of human behavior, wherein ideas function to secure adjustment. Human intelligence does not work in a mechanical way, nor is the movement of ideas a purely logical one, as some social thinkers have tried to make out. Ideas or mental patterns are instruments of adjustment to guide efforts at betterment. They are indispensable instruments if social progress is to be rationally planned and humanly controlled; but progress, if it comes, must come as the result of conscious human effort. It comes through the human will and not through intelligence working by itself. A purely intellectualistic theory of social progress is perhaps as dangerous and one-sided as any of the theories which we have discussed.

If progress comes, then, it must be through human effort, and not through the effort of one, but through the effort of

many. It involves the coöperation of groups of men; and this coöperation necessitates, as we have seen, understanding, sympathy, and good will. The increase of sympathy and good will is just as necessary for better social adjustments as the accumulation and rationalization of knowledge. The control which brings about progress, as we have seen, is a double control over physical nature and human relations. Both sorts of control demand intelligence; and the latter manifestly demands social good will between individuals. But even the control of physical nature cannot go far without the increase of coöperation; and increase of coöperation depends not only upon increasing intelligence, but also upon increasing good will. The second positive psychological factor in social progress is, therefore, clearly the increase or accumulation of good will; and if humanity, as we earlier said, is the ultimate subject of progress, then progress depends upon the accumulation of good will between all human groups.

We have already said that there is no necessary antagonism between intelligence and altruism in human society. The one can and should be made to aid the other. We can hardly expect to develop right emotional and will attitudes in individuals who lack intelligence, or even who are uninformed. Ignorance has been the greatest obstacle to human progress because it prevents not only the perception of the means of progress but also of the need of the right emotional and will attitudes. Knowledge aids in getting the right social values and so in getting the right attitudes in individuals. Good will, as we have seen, is largely to be cultivated through the expansion of our knowledge of our fellow beings, but it is also true that there is no assurance that knowledge will be used rightly unless there is good will. Therefore, we must recognize that the emotions and the will, especially if they are socialized, play a scarcely less important part in human progress than the development of intelligence. If we are to

realize permanent progress, we must not only accumulate knowledge and develop intelligence, but we must also accumulate altruism by the cultivation of altruistic habits and sympathies.

The movement against alcoholism in modern society will serve to illustrate these points. Without any change in geographical environment or biological conditions, and without radical changes in our economic system, but simply through the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge regarding the physiological and social effects of alcohol and through the growth of humanitarian sentiments, a great movement has arisen in the more progressive societies of Western civilization which seems about to sweep away the use, if not of all, at least of the stronger alcoholic beverages. If through the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge regarding the injurious effects of alcohol and the inculcation of humanitarian sentiments, such a revolution can be brought about in the long-standing mores of civilized nations regarding alcohol—mores defended by privilege and by vested interests—then there is good ground for believing that progressive, rational changes can be brought about in every phase of our social life and culture by similar means. Let us note, however, that this movement has been successful only to the extent that standards and habits regarding alcohol have been inculcated in the young through the imparting of scientific knowledge and the cultivation of humanitarian sentiments. If the movement is still far from complete success, it is only because this has not yet been done with sufficient thoroughness throughout our civilization.

Education as the Method of Social Progress

If the accumulation of knowledge and of altruism, or good will, are the two great keys to social progress immediately within our control, then the means of social manipulation and control of these psychic processes becomes a question of

supreme importance for social progress. Obviously the means lie in the process of individual education, if we use that phrase to mean everything which helps to form the habits and character of individuals. The great service which Lester F. Ward rendered to the social sciences was to demonstrate that education was the initial means of progress in human society. Ward showed that it was through education that we must hope to control opinions, beliefs, standards, and so actions in human society. We have tried to show that this view is essentially correct, if we give to education the large conception which has been worked out by educational science; namely, the whole process of controlling the formation of habits and character in individuals.

The key to progress then lies in the "social attitudes" developed in individuals, and their development is a matter of education in the broadest sense. It is, of course, more than the education of the intellect, but equally the education of the habits and the emotions. It is more than any education which the school alone has thus far offered, but equally the education of the home, the neighborhood, the press, the church, and of the whole psycho-social environment. It is the education of the whole man, such an education as will fit him for participation in the social life in the way most advantageous to the future of humanity.

Manifestly such an education can be provided only through the coördination of all the educational agencies of society. But the school may justly be regarded as the chief and the center of these agencies. The school, however, should be coördinated with other agencies which control the formation of the habits and character of individuals and find a way of working in harmony with them. Probably the school should find means of coördinating itself with such other educational agencies as the home, the church, the library, and the public press. The educative process should become the organization of all the means of the psychic adjustment of

the individual to the social life. It should be a consciously directed and controlled social evolution. Such an education would truly become the initial means of controlling social organization and social progress.

This is not a mere theory as to the method of progress; for we know that culture has always been handed down from generation to generation by an educative process, by a process of teaching and learning. Culture has been passed down in human history, therefore, essentially by educational processes, though until recently these have usually been of an informal character. While culture may be passed along to the new generation in a static way, and so become a bar to progress; yet, as we have already pointed out, education may become as easily the instrument of progress. For it is exactly in the process of the transmission of the acquirements of the past from one generation to another that there is opportunity for improvement. Methods and processes of education have largely determined whatever social progress there has been in the past; they can even more largely determine the social progress of the future.

But the educational theory of progress is essentially a theory of the method rather than of the causes of social progress. The learning process is the method by which humanity improves its social adjustments. Formal education may be a method through which all the various factors in progress, especially the psychic factors, may be put to work. When we attribute great importance to education in social progress, we do so because human experience has shown education to be an effective means of the social manipulation of habits of thinking and acting, and so of the control of social behavior, and, indirectly, even of industrial processes and biological conditions. It is through education that the tradition of progress must be established in all phases of our social life. Through education progressive ideas in government and law, religion and morality may be inculcated in the

young, and so furnish the patterns for future social behavior. In short, education can furnish, as we have seen, a sort of artificial psycho-social environment for the development of a higher life both for the individual and for society.

The Sociological Theory of Progress

It is evident that the conditions and causes of social progress are complex. An adequate scientific theory of social progress must, therefore, include more than the strictly psychological factors. A scientific theory of social progress must include all elements and factors in progress. It must be not unilateral, but synthetic. In other words, the sociological theory of progress must find a place for favorable physical and geographical conditions, biological factors of heredity and selection, the economic factors of the production and distribution of wealth, and the psychological factors of knowledge, attitudes, and values. In homely language, we need for social progress not only natural resources, better bodily health, and better economic conditions, but better thinking, better mutual feeling, and better mutual will. A sociological theory of progress must show how all of these must work together. As Professor Todd has said, "The progress of society is not merely moral progress, or intellectual progress, or material progress, or institutional progress; it is a complex combination of all these and more. It is probable, however, that the natural order of these may be through the material and intellectual to the moral; the material furnishing the basis, the intellectual and institutional the means, working toward the moral as the result."⁶

A scientific theory of progress must show how all of the factors at work in social evolution may be given, through rational social control, a socially progressive direction. So far as psychic processes are concerned, it is clear that they

⁶ Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 148.

must work toward an increasingly efficient and harmonious social organization if they are to work consistently toward social progress. In other words, these psychic processes must be socialized. Intelligence, emotional and will attitudes of individuals must be socialized through the social education which we have already discussed. Through the direction of the intelligence toward the understanding of social conditions, the training of efficient social imagination, and the enlargement of social sympathy in individuals, we shall bring about more harmonious adjustments in the total life of humanity. If humanity is the final subject of progress, then it is only the ideas, attitudes, and values which work toward the harmonious adaptation of humanity as a whole which are capable of working consistently in the direction of social progress. If we thus socialize the ideas, attitudes, and values of individuals, there is every reason to believe that it will be found comparatively easy to socialize industrial and even biological processes also; that is, to direct them so as to increase the sum total of human values or to realize the largest human good for all.

In practice, this increasing socialization of the various elements in human nature and in social life shows itself in the maximization of harmony and coöperation and in the minimization of hostility and conflict among men. The direct inculcation of harmony and coöperation and the public condemnation of hostile conflict may accomplish something; but in general the indirect means of developing harmonious coöperation which we have already discussed will probably prove to be the more fruitful method. To accept coöperation as the key to collective achievement, and so to social progress, does not mean, however, that all forms of competition are to be gotten rid of in human society. As we have already pointed out, competition is indispensable for the working of any sort of selective process. It is only the lower and more brutal forms of competition and conflict which we need to

eliminate as dangers to social progress. Conflict of ideas and competition among groups and institutions are indispensable for social progress. In other words, we need to socialize and moralize the competitive process in human relations. Such socialized competition stimulates and is an aid to social coöperation and, as we have said in the preceding chapter, is in no way opposed to order and harmony in human groups.

Another practical conclusion to which the sociological theory of progress clearly leads is that we should get rid of narrow, one-sided movements and developments in our social life. Especially do we need to get rid of the development of material civilization at the expense of spiritual culture. This we can do readily enough by devoting more energy and attention to the spiritual side of our civilization. In general, our civilization is menaced by one-sided development and narrow group movements, aiming only at the good of particular classes or groups. All of these one-sided movements are implicitly based upon one-sided theories of social progress, such as those which we have discussed. They rest upon the perception of the importance of some single element or aspect in our social life. They are usually well-intentioned, but short-sighted. No true progressive policy which will be lasting in our civilization can be secured by encouraging such one-sided movements. As we have already seen, they present a grave social danger, because they give rise to ill-balanced views of the social life and to exaggerated and inharmonious developments. We shall not be able to secure balanced social progress until social policy is broadened so as to give scientific and duly proportionate attention to all important factors in our social life. This means that our social movements need to be synthesized into a general movement for human social welfare, if satisfactory social progress is to result; and that they need to be given a humanitarian direction rather than a direction favorable to one class or group.

Practically, also, the sociological theory of progress points to the scientific method as the rational means of achieving progress. There is a better way of learning to solve the problems of life than by muddling through them; this is through the scientific method of a rationally planned education which will fit the individuals of a group to solve their problems by means of scientific knowledge. The hope of human society, in other words, lies in the development of its own social self-knowledge; that is, in the development of social consciousness concerning every phase of the social life and concerning human society as a whole. It is through such scientific study and investigation of the social life that the value of each of its phases as a factor in social welfare must become apparent. And it is through the bringing together and the synthesis of all of this knowledge in a science which will deal with the social life as a whole that the social life as a whole will become intelligible, and so, subject to rational control. The perfecting of the instruments of social progress depends, therefore, largely upon the development of the social sciences, and especially of sociology. Only the development of these sciences can give assurance of continued social progress, and even of avoiding social catastrophe. Humanity will be able to secure control over itself and over physical nature only with the fuller knowledge of social relations which the development of the social sciences can give to us.

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CHAPTER XV

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

THE knowledge which social psychology and sociology furnish us may be summed up in a general theory of the nature of human society. Obviously, all that we have said has a bearing upon such a theory. What, then, shall we conclude to be the nature of human society from the discussions of the preceding pages?

Three great historical theories of the nature of human society have been held by the social thinkers of the past, and all of them are to some extent still held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the contract theory, the organismic theory, and the broadly psychological theory which we may call the cultural. Other theories of the social life than these three are, of course, possible; but as a matter of fact, other theories have gravitated in the direction of one or the other of the three great historical theories which we have named. Thus, mechanistic theories of human society have usually tended in practice to become either contract theories or organismic theories. A critical consideration of these three leading theories should, accordingly, help us to bring together what we have learned concerning human society and to get a general scientific view of its nature. Let us, accordingly, consider briefly these theories in the order of their historical development.

The Contract Theory of Society

Probably most persons who have thought about human social life at all have begun their thinking with what we call a crude contract theory of society; that is, they have thought

of the unity and form of the social life as a matter of agreement and understanding between individuals. This theory is very old. It is, indeed, the first form which rationalistic thought, as a rule, has taken regarding the social life. While it goes back in its beginnings to early Greek philosophy, it became fully developed only in the hands of the legal and political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The sociological thought of those centuries was very largely in terms of the contract theory. Such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau each gave the theory a peculiar expression. The theory had defenders even among nineteenth century sociologists. De Greef, the Belgian sociologist, found the essence of society to consist in the phenomena of contract.¹ All sociological thinkers who find that the social life rests fundamentally upon mutual understanding and mutual agreement should be ranked with the contract theorists.²

The essence of the contract theory is that human society is primarily a rational and artificial construction brought about by an expressed or implied agreement among individuals, an explicit or implicit "contract" between individuals. It is the theory that human institutions are essentially arbitrary inventions, and that they can be made over by mutual agreement to suit the convenience of the parties in the contract. All social organization, according to this theory, is the outcome of the mutual consent of the individuals of the group, whose relations exist only by virtue of this mutual consent. For example, according to this theory the form of government, or the form of the family, is dependent simply upon the agreement and convenience of the individuals involved, and these forms may be made over to suit the pleasure of the individuals concerned.

A modification of this theory is to be found among recent

¹ De Greef, *Introduction à la Sociologie*, Vol. I, pp. 131-147.

² Fite's *Individualism* contains the most modern presentation of the contract theory (Lecture IV).

writers who hold that, while the origin of human society and human institutions was not in contract or mutual consent, society and institutions should proceed to organize at once upon the basis of contract. Mutual agreement as to the forms of the social life may not have been the basis of social order in the past, but it can and should speedily become so. For example, marriage and the family may not have been originally a contract, but marriage and family relations in the future should be simply of the nature of a contract, entered into by individuals of their own free choice, and dissolved by individuals by mutual consent. All human society is passing, these theorists tell us, from a condition of status to a condition of contract. This theory accordingly presents contract, not as the origin of society, but as its goal.

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the contract theory in some of its forms with a cultural or psychological view of human social life. The contract theory is, however, not a psychological theory of society in the broad scientific sense, but rather an intellectualistic theory; its basis is an individualistic theory of our mental and social life. It is to be sharply distinguished, therefore, even in the modified form which we have just stated, from the general psychological theory of human society which we have attempted to set forth in this book.

Criticism

The whole view of human group life which we have presented is opposed to the belief that human relations and human institutions are essentially rational and artificial constructions or mere arbitrary inventions. We have tried to show that they are rather in the nature of adaptations to the requirements of life, in which the intellectual factor figures simply as one element. We are very far from denying an element of truth in the contract theory, especially as stated in its modified form. We have seen that intelligence,

and, hence, intelligent agreement, play an increasingly important part in all social adjustments, and that even the convenience of men can be better served through the intelligent understanding of the laws of physical nature and of human living together. However, the contract theory, in making human institutions arbitrary inventions, fails to take these laws into account in any adequate manner, that is, to allow for the factors in human living together which are beyond arbitrary control, or not subject to man's mere convenience. In general it neglects or discards as of little importance the biological, instinctive, and habitual elements in human relations, to say nothing of the great factor of organized authority or coercive social control.

Nearly every one sees now that the contract theory fails entirely as a theory of human social origins. As has often been pointed out, it presupposes that human society was originally made up entirely of normal adult individuals, each of high intelligence, capable of understanding and of acquiescing in all the regulations which exist in a well-ordered social life. That such a condition of affairs existed primitively is, of course, a ludicrous idea.

Many people who see this do not see, however, that the contract theory affords no adequate ideal for human relations. They fail to see that human social life, in its essence, is not, and never can be, a matter of mere consent or convenience between individuals; that human living together, if it is to have any measure of success, must be in accord with the more fundamental forces which shape human life as a whole. The more general conditions and laws of human living together are beyond the control of man; they are not arbitrary constructions of the human intellect. They must be understood and accepted. Men must adjust themselves to these fundamental conditions of harmonious human living whether they please them or not. There is much more than mere contract, therefore, in human social life. Status must

always remain a part of the social life. The contract theory assumes that the social life may become, even if it is not such already, quite entirely an intellectual and arbitrary construction to suit the pleasure of individuals. But physical, biological, and the deeper psychological factors which enter into human institutions and relations make it necessary that these be something more than mere arbitrary inventions. Rather, human institutions must be made like the steam engine—taking fundamental facts and laws into account. Fundamental biological and psychological conditions must be accepted; and these preclude a social life which is merely a matter of consent. For example, marriage and the family can never become merely a form of contract or of mutual agreement. The biological conditions of life militate against such a possibility. The necessities of the birth and rearing of children, and hence of the whole welfare of humanity, would bring about, if such a possibility could be realized, the defeat of any civilization which adopted it. Obviously the contract theory is individualistic and, in its more extreme forms, antisocial and unethical.

Because the contract theory neglects the deeper, more fundamental factors in the social life, it is a theory which favors the making of arbitrary changes in human institutions and relations. It was formulated very largely in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as an instrument of social revolution, and it is still to-day used largely for that purpose. It is a dangerous theory, because it exaggerates the ease with which social changes can be made, and it fails to take into account all factors upon which social changes which are successful must rest. Very naturally, therefore, it leads to reaction, that is, to the very opposite theory which would overemphasize the part which blind forces play in human relations, and so underemphasize the part which the human mind may play in modifying human institutions.

The Organismic Theory of Society

As we have just said the natural reaction from the contract theory of society is to be found in the organismic conception of society. This conception grew up largely under the influence of the reaction which followed the French Revolution and of the development of biological science in the nineteenth century. While its beginnings go back again to Greek philosophy, it came to its fullest and most consistent expression in writers such as Herbert Spencer who were dominated by the theory of organic evolution.³

The essential idea of this theory is the opposite of the contract theory. It is the idea, namely, that society is a product of organic evolution and so is essentially an organism, like a plant or an animal. It is a growth which has come about through the operation of natural law. If it is not exactly a biological organism, it is, in any case, essentially like a biological organism in its nature and construction. Its unity is in nowise different from the unity which we find in the biological organism; it is essentially a physical or physiological dependence, such as we find between the parts of a biological organism. Moreover, like an organism it is subject to the same general laws of organic growth and decay. It is not unfair to say that this organic theory made human society essentially a product of the blind forces of nature. While the organic theorists admitted differences between the social organism and the biological organism, they held that the points of resemblance were much more important than the points of difference.

Some of the organic theorists, such as Lilienfeld in Russia, held that the resemblances between biological and social organisms were not mere analogies, but accurate scientific descriptions of the social reality. In general, however, the organic theorists claimed only that human societies

³ *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Part II, Chaps. I, II.

presented analogies to biological organisms; that they were not biological organisms in the strict sense, but were "superorganisms." Most of these theorists, however, regarded the social organism as a growth brought about by the operation of the blind forces of organic nature, but little subject to rational human control. Such especially, was the view of Herbert Spencer, in whose writings it is not unfair to say society appears as a sort of superhuman structure which science might presume to describe, but hardly to control. While Spencer did not draw the conclusion of a rigid predetermination of social life by nonhuman factors, he nevertheless took a laissez-faire attitude toward human institutions, as natural or organic constructions which man could hardly hope to control successfully by interfering with natural processes.

When the implications of such a biological determinism or fatalism began to be perceived in the conception of human society as an organism, reaction from it was inevitable. But many attempts at modification of the theory arose. Philosophical writers undertook to interpret the view that human society was an organism in a philosophical or psychological way.⁴ Writers like De Greef and Fouillée⁵ aim to reconcile the contract theory of society with the organismic theory by finding society to be essentially a "contractual organism." These attempts at synthesis, however, were based not upon generalizations from social facts, but upon logical processes of reconciliation of antithetical theories, and hence they fell short of making a true synthesis.

Criticism

As a reaction from the contract theory, the organismic theory of society served a very useful purpose in the history of social thought. It emphasized the connections

⁴ Compare Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Chap. III.

⁵ *La Science sociale contemporaine*, Bk. II, Chap. III.

between organic and social evolution, even though it exaggerated them. It also emphasized the compelling nature of the unity of the group, and the fact that social institutions are by no means arbitrary inventions. It set forth certain truths which the social sciences can never afford to ignore—namely, that human social life is a phase of organic life; that in the social process biological conditions and forces are fundamental; and that the unity and solidarity of human groups grow out of the original and continuing unity of the physical life-process. In fact, if the organismic theory were applied only to animal societies, such as a hive of bees or a colony of ants, there could be little objection to it. The objection to the organismic theory lies in the fact that human social life has transcended the purely biological.

There is little objection, of course, to the use of the term "organism" in the broad philosophical sense to describe human groups, if by it is meant nothing more than to emphasize the unity and interdependence of their group life. The word organism is in many ways the most apt philosophical term which we have to describe the unity of a human group. On the other hand, its use often suggests misleading analogies and leads to wrong conclusions. Analogy is never true science. The actual social life which we find in human groups is far from corresponding to the ordinary organismic conception; for they are made up of relatively independent, self-determining, self-conscious individuals, quite unlike in their nature, relations and behavior to the cells of a plant or an animal.

There are many conditions in human social life which find no parallel in the strictly organic world. For example, human individuals are often members now of one group, now of another, and even of many groups at the same time. As long as the national group was the chief object of study in the social sciences, as it was in the nationalistic stage of sociology, it was easy to insist upon the many resemblances between

such a group and a biological organism. But as soon as *any* social group became the unit of investigation in sociology, it was quite impossible to keep to the biological analogy. As Professor Ross said, under such conditions where the social organism begins or ends becomes a puzzle. The social sciences, moreover, now see that the national group itself, except in our special period of history, has no such definiteness of form and structure and separateness from other groups as the organic analogy presupposes.

In the hands of certain sociological writers the organismic theory became an instrument of social conservatism and even of the defense of absolutism in government. This was especially the case with Lilienfeld, a Russian sociologist. Lilienfeld held not only that the national group was a true organism, but also that its governing class corresponded in their function to the cells of the central nervous system. He held, therefore, that sociology upheld absolutism, and that the social order of the Russian autocratic state was scientifically justified. Thus it is evident that if the contract theory has played too much into the hands of social radicals and revolutionists, the organismic theory has played too much into the hands of social conservatives and absolutists.

While we should drop the organic analogy in the social sciences, at least in the form in which it came to us from the nineteenth century, the truth which it emphasized, that human social groups are living, functioning unities whose basis is biological because they are part of the world of life in general, is a truth which objective social science will never discard.

The Cultural or Psychological Theory of Society

The further we get away from the animal plane, the less does a purely organic or biological way of looking at group life suffice. The human societies that we know are largely creations of cultural evolution, and human culture is essentially a psychic matter. As we have seen, the continuity

which we find in human groups is a continuity maintained by passing on from generation to generation mental patterns—that is, knowledge, ideas, standards, and values—largely by means of language. These mental patterns have gradually accumulated and developed from primitive times to the present. They are a set of inner mental habits acquired in ever increasing complexity by each succeeding generation. They also become a set of objective customs and institutions. Thus human social life presents itself as a developing culture, and human history as a growing tradition, which cannot be understood apart from its content, that is, the concrete ideas, attitudes, and values which make up a particular culture.

This historical and cultural way of looking at human social life is often represented to be opposed to the psychological way; but this is surely a mistake. In its constituent elements culture is psychological, and in the last analysis comes from the individual mind. If culture be analyzed, as Professor Goldenweiser says in effect,⁶ every element in it will be found to have had its beginning in the creative act of an individual mind. Nevertheless, in another sense culture is cumulative, historical, and extraindividual. It is absorbed by the individual and thus shapes his nature and his behavior. Its carrier is, however, the group. It furnishes the pattern for human group organization and group behavior as well as for individual behavior. Thus many human groups are entirely products of culture. Even though communities are natural genetic groups, all human communities which we know have been profoundly modified by their cultures.

The cultural theory of human social life and the psychological are thus not opposed, except that the psychological is broader in its foundations and makes a place for the conception of social evolution as something broader than cultural evolution. While social life is modified by culture, it existed before culture began and is the carrier of culture. If we

⁶ *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1924.

neglect that part of social evolution which is brought about through the working of the factors in organic evolution—variation, heredity, and selection—then the social process presents itself as a continuous adaptation and readaptation in the relations of individuals to one another and to physical nature brought about by their mental processes. It is a behavior process mediated by interstimulation. The adaptations which persist in the group give rise to what we have termed group habits, also called folkways, which become crystallized into institutions of law, government, religion, morality, industry, and the like. These institutions mold the life and behavior of human groups. Accompanying them are, of course, uniform ways of thinking and feeling in the group passed along from generation to generation, which we term the tradition of the group, or the inner side of its culture. But all of this necessitates a continuous psycho-social process, a process of interstimulation and response among the individuals of the group. Social interaction, interstimulation and response lie, therefore, at the basis of the cultural process, and hence of the behavior of human groups and of the changes in their behavior.

Consequently, when we look at human society from the standpoint of its culture, that is from the standpoint of its folkways, its mores, its traditions, its conventions, and its institutions, we are looking at it from an essentially psychological standpoint, if we recognize that these things are essentially human behavior and are rooted in the mental life and development of its individual members. This we must do, unless we are to separate our whole view of human society from the rest of established scientific knowledge. We cannot view human culture as an abstraction apart from the rest of life. It is an outcome of the total life-processes of human groups. As soon as we recognize this the cultural view of human society blends with a broadly psychological view.

It is the contention of this book that the psychology of human society, in the sense of the study of human group behavior, offers a scientific basis for the synthesis of the elements of truth in all contending theories of human society. It makes possible a true synthesis of the elements of truth in both the contract and organic theories, for example, because through the objective study of group behavior it makes possible a wider generalization which includes the facts in the social life which both have emphasized. The psychological theory of human social life is that its explanation is to be sought in three sets of facts: First, in the underlying traits and dispositions of men as furnished by organic evolution; second, in the influences of the environment, especially the psycho-social environment, which act upon the plastic natures of individuals; and third, in the resultant habits, attitudes, and values which individuals develop. The scientific analysis of society leads back to the psychic individual.

The psychological conception of human society presents the social life as an adaptive process in which the habits, attitudes, and values of the individual function are active elements. The social process, according to this theory, is psychic only in the sense that its significant elements, such as interstimulation and response, and the habits, attitudes, and values developed by individuals, are psychic. More strictly, as we said in Chapter V, the social process may be described as a psycho-physical process of coadaptive adjustments among individuals.

It is a mistake to seek the full explanation for group behavior either in the individual or in the culture of the group; for, again to quote Professor Goldenweiser, "while it is certainly true that the cultural content comes to the individual in a way that is external and objective, the individual does, after all, recreate what he receives. He does so unconsciously by dint of the very variability of his native endowment, as well as consciously in the overt acts or

psychic originality.”⁷ Thus the social life presents itself as a process, but a process made up both of individual psychic elements and of social psychic, or cultural, elements; that is, of elements of interstimulation and response among individuals—such as communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy, conflict—and of cultural elements—such as custom, tradition, conventions, and institutions. All of these processes ultimately enter into, and determine, the form of group behavior. Some of them are individual psychic, others are social psychic. The social psychic, or the cultural, however, can operate only through the individual and hence the individual has a chance to modify it. On the other hand, the individual’s psychic life itself is largely determined by the social psychic, or the cultural. Individual behavior, in other words, comes largely from group culture; but culture in the last analysis, as we have said, comes from the individual mind.

Thus the unity and the regularity developed in the life of human beings is a unity and regularity upon the psychic plane. The coadaptations between individuals, as we have seen, while they are coördinations of their activities, yet as they are intermediated by feelings and ideas, also involve coördinations of these psychic processes. Thus there is a large and increasingly important place in human social life for such factors as understanding, sympathy, imitation, and conscious social control as we ascend in the scale of group development.

The psychological theory of human society is that society is the behavior process which arises from living together. It is a process in which the psychic elements of impulse, habit, feeling, and ideation, and their social expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion, sympathy, and other types of mental interaction, function as the vital constituent elements. It is a process which becomes unified necessarily

⁷ *Publications of the American Sociological Society, 1924.*

on its psychic not less than on its physical side. Because human group life is mediated by these psychic processes, it must be interpreted, if interpreted scientifically, in terms of these processes. That is, it must be interpreted in psychological terms. It is for this reason that the sociological theory of society coincides with the broadly psychological.

The psychological theory is often misrepresented to be the imitation-suggestion theory, the sympathy theory, or even as we have seen, the contract theory. Scientific psychology, however, takes into account not only the strictly psychic elements in human behavior, but also biological processes and environmental conditions. It takes account not only of the organism but of its environment. It would be absurd, therefore, to describe as a scientific psychological theory of human society a theory which is dominantly in terms of some one psychic element, such as imitation or sympathy, or even in terms of a whole class of psychic elements, such as the instincts or the intelligence. The psychological conception of society is a distinct conception, not to be confused with these one-sided conceptions, nor with the contract or organic conceptions. Like the organic conception, it gives a fundamental place to organic factors, but unlike it it gives a large and increasingly important place to mental processes as we ascend in the scale of social evolution. The psychological view of the social life as essentially a collective behavior process mediated by conscious interstimulation and response furnishes, therefore, a basis for the synthesis of other theories, and so becomes itself the sociological view. It is a synthetic theory of the social process.

The Practical Value of the Psychological Conception of Society

The psychological conception of human social life has more than a mere theoretical value. As soon as we understand that human group life is a behavior process, we begin

to understand how it may be modified. We understand that such a behavior process is not so much the result of inborn traits plus the influence of the physical environment as of the mental patterns in the minds of the individuals of the group. We see that in almost every case these mental patterns have been embodied in customs, traditions, and institutions and have been transmitted to the existing members of the group by previous generations. We see that these mental patterns have been acquired by the individuals of the group by a *learning process* and that, therefore, they can be modified through modifying the learning process. Human institutions, sociology and psychology show, are in every case *learned* adjustments. Most group behavior, therefore, as well as the more highly conscious individual behavior, is learned. As such it can be modified, provided we can control the learning processes. The social custom or tradition out of which an institution is formed is easily enough changed, provided we can effectively teach all concerned a better way, and provided also we can change those material conditions which support the institution and make it advantageous for individuals or a class of individuals to maintain it. This may be difficult to do in practice, but it has been done often enough in history, so that we have every reason to conclude that the social and institutional life of man is indefinitely modifiable, in the way of more rational adjustments to the requirements of social existence.

The problem of modifying the social life, according to the psychological view, is essentially a problem of modifying habits and beliefs in vast masses of individuals. This can be done most easily through the education of the young. The easiest approach to the modification of human society, therefore, is through making changes in the psycho-social environment or the culture of the group. While it is difficult to change this quickly on a wide scale, it can be changed in small select groups, which become breeding places, so to

speak, for new habits, ideas, and standards for the larger group. Thus, through the school and the church, it is possible to manipulate the ideas, attitudes, and values of individuals, especially of the young. The rational direction of these in the individual can certainly be counted upon to change the whole mass of habits, social attitudes, customs, and institutions of the larger group, even of human society at large.

As soon as we perceive that the problem of modifying human society is a problem of modifying culture, we see that the limits of the possibilities of social change cannot be set. It is certain from anthropological science that human culture is still in its earlier stages of development. Civilization, in the sense of higher culture, is just beginning. When science has perfected our understanding of the principles of human psychology and sociology, especially when it has established a scientific sociology, the civilizing process will be rationally directed, and social progress will be beyond anything which the world now dreams to be practical.

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CHAPTER XVI

HUMANITY AS THE ULTIMATE GROUP

The Individual and Society

To what practical conclusion do we come as to the relation of the individual to society, and of minor groups to the larger social life of humanity? We have seen that the individual and society are correlatives, and that there is no necessary antagonism in their development. The development of the individual comes very largely through participation in the social life, and on the other hand the social life is enriched through the development and achievements of the individual. This is not a circle in our reasoning, but it is the circular type of reaction which we find to exist universally between the individual and the group.

As soon as we have familiarized ourselves with the conception of the social life as a process made up of many interacting, though continually changing, individual elements, it would seem that there should be little difficulty in grasping this conclusion. Nevertheless, we still find three conflicting theories as to the relation of the individual to society in present day thought. Some social thinkers hold that the individual alone is real, and that society is nothing but a grouping of individuals. According to this view all interpretations of group behavior must be sought exclusively in the processes of individual behavior. Other thinkers hold that the individual is an abstraction, that the group alone is real, and accordingly that all individual as well as social phenomena should be interpreted in social terms. Still others hold that the whole question is a fictitious problem, and that the individual is society and society the individual.

All three views just stated we have tried to show are erroneous. Both the group and the individual are real, and both are effective in causing certain types of behavior. The exceptional individual, the creative individual, is a social factor who brings about changes within his group. The extreme social determinists are wrong in overlooking the individual. On the other hand, social factors, especially, those of culture, creep into and mold the character and conduct of the individual. We must allow, in our study of group life, for the emergence of the relatively detached and exceptional individual who brings about changes within his group. On the other hand, we must allow for the molding influence of the custom and tradition of the group, and of its culture, upon the mass of its individuals. Neither can we deny the existence of the problem of the relation of the individual to society, or to group life. To say that there is no such problem is a simplification which realistic science cannot admit. It is true, however, that it is not a single problem, but many problems; for, as Professor Goldenweiser says, "The relation of the individual to the social varies both with the social situation and with the character and state of the individual."¹

The human life which we know is a social life and the individual whom we know has gotten his development in and through the larger life of which he is a part. Normally there should be no antagonism between the development of the individual and the development of social life; but, as a matter of fact, such antagonism at times does develop. It is a fact that groups in their development, as we have seen, often put unnecessary and injurious restraints upon the individual, thereby repressing the normal development of personality and at the same time hindering the development of culture. On the other hand, individuals often develop selfish attitudes which are inconsistent with the welfare of the

¹ *Publications of the American Sociological Society, 1924.*

group. Hence the constant question in practical social politics and in social ethics is how the interests of the individual and those of the group may be reconciled.

The development of group life has as one of its conditions, as we have seen, a certain freeing of the individual, so that his personality will have the fullest opportunity for normal development. On the other hand, to emancipate the individual entirely from social control would be to make of him a mere animal, a sheer savage. The individual must have reasonable freedom if he is to contribute his best to the social life of the group, but the idea of developing the individual apart from social life and independent of it finds no support in either psychology or sociology. However, a strong trend of nineteenth century thought was in the direction of the development of what we may call a "super-individual." Such was the "superman" of Nietzsche, and the superior individual pictured by many more idealistic thinkers. The idea was that a superior individual might be produced who would be beyond any need of social control, whether of government and law or of religion and morality. Thus could be established a sort of anarchistic society, or a basis of pure individualism, made up of superior individuals, each a law to himself in most, if not in all, the relations of life. In such a society the ordinary restraints of law, religion, and morals would not be necessary, it was argued.

Such a society, however, is an impossibility from the standpoint of sociology and social psychology. So far as the superior individual exists, he is a product, as we have seen, very largely of his social environment, that is, of the superior forms of social control which have guided his development. The socially superior individual, in other words, is produced by the constraining and restraining influences of civilization, especially those working through such agencies of control as government, law, religion, moral ideals,

and, above all, education. The movement to emancipate the individual from the obligations and restraints which society imposes upon him must be regarded, therefore, as a mistake, provided that such obligations and restraints are for the total social welfare. The individual, however, has a right to demand that the obligations and restraints to which he must submit himself shall not be arbitrary, but shall be rationally determined and for the good of human social life as a whole. This means that the standards which human groups set up and enforce through their customs and institutions should be not arbitrarily but scientifically determined for the welfare of the social whole. The antagonism between the interest of the individual and the interest of society can be resolved only by a scientific determination of the balance of these interests and of how they may be made to coincide.

The fact that the human individual gets practically all of his development in a spiritual way from the social life in which he participates leads us to see that human progress lies not in the direction of producing a superindividual, or superman, but in the direction of producing a superior social life. Social values are not carried by the individual alone, nor exhausted by the concept of personality. But they are also carried by institutional forms and group culture; that is, they inhere in a larger social life of which the individual is only a part. To pay attention merely to the development of the individual and his personality means often to overlook the value of institutional forms, of group culture, and of the larger life of humanity. It is for this reason that the nineteenth century movement toward pure individualism, the movement which was concerned simply with producing the superior individual and which made the individual the source and seat of all social values, was a one-sided movement dangerous to humanity at large. It is a movement which must be transcended if a stable social life is to be realized.

The Group and Society

While our civilization has been trying to transcend individualism, a new and more insidious danger has developed in group egoism. This is the tendency of minor groups to regard themselves as the units of development, if not as society itself. Western civilization will probably find more difficulty in transcending such group egoism than in leaving behind individualism. That this tendency toward group egoism may produce even greater social disturbances than individual egoism, the world of the present bears witness. Group egoism of any sort, however, whether it be of a class, a nation, or a race, rests upon the same fundamental fallacies as individualism.

No social group can develop an ideal social life without an ideal social setting; for groups as well as individuals must form an environment for one another. As long as the rights of any group fail to be respected the rights of all groups will be imperiled. For example, national autonomy will be threatened so long as international equality and good will are not established. As long as nations have to arm to protect themselves from other nations, no nation can give proper attention to its internal social order; for while military expenditures eat up public resources, equality of opportunity cannot be maintained, and an ideal social life cannot be realized. It is evident, as Professor Hobhouse says,² that "the cause of democracy is bound up with that of internationalism. The relation is many-sided. It is national pride, resentment, or ambition one day that sweeps the public mind and diverts it from all interests in domestic progress. The next day the same function is performed no less adequately by a scare. The practice of playing on popular emotions has been reduced to a fine art which neither of the great parties is ashamed to employ. Military ideals possess

² *Liberalism*, pp. 237-249.

the mind, and military expenditures eat up the public resources. On the other side, the political and economic and social progress of other nations reacts on our own. Physically the world is rapidly becoming one, and its unity must ultimately be reflected in political institutions. The old doctrine of absolute sovereignty is dead. The greater states of to-day exhibit a complex system of government within government, authority limited by authority, and the world state of the not impossible future must be based on a free, national self-direction as full and satisfying as that enjoyed by Canada or Australia within the British Empire. National emulation will express itself less in the desire to extend territory or to count up ships and guns, and more in the endeavor to magnify the contribution of our own country to civilized life. . . . A nation as a whole cannot be in the full sense free while it fears another or gives cause of fear to another. The social problem must be viewed as a whole."

If all human groups form an environment for one another, then sociology cannot possibly stop with the conception of any social group as society. We now see that this is only a tentative conception for the sake of investigation and research into the nature of social life. We see that there is truth in the conception of society proposed by Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology, that *society is humanity viewed from the standpoint of its reciprocal relationships*. At any rate, the ultimate unit of our sociological thinking can be neither the individual nor any minor social group, but the largest human group possible, humanity.

It follows from this that no class or group, not even the national group, can be the bearer of all social values or even of a majority of them. Social values inhere in the total life of humanity. There is, therefore, as much need for the socialization of classes, nations, and races as for that of individuals. These groups, and indeed all human institutions, need to be socialized with reference to humanity, in order

that the larger life of humanity may be made to flow through them. It is not only the family and the local community which need a wider social spirit, but also economic classes and national groups. The selfishness of all of these groups obviously threatens the development of all humanity. We shall be successful in socializing the behavior of these minor groups of men, however, only if the individuals which make them up are socialized with reference to humanity at large. The family, the trade union, the industrial corporation, the state, the nation, and even the racial group will no longer manifest group egoism when their constituent members have fully developed the humanitarian spirit. Purely group morality must be transcended, and the conscious ideal of all groups should be to serve the life of all humanity. Class and group consciousness in general should be replaced by a truly social consciousness, for groups no more than individuals exist as ends in themselves apart from the rest of humanity, but as parts of humanity. Like the individual personality, however, each group is the bearer of certain social values, and each should be given its due place in the total social life of humanity. Only thus can we secure a harmony of interests among all social groups and their cooperation in promoting the welfare of humanity at large.

The Meaning of the Social Life

The question of the meaning of human social life belongs to philosophy and ethics rather than to sociology. However, much that we have said bears upon this philosophical problem, and a few words upon this question may not be out of place in concluding our discussion, in order to gather together and make clear the implications of this text.

Three principal theories as to the meaning of our social life are to be found in the ethical and sociological writings of to-day. The first is the theory that the goal and purpose of human society, and therefore its whole meaning, is to be

found in the happiness of individuals. According to this theory the subjective condition of a preponderance of agreeable over disagreeable feelings in the mass of individuals is the adequate and rational aim of human association. Without entering into a detailed criticism of this hedonistic theory of human society, it is perhaps sufficient to say that, if the view which we have striven to present is at all correct, no merely subjective element can be made the goal of human social development or give adequate meaning to that process. Especially cannot so subjective an element as agreeable feeling in individuals be made the meaning and goal of social development. For psychological reasons which we have seen, the concept of happiness is all but useless as a guide in the vast and complex forces of modern social life. No more elusive goal could be set for social development than the maximization of human happiness. It is notorious that it is not certain that civilization has added anything to the happiness of the peoples among whom it has been most highly developed. To be sure, this may be no necessary consequence of civilization; but the futility of the chase after happiness, enjoyment, comfort, and pleasure by all classes in modern society emphasizes the inadequacy of this ideal. This is not saying, however, that the happiness of individuals should not be included as one element in the end of a normal social life.

A second theory of the meaning of human society found in the thought of to-day is that it is for development of personality, that is, the self-realization or self-development of individuals. Conceived broadly enough there may be perhaps little objection to this theory; but as we have already seen, the popular interpretation of this theory is that the self-culture and self-development of the individual is an adequate ideal of life by itself. This makes the end of social development again quite entirely individualistic. It is perhaps sufficient to say in criticism of this social and ethical

doctrine that the meaning of the social life cannot lie merely in individual development, because individual development apart from social considerations gives no assurance of a right social life. It is this very ideal, indeed, together with the hedonistic ideal which we have just discussed, which is the source of most of the distintegrating tendencies in modern society. If there is to be any sort of unity in the social life, then the ideal of social development cannot be an individual superman or any number of individual supermen.

We, therefore, come to the third and final theory of the meaning of our social life, namely, that it is not simply for the sake of individual happiness, nor even so much for the sake of the development of individual personality, as it is for the sake of the development of a harmonious and perfect society of individuals. Not the development of self, but the development of humanity, in a word, is the meaning of human society. Self-culture, or self-realization, is good as an ideal only in so far as it conduces to the development of humanity. The purpose and goal of society is the progressive realization of a perfect society consisting of all humanity. Self-development is thus only a means to a larger end. The individual lives not for himself, but for his race. Practically for the individual, therefore, the moral ideal becomes a life of service, a life in which he shares and strives to realize the highest life for all humanity.

This ideal is synthetic, because it includes all elements of permanent value in human social life; and it therefore answers the requirements of sociological science. It includes the ideal of self-development, because the development of personality in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life is the first condition for the realization of humanity. The individual finds his self-realization in the development of the life of humanity, not in arbitrary self-realization, but one conditioned by the needs of the larger human life of which he is a part. This ideal also includes the happiness of every in-

dividual; for the most efficient service and most harmonious social life can be secured only when reinforced by agreeable feeling. Thus the humanitarian ideal is synthetic of all subordinate ideals, giving to each its due place and value, but taking from each the danger which comes when it is given the first place in life.

This humanitarian ideal, moreover, is alone absolutely constructive from a social point of view. It leads to collective achievement. Individualistic and hedonistic ideals are apt to be destructive of social possessions. They work not toward social conservation, but toward social exploitation for the benefit of special classes and privileged individuals. The great need of our civilization, therefore, is an ethics of service, a humanitarian ethics which shall be recognized by all individuals and groups, and which shall teach all to find their development and happiness in the unselfish service of humanity.

It is often said that this ideal is vague, and that it has no definite content. The reply is that the development of humanity must, in the nature of things, be not a static, but a dynamic and expanding ideal. It is an ideal of progress, in other words, and does not admit any more than life itself of complete definition. The direction of progress is, however, clear; namely, that it is a progress towards a completer harmony of all factors, both internal and external, in the life of humanity. The process is thus one of the progressive rationalization of human life, and so of the progressive control over the lower and more brutal elements in life by the higher and more spiritual elements.

The outcome of scientific sociology must be, therefore, to point to, even if it does not establish, a humanitarian ethics and a humanitarian religion. Thus, as Comte foresaw, science in its final development as applied to the social life of man is in harmony with the highest developments of morality and religion that we know. Science, morality, and religion, there-

fore, should all unite in the work of realizing a perfected human social life, or in theological phrase, in the establishment of "the Kingdom of God."

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